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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research is to define the payout policy of Islamic banks in the GCC and to 
identify the factors that influence payout distributions. For this purpose, a two stage research 
strategy was employed. In the first stage, investors‘ and managers‘ surveys were conducted to 
measure the perceptions towards payout policies. In the second stage, the survey results are 
utilized to formulate and test a payout model by multivariate regression analysis.  
 
In the investors‘ survey, an electronic questionnaire was posted on internet investment forums in 
the GCC and sent via email to investors. 287 useable responses were collected. The data was 
analyzed and the results show that investors prefer to receive dividends due to transaction and 
agency costs, which supports the dividend relevance hypothesis. The findings suggest that the 
agency cost is explained by the uncertainty resolution, window dressing and free cash flow 
hypothesis.  Investors were found to assess the payouts, which comprises of dividends and profit 
distributions for profit and loss saving and investment accounts (PSIA), by comparing it to 
market and historical rates.  
 
Investors were found to diversify their investments based on risk and return. If the characteristics 
of an asset (e.g. dividend policy) are changed, investors would switch to other assets that meet 
their investment objectives. In terms of stock repurchases, investors perceive it as a signal that the 
stock price is undervalued. On the other hand, stock dividends were interpreted by investors as a 
stock split or capital increase. As for Islamic banking, customers reported that the primary 
motivation to deal with these banks is the religious obligation. 
 
In the managers‘ survey, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 10 managers to 
understand the payout process and the factors that influence distributions. The results show that 
PSIA distributions are mainly driven by competitors‘ payouts, historical distributions, and 
signalling. As for dividends, managers reported that the payout decision is relevant to the firm‘s 
value. Dividends were believed to comply with the increasing stream hypothesis and the Lintner 
model. Managers believe that stability of the payout policy is perceived by investors as a positive 
signal of the bank‘s strength. They also believe in the maturity and growth effects arguing that 
new banks have relatively higher capital expenditures which flatten out over time. Consequently, 
mature banks tend to have higher and more stable dividend distributions. Finally, managers 
reported that banks‘ liquidity and financial ability has a positive relationship with dividend 
distributions. 
 
Based on the feedback of stage one, a payout model that comprises of PSIA and dividend models 
was formulated and tested by employing multivariate regression analysis. The study uses the 
financial data of 13 Islamic banks in the GCC between 1993 and 2008. The results show that 
PSIA is influenced by competitors‘ distribution and historical distribution rates. On the other 
hand, the results of the dividend model show that dividends are influenced by profitability, 
historical dividends and the level of maturity. The results of the PSIA model support the 
competitive payout hypothesis, increasing stream hypothesis, the Lintner model and information 
signaling hypothesis. The results of the dividend model support the increasing stream hypothesis, 
the Lintner model, information signaling hypothesis, and the growth and maturity effects. The 
findings for the competitive payout hypothesis reported by investors, managers, and the PSIA 
model support the existence of displaced commercial risk, which calls for additional research in 
this area by the banks and regulators to control it by focusing on research for cooperative 
insurance schemes, prudent reserve practices, and liquidity management.   
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1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
The issue of dividend policy has been widely discussed amongst researchers since the 1950s. 
Opinions towards the effect of dividend distributions are split into three schools. Scholars, such as 
Brennan (1970), Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1980) and Poterba and Summers (1984), argue 
that dividends have a negative impact on the firm‘s value due to transaction costs and tax 
differential. Others, such as Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Bernstein (1996) , contend that 
dividend policy is irrelevant to corporate managers. In their view, investors can create homemade 
dividends by selling part of their appreciated capital. The overwhelming majority of scholars, 
including Easterbrook (1984), Jensen (1986) and Crutchley and Hansen (1989), argue that 
dividends positively influence the firm‘s value and therefore, it should be considered as a relevant 
corporate decision.
1
 
Numerous empirical studies have been conducted to validate different dividend theories. 
However, the results produced conflicting outcomes, which increased the complexity of the topic 
even further. A depiction of this situation was presented by Black (1976) who stated that ―The 
harder we look at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, with pieces that just don‘t 
fit together.‖ Aivazian et al. (2003) attributed the inconsistencies to the influence of contextual 
factors associated with different countries, markets, or industries. 
In an effort to partially resolve the dividend puzzle, this thesis attempts to uncover the 
dividend policy of a particular geographic region and industry. For this sake, the topic of the 
payout policy of Islamic banks in the GCC was selected. The researcher expects to have different 
results due to several reasons. First, Islamic banks are controlled by Shari’ah (Islamic law) that 
dictates its business operations and profit distribution mechanism, which treats depositors and 
shareholders on equal footing when it comes to profit distribution. As such, an interaction 
between the distributions on PSIA and dividends is expected, and comparatively, leading to a 
different set of factors that control the payout decisions. The second reason why the research 
                                                   
1 For information on these hypotheses, refer to chapter 3 on literature review.  
2 The term payout policy is used instead of dividend policy because the profit distributions of Islamic banks 
encompass distributions to depositors and shareholders. For more information, refer to sections 2.4 and 6.3. 
3 See sections 1.4 and 1.5. 
4 See section 1.3. 
5 See section4.6.7. 
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outcome could be unique is that the GCC market has special characteristics attributed to 
economical, political, regulatory, and cultural influences. For instance, there are no taxes on 
dividends or capital gains in the GCC, which neutralizes the effect of the tax differential to the 
favour of dividend relevance theories.  
Based on the above discussion, the aim of this thesis is to explore the payout policy
2
 of 
Islamic banks in the GCC and to identify the factors that determine its payout distributions. To 
achieve this purpose, a mixed research strategy was employed that comprises of: investors‘ 
survey, managers‘ survey, and econometric modelling. This strategy minimizes the limitations of 
each methodology while increasing the depth, validity, and reliability of results through the 
process of triangulation.
3
 The main contribution of this thesis is that it is the first to focus on the 
determinants of the payout policy of the Islamic banking industry. 
The motivation for selecting the Islamic banking industry is that it has attracted the 
attention of researchers because it captured an increasing stake of the financial market worldwide. 
It has been witnessing a consistent growth rate of over 10% per annum (Hassoune, 2004).  The 
industry‘s role has gained more importance post 2008 economic crisis as it forbids any sort of 
speculative financial activities (e.g. derivatives), which was believed to be the main cause of the 
crisis.
4
 Furthermore, the GCC region was selected because it is considered the world centre of 
Islamic banking given the size of the industry, growth rate, history, and societal preference, which 
is mainly driven by the religious motive.
5
 
The research findings show that in order to maintain and grow its market share, Islamic 
banks tend to distribute competitive profits to depositors, even if such distribution would 
negatively impact shareholders on the short-run. This effect is termed as the displaced 
commercial risk, which has been empirically proved by the results. It is, therefore, recommended 
                                                   
2 The term payout policy is used instead of dividend policy because the profit distributions of Islamic banks 
encompass distributions to depositors and shareholders. For more information, refer to sections 2.4 and 6.3. 
3 See sections 1.4 and 1.5. 
4 See section 1.3. 
5 See section4.6.7. 
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that regulators, researchers, and practitioners to seriously considered this risk in their future 
investigations. Risk management techniques, such as reserve management, cooperative insurance 
policy, and the Mudarabah pool concept
6
, should be employed by Islamic banks to mitigate the 
displaced commercial risk. On the other hand, Islamic banks decide on their dividends based on 
their profitability and historical dividend distributions. As they mature, banks tend to distribute 
more stable dividends because it signals their financial strength and operating efficiency.   
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 1.2 illustrates the research aim and 
objectives. Section 1.3 discusses the research motivation and gap identification, which fuelled the 
research efforts. Section 1.4 discusses the research philosophy. Section 1.5 focuses on the 
research methodology. Section 1.6 highlights the contribution of the research to knowledge and 
practice. Finally, section 1.7 details the thesis style and structure.   
1.2 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the payout policy of Islamic banks in the GCC and 
to identify the factors that influence payout distributions. The research question is:  
―What is the payout process of Islamic banks in the GCC and what are the factors that 
influence‎the‎payout‎distributions?” 
To serve the research objective, three studies were conducted to uncover the topic from 
different angles. The first study aims at investigating the investors‘ perspective towards dividend 
payouts and Islamic banking in the GCC. As such, the research question is: 
“How‎do‎investors‎perceive‎payout‎distributions?” 
Achieve the research aim, and to answer the research questions, several objectives are pursued: 
 Do investors prefer dividends and for what reason(s)? 
 Do investors perceive dividends as mitigating instrument for agency conflict? 
 Do investors consider dividends as a signal for company profitability? 
                                                   
6 See section 7.5. 
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 How do investors assess a dividend distribution? Is it through comparing it to past 
dividends or by benchmarking it to the distribution of competitors? 
 Do investors follow an investment strategy? Does this strategy affect their preference for 
dividends? 
 How do investors perceive stock dividends? 
 How do investors perceive Islamic banking products, its relative risk, and payout 
assessment? 
 Do investors employ dividends as a self-disciplinary tool to control their consumption 
behaviour? 
The second study explores the payout process followed by Islamic banks and the factors 
that influence payout distributions. For this purpose, managers of Islamic banks were interviewed 
to describe the process and to identify its determinants. The research questions reads: 
―What is the payout process of Islamic banks in the GCC and what are the factors that 
influence‎payout‎distributions?” 
To answer the above question, the following research objectives are set: 
 To explore the payout process of Islamic banks. 
 To closely identify the determinants of their payout policy.  
 To understand and assess the intervention of central bank in the payout policy. 
 Do Islamic banks consider the payout of their competitors (market) when deciding on 
their own distributions? 
 Do Islamic banks employ payouts as a device to signal their financial strength and 
stability? 
 How does profitability and liquidity affect the payouts? 
 Does the bank‘s level of maturity impact the payouts? 
 Do Islamic banks have a tendency to use internally generated funds (i.e. retained 
earnings) for their investments and expenditures, and does this tendency affect the payout 
policy? 
 Do Islamic banks consider the investor‘s preference in their payout policy? 
 Why do Islamic banks use stock dividends? 
24 
 
 In the third study, the feedback of the first two survey studies is compiled with 
the findings of relevant literature to formulate the payout model of Islamic banks. The model is 
tested using multivariate regression analysis technique. The research question for this study is: 
“What are the determinants of payout distributions of Islamic banks?” 
To answer the research questions, the following objective were set: 
 To test the factors reported to have an influence on PSIA. 
 To test the factors reported to have an influence on dividends.  
 Proof the existence of displaced commercial risk. 
1.3 RESEARCH MOTIVATION AND GAP IDENTIFICATION 
The economic crisis of 2008 has arguably shown that the financial systems around the world 
could have major flaws. To address these flaws, the Dodd-Frank Act was signed by President 
Barrak Obama on 16 July 2010. The main purpose of this act is to control speculation activities, 
derivative instruments, agency conflicts, and to promote transparency.
7
 On the international 
arena, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BASEL) released the BASELIII accord on 
October 2010. The new accord is an updated version of their global regulatory standards on bank 
capital adequacy and liquidity control.
8
 Their aim is fix the flaws in the previous version which 
failed to detect the risks, which lead to the financial crisis of 2008.   
By tracing the trigger of the 2008 crisis, experts attributed the causes to a higher default 
rate in sub-prime mortgages amplified by excessive usage of exotic derivative instruments. The 
crisis began when inflation rate sharply climbed between 2006 and 2008. In response to this, the 
Federal Reserve increased the discount rate in order to reduce the money supply and keep 
inflation under control. Consequently, the repayment size of sub-prime mortgages increased 
considerably due to their relatively long-term maturities. As a result, a large number of borrowers 
                                                   
7 The full document is available at the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC)‘s website 
(http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf), last accessed March 22nd 2011.  
8 See http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm , last accessed May 17th 2011. 
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defaulted and banks rushed to sell the collaterals in the market. Eventually, the real estate market 
plummeted pulling down mortgage backed securities while further increasing the default rate. 
This breakdown in the system spurred a global financial crisis.
9
 
  The crisis gave an opportunity for alternative banking models to rise. Many experts called 
for a larger role for Islamic banking, which in their opinion would have prevented the occurrence 
of the crisis.
10
 They argue that the causes of the crisis were a combination of Riba (usury) in the 
form of interest based loans, Gharar (uncertainty)
11
 by using derivatives, and Taghreer 
(deception) through false opinions issued by credit rating agencies. All three causes are strictly 
prohibited by Shari’ah. The Islamic banking system offers a variety of alternative financial 
products to promote the economy while protecting it from adversity.
12
 
Islamic banking is still in its infancy. It has started in the second half of the last century.
13
 
It requires extensive focus from researchers to analyse and develop the system. The system 
requires an ongoing effort to develop new product and services, risk management, and liquidity 
measures (Iqbal et al., 1998.). This will help decision makers to take educated managerial and 
financial decisions.  
Based on the above discussion, the main motivation for this study is to be part of the 
research and development effort on Islamic banking. To find a helpful topic for the development 
                                                   
9
 In his testimony in Capitol Hill on 23 October 2008, Alan Greenspan, who is the ex-chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Bank, said ―The breakdown has been most apparent in the securitization of home 
mortgages. The evidence strongly suggests that without the excess demand from securitizers, sub-prime 
mortgage originations (undeniably the original source of crisis) would have been far smaller and defaults 
accordingly far fewer.‖ See minutes of the Committee of Government Oversight and Reform of the U.S. 
House of Representative.  The document is available electronically through 
http://clipsandcomment.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/greenspan-testimony-20081023.pdf, last 
accessed April 13th 2011. 
10 See Abdul Hassan article on the global financial crisis and Islamic banking found on http://www.islamic-
foundation.org.uk/IslamicEconomicsPDF/Hassan-financialcrisis-if.pdf, last accessed May 17th 2011.  
11 For a detailed definition of these terms, refer to chapter 2 on the Shari’ah‎principles.  
12 For information on principles of Islamic finance and products, refer to chapter 2.  
13 See section 2.2.  
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of Islamic banking, the researcher conducted a thorough review in the finance literature. One of 
the topics that continuously puzzled researchers and have a prime significance to managers is the 
dividend policy. The researcher noticed that the theories on dividend policy are far from being 
generic, especially when applied in the context of different countries and across different 
industries (Aivazian et al., 2003). Many empirical studies support this view.
14
 Since the 
researcher has experience and access to the GCC market, the topic of payout policy of Islamic 
banks in the GCC was selected.  
 It is expected that the research findings would be different from previous studies due to 
the market and industry characteristics. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
15
 market has 
unique cultural and environmental characteristics that would make it a special case. The GCC has 
rarely been covered by dividend policy researchers. In addition, the payout policy of Islamic 
banks is different from conventional banks since the profit distributions to depositors and the 
dividend distributions to shareholders are intertwined.
16
       
1.4 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY 
Hussey and Hussey (1997) defined research philosophy as the progress of scientific practice 
based on people‘s philosophies and assumptions about the world and nature of knowledge. 
Saunders et al. (2009) describe research philosophy as related to the development of knowledge 
and the nature of that knowledge. Research philosophy has a direct impact on the research 
paradigm, methodology, methods, and the overall research strategy.  
Hussey and Hussey (1997) cited five major dimensions of research philosophy, namely: 
ontological, epistemological, axiological, rhetorical, and methodological dimensions. In table 1.1, 
the two main research philosophies—positivists and phenomenologist—are described based on 
these five dimensions. Ontology is defined as the theory that deals with the nature of reality. 
                                                   
14 Refer to sections 3.10 and 3.11 on global implications and emerging markets. 
15 The GCC comprises of six states situated on the Arabian Gulf namely: Kuwait, Saudi, Bahrain, Qatar, 
United Arab Emirates, and Oman. 
16 For more information, refer to section 2.4 and 6.3.  
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Reality is perceived as objective and external to the researcher by the positivist approach and 
subjective and internal to the researcher by the phenomenologist approach. Epistemology is 
concerned with the study of knowledge and what is accepted to be valid knowledge. This validity 
involves the relation of the researcher to the research itself. Positivists believe that the researcher 
should be independent and distant from the research in order to give objective and measurable 
results. In contrast, a phenomenologist believes that the researcher should be immersed in the 
phenomena under investigation in order to obtain a thorough understanding (Hussey and Hussey, 
1997).  
Axiology is concerned about the role of values in the research. From an axiological 
perspective, positivists believe that science and research is value-free and unbiased. In contrast, a 
phenomenologist believes that science and research is value-laden and therefore, the researcher 
uses his or her values to interpret the phenomena. The rhetorical dimension is related to the 
language of research. In the positivist approach, the language tends to be formal and impersonal 
while in the phenomenologist approach it is informal and personal. Finally, the methodological 
dimension is concerned with the research process. For the positivist approach the methodology 
tends to be deductive with cause and effect associations. The analysis is context-free and aim at 
reaching generalization. In contrary, the phenomenologist approach is more inductive and context 
bound with its aim at reaching in-depth understanding of a certain phenomenon (Hussey and 
Hussey, 1997).  
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Table  1.1 Research Philosophy 
Assumption Question Positivists Phenomenologist 
Ontological  What is the nature of 
reality? 
Reality is objective and 
singular, apart from the 
researcher.  
Reality is subjective and 
multiple as seen by 
participants in a study.  
 
Epistemological What is the relationship 
of the researcher to that 
researched? 
Researcher is 
independent from that 
being researched.  
Researcher interacts 
with that being 
researched.  
 
Axiological What is the role of 
values? 
Value-free and 
unbiased.  
Value-laden and biased.  
Rhetorical What is the language of 
research? 
Formal based on set 
definitions and 
impersonal voice. Use of 
accepted quantitative 
words.  
Informal and evolving 
decisions. Personal 
voice use of accepted 
qualitative words.  
Methodological What is the process of 
research? 
 Deductive process 
cause and effect.  
 Statistic design 
categories isolated 
before study.  
 Context free 
generalisations 
leading to 
prediction, 
explanation and 
understanding 
accurate and 
reliable through 
validity and 
reliability.  
 Inductive process 
mutual 
simultaneous 
shaping of factors.  
 Emerging design 
categories 
identified during 
research process.  
 Context bound 
patterns, theories 
developed for 
understanding. 
 Accurate and reliable 
through 
verification.  
 
Source: Hussey and Hussey (1997, P.48)  
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Pragmatists believe that choosing a proper research philosophy depends mainly on the 
research question. They argue that the research question is what determines the ontological, 
epistemological, and axiological views of the research philosophy. Tashakkori and Teddlie 
(1998) contend that pragmatism is intuitively appealing because the researcher avoids engaging in 
pointless debates about philosophical concepts such as truth and reality (Saunders et al., 2009). 
The researcher chose the pragmatic view for selecting the research philosophy. This is 
due to the limitation that the dividend policy literature does not address Islamic banking. Hence, 
the researcher should conduct his study based on primary sources of information. This limitation 
forced the researcher to employ a mixed research philosophy. As such, a positivist philosophy is 
followed in the investors‘ survey and the payout model studies given the nature of the relatively 
large sample sizes
17
 and quantitative research approach. On the other hand, a phenomenologist 
philosophy is also applied in the managers‘ survey where the research approach tends to be more 
explorative and the sample size is relatively smaller.
18
 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Based on the gaps identified through the literature review and the research philosophy discussed 
in the previous section, the research strategy is formulated and a research methodology is 
developed for each study conducted in this thesis. These studies are: investors‘ survey, managers‘ 
survey, and payout model.
19
 
1.5.1 Research Strategy 
There are three research approaches namely: qualitative, quantitative, and mixed approaches. The 
characteristics of these approaches are shown in table 1.2. The quantitative research approach is 
closely linked to the positivist paradigm. Creswell (2003) defines the quantitative approach as 
―the one in which the investigator primarily uses positivist claims for developing knowledge, 
                                                   
17 See sections 4.4.5. 
18 See section 5.4.8. 
19 For more details on the methodology of each study refer to chapters 4, 5, and 6, respectively. 
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employs strategies of inquiry such as experiments and survey, and collects data on predetermined 
instruments that yield statistical data‖ (2003: P.18).  
Table  1.2 Research Approaches 
Typically Qualitative  Quantitative  Mixed Methods  
Use these 
philosophical 
assumptions 
 
Employ these 
strategies of inquiry 
Constructive/Advocacy/Participatory 
knowledge claims. 
 
 
Phenomenology, grounded theory, 
ethnography, case study, and 
narrative.  
 
Positivist knowledge 
claims. 
 
 
Survey and 
experiment.  
Pragmatic 
knowledge claims.  
 
 
Sequential, 
concurrent, and 
transformative.  
Employ these 
methods 
Open-ended questions, emerging 
approaches, text or image data.  
Closed-ended 
questions, 
predetermined 
approaches, numeric 
data.  
 
Both open and 
closed ended 
questions, both 
emerging and 
predetermined 
approaches, and both 
quantitative and 
qualitative data 
analysis.  
 
Use these practices 
of research, as the 
researcher 
 Positions himself or herself. 
 Collect participant meanings. 
 Focus on a single concept of 
phenomenon.  
 Brings personal values into the 
study.  
 Studies the context or setting of 
participants.  
 Validates the accuracy of 
findings.  
 Makes interpretations of the 
data.  
 Creates an agenda for change or 
reform.  
 Collaborates with the 
participants.  
 Tests or verifies 
theories or 
explanations.  
 Identifies 
variables to 
study.  
 Relates 
variables in 
questions or 
hypothesis.  
 Uses standards 
of validity and 
reliability.  
 Observes and 
measures 
information 
numerically. 
 Uses unbiased 
approaches. 
 Employs 
statistical 
procedures.  
 Collects both 
quantitative and 
qualitative data. 
 Develops a 
rationale for 
mixings.  
 Integrates the 
data at different 
stages of 
inquiry.  
 Presents visual 
pictures of the 
procedures in 
the study.  
 Employs the 
practices of both 
qualitative and 
quantitative 
research.  
 
Source: Creswell (2003, P.19)  
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The main strength of the quantitative research approach is the use of numbers that are 
measurable and precise. Therefore, the results can be directly tested for validity and reliability 
using objective statistical methods, which strengthen the generalizability of results. The limitation 
of this approach is that it requires large sample sizes, which are cumbersome and expensive. In 
addition, the results do not have enough depth to provide a rich understanding of the phenomena 
(Hussey and Hussey, 1997).  
Qualitative analysis is the preferred methodology for the phenomenologist paradigm. In 
relation to this broad definition, Creswell (2003) defines the qualitative approach as ―the one in 
which the inquirer makes knowledge claims based on constructive perspectives (i.e. the multiple 
meanings of individual experiences, meanings socially and historically constructed, with an intent 
of developing a theory or pattern) or advocacy/participatory perspectives or both. It also uses 
strategies of inquiry such as narratives, phenomenology, ethnography, grounded theory studies, or 
case studies. The research collects open-ended, emerging data with the primary intent of 
developing themes from the data.‖ (2003: P.18)  
The benefits of a qualitative research approach lies in the in-depth information generated 
by studying a phenomena closely. However, since the approach normally employ small samples, 
generalization of results is harder to achieve. Hence, these results would only be useful for 
investigative and explorative purposes (Marshall and Rossman, 1999).   
The last research approach is the mixed approach, which is a mix between quantitative 
and qualitative approaches. This approach reaps the benefits of both approaches while avoiding 
their limitations through what is known as triangulation (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). Hussey and 
Hussey (1997) define triangulation as the use of different research approaches, methods and 
techniques in the same study to overcome the potential bias and sterility of a single-method 
approach. Thus, using a mix of methods strengthens the research results. 
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Table  1.3 Mixed Research Approaches 
Implementation 
Priority Integration 
Theoretical 
Perspective 
Concurrent (no sequence) Equal At Data Collection 
Explicit 
Sequential Explanatory 
(Qualitative first) 
Qualitative At Data Analysis 
At Data Interpretation 
Or With Some Combination 
 
Sequential Exploratory 
(Quantitative first) 
Quantitative Implicit 
Source: Creswell (2003, P. 211)  
Creswell (2003) mentions different types of mixed strategies shown in table 1.3. In the 
concurrent triangulation design, the researcher simultaneously conducts the quantitative and 
qualitative data with no priority of one over the other. The data is then interpreted and cross-
validated in a single stage. In the sequential explanatory design, data collection and analysis of 
quantitative data is performed first and then analysis of qualitative data is used to explain the 
findings. The sequential exploratory design follows the sequence of collecting and analysing the 
qualitative data first followed by the collection and analysis of quantitative data for generalization 
and theory generation.  
Setting a suitable research strategy is a key element for the success of research. The 
design of the research strategy depends primarily on the research topic, purpose, and question. In 
this research, the formulation of a payout policy would mainly be determined by the interaction 
between managers and investors through the firm‘s stock price.20 Thus, when the managers set 
the dividend distribution rate, they take into consideration the response of investors by monitoring 
their reaction to the firm‘s stock price. The decision is then analysed and corrected in future 
payout distributions for the sake of stabilizing the stock price, and therefore the value of the firm.  
                                                   
20 Other stakeholders may intervene in the payout policy such as regulators, central banks and other 
governmental agencies. 
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In light of the above discussion, the research topic should be seen from the perspectives 
of both managers and investors. This design is essential to properly understand the phenomena 
especially with the scarcity of previous research.  
Figure  1.1 Research Strategy 
 
 
Figure 1.1 highlights the two research stages used in this study. In the first stage a 
concurrent triangulation strategy was employed whereby a quantitative approach is implemented 
to survey investors while a qualitative approach is conducted to survey managers of Islamic 
banks.  
Investors are characterized by a relatively large population. Hence, it is impractical to 
investigate their perspectives deeply on a large scale. For this reason, the questionnaire approach 
was deemed to be the most suitable data collection method. The results were used to help 
describe and understand investors‘ perceptions towards dividend policy. The findings were then 
considered in the design of the second and third research studies. 
Surveying the process and factors that affect the payout policy in Islamic banks requires 
an in-depth understanding of the phenomena. Since the population and sample size of Islamic 
Qualitative 
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banks in the GCC is relatively small, interviews with corporate and financial managers were 
conducted along with a review of literature, annual reports, contracts, and brochures of Islamic 
banks. The findings of this study are triangulated with the investors‘ survey to increase the 
robustness of the overall results.  
In the second stage of the research strategy, the feedback from the first stage is used to 
formulate the payout model. The model is tested through multivariate regression analysis to 
determine the factors that affect the payout distributions of Islamic banks in the GCC.    
1.5.2 Methodology of the Investors’ Survey 
The aim of the investors‘ survey study is to understand how investors perceive payout policies in 
the GCC.  To serve this objective, a questionnaire
21
 was developed based on published article and 
it was modified as needed through the process of focus group, pilot testing, and academic 
approvals. The questionnaire was then translated into Arabic
22
 and transformed into an electronic 
questionnaire to help obtain the maximum sample size possible in an easy and convenient 
manner.  
The questionnaire was posted on internet investment forums in the GCC and sent via email 
to investors of a major brokerage house. 287 useable responses were received. The data collected 
was analysed using suitable statistical methods and the results were used to help describe and 
understand investors‘ perceptions towards dividend policy. 
1.5.3 Methodology of the Managers’ Survey 
The aim of this study is to survey managers of Islamic banks in order to understand the payout 
process and to identify the factors that influence payout distributions. For this purpose, a semi-
structured interview was designed and conducted. The interview comprises of open and closed-
ended questions. The questions used during the interview were based on published articles and 
were amended as required through the process of focus group and academic approvals. 
                                                   
21 See appendix 1.A. 
22 See appendix 1.I.  
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Ten corporate managers, from 9 Islamic banks in the GCC, were interviewed. In the first 
part of the interview, the interviewee is asked to describe the payout distribution process. In the 
second part of the interview, the interviewer asks a set of closed-ended to verify the information 
given in the first section and to assure that the subject is properly covered.  
The results were analysed using triangulation with the findings of the investors‘ survey, 
articles, annual reports, and by internal comparison of the results of the open-ended and closed-
ended questions. As a consequence, the payout process is delineated and a list of applicable 
theories and related factors were identified for further examination. 
1.5.4 Methodology of the Payout Model 
The aim of the payout model study is to test the determinants of payout distributions predicted by 
the investors‘ and managers‘ survey studies. For this sake, a payout model is derived to 
mathematically describe the relationship between payouts and its determining factors. The model 
is based on the findings of the investors‘ and managers‘ surveys and the literature review on the 
topic. The model is tested using multivariate regression analysis technique based on the financial 
data of 13 Islamic banks in the GCC between 1993 and 2008.  
1.6 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION 
The value of a research lies in the amount of contribution it creates. For a research to be 
practically acceptable, it should strike a balance between rigor and practice. In terms of rigor, the 
research should contribute to the body of knowledge under investigation. On the other hand, for 
the research to be useful to practice, the topic should address a practical problem relevant to 
industry(s). These contributions are discussed below.  
1.6.1 Contribution to Knowledge 
The results of dividend policy studies have been highly contradictory. Many cross-comparative 
studies have been conducted in different industries, markets and countries in order to address the 
subjectivity issue.
23
 Hence, the first contribution of this research is that it focuses on the GCC 
                                                   
23 Refer to section 3.9.  
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market, which has been rarely covered by researchers. The researcher has only found two studies 
on dividend policy in the GCC, both of which used econometric modelling.
24
 This study employs 
a more comprehensive research strategy and a mix of methodologies to perform investors‘ 
survey, managers‘ survey, and econometric modelling. The first two studies are the first of its 
kind to be conducted in the GCC.    
The second contribution of this research is that it focuses on the banking sector, which 
was hardly covered in previous research (Dickens et al., 2002). The reason is that researchers 
avoid studying regulated firms as they believe that their dividend policies are controlled by 
regulators (Partington, 1985). Hence, knowing that many studies are based on econometric 
modelling and secondary data, researchers find difficulty in distinguishing between dividend 
decisions made by managers from those influenced by regulators without directly intervening in 
the process through other research methods (e.g. interview).
25
 In this study we employed a semi-
structure interview with corporate and financial managers to get a clear insight of the payout 
process and its determinants.  
Another contribution is that this research focuses on the payout policy of Islamic banking 
sector, which is a highly growing sector and has not yet been covered in the finance literature. 
The few studies that discuss the topic focused only on the aspects of Shari’ah and purely 
accounting interpretations.
26
 None of these studies surveyed investors and/or managers, or used 
economic modelling to describe the payout policy of Islamic banks and to identify its 
determinants. 
In addition, this research employs a mixed research strategy comprising of: investors‘ 
survey, managers‘ survey, and econometric modelling. The strategy mitigates the limitations of 
the research approaches and methodologies based on multilevel triangulation (i.e. collection and 
                                                   
24 See Al Yahyaee (2006) and Al-Kuwari (2009). 
25 To avoid this limitation, Dickens et al. (2002) include a capital adequacy ratio (capital/assets) as a proxy 
for the regulatory effect arguing that the lower capital adequacy of the bank, the stronger the regulatory 
influence. A similar ratio is employed in this study to capture this effect. For more details refer to section 
6.3.2.3. 
26 See section 2.5. 
37 
 
analysis methods) to increase the depth, reliability, and validity of results.
27
 The mixed strategy is 
especially useful in emerging markets, where published data is limited. The researcher has found 
few studies that employed a mixed strategy with a maximum of two approached (e.g. 
questionnaire and interview) while the majority of studies are based on either questionnaire or 
econometric modelling.
28
 
In addition, although the purpose of dividend policy research is to investigate the views 
of both investors and managers, investors were rarely surveyed (Dong et al., 2005). Only two 
studies were found that focused on investors‘ perception. These studies are Dong et al. (2005) on 
the Dutch market and Maditinos et al. (2007) on the Greek market.  
The final contribution is that most of the data used in this thesis are considered primary 
data. It is quite challenging for many researchers to get access to such data due to the secretive 
nature of the banking sector, rarity of published data on the GCC, and the cultural barriers. The 
research data was either taken directly from investors and managers or was entered manually 
from published annual reports.
29
 
1.6.2 Contribution to Practice 
The research topic of dividend policy lends its relevance to practice from the fact that payout 
decisions are amongst the most important financial decisions that the management take. Based on 
empirical evidence, these decisions have a direct implication for the firm‘s value.30 The issue is 
also significantly important to investors, depositors, analysts, managers, regulators, stock 
exchanges and other stakeholders of Islamic banks.  
                                                   
27 See section 1.5. 
28
 Examples of mixed approach studies employing questionnaire and in-depth interviews are Lintner (1956) 
and Brav et al. (2005).  
29 Secondary financial data on the GCC are available through Reuters Knowledge service. However, since 
these services use a proprietary accounting scheme, some valuable information of Islamic banks could 
either missing or merged to comply with the standard. 
30 See sections 3.4 – 3.8. 
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By understanding the mechanics of the payout process of Islamic banks and the effect of 
the payout decisions on stock prices, investors will be able to design better investment strategies. 
They will also be able to time their buying and selling decisions based on dividend declarations. 
In addition, by using the payout model developed in this thesis, analysts can enhance their equity 
research, profitability expectations, and they will be able to predict the declaration impact on 
stock prices.  
Value maximization is supposed to be the ultimate objective of corporate managers. 
Therefore, this research will help them to maximize the value of their firms by meeting the 
preference of their investors using the tools and methodologies discussed in this thesis. In 
addition, managers will also learn how their competitors make the payout decisions, which will 
help them maintain their competitiveness by benchmarking their practices against the market.  
The findings of this research will also help regulators in the GCC to make informed 
decisions regarding capital adequacy, capital structure, and payout policies. This step will 
increase the probability of achieving the intended purpose of regulations. Furthermore, the 
research meets the recommendations of international regulative bodies, such as International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the central banks of Islamic countries, in terms of 
understanding the risk facing Islamic banks in the areas such as operations and financial risks.
31
 
By improving the understanding of investors, analysts, and regulators in relation to the 
payout policy of Islamic banks, market volatility resulting from misinterpretation and false 
expectations is reduced leading to a higher level of stability in the economy. 
1.7 THESIS STYLE AND STRUCTURE 
Due to the complex nature of the research strategy with different methodologies employed by 
each study, the essay style was adopted in writing this thesis. The essay style has the advantage in 
the ability of breaking down the grand research theme into smaller and more manageable parts, 
                                                   
31 Sundararajan and Errico (2002), a research team from IMF, have closely studied the Islamic banking 
industry from a regulatory aspect. They concluded that a development of a more suitable regulatory 
framework and new financial instruments to encompass Islamic banking is crucial.  
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each of which presents a specific problem within the relevant context. Following this format (See 
figure 1.2), the thesis starts with an introduction and literature review chapters that are common 
for the three studies (i.e. projects). Each study is then discussed in a separate chapter containing 
its own selected literature review, methodology, analysis, and findings. The findings of earlier 
studies are used as input for the later ones. At the end of the thesis, the findings of the three 
studies are summarized and integrated to draw an overall conclusion that answers the main 
research question.  
2 Figure  1.2- Essay Style 
 
The thesis structure is as follows. Chapter 2 covers the principles of Islamic finance and 
Islamic banking products. This helps to form the basis required in understanding the 
terminologies and arguments of payout policy in the context of Islamic banks. Chapter 3 covers 
the main theories of dividend policy with selected empirical studies. The purpose of this chapter 
is to review relevant research articles in an attempt to construct the theoretical framework for the 
research. In doing so, the chapter gives an overview on dividend theories, research 
methodologies, and the factors that affect dividend payout decisions.  
Chapter 4 covers the investors‘ survey research. The chapter starts with an introduction of 
the GCC market. Next, it illustrates the methodology used for the survey including a discussion 
of the questionnaire design and development, sampling, goodness of measure, and statistical 
inference. The chapter would then moves on to the analysis and results. It concludes with a 
summary of the results, limitations and recommendations for future research.  
Chapter 5 covers the managers‘ survey. It starts with selected literature review. It then 
discusses the research methodology used in the survey, interview development, and sampling. 
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The data is then analysed and discussed. Finally, the results are summarized and 
recommendations for future research are proposed.  
Chapter 6 covers the formulation and testing of a payout model based on the previous 
results. The chapter starts with selected literature review. The research methodology is then 
discussed. Then a multivariate regression analysis is employed to test the model and the results 
are presented and analysed. The last section summarizes and discusses the findings in light of the 
theoretical framework. Finally, chapter 7 compiles the overall findings, results implications, 
conclusions, limitations, and research recommendations.  
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2 CHAPTER 2: ISLAMIC FINANCE: A PRIMER 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter serves as an introduction to Islamic finance. It commences with a historical brief of 
modern Islamic banking. It continues by defining the main Shari’ah principles that govern it, 
which will be referenced throughout the thesis. It will then cover the main products and services 
offered by Islamic banks.  
2.2 BRIEF HISTORY OF ISLAMIC BANKING 
The need for Shari’ah compliant financial products has always existed in Muslim societies. 
Several academic papers were written on the topic during the 1940s and 1950s. Siddiqi (1980) 
mentioned that Qureshi (1946), Siddiqi (1948), Ahmad (1952), and Mawdudi (1961) formed the 
cornerstone of modern Islamic banking and finance (Abdul Gafoor, 1995). Their proposition was 
to build an interest-free banking system based on the concept of Musharakah (profit-sharing) and 
Murabaha (cost-plus) instruments (Abdul Gafoor, 1995).  
During the 1960s and 1970s, the financial markets in Islamic countries became more 
mature, which made the concept of Islamic banking more feasible. As a result, several research 
studies were published including Al-Araby  (1967), Siddiqi (1961, 1969), al-Najjar (1972), and 
Al-Sadr (1974). Furthermore, many conferences were held to discuss Islamic banking, such as the 
Conference of Finance Ministers held in Karachi in 1970, the Egyptian Study in 1972, the First 
International Conference on Islamic Economics in Mecca in 1976, and the International 
Economic Conference in London in 1977 (Abdul Gafoor, 1995).  
As a consequence of the above activities, a number of large Islamic banks were 
established in the 1970‘s. These banks have captured an increasing share of the financial market. 
Islamic banks witnessed a growth rate of over 10% per annum, reaching a total asset size of more 
than US$ 200bn (Hassoune, 2004). The industry expanded across the globe. Countries such as 
Iran and Sudan have transformed their entire banking system to comply with Shari’ah standards. 
The growth of Islamic financial industry is primarily attributed to the exponential increase in the 
demand for Islamic financial products and services by the Muslim population across the world. 
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Islamic financial institutions have so far played a monopolistic role in the Islamic 
financial market. In terms of profitability, they have shown significant progress in growth and in 
absolute income. The profitability of the industry has attracted conventional banks, which have 
been eager to open Islamic windows to serve their clients interested in Islamic-compliant 
products and to reduce competitive pressures from Islamic banks. International banks include 
Chase, Citibank, ANZ Grindlays, Klienwort Benson, Union Bank of Switzerland, Grirozentale of 
Australia, and ABC International has entered the rapidly growing Islamic banking market (Iqbal 
et al., 1998). In the next two sections, we will go over the main principles that guide Islamic 
banks and the main products and services offered by them.  
2.3 GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC FINANCE32 
Shari’ah encourages people to trade goods and services in order to grow the wealth and maintain 
the stability of society. Therefore, it considers all kind of trades as Mubah (permissible) except 
for those trades that are explicitly forbidden by evidence from the holy sources of Shari’ah. The 
first and most superior source is the holy book of Qur’an, which is considered to be the words of 
Allah (God) (almighty) and delivered to the prophet Mohammed Peace Be Upon Him (PBUH). 
The second source is Sunnah, which are the words, actions, and approvals instituted by prophet 
Mohammad (PBUH). The third source is the Ijma, which is the consensus of Muslim scholars 
based on their readings and interpretations of Qur’an and Sunnah. The fourth and the least 
powerful source is Ijtihad, which is the individual(s) interpretation of Muslim scholar(s) but less 
than the degree of Ijma.
 
Scholars have divided the Shari’ah principles into several sections. Since the spirit of 
Islam encourages trade, the largest section in Shari’ah is the book of Byou’a (Trade), which 
contains the principles that govern daily business activities. The main principles that are relevant 
to Islamic banking will be covered in this section. 
                                                   
32 The Shari’ah principles presented in this section were summarized, edited, and translated from AYOUB 
(2003). The translated Qur’an verses are sourced from ALI (1938). The translated Hadith citations are 
sourced from Sahih Al-Bukhari, translated by M. Muhsin Khan  and Sahih Muslim¸ translated by Abdul 
Hamid Siddiqui. Both translations are available at: http://www.iium.edu.my/deed/hadith/, last accessed 
29/06/2011.   
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2.3.1 Taradhi (Mutual Agreement) 
Taradhi is the mutual acceptance of the buyer and the seller on the terms of the transaction (e.g. 
decision to trade, amount, price, conditions, characteristics,…etc) by free choice and without 
external pressures. Allah (almighty) says in Qur’an :―O ye who believe! Eat not up your property 
among yourselves in vanities: But let there be amongst you traffic and trade by mutual good-will: 
Nor kill (or destroy) yourselves: for verily Allah hath been to you Most Merciful‖ (Qur’an, Al-
Nisa‘a: 29). Based on these guidelines, if the buyer, the seller, or both are forced into a 
transaction, then from a Shari’ah point of view the transaction is considered void.  
By enforcing Taradhi as a condition for trade, Shari’ah intends to protect the interest of both 
parties of the transaction and the interest of society as a whole from being controlled by the few. 
However, under certain circumstance Shari’ah allows the Hakim (ruler) or the Qadhi (judge) to 
force a person, who is able but unwilling to pay his/her debt to others, to sell part or all of his/her 
assets in order to meet his/her financial obligations. It was cited by Abu Huraira (PBWH) that the 
prophet (PBUH) said: ―Procrastination in paying debts by a wealthy man is injustice. So, if your 
debt is transferred from your debtor to a rich debtor, you should agree.‖ (Sunnah: Bhukhari and 
others).  
Furthermore, if the person in debt does not have any assets with which to pay his/her 
obligations, then s/he shall be given a grace period until s/he recovers and is able to make the 
payment. Allah (Almighty) says in Qur’an: ―And if the debtor is in a hard time (has no money), 
then grant him time till it is easy for him to repay, but if you remit it by way of charity, that is 
better for you if you did but know‖ (Qur’an, Al-Baqarah: 280).  
2.3.2 Adalah (Fitness) 
Adalah means that the seller and the buyer should be mentally and physically fit to fully 
understand the consequences of their actions. For example, selling a mosque to a minor is 
considered a false transaction since mosques cannot be sold in Islam. Shari’ah, however, permits 
minors to purchase goods that are negligible in value (e.g. chocolate, candy, groceries, and so on) 
to make life easier for Muslims and more convenient to the parents and children. Allah 
(Almighty) says in Qur’an: ―To those weak of understanding make not over your property, which 
Allah hath made a means of support for you, but feed and clothe them therewith, and speak to 
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them words of kindness and justice‖ (Qur’an, Al-Nisa‘a: 5).  Shari’ah’s intention is to protect the 
wealth of the unfit person from those who may take advantage of their unawareness or ignorance, 
and hence instilling justice in society.  
2.3.3 Maqdirah (The Ability to Deliver) 
The buyer and the seller should be able to deliver their contractual obligations upon closing the 
deal. Therefore, the seller should have the good or service ready to be delivered and the buyer 
should have the payment ready by the exchange date. 
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2.3.4 Bayinah (Awareness)  
The buyer and the seller should agree on the price, quantity, characteristics, and specifications of 
the good or service under exchange. Abu Huraira (PBWH) reported that messenger of Allah 
(PBUH) forbade a transaction determined by throwing stones, as it involves uncertainty. This 
type of deal is defined by Shari’ah as Gharar (uncertainty).34  
Misunderstanding the scope, terms, and conditions of a business transaction potentially 
leads to conflict. Therefore, by imposing the Bayinah principle, Shari’ah intends to maintain the 
structure of society from being eroded.  
2.3.5 Ifsah (Full Disclosure) 
Ifsah means full disclosure. Under this principle the owner of the good or service should fully 
disclose any information deemed relevant to the transaction. In this regard, Shari’ah assures that 
both parties are fully aware of the outcome of the trade in order to avoid future conflict. If, in any 
case, the seller conceals relevant information about the good that may affect its value, then the 
trade would be considered as Taghreer (deception). This type of sale is forbidden and is 
considered as a Kabeera (great sin).  
                                                   
33 Unless if that transaction involves some forms of Islamic financial products that permit deferred 
payments or delivery such as Ajil (forward) trade, Al-Salam or Arbun (down-paymnet), Istisna’a‎
(manufacturing), or other types of instruments, which will be covered later in the chapter. 
34 See section 2.3.9. 
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As narrated by Abu Huraira (PBWH): ―The Prophet (PBUH) passed by a sack of food, he 
entered his hand in it and his fingers were wet. He asked the seller: ‗What‘s this?!‘ The seller 
replied: ‗It was in the rain prophet‘. The Prophet (PBUH): ‗you should put the wet food above so 
it is apparent to buyers? Who cheats is not of my followers‘. (Sunnah, Muslim). 
The idea behind Ifsah is well understood in today‘s business environment. Hiding 
valuable information from the buyer is considered illegal. Therefore, Shari’ah and most modern 
legal systems impose the full disclosure principle in business to protect the interests of 
stakeholders and the overall society.  
2.3.6 Hiyazah (Possession) 
Hiyazah means the ownership and possession of the good. Therefore, the seller should have 
Hiyazah of the good before entering into a trade. Otherwise, the trade is considered false in the 
eyes of Shari’ah. Tawus narrates that Ibn 'Abbas (PBWH) said: ―Allah's Apostle (PBUH) forbade 
the selling of foodstuff before measuring and transferring it into another‘s possession. I asked Ibn 
'Abbas, ‗How is that?‘ Ibn 'Abbas replied, ‗It will be just like selling money for money, as the 
foodstuff has not been handed over to the first purchaser who is the present seller‘.‖ (Sunnah, 
Bukhari). 
2.3.7 Wakalah (Agency) 
Shari’ah specifies four types of Wakalah. The first is the Wakeel (agent), who is a person that has 
the legal permission from the owner to make any suitable transaction on his/her behalf or as 
specified by the power of attorney. The second type is the Wali (guardian), who is usually the 
father, relative, or a person assigned by the court to be the legal guardian. The Wali is responsible 
for maintaining the wealth of a minor or an incapacitated person until s/he is deemed fit by 
reaching the legal age (i.e. 21 years old) or by recovery. The third type is Nadhir (supervisor), 
who is responsible for Waqf (Charity). The fourth type is the Wasi (custodian), who is appointed 
by an individual prior to his or her death in order to execute his or her will after death.  
It is argued that in many cases, breach of contract occurs because the seller of the good 
does not have the legal permission from the real owner to enter a transaction. Thus, Shari’ah 
strictly imposes the legal representation principle. Hakim Bin Hizam (PBWH) narrates that the 
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Prophet (PBUH) said: ―do not sell what you do not own or what you do not have in your 
possession‖ (Sunnah, Tarmathi, Ibn Majah, Nisaee, and Abi Dawood ). 
2.3.8 Mubah (Permissible) 
This condition states that the good or service under exchange should be permissible by Shari’ah. 
For example, the good should not be in the form of alcohol, pork or its extracts, cigarette, drugs, 
or any other type of goods that are considered by Shari’ah as Muharam (forbidden), otherwise the 
transaction is considered a false trade. Abu Dawood and Ibn Abi Shaiba narrate that Ibn Abbas 
(PBWH) states that the messenger of Allah (PBUH) says: ―if Allah forbids something, Allah 
forbids selling it‖ (Sunnah, Ahmad). 
Not only does Shari’ah forbid trade of what is Muharram, it does not permit any Mubah 
(permissible) that indirectly leads to Muharram. For instance, selling grapes, which is Mubah, 
knowing that it will be used to produce alcoholic spirits, which is Muharram. In this regard, Allah 
(almighty) says in Qur’an: ―Help ye one another in righteousness and piety, but help ye not one 
another in sin and rancour: fear Allah. for Allah is strict in punishment‖ (Qur’an, Al- Maeadah: 
2). 
2.3.9 Freedom from Gharar (Uncertainty) 
Gharar occurs when the seller enters a transaction without having possession of the good and/or 
the intention to deliver it; hence the trade may result in unknown outcomes in the form of a zero-
sum game. A classical example of Gharar is a person who lost a camel but sells it to someone at 
a deep discount. In this case, the buyer enters the transaction hoping to find the camel in order to 
sell it at the market price and reap the difference. If the camel is found, then the buyer makes 
abnormal profits, otherwise the seller would have recovered part of the camel‘s value. This 
transaction involves a high degree of risk on both sides of the trade. Consequently, one of the 
parties will eventually lose.
35
 This form of trade is against the principle of fairness and may put 
                                                   
35 This transaction sounds very similar to modern day derivatives, which many scholars consider it as a 
form of Gharar. See Jobst (2007a). 
47 
 
high risk on either side. To avoid this, Shari’ah instituted having possession of the good under 
negotiation before entering a trade.
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2.3.10 Freedom from Qimar (Gambling) 
Qimar is gambling and it is considered a Kaberah (great sin). Allah (almighty) says in Qur’an:  
―O ye who believe! Intoxicants and gambling, (dedication of) stones, and (divination by) arrows, 
are an abomination, of Satan‘s handwork: eschew such (abomination), that ye may prosper. 
Satan‘s plan is (but) to excite enmity and hatred between you, with intoxicants and gambling, and 
hinder you from the remembrance of Allah, and from prayer: will ye not then abstain?‖ (Qur’an, 
Al-Ma‘edah: 90/91). 
Qimar is a zero-sum game as both party of the transaction are unaware of the outcome. 
Qimar comes in a variety of forms such as lottery tickets, casino games, and card games that 
involve gambling. Any trade that has these characteristics is considered by Shari’ah as Qimar.  
2.3.11 Freedom from Dharar (Detriment) 
Dharar occurs when the trade is harmful to any of the contracting party, a third party, or society. 
A good example is drug dealing, which could result in huge financial benefits to the seller. 
However, it destroys people and societies. In this regard, Abu Saeed Al-Khudri (PBWH) narrates 
that the messenger of Allah (PBUH) said: ―Neither harm nor detriment‖ (Sunnah, Ibin Majah and 
Dar Qutni). 
2.3.12 Freedom from Najash (Price Manipulation) 
Najash usually occurs in auction markets (e.g. stock markets) whereby a person participates in an 
auction to manipulate the price of a good by bidding it higher or lower without the real intention 
of purchasing it. The aim is to benefit the real buyer or seller by giving him/her a preferable price 
compared to market. Abu Hurairah (PBWH) narrates that the messenger of Allah (PBUH) said:  
―Do not envy one another; do not inflate prices one on another (Najash); do not hate one another; 
                                                   
36 See section 2.3.6 
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do not turn away from one another; and do not undercut one another, but be you, O servants of 
Allah, brothers. A Muslim is a brother of a Muslim: he neither oppresses him nor does he fail 
him, he neither lies to him nor does he hold him in contempt. Piety is right here – and he pointed 
to his chest three times. It is evil enough for a man to hold his brother Muslim in contempt. The 
whole of a Muslim for another Muslim is inviolable: his blood, his property, and his honour‖ 
(Sunnah, Muslim). 
2.3.13 Freedom from Ihtikar (Monopoly) 
Ihtikar (monopoly) is defined as storing goods to create a temporary shortage in the market in 
attempt to increase the demand and the price. At this stage the trader sells the good to reap 
abnormal profits. Ihtikar can be performed by a single or group of merchants (AFIFI , 2003).  
Scholars are divided about the goods that fall under the restriction of Ihtikar. Some 
scholars argue that it is only applicable to commodities and basic food products, while others 
contend that the restriction covers all types of goods that are essential to society. Ihtikar is 
severely condemned by Shari’ah as cited in Sunnah: ―whoever monopolizes a product from 
Muslims for more than forty days, god will hit him with Jutham (illness) and bankruptcy‖ 
(Sunnah, Ibin Majah, Al Darmi) (AFIFI , 2003).  
2.3.14 Freedom from Jalab 
In the old days, Bedouins travel a long way to sell their products in towns and cities. Some urban 
dwellers, who are aware of the fair value of these goods, await for Bedouin on the outskirts of 
towns to deceive them by purchasing their products at a price that‘s deeply less than the market. 
This is what Shari’ah defined as Jalab, which is forbidden unless the buyer discloses the fair 
market price to the seller, who would then be able to accept or reject the offer. Abu Huraira 
(PBWH) narrates that Allah Apostle (PBUH) said: ―A buyer should not urge a seller to restore a 
purchase so as to buy it himself, and do not practice Najash; and a town dweller should not sell 
goods of a desert dweller‖ (Sunnah, Bukhari). 
2.3.15 Bai’ ’Ala Albai’ (Bidding on a Finished Deal) 
Shari’ah looks beyond the financial benefits of business into maintaining societal coherence. This 
can be achieved by minimizing potential conflicts in trade. For this sake, Shari’ah explicitly 
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forbids a person from interfering in a closed deal by offering a better deal to the buyer or seller. 
Ibn 'Umar (PBWH) reported that the messenger of Allah (PBUH) said: ―A person should not 
enter into a transaction when his brother is already making a transaction and he should not make a 
proposal of marriage when his brother has already made a proposal except when given 
permission‖ (Sunnah, Bukhari, Muslim).  
The restriction applies after the trade is closed. A trade under Shari’ah is considered 
complete when an offer to buy the good is accepted verbally by the seller in a Majlis (meeting). 
Hakim bin Hazim (PBWH) reported that messenger of Allah (PBUH) said: ―Both parties in a 
business transaction have the right to annul it so long as they have not separated; and if they 
speak the truth and make everything clear they will be blessed in their transaction; but if they tell 
a lie and conceal anything the blessing on their transaction will be blotted out‖ (Sunnah, Muslim) 
2.3.16 Freedom from Riba (Usury) 
Riba is defined in Arabic language as the addition or excess, and in the context of Shari’ah as the 
additional interest (monetary or non-monetary) of any size charged above the principal amount of 
a loan. In English, on the other hand, usury is defined as the lending of money with an interest 
charge for its use; especially the lending of money at exorbitant interest rates (Merriam – 
Webster). Historically, usury is defined as the interest of any size. However, in the western 
economies, this definition has evolved so that it only refers to excessive but not modest interest 
rates (Glaeser and Jose, 1998).  
Riba is considered the main difference in the practice between conventional and Islamic 
banks. The former allows interest as compensation for the use of money while the later forbids all 
forms of interest. It is fair to note that in some western economies, excessive interest is forbidden 
especially on certain types of loans (e.g. housing loans) (Glaeser and Jose, 1998). The rationale 
behind it is to protect the middle and low income strata in the society from expensive interest 
payments especially when it comes to necessities. However such protection did not prevent the 
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occurrence of sub-prime mortgage crisis in 2008 which was mainly due to the variable and 
compounding element of interest.
37
 
Shari’ah considers Riba to be a Kabeera (great sin). Allah (Almighty) says in Qur’an:  
―O ye who believe! Fear Allah, and give up what remains of your demand for usury, if ye are 
indeed believers. If ye do it not, take notice of war from Allah and His Messenger‖ (Qur’an, Al-
Baqarah: 278). 
 In this section, an overview of the main principles of Islamic finance was provided. 
Islamic banks use the above principles in developing their products, services, contracts, and work 
processes. In their operations, Islamic banks take into account the restrictions of Shari’ah, 
especially those related to Riba and Gharar, which are widespread in financial markets in the 
form of interest-based loans and derivatives.  
2.4 PRODUCTS AND SERVICES OF ISLAMIC BANKS 
This section gives an overview of the products and services offered by Islamic banks with special 
focus on GCC banks. The information was sourced from published articles, annual reports, 
brochures, contracts, and other documents.  
2.4.1 Sources of Fund 
                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
37 See section 1.3. 
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Figure  2.1- Types of Fund in Islamic Banks 
Source: (BIB, 2009, DIB, 2009, EIB, 2009, KFH, 2009, QIB, 2009) 
 
As seen in figure 2.1
38
, the fund sources of Islamic banks come from shareholders and 
depositors.
39
 From a Shari’ah perspective, the nature of the relationship between the bank and the 
depositors and shareholders is based on the Mudarabah contract
40
, which is an agreement 
between the fund owner (Rab ul-Mal) and the fund managers (Mudarib), who have the 
knowledge and expertise in the area of enterprise. The Mudarib (i.e. the Islamic bank) charges a 
management fee against the service rendered. In the case of normal economic loss, the fund 
provider bears the financial loss while the fund manager losses the opportunity cost in terms of 
time and effort. However, if the loss is due to negligence, then the Mudarib bears it entirely (EIB, 
2009). 
                                                   
38 In the figure, an approximation of the percentage of each type of fund is shown based on the reviewed 
annual reports. 
39 Some practitioners prefer to use the term ―customers‖ rather than depositors. The justification given that 
unlike depositors of conventional banks, the Islamic bank depositors, or more appropriately customers, 
share the risk and return with shareholders (Interviewee 3) (See chapter 5). Although, customers would be a 
closer definition to the nature of the business, the term ―depositors‖ is used throughout the thesis for 
illustrative purposes. 
40 The only exception would be for the current account or demand deposit, which will be covered later in 
the chapter. 
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The nature of the relationship between depositors and shareholders is based on the Anan 
(shareholding) company. The main attribute of this type of company is that shareholders have 
equal rights and claims to the company in terms of revenue or loss based on the percentage of 
participation (i.e. on a pro-rata basis). However, shareholders may agree that a partner is granted 
a higher percentage of the income than his or her original share as a compensation for additional 
efforts or services (e.g. management) (Ayoub, 2003).  
From a practical point of view, shareholders are willing to give away part of their income 
to depositors during hard times in order to maintain the bank‘s reputation and competitiveness. 
This is known as displaced commercial risk, which is the risk involved in the process of using 
shareholders‘ income or capital to pay depositors as a result of market and competitive pressures 
(Archer and Abdel Karim, 2005).
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Shareholders are the legal owners of the bank. Among other privileges, shareholders can 
vote or nominate the board of directors (BOD) of the bank in a general assembly. The BOD is 
directly responsible for overlooking the strategy, management, control, and bank operations. 
During the general assembly the shareholders vote on crucial decisions including the approval of 
financial statements, capital raise, dividend distributions, and bank investments. Shareholders 
have the right to receive dividends and priority to capital increases (i.e. pre-emptive right issues). 
The downside is that shareholders normally have the lowest claim when the firm is liquidated. 
However, this principle is not applicable for Islamic banks as shareholders and depositors equally 
own the Mudarabah pool of assets.     
In terms of bank accounts, Islamic banks have a variety of accounts depending on the 
amount, duration, contract type, and other variables. Banks generally have the following types of 
accounts: 
2.4.1.1 Checking Account (or Demand Deposit) 
This account is very similar to the demand deposit account offered through conventional banks. 
The fund in this account is available for withdrawal at any time. It is also guaranteed by the bank 
                                                   
41 See section 5.5.3.6.6. 
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against losses. This account is usually associated with the issuance of cheque books for 
withdrawals; hence, it is used by customers as an intermediary account for the payment of current 
expenses.  
Shari’ah approves offering of checking accounts by Islamic banks because it is 
considered as Qardh (non-interest bearing loan).
42
 In this context, the International Islamic Fiqh 
(legislation) Consortium issued Resolution Number 86/3/9 which states: ―current accounts, 
whether offered through Islamic or conventional banks, are a type of Qardh, or non-interest 
bearing loan, from the point of view of Shari’ah, and the bank receiving such loans and should 
return it to customers on due course.‖ (Essa, 2010).  
Since the bank guarantees funds in checking accounts, Shari’ah gives the bank the 
discretion to invest the funds and reap the returns for itself during the time it is held with the 
bank. In relation to this, evidence from Hadith attest that Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) said: ―the 
return is to the guarantor‖ (Sunnah, Abu Dawood) (Shaheen, 2005).  
2.4.1.2 Saving Account 
Some Islamic banks contractually treat saving accounts in the same way they treat checking 
accounts. Therefore, the funds under these accounts are also considered as Qardh. Based on the 
principle of ―the return is to the guarantor‖, the bank can invest these funds (or part of it) to 
generate income for itself. In order to entice customers, the bank may give a portion of the profit 
back to them in the form of Hebba (grant). However, Shari’ah stipulates that no Hebba should be 
promised in the contract, or else it would be considered a form of Riba.  
 
Other Islamic banks treat saving accounts on a Mudarabah basis, whereby the bank 
manages the accounts to earn management fees, and the funds are exposed to investment losses 
(EIB, 2009). The only difference between saving and investment accounts, which will be covered 
subsequently, is that saving accounts allow withdrawals at all times. Against this benefit, profits 
distributed to saving accounts are usually lower than those distributed to investment accounts.
43
  
                                                   
42 See KFH (2009) 
43 This is due to reserve ratio. See section 5.5.3.1. 
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2.4.1.3 Investment account (or Fixed Deposit) 
This type of account resembles the core business of Islamic banks. It is available in a variety of 
structures and maturities (e.g. 3, 6, 9, or 12 months). Depositors give the bank the full discretion 
to manage their own funds at a pre-specified Mudarabah fee. Depositors‘ funds are treated as part 
of the Mudarabah pool in the Islamic bank. The profit or loss incurred from investing in the 
Mudarabah pool will be shared by pool participants, which include shareholders and depositors 
(BIB, 2009).  
2.4.1.4 Investment Wakalah (agency) Account 
This type of account is not common in the GCC. However, a small number of banks offer it as an 
alternative to conventional time deposits. The product is based on a Tawaruq (securitization) 
structure, whereby the customer purchases a commodity or precious metal and resells it to the 
bank at a specified profit. Later, the bank, at its own discretion, resells the commodity and uses 
the proceeds to finance other customers.  
Although it appears to be a convenient way to mimic conventional time deposits, this 
structure faces considerable criticism from Shari’ah scholars who perceive it as a method of by-
passing Riba (Al-Suwailem, 2007). Furthermore, the structure is financially inefficient due to its 
high transaction costs and excessive turn-around time.  
Another type of investment Wakalah is based on an agency agreement between the fund 
owner and the Wakeel (e.g. bank) to invest the fund in a certain enterprise (e.g. equities, lease, 
etc). The Wakeel charges a management fee as a lump sum or as a fixed percentage of the capital 
regardless of the investment outcome. However, in the case of negligence, the agent bears the 
entire loss. From an accounting point of view, since the Wakeel does not carry substantial risk 
associated with the Wakalah contract, these types of accounts are carried off-balance sheet (EIB, 
2009).   
2.4.2 Sources of Revenue 
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Figure  2.2 -Products and Services of Islamic Banks 
Source: ( DIB, 2009, EIB, 2009, KFH, 2009,QIB, 2009) 
As seen in figure 2.2,
44
 Islamic banks receive income from a variety of investment products and 
services. In this section the most common products offered in GCC Islamic banks are discussed. 
The purpose of this overview is to understand the income streams of Islamic banks, in order to 
learn how these revenues are distributed amongst depositors and shareholder when discussing the 
payout process in chapter 5.  
2.4.2.1 Revenue from Banking Services 
This covers a broad range of banking services such as: usage of automated teller machine 
(ATM),
45
 wire (or telex) transfers, overdraft charges, branch deposit/withdrawals
46
, foreign 
exchange, trade finance, safety deposit boxes, cheque book issuance, and credit card usage.  
                                                   
44 In the figure, an approximation of the percentage of each type of revenue is shown based on the reviewed 
annual reports. 
45 Most banks offer ATM service for free as a complementary service. However, if the service is used by a 
customer of another bank, then charges are applicable. 
46 To promote using the ATM machines, some banks introduced fees on deposit/withdrawals at the branch 
front desk. 
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Islamic banks deliver the above services by relying heavily on electronic channels and 
robust information technology infrastructure. This strategy minimizes the operating cost and 
enhances service quality and convenience. Today, most banks offer e-banking, e-trading, 
electronic payment gateways, and highly integrated core banking systems.  
2.4.2.2 Revenue from Investment Services and Proprietary Investments 
These revenues are generated by offering investment management services or by investing the 
bank‘s own capital.  
2.4.2.2.1 Investment Management Services 
These services are categorized either as off-balance sheet in the form of funds, portfolios, and 
restricted investment accounts, or as on-balance sheet, which consist of unrestricted investment 
accounts. The structure of these services is mainly based on Mudarabah but in a number of 
instances on Wakalah arrangement. 
2.4.2.2.1.1 Funds and Portfolio Management 
Many Islamic banks offer an alternative to investment accounts through funds and portfolio 
management services. Unlike the generic investment accounts, funds or portfolios can have 
various investment objectives and philosophies (e.g. real estate or equity) tailored to the customer 
needs. The bank is responsible for delivering the objectives in a timely manner and in accordance 
with the investment contract. The bank charges management fees by acting as a Mudarib.  
2.4.2.2.1.2 Restricted and Unrestricted investment accounts 
In restricted accounts, depositors instruct the bank to invest in specific investment vehicles and 
under specific conditions. These accounts are separated from shareholders and depositors funds 
(i.e. off-balance sheet). For transparency purposes, some of the annual reports of GCC Islamic 
banks clearly classify these accounts in a separate section in the balance sheet along with the 
assets under management.
47
  
                                                   
47 See (EIB, 2009). 
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On the other hand, unrestricted investment accounts are managed through the Mudarabah 
pool where the funds of depositors and shareholders are co-mingled. In both cases, the bank 
charges management fees as Mudarib or Wakeel, depending on the type of agreement.  
2.4.2.2.1.3 Brokerage and treasury 
Many Islamic banks offer brokerage services either directly or through a financial 
brokerage/investment subsidiary. These services mainly focus on offering local and international 
equities. Banks in the GCC offer such services through electronic channels (i.e. website).  
There are two schools of Shari’ah that specify the type of stocks that are allowed to be 
traded. The first, and more restrictive school, allows trading in stocks that adhere to Shari’ah as 
per the article of association. The other school permits trading in Islamic-compatible stocks, 
which meet certain criteria such as: the type of business, percentage of interest-bearing debt, and 
percentage of interest income, along with other factors.
48
  
In addition to offering trading services on equities, many banks provide a complementary 
margin facility on the basis of Tawaruq. Through this service, the bank earns arrangement fees, 
management fees, Murabaha profit on the resting cash, and brokerage commissions. This facility 
allows banks to increase the daily volume of trade and to attract new clients.  
Figure  2.3 - Tawaruq Structure 
 
                                                   
48 See AAOIFI Shariah Standard No. 21, paragraph 16 of Appendix B. http://www.aaoifi.com, last accessed 
12/08/2011.  
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The Tawaruq structure is shown in figure 2.3. The bank purchases precious metals from 
the market. These metals are then sold to the client at a cost plus profit with deferred payment 
(i.e. Murabaha).
49
 The client instructs the bank (as an agent) to sell the precious metals in the 
market and receive the proceeds in cash. Meanwhile, the client uses the cash for trading equities 
while taking into consideration the conditions stipulated by the Tawaruq contract. These 
conditions vary between banks, however, it mainly focus on the loan-to-capital coverage ratio and 
capital allocation restrictions. Upon maturity, the client pays off the remaining amount in the 
contract.  
In addition to brokerage service, many Islamic banks offer short-term Murabaha products 
on commission basis for high net-worth and institutional clients. These products are suitable for 
managing short-term excess cash. The treasury department in the bank is responsible for the sales 
and execution of such products.   
2.4.2.2.2 Direct Investment50  
Islamic banks invest a portion of their own capital (i.e. shareholders‘ capital) in long term 
investments such as: subsidiary companies, investment funds, Sukuk (securitization)
51
, listed and 
unlisted equities, investment Wakalah or Mudarabah with third parties, and other assets of 
similar nature. These types of investments are categorized under three accounting classifications: 
held-to-maturity, available-for-sale, and investment designated at fair value through the income 
statement. 
                                                   
49 The client is usually requested to present collateral in the form of cash, equities, or real estate in order to 
receive the finance.  
50 See (EIB, 2009).  
51 Sukuk are asset backed securities of investment properties, usufruct, land, and real estate projects. For 
more information refer to Jobst (2007b). 
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The held-to-maturity investments are mainly financial securities that the bank intends to 
hold until maturity or completion of the project.
52
 Such investments are long term in nature; 
therefore, it is normally sourced from shareholder capital or the restricted investment accounts 
holders
53
 who agree to the investment objectives and duration. If the bank has management 
control or owns above 50% of a subsidiary, then the investments should be consolidated with the 
bank‘s financials as per the accounting standards and central bank regulations (EIB, 2009).  
 The second classification of investments is the available-for-sale. This classification 
covers non-derivative instruments
54
 of medium to long term duration. The revaluation of the 
instruments is either marked to market or quoted based on historical, replacement cost, or other 
methods specified in the accounting standards. The profit and loss arising from the revaluation 
process is reflected in the owner‘s equity section of the balance sheet.  
The last classification is trading investments or investment securities designated at fair 
value through the income statement. As the name indicates, this type of investment are more 
liquid ad actively traded (e.g. listed securities and funds). The revaluation process affects the 
income statement.  
The revenues from the above types of investments are in the form of dividends and/or 
capital gains. The methods of revenue recognition, depreciation, amortization and other 
accounting treatments depend on management directives, regulations and accounting standards.
55
  
                                                   
52 Accounting standards are strict in treating this category especially in the case of equity investments. If a 
single share is sold during before maturity, then the investment is reclassified as available-for-sale (DIB, 
2009).  
53 As stated previously, the restricted investment accounts are normally considered as off balance-sheet.  
54 Some Islamic banks in the GCC employ Islamic financial derivatives to manage the exposure to foreign 
currencies and Islamic swaps. For more details, refer to (DIB, 2009). 
55 See (Al-Jazira, 2009, BIB, 2009, DIB, 2009, EIB, 2009, KFH, 2009, QIB, 2009, Rajhi, 2009). 
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2.4.2.2.3 Property 
Islamic banks in the GCC invest in property such as real estate, land and usufruct (e.g. 
government lands). These properties may be classified as investment properties or investment 
properties under development. The income expected from them can be in the form of capital 
appreciation and/or rentals.  
2.4.2.3 Revenues from Financing Services 
Islamic banks offer a multitude of financial products as an alternative to those offered by 
conventional banks. These products are covered in this section.  
2.4.2.3.1 Murabaha (Cost-plus)  
Murabaha is a process whereby a person or entity (e.g. a bank) buys a product, takes possession 
of it (i.e. carry the resale risk), and then sells it at a cost plus profit. The product delivery is 
immediate with deferred payment. The payment can be paid in instalments or as a lump sum at 
maturity. From a Shari’ah point of view, the following guidelines should be followed  in a 
Murabaha process (Shaheen, 2005):  
 The purchasing contract used for the product acquisition should be valid and separate 
from the resale agreement. Validity of the contract requires a clear description of the 
product and other specifications.  
 The resale agreement should clearly specify the administration fees, the profit 
margin, number and amount of instalments, duration and schedule of delivery.  
Although Murabaha is widespread amongst Islamic banks, some Shari’ah scholars argue that 
it does not reflect the spirit of Islamic banking, which promotes entrepreneurship and risk 
sharing.
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56 Controversy includes critiques that some Murabaha structures used by Islamic banks could involve the 
imitation of interest-based loans if the bank does not take possession and ownership of the goods before 
reselling it to the client. If the bank fails to separate the purchasing and reselling contracts in the Murabaha 
structure, this is considered unacceptable by Shari’ah and considered a form of Ainah (Riba workaround). 
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2.4.2.3.2 Musharakah (Partnership)  
Musharakah is a partnership contract between two or more individuals. The entrepreneur(s) 
approaches the bank to seek equity financing. The bank studies the project from a technical and 
financial perspectives and then decides whether or not to participate. If the bank invests in the 
project, then the profit or loss is shared between the bank and the entrepreneur(s) on a pro rata 
basis. In addition, if one or more of the shareholders manage the company, they can charge 
management fees, which are deducted from the net profit (Al-Iqtisadiyah, 2006). 
2.4.2.3.3 Ijarah (Leasing) 
Ijarah is a leasing contract that gives the client the right to rent a specific asset from the bank (i.e. 
a car or a house) for a certain period of time and at a predetermined rent. The rent payment varies 
in accordance with the contract conditions. The client can choose to pay the rent either as a lump 
sum at the beginning or at the end of the contract, or in the form of periodic instalments. The 
rental amount varies depending on the value of the asset, contract period and payment method 
(Al-Iqtisadiyah, 2006).  
 Another form of Ijarah is the Ijarah Muntahiya Bil Tamaluk which is a rental contract 
with the same conditions as Ijarah except that the client has the option to purchase the rented 
asset on maturity at a specific price (e.g. book value). This form of financing is common for real 
estate, car leasing, and industrial equipments (Al-Iqtisadiyah, 2006). 
2.4.2.3.4 Istisna’a‎(Manufacturing) 
In Istisna’a‎  or manufacturing, the client approaches the bank to finance the production of a 
product that s/he desires with certain specifications and delivery date. Upon approval, the bank 
finances the project, which will be executed through a contractor (third party) and delivered in the 
name of the bank after completion. At this stage, the bank sells it to the client at a profit. The 
payment can either be immediate or deferred using Murabaha financing (Al-Iqtisadiyah, 2006). 
                                                                                                                                                       
In addition, if the bank does not take possession of the good, the transaction will involve Gharar 
(uncertainty) (Al-Suwailem, 2007).    
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 In this chapter, an overview of Shari’ah principles related to Islamic finance was 
presented. The principle of forbidding Ribba , which is the main difference between conventional 
and Islamic banking, was explained and how Islamic banks would alternatively use Mudarabah 
to be the core of its operations. Shari’ah principles form the basis that guides the efforts of 
products and service development in Islamic banks, which was presented in the chapter. 
2.5 SHARI’AH PRINCIPLES FOR PROFIT DISTRIBUTION 
According to Shari’ah, several conditions should be stipulated in the Mudarabah contract that 
governs the relationship between the bank as Mudarib (manager) and the depositor as Rab ul-Mal 
(owner). First, in order to maintain full disclosure in the transaction and the avoidance of 
Taghreer (deception), the Mudarabah contract should clearly delineate the distribution 
mechanism, Mudarabah fees, other expenses, balance and duration of the contract (AAOIFI, 
2007). Second, the profit from the Mudarabah investment should be equally distributed between 
depositors and shareholders based on the balance and duration of the invested capital (i.e. on a 
pro-rata basis). Some scholars argue that it is permissible to predefine the share of the profit 
between the Mudarib and Rab ul-Mal in the contract (AAOIFI, 2007). Third, in order to avoid 
Gharar (uncertainty), Islamic banks should ensure that the depositor‘s fund is received upon 
signing the contract.  
Upon closure of the accounting period, any relevant expenses are deducted from the 
revenues. The excess amount remaining after deductions is defined by Shari’ah‎ as the profit. 
From the Islamic bank‘s perspective, this profit is available for distribution between the Mudarib 
(i.e. bank) and Rab el Mal (i.e. depositors and shareholders) after the deduction of reserves and 
provisions. However, in the case of a restricted investment account, no provisions or reserves are 
deducted and the accounts are treated as off-balance sheet items.  
The above Shari’ah‎conditions cover investment accounts offered by Islamic banks that 
are based on Mudarabah contracts. In the case of demand deposits and some types of saving 
accounts,
57
 Islamic banks guarantee the funds in the accounts. Hence, Shari’ah‎scholars consider 
                                                   
57 Similar to the treatment of demand deposits, some Islamic banks consider saving accounts as demand 
deposits with the possibility of earning profits to attract clients. See section 2.4.1. 
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these accounts as Qardh Hassan (interest-free loans). The loan can be invested, at the discretion 
of  board of directors (KFH, 2009), and the income belongs to the guarantor (i.e. Islamic bank) 
against the guarantee and maintenance of deposits.
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As for the payout process of Islamic banks, several articles were found that focus on the 
payout policy of Islamic banks. However, these articles consider the topic from Shari’ah and pure 
accounting perspectives. These studies can aid in formulating the skeleton of the payout process, 
which will be covered in chapter 5. However, it does not cover the theories and factors that 
influence the payout policy, which is the purpose of this research. In other words, it does not 
provide the tools necessary to predict the payout distributions of Islamic banks.  
El Tegani (1996) attempted to learn the distribution of profits in Islamic banking by 
conducting a case study on Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan. In doing so, the author examined the 
financials of the bank for two consecutive years. The study gave an example of the profit 
distribution process of the bank from an accounting standpoint. This study was able to show that 
profits accrued by the bank from investing the funds of current accounts were used to enhance the 
profit distributions on PSIA, which supports the smoothing effect and displaced commercial risk 
assumption.
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Shaheen (2005) focused on the measurement and distribution of profits among 
shareholders and depositors. The goal of the research was to identify the issues associated with 
the accounting practices used in the profit distribution process and to recommend possible 
solutions that reflect the spirit of Shari’ah. Essa (2010) examined the payout policy of Islamic 
financial institutions. The study covered four aspects of the policy namely: the Mudarabah 
contract from a Shari’ah perspective, the relationship between the funds sources and generated 
income, the policy of expense allocation, reserves, and provisions, and the description of the 
payout policy. Similarly, Al-Gurrah Daghi (2009) cited a study conducted by the committee of 
Shari’ah‎supervision in Dubai Islamic bank  using a questionnaire based survey sent to several 
                                                   
58 Refer to section 2.4.1.1. 
59 Islamic banks are allowed to invest the funds of current accounts on their own discretion provided they 
guarantee these funds to depositors. For more details, refer to section 2.4.1.1. 
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banks to identify the accounting processes used in the distribution of profit. The results show that 
Islamic banks follow various standards in this respect. The author has then discussed these results 
in light of Shari’ah. 
2.6 SUMMARY 
The knowledge gained from this chapter will be utilized in understanding the revenue 
distribution, expense allocation, and the overall profit distribution schemes in the discussion of 
the payout process of Islamic banks in chapter 5. It also helped in criticizing the different payout 
practices used by Islamic banks while taking in consideration Shari’ah implications. In addition, 
it assisted in formulating the questions for the Islamic banking part in the investors‘ survey as 
well as the questions used in the semi-structured interview of managers. These questions were 
then converted into testable research hypothesis, which were eventually employed in the payout 
model in chapter 6. The terminologies explained in this chapter are continuously referenced 
throughout the thesis. 
 
 
  
65 
 
3 CHAPTER 3: INTRODUCTION TO LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Theoretically speaking, under perfect market conditions, where no information asymmetry, 
transaction costs, taxation, or other market impurities, payout decisions have no effect on the 
firm‘s value. This makes the payout policy irrelevant to corporate managers. This idea was 
introduced in the seminal paper written by Modigliani and Miller (1958). 
In reality, however, markets are not perfect. Market impurities may shape the investors 
preference and hence, indirectly influence the demand on stocks. Under such conditions, the 
management decision on the firm‘s dividend policy is widely believed to be relevant. 
Management tend to follow an optimal dividend policy in order to maintain a fair value of the 
firm. Based on this belief, academics and practitioners have studied the determinants of dividend 
policy and its impact on the value of the firm under different environments.  
Due to the complexity of the research topic and the large variety of factors that can 
influence the dividend policy, research efforts gave conflicting results. The literature on dividend 
policy is divided into three opinions (see figure 3.1). The first opinion argues that dividend 
decisions are irrelevant, and hence, managers should not worry about them. The second opinion 
argues that dividends reduce the value of shareholders due to tax differentials and transaction 
costs. Thus, it has a negative effect on the value of the firm. The third opinion states that 
dividends increase the value of the firm as investors prefer to receive dividends.  
In this chapter the main theories and empirical studies on dividend policy are discussed. 
The overview will be used, in subsequent chapters, as a theoretical framework for the 
development of hypothesis, measures, and analysis of results.  
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Figure  3.1 Theoretical Framework 
 
3.2 DIVIDEND IRRELEVANCE HYPOTHESIS 
Dividend irrelevance hypothesis was first introduced by Miller and Modigliani (1958, 1961). 
They argue that under perfect market conditions where financial information is instantly available 
and accessible to all rational market participants and no transaction costs or taxes are present, the 
dividend policy will not affect the firm‘s market value. This means that the market will not 
respond to the level of dividends, whether high, low, or non-existent. As a result, a firm‘s 
management should consider dividend policy as irrelevant to the market value of the firm.  
The rationale behind the dividend irrelevance hypothesis is that the value of the firm is 
determined by the present value of future cash flows discounted at the required rate of return. 
These cash flows can take the form of either dividends, capital increase, or both. The formula is 
expressed as follow: 
PV(present value) = CFn (n-th cash flow) / (1+ Kr (required rate of return))^N(no. years) 
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According to the formula, if no dividend is paid, it will be retained in the form of capital 
gain available for future collection. Under perfect market conditions, if the investor does not 
receive a dividend this year, s/he has the option of selling his/her shares that equal to the amount 
of dividend in the market at no extra cost and without affecting the stock price or the value of the 
firm. Based on this justification, management cannot improve the value of the firm by simply 
choosing a certain dividend policy. 
In reality where imperfections in capital market exist, management plan their dividend 
policy in order to maintain the market value of the firm (Black, 1976). Allen and Michaely (2002) 
suggest five imperfections in today‘s capital markets namely: taxes, information asymmetry, 
incomplete contracts, institutional constraints, and transaction costs. These imperfections form 
the basis of all theories that explains the importance of dividend policy to management. To 
address market imperfections, Modigliani and Miller (1963) argue that the tax effect should be 
considered in the valuation models presented in their earlier work.  
Many empirical research studies focused on dividend irrelevance theory. One early 
attempt to test the theory was performed by Black and Scholes (1974). The researchers 
constructed 25 portfolios of high and low dividend yield stocks in order to find the relationship 
between dividend yield and stock returns. The results of the study show that there is no difference 
between high and low dividend yield stocks in terms of the impact on the return of stock prices 
either before or after taxes. It follows from this result that a change in dividend policy should 
have no impact on the stock price, which supports the dividend irrelevance hypothesis.  
Bernstein (1996) suggests that the dividend yield is irrelevant to the price of the stock. 
Therefore, dividend yields do not serve as a significant forecasting device for the stock market. 
To reach this conclusion, Bernstein used a new approach. He attempted to ascertain what the 
stock market would look like if all earnings are reinvested. He then checked if the returns would 
be higher or lower than the actual course of events. To achieve this, the author used data from 
1960 to 1995 of the Standard and Poor‘s 500 (S&P 500), he added back all the operating earnings 
from the previous year in the market.  
In addition, evidence supporting the dividend irrelevance hypothesis comes from Far East 
Asia. Conroy et al. (2000) took advantage of the unique market setting in Japan where dividend 
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and earning announcements are often associated with expected dividends and earnings for the 
following year. The results show that unlike dividend announcements, earning announcements 
are significant in explaining stock price movements. In addition, management forecasts of next 
year‘s dividends and earnings have a small but significant effect on stock price movements.  
Other empirical studies found evidence against the dividend irrelevance hypothesis. Ball 
et al. (1979) used a version of the dividend yield experiment conducted by Black and Scholes 
(1974) in order to determine whether or not there is a preference for dividends over capital gains. 
Using data from 1960 to 1969, the findings show a highly significant relationship between 
dividend yields and risk-adjusted returns of the following year. Furthermore, Baker et al. (1985) 
surveyed 562 firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and found that most of the 
respondents believe that the dividend policy affects the stock price. 
More recently, evidence against the irrelevance theory came from the UK. Dhanani 
(2005) used a survey approach to examine the relevance of dividend theories to the dividend 
policies of firms in the UK. The study uses 164 questionnaire responses out of the total 
questionnaires sent to the top 800 London Stock Exchange (LSE) firms and the top 200 AIM 
(Alternative Investment Market) firms. The results show support for the dividend relevance 
hypothesis. Finally, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) showed that in contrast to the view of Miller 
and Modigliani (1961), dividend policy is pertinent to the value of the firm.  
Overall, it is widely believed that under imperfect market condition, which is the 
situation for most financial markets, the dividend irrelevance hypothesis does not hold. The vast 
majority of theories mentioned in this thesis supports this conclusion including Modigliani and 
Miller (1963), who proposed the tax induced clientele effect on stock prices.  
3.3 RESIDUAL DIVIDEND THEORY AND FREE CASH FLOW HYPOTHESIS 
Free cash flow (FCF) is defined as the cash flow that the company is able to generate after taking 
into account the cash required to support its operations, expansion plans, financing needs, and 
profitable investment opportunities (Brigham and Daves, 2002). The dividend residual theory 
states that the FCF should be redistributed to shareholders; otherwise, the cash will become a 
burden on the firm in the form of opportunity and agency costs.   
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Among the seminal papers that discussed the concept of residual dividend policy was 
Preinreich (1932) who argues that from the investor‘s perspective, the ideal dividend is  the one 
that pays back in the form of dividends the increase of the firm‘s net-worth, which cannot be 
reinvested at the hurdle rate. Similarly, while discussing the appropriate dividend policy Sage 
(1937) describes the policy as the one ―that best avoids the extremes of ‗ploughing back‘ and of 
‗paying out‘ all earnings and adopt a ‗middle course‘ in combining the better elements of each‖ 
(Baker, 2009). 
Empirically, Partington (1985) presented an evidence of the relationship between 
dividends, investment and financing decisions based on a survey of 93 large Australian 
companies. He found that dividends were not residually determined, and that firms would usually 
adopt independent dividend and investment policies. Therefore, they have separate investment 
and financing policies. The survey suggests that firms set desired levels of dividends and 
investments. If internal funding falls short of these levels, they usually use external funding 
through debt. If the amount raised is still not sufficient, the shortfall would either be divided 
between dividend distributions and investment plans, or dividends would take the priority. 
Furthermore, Alli and Khan (1993) tested an alternative argument by incorporating 
managerial considerations towards paying dividends with the theories of dividends proposed in 
literature. For this purpose, they examined 105 US listed firms across 34 industries. The study 
used a two step-factor-regression model while introducing several new variables that had 
previously not been tested. The results show a significant negative relationship between the 
dividend payout and issuance cost, pecking order, investment, and financial slack.  
Other empirical studies find evidence against the dividend residual theory. Elston (1996) 
examined the effect of dividends and liquidity on investment decisions for firms in the US. In 
order to test the independence between dividend and investment decisions the study used an 
alternative Q investment framework, which incorporates dividend payments.
60
 The sample of data 
used spanned from 1975 to 1988. The results suggest a weak role for dividend policy in firm 
liquidity constraints and investment decisions.  
                                                   
60 For more details on the Q investment framework and modified model, refer to Elston (1996).  
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More recently, Mikkelson and Partch (2003) examined if large cash reserves hinder the 
performance of the firm. They tested the operating performance and characteristics of 89 firms 
that held more than 25% of their assets in cash over a five year period between 1986 and 1991. 
While controlling for firm characteristics, the results show that the operating performance of high 
cash firms are comparable or better than their counterparts. The study shows that large cash 
holdings are usually associated with high expenditures on research and development (R&D) and 
greater growth in assets. 
In addition, Brav et al. (2005) indicated that corporate managers feel that dividend levels 
have the same priority as investment decisions, therefore dividends are not a residual of 
investment decisions. The results support the dividend relevance hypothesis. Lastly, Foley (2007) 
shows that firms in the US hold significant amount of cash on their balance sheets in order to 
avoid the tax cost associated with repatriating foreign income. Therefore, the FCF hypothesis 
does not apply for large multinational firms. 
Conversly, Baker and Smith (2006) surveyed a sample of 309 firms showing signs of 
following a residual dividend policy. A comparative analysis was conducted to investigate how 
these firms formulate their dividend policy. The results show that these firms follow a long-term 
dividend payout ratio while using long-run earning forecasts. The firms tend to neglect the cost of 
raising external funds. They also appear to be very careful in managing the payout ratio and 
dividend trends, which results in relatively lower free cash flows. This behaviour may suggest 
that their dividend policy is rather a ―modified‖ version of a residual dividend policy. 
3.4 TAX EFFECT HYPOTHESIS  
In order to maximize shareholders‘ wealth, the hypothesis suggests that corporate managers 
should take into account the cost associated with taxation when deciding on dividend payments. 
The premise of the argument is based on the fact that in most countries income taxes on dividends 
are higher than that on capital gains (Al Yahyaee, 2006). In addition, taxes on dividends are paid 
upon receipt of the dividend while taxes on capital gains can be deferred until the investor wishes 
to sell the shares. In other words, the investor obtains the benefits of paying taxes conveniently 
with no extra interest cost.  
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Based on this, investors should, in theory, prefer capital gains over receiving cash 
dividends assuming that the transaction cost (e.g. brokerage commission) does not exceed the tax 
benefit. As a result, the hypothesis argues that investors are willing to pay a premium for those 
companies who pay lower dividends but retain their earnings as capital gains (Al Yahyaee, 2006). 
Therefore, the theory recommends that firms should pay lower dividends in order to improve 
their market value.  
Modigliani and Miller (1963) argue that the clientele effect can be induced by any market 
imperfection factor or friction such as tax. One of the early proponents of this hypothesis is 
Brennan (1970). He was in favour of the tax clientele theory arguing that due to the tax 
disadvantage of dividends, investors prefer to purchase companies that retain earnings rather than 
distributing them through dividends. Therefore, investors would pay a premium for low dividend 
paying stocks.  
Based on the Brennan‘s modified version of capital asset pricing model (CAPM), 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1980) examined the effect of tax-induced clientele on capital 
asset prices. The authors attempted to prove the tax-induced clientele effect. Their hypothesis 
states that in a world of a tax differential between dividends and capital gains, it is expected that 
investors in high (low) tax brackets tend to buy stocks that have low (high) dividend yields. The 
study used five sub-sample stock groups: ranging from group one as the lowest dividend yield 
stocks and group five as the highest. They found that the dividend yield coefficient of the lower 
dividend groups is higher than that of the higher dividend yield group. This difference was 
interpreted as being due to the clientele effect. However, other studies argue against this 
conclusion as they found that half the dividends paid by corporations in 1979 were received by 
tax-exempt or tax-deferred investors (Lease et al., 2000). 
An empirical investigation of the theory was performed by Elton and Gruber (1970) who 
tested a method of determining marginal stockholder tax brackets and its implications on 
corporate investment policy, dividend policy, and the assumption of market rationality. They 
argued that the stockholder‘s tax bracket is important in determining the cost of capital to firms. 
Based on the assumption that a rational investor wishes to maximize his/her after-tax wealth, an 
expression is formulated delineating the relationship between ex-dividend stock price behaviour 
and the marginal tax rate of a marginal stockholder. In conclusion, the results provide evidence to 
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support the tax-induced clientele effect hypothesis stating that investors in higher tax brackets 
favour capital gains over dividend income.  
Pettit (1977) constructed an actual portfolio position of individual accounts in large retail 
brokerage houses along with demographic data available from the Individual Investor Research 
Project at Purdue University. Using a multiple regression model, the study was able to find 
evidence supporting the tax-induced clientele effect hypothesis. The results were explained by the 
cross-sectional variability of the individual‘s portfolio dividend yield. This variability is driven by 
age and the investor‘s differential tax rate between incomes from dividends versus capital gains. 
However, using the same database, Lewellen et al. (1978) found weak association between 
dividend yields of investors‘ portfolios and their marginal tax rates (Baker, 2009).  
In support of the tax effect hypothesis, Poterba and Summers (1984) used daily and 
monthly data of British securities to determine the effect of taxes on the relationship between 
dividend yield and stock market returns. The model tests the relationship using the after-tax 
(CAPM) described by Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1980). The findings provide evidence that 
dividend taxation has a substantial effect on the required premiums by investors who receive 
returns in the form of dividends.  
Other empirical studies show evidence against the tax effect hypothesis. Black and 
Scholes (1974) constructed 25 portfolios of high and low dividend yield stocks to find the 
relationship between dividend yields and stock returns. The results show that there is no statistical 
significance in determining the difference between high and low dividend yield stocks in terms of 
the impact on the return of stock prices either before or after taxes.  
Many studies since Black and Scholes (1974) attempted to find new data sources and 
more powerful empirical methods in order to explain the relationship between dividend yield and 
stock price under the existence of a tax differential between dividends and long-term capital 
gains. 
61
 Miller and Scholes (1978) criticized the methods used by these studies, which mainly 
attempted to determine the tax differential between income taxes on dividends and the lower 
                                                   
61 See Long et al. (1994), Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1980), Blume (1980), Gordon and Bradford 
(1980),  Morgan (1998), and Morgan and Thomas (1998). 
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taxes on capital gains by comparing the returns of dividend paying stocks and non-dividend 
paying stocks. They argued that this method is biased in favour of the returns of dividend 
announcements rather than the returns due to tax differentials.
62
 Other authors used different 
methodologies to disprove the tax theory. By examining ex-dividend returns of taxable and non-
taxable distributions, Eades et al. (1984) found no conclusive explanation of the phenomenon.  
More recently, Hassett and Auerbach (2006) studied the impact of the dividend income 
Tax Relief Act of 2003. The study reported that the tax cut has significantly affected the equity 
market such that dividend paying firms had experienced stock price increment along with 
dividend payment rather than a reduction in the cost of capital. On the other hand, non-dividend 
paying firms have experienced a reduction in their cost of finance and an investment stimulus, 
which is consistent with the dividend taxation hypothesis.  
Brav et al. (2008) surveyed 328 financial executives to determine the effect of the May 
2003 dividend tax cut. The results suggest that the tax cut led to dividend initiations and increases 
for some firms. However, executes reported that the tax rate reduction is less important that 
stability of future cash flows, cash holdings, and historic level of dividends. They reported that 
tax effects, in general, have the same importance as to meet the preference of institutional 
investors and the availability of profitable investment opportunities.  
3.5 INFORMATION SIGNALLING THEORY 
Information signalling theory argues that under perfect market conditions, information available 
to managers and directors are instantly available to other investors and to the public. In theory, 
everyone has an equal chance to profit from such information. However, reality may be different. 
It is widely believed that managers and directors (insiders) have superior knowledge of future 
projects, current results, and other valuable information that is unavailable, at least temporarily, to 
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  They re-examined whether holders of shares with higher dividend yields receive higher risk-adjusted 
rates of return to compensate for heavier taxes on dividend payments than on long-term capital gains. 
Miller and Scholes used an after tax capital asset pricing model (CAPM) used by Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
method of time-series pooling of cross-sectional coefficients. 
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investors and the public. The lag in information delivery between managers and shareholders is 
called information asymmetry. Regulators and lawmakers pass laws to prohibit managers and 
directors (insiders) from taking advantage of information asymmetry in order to protect investors 
and to enhance transparency in the market. 
Stemming from the fiduciary duties, which require them to maximize shareholders‘ 
value, managers and directors are urged to disclose information to shareholders in the best 
possible manner. This information would then be reflected on the current stock price, which 
would be otherwise under (over) valued. Therefore, if an investor sells their stock while 
information is withheld by insiders, then they will unfairly lose the difference in value between 
market price and the fair price.  
The information signalling theory of dividends argues that managements signal 
information to investors through dividend declarations. The market perceives a declaration, which 
is higher than expectation, as new information that increases the stock price by the present value 
of the payout difference. On the other hand, if a weak firm mimics a dividend declaration, it 
would not be able to sustain the dividend commitment in future. Consequently, its stock price will 
be reduced by an amount that is greater than the earlier gains because the firm has not only lost 
the effect on stock price induced by dividend paid previously but also incurs higher agency and 
financing costs due to lower credibility and market confidence.  
Information Signalling theory in the context of dividend policy was first introduced by 
Ross (1977), who created a theoretical model for dividend signalling. He studied the topics of 
capital structure and dividend irrelevance theories. He also used the concept of signalling in the 
context of job and product markets, which was introduced by Akerlof (1970) and Arrow (1972) 
and subsequently used by Spence (1974) in his equilibrium theory.  
Ross (1977) was able to formulate an incentive-based signalling model. The model is 
leveraged based on a cost structure of significant bankruptcy penalties for company managers 
(Bhattacharya, 1979). In his paper The determination of financial structure: the incentive-
signalling approach, Ross (1977) mentioned that considerable work is required before the model 
is ready for empirical testing. He proposed some suggestions to serve future research in this 
arena.  
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The work on signalling theory was further enhanced by Bhattacharya (1979), who 
developed a model similar to Ross‘s model in spirit and structure. The main difference between 
the two models is that Bhattacharya‘s model uses a tax-based signalling cost structure. It also 
accounts for the relative weights placed on the benefits and costs of signalling with dividends.  
In Bhattacharya‘s opinion Ross‘s model faces the difficulty that ―unless enforceable 
penalties of similar magnitude relative to the benefits of non-bankruptcy exist for shareholders, 
there is an incentive for shareholder to make a side payments to managers to induce false 
signalling by employing higher levels of debt‖ (1979: p.269) 
Miller and Rock (1985) argued that the full-information investment model for dividend 
and investment decisions is supported by numerous empirical research findings that suggest a 
relationship between dividend announcement and stock price. This relationship clearly implies 
information asymmetry. They suggested that information consistency between trading the firm‘s 
share and information asymmetry leads to a time correction (lag) in investment policy. However, 
information asymmetry leads to lower investment levels in the firm than the optimal level under 
full-information model.  
John and Williams (1985) found that insiders have more information about the firm and 
future cash flows than outsiders. Thus, in equilibrium, when insiders expect larger future cash 
flows, they tend to distribute larger dividends. As a result, the stock price will appreciate while 
external funding becomes necessary since dividends deplete internally generated funds. Firms 
distribute dividends and simultaneously sell new shares by raising their capital.  
In addition, John and Williams found evidence of a clientele effect, whereby firms 
distribute dividends according to their clients‘ preference. They also found a relationship between 
repeated dividends and corporate reputation. Thus, if neither the firm nor the stockholders 
demand cash, insiders would payout dividends to satisfy the image and reputation of the 
company.  
Baker et al. (1985) used the methodology of  Lintner (1956) to survey corporations listed 
on the NYSE to identify the determinants of dividend policy, examine the management‘s 
perception towards signalling and clientele effects, and to determine if the managers in different 
industries share the same views towards dividend policy. The results were very similar to those of 
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Lintner (1956) particularly those related to dividend continuity. The findings also show that 
managers believe that dividend policy has an effect on stock price. Therefore, dividend policy is 
considered a relevant management decision. The results also support the signalling and clientele 
effects. Finally, the study shows that managers in regulated firms have different perceptions 
towards dividends than those working in a more competitive environment.  
Moreover, Baker and Powell (1999) investigated the views of corporate managers about 
the relationship between dividend policy and value of the firm. The study explained dividend 
policy decisions in terms of various theories. It also attempted to find the main determinants of 
dividend policy. The survey was sent to 603 chief financial officers (CFOs) of companies listed 
on the NYSE. Only 198 usable responses were received for the study. The results show that the 
most widely known explanation for the relevance of dividend policy is related to signalling. It 
also shows that managers support the continuity and stability of dividends in order to maintain the 
market value of the firm.  
Some empirical evidence came against the information signalling hypothesis. Viswanath 
et al. (2002) examined dividend signalling hypothesis by focusing on the role of liquidity. For this 
purpose, data was collected for the changes in quarterly dividend of NYSE and AMEX listed 
firms from July 1986 to June 1995. The study allowed for two types of signaling models: one 
where dividends are employed to signal the firm value and to prevent current dilution and the 
other is to signal commitments for future dividends. The results are partly consistent (only pre-
1991 period) with the commitment model. This is explained by growing level of institutional 
ownership with longer investment horizon, and hence the signalling role is minimized when 
explaining the market reaction to dividend surprises. The findings also support the 
overinvestment and wealth-transfer hypotheses. 
More recently, Khang and King (2006) examined the relationship between dividends and 
information asymmetry. As a proxy for it, they used the returns of insider trades. The results 
show a negative relationship between the relative size of dividends and insider returns. The 
findings do not support the information signalling hypothesis. Thus, firms with higher dividends 
have lowest level of information asymmetry. Gunasekarage and Power (2006) examined the long-
run financial and return performance of UK companies. The companies are grouped together if 
they have changed their dividends and earnings. The results show that at the time of 
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announcement, returns in stock price tend to be positively (negatively) related to an increase 
(decrease) in dividends and earnings. In addition, there is evidence that the market has anticipated 
such dividend and earning announcements; however, such prediction did not signal the long-term 
performance of the firm. 
3.6 AGENCY COST THEORY  
The principal-agent problem arises when the agent (manager) owns less than 100% of the firm‘s 
share capital (Brigham and Daves, 2002). In this case, his/her interest may not be in line with the 
goal of maximizing shareholders‘ value. As a result, a vast amount of research has been 
conducted to solve this dilemma. The results suggest different treatments such as repackaging 
management compensation (e.g. bonus schemes and employee stock options) to better align the 
goals of agents and principals. Today, this practice is widespread in many industries and markets 
as a tool for mitigating agency conflict.  
Stemming from this argument, agency theory states that dividends act as a protection for 
investors because dividends reduce the excess cash available to managers after investment and 
operational activities. With the excess cash, managers may in good or bad faith invest it in less 
than desirable investment opportunities, which may have undesirable risk/return characteristics 
for the investors. Thus, the agency conflict will make the firm less attractive to investors, which 
will consequently increase the cost of capital. As a result, the value of the firm will fall.  
Gordon (1959) presented the bird-in-hand or the uncertainty hypothesis. As the name 
indicate, the author argues that dividends minimize the uncertainty associated with deffered 
dividend payments. Although such payments can be more than the dividend amount, this increase 
is more than offset by the increase in the required rate of return by investors. 
Rozeff (1982) developed a model of optimal dividend payout. The author argues that 
managers have to strike a balance between agency cost and transaction cost. This can be done 
through distributing the excess cash in order to avoid the agency cost while maintaining enough 
cash to cover the necessities thereby avoiding to raise external funds, which could lead to 
excessive transaction cost. To test the model, the author employed a cross-sectional analysis to 
relate dividend payout to the proportion of equity held by insiders, the past and expected future 
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revenue growth, the beta coefficient, and the number of common stockholders. The results show 
that dividends are significantly correlated with revenue growth, beta, and agency cost.  
Easterbrook (1984) elaborate on the agency cost argument by examining whether or not 
dividends mitigate the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. He suggested that 
paying dividends may push the management to use external financing, which brings professional 
and skilful monitoring entities to continually monitor the firm and eventually minimize the 
agency costs. Furthermore, Jensen (1986) proposes that if corporate managers hold excess cash 
after meeting all the commitments required to operate the company and future investments, they 
would be prone to consume the excess cash in a harmful way such as investing it in less than the 
desirable hurdle rate or spending it in unjustified expenditures (e.g. lavish offices). The author 
argues that the agency cost and free cash flow (FCF) hypotheses are theoretically justified and the 
available data does not refute it. 
Crutchley and Hansen (1989) found empirical support for the agency theory. The study 
reported a number of new findings. First, it found an inverse relationship between managerial 
common stock ownership and the degree of common stock diversification. Secondly, firms with 
more earning volatility, advertising expenses, R&D expenses, and flotation cost tend to have less 
leverage. In addition, managers incur an opportunity loss due to capital concentration in the firm. 
The researchers found that managers conduct cost-benefit analysis by substituting between 
ownership, leverage, and dividends to control for agency costs. 
Furthermore, Jensen et al. (1992) empirically showed that insider ownership, debt, and 
dividend policies have an indirect relationship with the operating characteristics of the firm. They 
examined cross-sectional differences between the three policies within a system of equations. The 
results supported the hypothesis that insider ownership differs systematically across firms. It also 
suggested that high insider ownership firms choose lower levels of both debt and dividends. 
Insider ownership is found to be related to variables that proxy for wealth gains from the potential 
control of the firm. Finally, they found that the effect of profitability, growth, and investment 
spending on debt and dividends support a modified pecking order hypothesis, whereby agency 
and bankruptcy costs are additional factors that affect the firm‘s financing decisions. 
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Blanchard et al. (1994) found evidence that supports the agency model of managerial 
behaviour towards using excess cash for the benefit of their own benefit rather than the interest of 
shareholders. More recently, Harford et al. (2008) claim that firms with weaker corporate 
governance have smaller cash reserves. The authors argue that firms with excess cash and weaker 
corporate governance have a tendency for cash spending on acquisitions or capital expenditures. 
3.7 BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE  
Behavioural finance theory of dividends states that individuals prefer dividend paying stocks even 
if they have to pay higher income taxes. The reason behind this preference is that investors want 
to follow a self-disciplined financial plan to grow their capital and prevent impulsive spending 
behaviour which tends to occur in the short-run. Investors care more about the periodicity of the 
dividend cash flow to cover their expenses and the restrictions of using capital gains which might 
induce unwanted spending habits. These habits interfere with the investors‘ long-term financial 
plan. In the eye of investors, benefits gained from self-discipline surpass the negative effect of tax 
differential to their wealth (Shefrin and Statman, 1984). 
Myers (1983) attributes the behaviour of investors as irrational if investors prefer 
dividends over capital gains despite the tax differential. However, considering that investors are 
rational economic agents, Shefrin and Statman (1984) presented a framework that describes the 
investor‘s preference for receiving dividends rather than capital gains. This framework was 
formulated based on the theory of self-control by Shefrin and Thaler (1988) and the theory of 
choice under uncertainty by Kahneman and Tversky (1979)  (Shefrin and Statman, 1984). Their 
argument is that under imperfect market conditions, dividends and capital gains are not perfect 
substitutes, rather, investors prefer dividends over capital gains due to reasons of self-discipline.  
Shefrin and Statman (1984) argue that stock dividends are also considered as income to 
investors. From a self-disciplinary point of view, investors avoid consuming from their own 
capital to meet their expenditures. They would rather sell the stock dividends to collect the sale 
proceeds as income. The authors also found that older investors have more preference for 
dividends than younger investors. The reason is that older investors, who are retired or near 
retirement age, have less (or no) income generated from salaries and therefore much of their 
consumption is dependent on dividends from stocks and/or pensions. This conclusion supports 
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Ross (1977), who found that the variability of portfolio composition of individual accounts is 
driven by age and differential tax rates. In addition, Brav et al. (2005) found support for the age 
phenomena through interviewing corporate financial managers. A similar result was found by 
Dong et al. (2005) in the Dutch market. 
An empirical study that supports the behavioural argument was conducted by Barber et 
al. (2000). The researchers analysed the portfolio holdings and trading activities of 78,000 
households at a large discount brokerage firm between the years 1991 and 1996. The aim of their 
research is to study the relationship between dividends and net withdrawals in order to understand 
how much of the dividend is used for personal consumption. Their assumption is that investors 
withdraw dividends from their brokerage account in order to consume it. The study reports a 
significant positive relationship between dividends and withdrawals, which reached 
approximately a one-to-one ratio for small dividends. This behaviour supports the hypothesis that 
dividends are used for consumption purposes (Baker, 2009).  
3.8 CLIENTELE AND SUBSTITUTION EFFECT 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) describe the clientele effect by stating that ―each firm has its own 
body of stockholders, who find its dividend policy optimum‖. This statement is the basis of what 
is called the clientele effect. The idea is that investors have different financial needs and 
investment objectives. For example, assuming that investors have a portfolio of investments, 
these investments are attuned to serve the investors‘ goal such as: high growth, capital 
preservation, income generation, and other types of strategies. These goals vary in terms of 
investor‘s age, family size, education expenses, career, employment package, and other 
characteristics. Therefore, regardless of whether the investor invests directly through the capital 
market or indirectly through mutual funds, s/he is keen to know that his/her investment goals are 
satisfied.  
Based on this argument, investors perceive and categorize stocks depending on their 
financial and operating characteristics. This perception creates a clientele base for each category 
of stocks. Therefore, changing the characteristics of firms (e.g. product line, investment and 
dividend policy, etc) could have an impact on the clientele. Depending on the magnitude of the 
change, investors could exit the company by selling its stock and buying another one that meets 
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their goal. This is known as the substitution effect.
 63
 This action could, on a large scale, create 
selling pressures that negatively impact the stock price. However, normally and over the long-run, 
firm characteristics change (e.g. maturity level). In this case, the substitution effect on stock price 
would be negligible. The reason is that the substitution process is offset by new investors 
purchasing the stock, as it becomes more suitable to their investment objectives. This action helps 
maintain a long-term equilibrium.  
Baker et al. (1985) agree with the clientele argument that different investors‘ preferences 
form a clientele effect. They highlighted two reasons behind the effect. The first reason is the 
variation in perception towards risk associated with retaining earnings. The second reason is the 
taxation effect. The author found evidence for signalling and clientele effect after surveying 
NYSE-listed firms.  
More recently, Brav et al. (2005) found that despite the large tax disadvantage of 
dividends, retail investors prefer cash dividends. The authors interviewed financial managers who 
argued that dividends are an essential factor to attract retail investors. They also mentioned that 
the preference of dividends grows with age. 
Furthermore, Graham and Kumar (2006) analysed the portfolio holdings and trading 
behaviour of 60,000 households in the US for the period between 1991 and 1996. The analysis 
showed that retail investors in general prefer non-dividend paying stocks. Their preference of 
dividend paying stocks increases with age and decreases with income. On the other hand, 
institutions prefer to hold dividend paying stocks. The findings also shows that investors above 
45 year old and low income investors, who earn below USD45,000 per annum, have a tendency 
to purchase dividend paying stocks following the dividend announcement and before the ex-
dividend day. The overall analysis shows evidence that is consistent with the dividend induced 
clientele effect. 
                                                   
63 Scholes (1972) argues that the capital market prices assets such that the expected rate of return of an 
asset with similar risk is equal (i.e. equilibrium condition). Hence, if any asset provides higher return with 
the same risk, a substitution effect in the form of arbitrage takes place to absorb any profit opportunities.   
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3.9 GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS 
A good example of the application of the dividend theories on a global scale is presented by La 
Porta et al. (2000). They argue that dividends are paid due to pressure exerted by minority 
shareholders upon the managers (insiders). On the other hand, insiders, who expect to raise their 
firm‘s capital, try to establish a reputation that their treatment of minority interests is decent. The 
study found that stronger minority rights are positively correlated with higher dividend payouts. 
The study tested the proposed model across 4,000 companies listed on the stock exchanges of 33 
countries. The researchers argue that the reason to look across different markets is that the agency 
problem against minority shareholders varies between countries due to differences in legal 
systems and minority protection laws. The study found that in countries where legal protection to 
minority shareholders is present, investors try to use their legal power to extract dividends 
especially when reinvestment opportunities are poor.  
Other researchers applied the Lintner model in different countries to check for its 
robustness. Dewenter and Warther (1998) conducted a comparative study on dividend policy 
between U.S. and Japanese corporations. They used a sample of listed companies in 1983 from 
S&P 500 and all the Japanese companies listed in the Morgan Stanley Capital International Index 
excluding financial and utility companies. The study found that the Lintner model is applicable to 
Japanese firms. However, on average, the speed of adjustment for Japanese firms is faster than 
that for U.S. firms. It also shows that Japanese firms to cut dividends in response to poor 
performance much quicker than U.S. firms.  
Goergen et al. (2005) examined the tendency to change dividend for German firms 
between 1984 and 1993 and by applying the Lintner model. The found that, similar to the model, 
net earnings is a key component of the model. However, several modifications were suggested to 
improve the model. First, when a loss occurs, it should be included in the model in addition to the 
level of net earnings. Second, the results show that dividend cuts and omission has a temporary 
effect unlike in the US and UK where dividends are reduced along with earning long term 
deterioration. This minimizes the role of information signalling among German firms. Finally, 
firms owned by banks tend be more willing to cut their dividends compared to others. 
83 
 
Recently, Denis and Osobov (2008) examined the dividend payment behaviour in the US, 
Canada, UK, Germany, France, and Japan. The results show that more profitable firms, and those 
with high level of retained earnings as a percentage of total equity, tend to have stronger 
propensity to pay dividends. Although the data between 1994 and 2002 show lower tendency for 
dividend payment, such tendency is attributed to failure of newly listed firms to initiate dividends. 
In aggregate terms, dividends have not declines and it is concentrated among the larger and more 
profitable firms. Outside the US, there is little evidence of a positive relationship between the 
relative prices of dividend paying and non-paying firms and the propensity for dividend payment. 
The overall findings minimize the role of signaling, clientele, and catering hypothesis and support 
agency sot-based lifecycle theories for the explanation of dividend payment. 
3.10 EMERGING MARKETS 
Emerging markets are gaining more focus and greater recognition from institutional investors in 
the developed world due to attractive growth opportunities and market liberalization efforts in 
recent years. As a result, many researchers are conducting comparative analysis in the areas of 
finance, legal, and economics to mitigate possible obstacles that may arise from investing in 
emerging markets. Among the possible differences between emerging and developed markets are 
the capital structure and dividend policy practices (Aivazian et al., 2003).   
One of the earlier empirical work in emerging markets was by Mookerjee (1992). The 
researcher applied the Lintner model to the Indian market. Using annual data for the period 1950 
to 1980, he found that the model in its basic form explains the aggregate dividend behaviour of 
the Indian market. However, when the model is augmented with external finance, it has a stronger 
explanatory power. The finding suggests that the dividend policy of Indian firms is affected by 
their ability to acquire external finance. In addition, Glen et al. (1995) observed a payout ratio of 
companies in emerging markets and found that it is substantially lower than those in developed 
markets. 
Kumar and Tsetsekos (1999) argue that emerging markets are different from industrial 
markets not only in terms of economic development but also in terms of maturity. The 
development of institutional infrastructure and legal framework is primitive or absent in emerging 
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markets. The researchers used logit and discriminant analysis to arrive at this fact. They also 
suggested that as emerging markets develop, these differences will be constantly reduced. 
In addition, Manos (2001) examined the dividend policies of firms in the context of 
emerging markets. The researcher used a cost minimisation regression model to test the factors 
that affect the dividend policy in India. The study used a sample size of 880 observations taken 
from listed companies on the Bombay Stock Exchange. The results are consistent with the cost 
minimization model. They also show a positive impact of foreign ownership and ownership 
dispersion upon the dividend payout. In addition, business risk, growth, and insider ownership 
shows negative effect on dividend levels.  
Furthermore, Aivazian et al. (2003) argued that most signalling and agency cost models 
assume separation of ownership and control. They also assumed that financing is raised externally 
through capital markets. However, there is little separation of ownership and control of firms in 
emerging markets and they also rely heavily on bank financing. Therefore, clear channels of 
communication that give access to confidential and insider information is available to banks. This 
reduces the need for signalling and agency controls through dividend payments.  
The researchers stress the importance of studying dividend policy under different 
institutional and capital market settings. They examined a sample of firms from eight emerging 
markets and compared them to 99 firms from the US. The results show that dividend policies in 
emerging markets and in the US react similarly to certain variables. However, the sensitivity 
towards these variables differs across countries. 
Aivazian et al. (2003) results show that high return on equity (ROE) ratio is positively 
associated with high dividend payments, which suggests a strong support for the residual theory. 
In addition, high debt ratios tend to lower dividend payments meaning that financial constraints 
have a significant effect on the dividend policy. Furthermore, high market-to-book ratios 
positively influence dividend payments. Lastly, it was found that in emerging markets dividends 
are negatively related to tangibility. 
Pinkowitz et al. (2006) employed the valuation regression model developed to examine 
the relationship between cash holdings and firm value in countries with relatively poor investor 
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protection laws. The findings support the agency theories as the relation between dividends and 
firm value were found to be weaker in countries with stronger investor protection laws.  
Pandey and Bhat (2007) investigated the effect of monetary policy restrictions on the 
dividend behaviour of Indian firms. They used a balanced panel data of 571 firms for the years 
1989 to 1997 along with a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator, which controls for 
autocorrelation and multiple correlations. The results show that Indian firms have a lower payout 
target ratios and higher adjustment factors. It also suggests that the monetary policy restrictions 
reduced the payout ratios by 5 to 6 percent. The findings suggest that macro-economic variables 
and monetary policy restrictions have an impact on the cost of raising funds, and the information 
asymmetry, which forces companies to reduce their dividend payouts. 
3.11 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the main theories and empirical studies on dividend policy were presented. The 
theories on dividend policy are as follows: 
– Dividend irrelevance hypothesis: the theory argues that, in the absence of market impurities 
(e.g. taxation, information asymmetry, brokerage commissions …etc), the firm‘s value would 
be independent of the dividend policy. If investors are not satisfied with the amount of 
dividend, they could create homemade dividends by selling part of their stocks. Hence 
managers should consider dividend policies as irrelevant decisions.  
– Residual dividend theory and free cash flow hypotheses: the hypotheses argue that in order to 
avoid agency costs, excess cash should be returned to shareholders. Otherwise, the value of 
the firm will be negatively impacted.  
– Tax Effect Hypothesis: proponents of this hypothesis argue that in many markets, taxes on 
dividend income are higher than capital gains. As such, investors would prefer firms, which 
pay lower dividends, to avoid paying higher taxes. Based on this assumption, managers 
should avoid paying dividends to maintain the firm‘s value.  
– Information signalling hypothesis: the hypothesis assumes the existence of information 
asymmetry between managers and investors. This information gap may negatively affect the 
value of the firm, when new information occurs. Hence, managers employ dividends as a 
signalling device to deliver new information to the market, and hence correct the stock price.  
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– Agency cost theory: the hypothesis argues that investors prefer to receive dividends to avoid 
agency conflict. They assume that managers would misuse excess cash by spending it on 
undesirable investments and expenditures.  
– Behavioural finance theory: the theory states that investors employ dividends as a tool for 
controlling their consumption behaviour. Investors try to avoid consuming capital gains, and 
would rather follow a more restrictive plan by limiting their consumption on the amount of 
dividends they receive.  
– Clientele and substitution effect: the hypothesis argues that firms have their own clientele. If 
any of the firm‘s characteristics (e.g. dividend policy) is altered, investors would substitute 
their investments to others that suffice their preference. Depending on the speed of change 
and the substitution intensity, the value of the firm could be negatively impacted.  
– Global Implications and Emerging markets: the applicability of dividend theories is not 
universal across different countries. The reason is due to the effect of contextual factors (e.g. 
economic, legal, taxation, regulation, political framework …etc) on the appetite for 
dividends.  
 Several gaps were identified in the theoretical and empirical review presented in this 
chapter, which are as follows: 
1. Most of the research effort on dividend policy focuses on the developed markets and it 
rarely covers emerging markets.  
2. Most of the research effort on dividend policy focuses on non-regulated firms. The reason 
is that researchers believe that regulated firms are controlled by external bodies (e.g. 
government authorities and regulatory bodies) (Partington, 1985). Hence, very few studies 
were found that discusses the banking industry. These studies suggest that the determinants 
of the payout policy of banks are different from other industries (Dickens et al., 2002). 
3. No articles were found that cover the determinants of the payout policy of Islamic banks. 
However, few studies were found that address the payout policy from a Shari’ah or pure 
accounting perspectives with no reference to the factors that affect the payout 
distributions.
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64 See section 2.5.   
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4. Although investors play a major role in formulating the dividend policy, only two studies 
on investors‘ perspective were found.65 
5. Most research on dividend policy is based on a single approach (e.g. econometric 
modelling, questionnaire, or interview). This puts a limit on the depth, reliability, and 
validity of findings.  
To address the above gaps and limitations in dividend policy literature, this research 
paper aims at focusing on a new industry, which is the Islamic banking sector. This industry has 
its own characteristics as its part of a regulated industry, which was rarely studied before. It is 
also considered as a special case because, unlike conventional banks, the payout policy of Islamic 
banks involves interplay between the distributions of depositors and shareholders. On the other 
hand, this study will focus on the GCC market, which is a new and evolving area and has 
different characteristics than the rest of the world. Finally, unlike previous studies, which mainly 
use a single approach methodology, this study employs multiple approaches such as: 
questionnaire, interview, and econometric modelling. This comprehensive research methodology 
aims to enhance the robustness of results.   
  
                                                   
65 These studies are Dong et al. (2005) and Maditinos et al. (2007). For more details, refer to section 4.2. 
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4 CHAPTER 4: THE PERSPECTIVE OF GCC INVESTORS TOWARDS PAYOUT 
POLICIES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
There is ample evidence that investors prefer to receive dividends.
66
 Investors interact with 
dividend decisions made by corporate managers through their influence on the stock price and the 
shareholders‘ general assembly. Hence, investors play a major role in the determination of the 
dividend policy. Brav et al. (2005) concluded his research on managers‘ perspectives by stating 
that: ―At this point we can only speculate about what causes individual investors to prefer 
dividends‖ (Dong et al., 2005). Therefore, it is important to directly examine the perception of 
investors in order to avoid speculations caused by indirect methods of research.  
In this chapter, a survey is conducted to understand how investors perceive payout policies 
in the GCC. The results of this study will be expanded and complemented with the managers‘ 
survey, which is reported in the next chapter. The managers‘ survey aims to describe the payout 
process and to identify the determinants of payout distributions of Islamic banks. In the last 
chapter of this thesis, the results of both studies will be summarized by formulating an 
econometric model that describes the payout policy of Islamic banks.  
The main contribution of this study is that although investors are essential in the 
formulation of dividend policy, studies that focus on investors‘ perception towards dividend 
policies are rare. Only two studies were found namely: Dong et al. (2005) on the Dutch market 
and Maditinos et al. (2007) on the Greek market. The second contribution of the study is that an 
investors‘ survey methodology was used for the first time in the GCC while other studies on 
dividend policy focused on econometric modelling only.
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Chapter 4 is organized as follows. Section 4.2 contains selected empirical studies to form 
the theoretical framework. Section 4.3 is an overview of the GCC market to help contextualize 
the research environment. Section 4.4 delineates the research methodology used for the study, 
                                                   
66 For more details, refer to chapter 3 on literature review. 
67 See Al Yahyaee (2006) and Al-Kuwari (2009). 
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which contains the questionnaire design and development process, goodness of measure, 
sampling, data collection strategies, and statistical inference. Section 4.5 statistically describes the 
results. In Section 4.6, the questionnaire results are analysed based on the dividend theories 
covered in chapter 3 and partially in section 4.2 on selected literature review. Section 4.7 
generalizes the results on the GCC states. Finally, section 4.8 contains the conclusion, limitations, 
and recommendations for future research. 
4.2 SELECTED EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
This section contains the empirical studies that are relevant to the methodology used for 
investors‘ survey based research. A dilatation of dividend theories and related empirical studies is 
found in chapter 3.  
Dong et al. (2005) have recognized the importance of investors‘ perception to dividend 
policy. They argue that dividend policy depends on the behaviour of individual investors as 
learned from the early work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Gordon (1959) to recent 
behavioural finance theories. Although there is general agreement between researchers that 
investors prefer receiving dividends, most of the dividend-related research methodologies have 
focused solely on corporate managers and mathematical modeling. The author claimed that no 
research studies have so far focused on investors themselves in an attempt to find the reasons 
behind dividend preference. 
Dong et al. (2005) surveyed the perception of investors towards dividends using a 
questionnaire that covers the main theories written on the topic. The survey was conducted on a 
sample of Dutch household members of a voluntary panel that answers family financial and 
consumer related questionnaires.
68
 By using the data panel, the authors ensured a large response 
rate while minimizing questionnaire-related issues such as administration and question 
comprehension. The questionnaire was sent to 2723 household members from whom 555 usable 
responses were received.  
                                                   
68 This panel is CentER data panel, a division of the faculty of Economics and Business Administration of 
Tilburg University in the Netherlands. 
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The results of Dong et al. (2005) show that investors have a strong preference to receive 
dividends. A possible reason is that investors try to avoid transaction costs.
69
 The preference to 
receive dividends suggests that the dividend policy is a relevant decision.  
The results of Dong et al. (2005) did not show support for the uncertainty resolution 
theory of Gordon (1959) nor for the behavioural finance theory of Shefrin and Statman (1984) 
except for the fact that investors prefer to receive stock dividends if cash dividends are not 
distributed. On the other hand, the results show support for the signaling theories of Bhattacharya 
(1979) and Miller and Rock (1985). However, it did not find support for the agency theories of 
Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986).  
Similar to previous research efforts that focus on specific markets, it is difficult to 
generalize the results of one market (i.e. the Dutch market) on the entire investor population. 
Hence, it is suggested that further research is conducted on different countries to get a clear and 
more comprehensive picture. To fill this gap, and by following the footsteps of Dong et al. 
(2005), Maditinos et al. (2007) conducted an investors‘ survey study in Greece. They attempted 
to understand the investors‘ perception of dividends in a different context. For this purpose, they 
utilized a modified version of the questionnaire introduced by Dong et al. (2005) taking into 
consideration certain properties of the Greek capital market.  
Their questionnaire was translated into Greek using plain and clear language in order for 
Greek investors to fully comprehend it. The questionnaire was sent to a sample of 750 investors 
distributed through exchange listed companies. 248 respondents completed the questionnaire. 
Similar to Dong et al. (2005), the study show that investors have a strong preference for 
dividends. The majority preferred cash dividends while a small number of the wealthier and more 
educated investors preferred stock dividends. However, unlike Dong et al. (2005), the results 
show that Greek investors are not motivated by the lower transaction cost associated with 
receiving cash dividends. On the other hand, the results are not in favour of the uncertainty 
                                                   
69 If dividends are withheld as capital gains, investors can create homemade dividends by selling the stock 
in the market. This usually involves a transaction cost in the form of brokerage and transaction 
commission.  
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resolution theory of Gordon (1959) which stipulates that investors perceive companies that pay 
more dividend as less risky than others. 
Furthermore, the results show that Greek investors consume most of their dividends. 
They do not tend to save or reinvest them. They seem to treat their income from salary and 
dividends as one consumption pool. In addition, investors prefer to receive stock dividends if cash 
dividends are not available. However, Investors are not satisfied with intangible assets that do not 
pay real profits. These results support the behavioural finance theory of Shefrin and Statman 
(1984). Finally, the results show support for the signalling theory of Bhattacharya (1979) as 
investors believe that dividends are a signal of the firm‘s future profitability.  
4.3 OVERVIEW OF THE GCC70 
The GCC cartel was established on May 25
th
 1981. It comprises of six states situated on the 
Arabian Gulf namely: Kuwait, Saudi, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman. These 
states share the same geography, history, ethnicity, language and traditions. With the advent of 
the GCC, the laws and regulations, especially those related to the organization of trade, have 
become unified in order to improve economic cooperation between the states.  
The GCC is known for being the world‘s centre of oil production as it produces 15.009 
million barrels per day, representing 20.8 percent of the world‘s production in 2004. From an 
economic perspective, the overall GDP of the GCC states for 2007 was USD 823 billion. The 
overall population is 36.2 million and the average income per capita is USD 22,800, which makes 
the GCC states amongst the wealthiest nations in the world.  
As a result of the surge in oil prices in recent years, GCC governments have significantly 
increased spending reaching USD 325.2 billion dollars in 2008.
71
 The geographic location and 
                                                   
70 The information is sourced from the official GCC website at: http://www.gcc-sg.org, last accessed on 
Sept. 29th 2010. In order to read the data provided in this section objectively and to avoid any bias caused 
by the economic crisis occurred in the last quarter of 2008, the data collected is as of 2008 or before. 
Information providers (e.g. Reuters, Bloomberg, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)) may provide 
up-to-date economic figures on GCC states. 
71 Global Research – GCC Economic Outlook June 2011. The report is available at: 
http://www.global.com.kw last accessed on Sept. 29th 2011. 
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high liquidity of the GCC have assisted in the emergence of strong capital markets and trade 
centres (e.g. Jabal Ali). A result, subsidiaries and branches of major international banks, telecom, 
oil and gas, and other major institutions are spread across the area. These entities has re-enforced 
the local markets and economic growth across the board.  
4.3.1 GCC Capital Markets72 
The stock markets in the GCC are considered the largest in the Middle East in market 
capitalization and volume. These markets are highly advanced in terms of regulations and 
technology. Some stock exchanges are electronically linked with commercial banks, clearing and 
settlement agencies, and brokerage firms in order to give fast and reliable executions. The 
deregulations, technology, and high liquidity have been the main contributors to the development 
of the GCC capital markets.  
Table ‎4.1 - GCC Market Statistics (as of 2007) 
Stock 
Exchange 
Transaction 
(USD billion) 
Volume 
(mn shares) 
Value 
(USD billion) 
% 
Market Cap 
(USD billion) 
% 
Listed 
Companies 
Index 
Gains 
Kuwait 2,101.10 70,432.80 135.50 13.49 210.50 18.59 196.00 30.00 
Saudi  65,665.50 58,862.00 682.10 67.88 519.00 45.83 111.00 40.90 
Bahrain 27.70 851.10 1.10 0.11 27.00 2.38 51.00 26.50 
Qatar 1,811.80 3,411.30 29.90 2.98 95.50 8.43 40.00 40.40 
UAE 3,354.60 157,318.10 151.00 15.03 257.40 22.73 120.00 33.60 
Oman 564.20 298,910.00 5.20 0.52 23.00 2.03 200.00 61.90 
Total 73,524.90 589,785.30 1,004.80  1,132.40  718.00 73,525 
Source: Global GCC Investor‘s Guide – 2007 published by Global Investment House – Kuwait 
 
Following global economic growth in 2007 and the hike in oil prices, the GCC markets 
gained 37.25% on average. The highest gainers were the Omani, Saudi and Qatari markets 
respectively. The largest 100 companies in the GCC gained more than USD 314.43 billion in 
market capitalization, which resembles a growth of 54.57%.  
By 2007, more than 718 companies were listed in GCC stock exchanges and the number 
has grown rapidly since then. These companies are local and international companies from 
                                                   
72 The information is sourced from the Global GCC Investor‘s Guide – 2007 published by Global 
Investment House – Kuwait. The report is available at: http://www.global.com.kw last accessed on Sept. 
29th 2010.  
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different industrial sectors. It form a total market cap of USD 1,132.4 billion while the largest 100 
companies in terms of market capitalization form USD 890.66 billion, which represents 78.6 % of 
the total market size. 
According to table 4.1, the cumulative value of trade in the GCC markets is USD 293.8 
compared to USD 165.9 billion in the previous year. The highest stock exchanges in terms of 
listings are the Omani, Kuwaiti, and UAE markets respectively. However, in terms of market 
capitalization the largest stock exchanges are the Saudi, UAE, and Kuwaiti markets respectively, 
which represent 87.18% of the GCC markets combined. On the other hand, the most liquid 
exchanges in value of trade are the Saudi, UAE, and Kuwaiti markets, which represent 96.4% of 
the total value of trade.  
4.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
The research methodology encompasses the analysis of different methods of scientific 
investigation in an attempt to select the most valid and appropriate method for the problem at 
hand (Roberts, 1971, Al-Hajji, 2003). In this section, the research methodology for this study is 
described.  
Figure  4.1 – Conceptual Framework 
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The goal of the research study in this chapter is to learn how GCC investors perceive the 
payout distributions, which comprises of cash and stock dividends, share repurchasing, and the 
profit distributions on PSIA offered by Islamic banks. For this purpose, the researcher tested the 
applicability of dividend theories from mainstream finance in the context of the GCC. Figure 4.1, 
shows how these theories, which may influence the perception of investors towards payout 
distributions.  
In order to achieve meaningful results, a suitable research methodology should be 
followed. This methodology should ensure an adequate degree of generalizability, validity, and 
reliability of results. This section discusses these issues at greater depth by focusing on the 
research hypotheses, research method, goodness of measure, and sampling techniques.  
4.4.1 Research Hypotheses 
The aim of this research study is to understand how investors perceive payout policies in the 
GCC. Hence the research question is: 
“How do investors perceive payout distributions?” 
The research question can be disseminated into several hypotheses, each of which 
belongs to certain dividend theory(ies). These hypotheses are used as tools for wording the 
questions in the questionnaire and as a framework for analysis. The theoretical basis for these 
hypotheses is covered in chapter 3. In this section, the research hypotheses are written in the 
alternative hypothesis format (positive relation) for illustrative purposes. As such, the researcher 
attempts to reject the null hypothesis (negative relation) in order to validate the alternative 
hypothesis.  
The first hypothesis is based on the dividend relevance hypothesis, which argues that 
investors have a preference for dividends. Based on this preference, they would react to dividend 
declarations by altering the stock price. Hence, management should consider the dividend policy 
as a relevant and important decision to maintain the value of the firm. 
H1: Investors prefer to receive dividends.   
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Hypothesis 2, 3, 4, and 5 cover the agency theories and the negative effect of agency cost 
on the firm‘s value. These theories are the uncertainty resolution and bird-in-the-hand, window 
dressing, free cash flow, and monitoring cost hypotheses. The second hypothesis H2 covers the 
uncertainty resolution hypothesis, which argues that investors prefer to receive the free cash flow 
instead of facing uncertainty associated with future cash flow.  
H2: Investors prefer to receive dividends in order to avoid the uncertainty of future cash 
flows.   
The third hypothesis is related to the window dressing hypothesis which states that 
investors believe that dividends reduce the ability of firms to manipulate or ―window dress‖ their 
financial results. 
H3: Investors give more credibility to the financials of firms that pay relatively higher 
cash dividends.   
The fourth hypothesis addresses the free-cash-flow hypothesis, which argues that 
dividends reduce the available cash with managers, and hence, reduce the tendency of spending it 
on less than desirable investments and expenditures.    
H4: Investors prefer to receive dividends in order to reduce the excess cash available 
with managers, which can be used inefficiently.  
The fifth hypothesis is based on the monitoring cost hypothesis. The hypothesis argues 
that by regularly paying dividends, firms will repeatedly need to increase its capital and hence, it 
will be exposed to scrutiny by creditors, investors and regulators. This scrutiny minimizes the 
agency cost and acts in favour of investors.  
H5: Investors believe that by regularly receiving dividends, managers will often require 
capital increases and as a result will be subject to constant monitoring activity by regulators, 
which reduces the agency cost.   
The sixth hypothesis is based on the information signalling hypothesis, which argues that 
corporate managers use dividends as a device to convey information about the future profitability 
of the firm and hence, maintain the firm‘s fair value.  
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H6: Investors perceive a dividend increase (decrease) as a signal of future improvement 
(deterioration) in profitability.   
Hypotheses 7, 8, 9 and 10 are related to the Lintner model. Lintner (1956) argues that 
firms attempt to smooth dividends using a targeted payout ratio and speed of adjustments. Firms 
try their best to avoid dividend reduction as it may have a negative impact on the stock price. The 
reason is that investors perceive firms with stable payouts (i.e. dividends and profits on PSIA) as 
stronger and more valuable. Hypotheses 9 and 10 address the theory in the context of PSIA profit 
distributions. 
H7: In assessing the quality of dividends, investors compare it with the distribution of 
last year.   
H8: Investors perceive firms with consistent dividends as more stable and valuable. 
H9: In assessing the quality of a PSIA distribution, depositors compare it with the 
distribution of last year.   
H10: Depositors perceive firms with consistent PSIA distributions as more stable and 
valuable.  
Hypothesis 11 is based on the competitive payout hypothesis, which argues that investors 
assess the value of dividends by comparing it to the dividends paid by competitors. Hypothesis 12 
addresses the concept in the context of Islamic banks.  
H11: In assessing the quality of dividends, investors compare it with the distribution of 
competitors. 
H12: In assessing the quality of a PSIA distribution, depositors compare it with the 
distribution of competitors.   
Hypothesis 13 is related to the clientele and substitution effects. The hypotheses argue 
that each firm has its own clientele. Hence, if the firm decides to change its dividend policy, a 
possible substitution effect would be ignited forcing investors to sell the stock and purchase 
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another stock that addresses their preferences. As a consequence of the selling pressure, the firm‘s 
stock price will be negatively affected.  
H13: Changing the dividend policy creates a substitution effect and a selling pressure, 
which negatively affect the stock price.    
Hypothesis 14 argues that investors perceive share repurchasing programme as a positive 
signal. It argues that the programmes indicate that the firm‘s stock price is undervalued.  
H14: Announcement of share repurchasing program indicates that the stock price is 
undervalued.  
Hypothesis 15 argues that the main reason why investors open accounts with Islamic 
banks is the religious motive.
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H15: There is a positive relationship between religious motives and demand for accounts 
at Islamic banks. 
Hypothesis 16 is related to the behavioural finance hypothesis that investors employ 
dividends as a tool of self-discipline to help them control their consumption habits and preserve 
their capital.  
H16: Investors employ dividends to self-impose conservative consumption behaviour.  
4.4.2 Questionnaire Development Process 
In order to achieve the objectives of this research and to ensure the generalizability of findings, a 
proper research method should be selected and tested using a relatively large and meaningful 
sample. For this purpose, the researcher selected a survey approach which uses a questionnaire 
method. This method is a widely used tool for large scale investigations (Easterby-Smith et 
al.,1991). 
                                                   
73 See Metwally (1996), Metawa and Almossaqi (1998), Al-Sultan (1999). 
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The main advantage of the questionnaire method is that it is cost effective and can be 
distributed to a large population in a relatively short time compared to other methods (Easterby-
Smith et al.,1991). The questions in the questionnaire should be carefully selected in order to 
ensure the validity and reliability of results (Easterby-Smith et al.,1991). Due to the usefulness 
and suitability of the questionnaire method to the context of investors‘ survey research, Dong et 
al. (2005) and Maditinos et al. (2007) used it to obtain their research data.  
Certain potential problems are associated with the questionnaire method. Graham and 
Harvey (2001) argued that the respondents may not be representative of the population under 
investigation. In addition, the survey questions could be misunderstood by respondents, and 
therefore, false information could be delivered. Finally, the survey could be measuring beliefs but 
not necessarily actions (Dong et al., 2005).  
To mitigate the potential problems associated with the use of questionnaires, several 
techniques were implemented. First, in order to avoid a representation problem of the sample 
used in the study, the researcher attempted to increase the sample size through the aid of 
electronic questionnaires sent to targeted audience via emails and internet posts. In addition, the 
researcher employed a reward system in the form of charity contribution upon questionnaire 
completion. This method has significantly increased the sample size.
74
  
Second, to avoid the potential problem of respondents giving false information, the 
researcher applied statistical techniques to ensure the validity and reliability of the results. For 
instance, concepts were addressed by different questions, which are expected to give similar 
results.
75
 Furthermore, the researcher preferred to use a published questionnaire that has gone 
through academic scrutiny. This covers language barriers, reliability and validity tests, 
psychological tests, and other measures that are required to assure compliance with academic 
standards. Other questionnaire induced biases related to political and social aspects are not 
threatening due to the nature of the topic (Dong et al., 2005).  
                                                   
74 Refer to section 4.4.5. 
75 Refer to section 4.4.4. 
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A suitable questionnaire was designed to address the purpose and requirements of the 
research study. The questionnaire development process is depicted in figure 4.2. The process 
starts with a thorough review of selected articles to come up with a preliminary design of the 
questions. This design is then translated into Arabic, which is the preferred language for the 
questionnaire recipients. The translated questionnaire is then reviewed and discussed in a focus 
group. The outcome is then used to amend the questionnaire. Next, a pilot test is conducted to 
ensure the validity and reliability of the draft questionnaire. Upon completion of the pilot study, 
the questionnaire is modified and presented for academic approval before the research study is 
launched. A detailed discussion of these steps is covered in this section.  
         Figure  4.2 – Questionnaire Development 
 
4.4.2.1 Preliminary Design 
Only two papers were found that focus on investors‘ survey namely: Dong et al. (2005), and 
Maditinos et al. (2007). Both are based on the questionnaire developed by Dong et al. (2005). The 
same template was used to develop the questionnaire. However, modifications were made as 
necessary to fit the GCC context and the research purpose. These modifications are explicitly 
discussed in section 4.4.3.   
The questionnaire was translated into Arabic in a plain and unambiguous language in 
order to address the theoretical interpretations and terminologies correctly. The translated 
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questionnaire was then sent to a professional translator for reassurance and to generate a reverse 
translated questionnaire into English
76
. The latter copy is produced for comparison with the 
original version of the questionnaire to ensure consistency. After the modifications are performed, 
the questionnaire draft and the reverse translation
77
 were reviewed by academics in the field of 
finance and accountancy from Durham Business School and Kuwait University. The 
questionnaire draft was then discussed and reviewed in a focus group.  
4.4.2.2 Focus Group 
A focus group, or group interview, is an interview where a group of individuals (between 5 and 
10 people) gather to discuss a certain issue. It usually takes the form of a loosely structured 
conversation steered by the interviewer or moderator. The interviewer plays a major role in 
controlling and facilitating the discussion so that all interviewees share their opinions in a 
constructive discussion. Interaction between participants may result in the creation of new and 
innovative ideas (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991).  
To assess the draft questionnaire of this research, a focus group was formed. The 
participants were selected from client relations and trading departments in a financial brokerage 
company based in Kuwait. The reason behind this selection is that those participants are well 
acquainted with the market jargon and the mentality level of clients. Eight people participated in 
the test which took ten days to accomplish.  
The focus group met in two sessions. The first session was to discuss the topic in general 
terms and to suggest the questions that should be incorporated in the questionnaire. At the end of 
the session, a draft copy of the questionnaire was handed to each member of the group. The 
participants were requested to fill out the questionnaire while commenting on the language 
clarity, terminology and whether or not it addressed the purpose. In the second session of the 
focus group, the participants handed back their copies of the questionnaire form with their 
                                                   
76 See Appendix 1.A for the English version of the questionnaire and Appendix 1.I for the Arabic version. 
77 See Appendix 1.C. 
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answers and feedback. The researcher then discussed the draft form in general and if it properly 
addressed the purpose of this research. 
The comments received from participants during focus group were mainly related to 
spelling errors, grammar, punctuation, and question clarification. Other participants commented 
that some of the questions were long and ambiguous. The researcher interviewed the participants 
in order to clarify the comments and to collect feedback and suggestions.
78
 As reported by 
participants, the average completion period for the questionnaire was between 15 to 20 minutes.  
4.4.2.3 Pilot Study 
Before conducting a full-scale study, a pilot study is recommended. The pilot study is a smaller 
scale study with the aim to identify strengths and limitations in the research study by assessing its 
design, methodology and feasibility (Cherry and Jacob, 2005). The pilot study is performed to 
test the validity and reliability of the questionnaire before the full-scale study is launched.
79
  
 For the pilot study, the same data collection method as the full-scale study is followed in 
order to achieve representative results. The study started on Feb 1
st
 2010 and ended on March 1
st
 
2010. Fifty-three responses were received. Validity and reliability analysis were performed. For 
the validity test, the KMO results were 0.63 (0.00 significance), which indicates that the data is 
suitable for factor analysis. The reliability test for items gave a Cronbach‘s alpha results between 
0.7 and 0.8. The results indicate that the questionnaire is adequate for the full-scale study.
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4.4.3 Questionnaire Design and Structure 
Compared to the original version of the questionnaire in Dong et al. (2005), several modifications 
were made to match the case of the GCC and Islamic banking. Although some of the amendments 
are justified through academic literature and the situation in the GCC, many were suggested by 
the researcher, academics, members of the focus group and the pilot test.  
                                                   
78 See section 4.4.3. 
79 For more details on validity, reliability, and related tests, refer to section 4.4.4. 
80 For more information on these tests, refer to section 4.4.4.  
102 
 
In the demographic section of the questionnaire, the same demographic variables as the 
original version were used. However, the variables of stock market and country of residence were 
introduced. These two variables will help in analysing the internal differences in the perception 
across GCC countries and markets.  
The variables of investment experience and investment style were introduced. The 
experience variable will help in assessing the quality of the research data assuming that the more 
experienced the respondents are, the more valuable their feedback is. In addition, other benefits of 
the experience level will help to explain certain dividend theories as shown in section 4.6 in the 
analysis of the questionnaire results. On the other hand, the investment style will help in 
understanding the market mechanics and to explain certain phenomena and theories discussed in 
the results analysis section.  
In terms of the language used in the original questionnaire, it was found more practical to 
convert the elements from a question-based format into a statement format. This way we can 
unify the Likert scale (i.e. 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree) across all questions 
except for those based on binary answers and nominal variables (e.g. yes or no). Arguably, the 
unification of the questionnaire answers will be mentally easier for the respondents to complete 
the questionnaire. In addition, the standardization of questions will have a positive implication in 
terms of the reliability of answers by minimizing the rate of human error.  
Questions 5 and 6 were merged, which compare the perception between ―stock only 
investors‖ and ―fund only investors‖ and related to the dividend stability level of funds. The 
respondents of the pilot test questionnaire found it hard to follow the questionnaire instructions 
for the questions linked to stock only owners, fund only owners, or both. Also in the GCC, the 
retail investors‘ ownership in funds is minor compared to their ownership in other assets. The 
assumption is supported by the questionnaire descriptive analysis results
81
, which shows that fund 
owners (including those who own funds and stocks) represent 10.85% only of the entire sample 
of respondents. Hence, it is not strongly representative.  
                                                   
81See table 4.7 in this chapter. 
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To compensate for the low level of fund ownership in the research sample, the researcher 
added two asset classes: real estate and fixed deposits. As in most emerging economies, the real 
estate sector is more established, and therefore, investors prefer to invest in real estate as it could 
be used for stable income generation and as a hedging tool against market volatility and 
inflation.
82
 On the other hand, since real estate investments are limited to institutional and high 
net-worth individuals due to the large capital requirements and since real estate funds are not 
widespread as mentioned earlier, it is expected that retail investors would concentrate most of 
their excess cash in fixed deposits. In addition, the research focus involves Islamic banking; 
therefore fixed deposit variable will serve such purpose as will be seen later in the analysis.  
Another remark mentioned during the pilot test was the extended length of some of the 
questions and the unnecessary detailed definition of certain theories. Hence, question 8 is 
summarized, which defined in detail the transaction cost associated with selling shares or 
receiving dividends. In addition, question 15 was removed, which asks the respondent for the 
percentage of regular income used for consumption purposes. This question was used in Dong et 
al. (2005) to compare it with the consumption percentage from dividend in order to determine if 
dividends are used for consumption purposes as behavioural finance theory argues. The 
researcher believes that unless the magnitudes of consumption, income and dividends, are 
determined, a conclusive comparison will not be justified. For example, if the personal income is 
considerably larger than the dividend income, then even a small percentage of spending from 
personal income would significantly exceed the amount of dividends spent for consumption 
purposes. Hence, the purpose of the question is defeated or minimized.  
On the other hand, from cultural observation in the GCC, many people would not be 
comfortable with giving out their income information. Instead, question 14 was employed, which 
asks for the percentage of dividend used for consumption purposes, to find the behavioural 
implication. If the answer significantly exceeds 50% then we can conclude that dividends are 
used for consumption purposes. In an attempt to further clarify the theory, question 18 was 
                                                   
82 By studying the real estate market in the US, Hartzell et al. (1987) found that real estate compensate 
investors for expected and unexpected components of inflation. Limmack and Ward (1998) reported similar 
results for real estate in the United Kingdom. For the Swiss market, Hoesli (1994) found that in long run 
real estate seems to provide a better hedge against inflation than common stocks.  
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modified, which describes the free cash flow hypothesis. The question did not mention that 
excess cash could be used by managers in unjustified expenditures (e.g. lavish offices). This 
statement was added to reflect this concept.  
On the other hand, questions 19 and 20 were merged, which are almost identical except 
for the last part of the questions. The questions ask if the investor wishes to receive cash 
dividends even if the company needs to raise funds (in question 19) or borrow money (in question 
20). The questions were used by Dong et al. (2005) to find support for the pecking order theory, 
which states that in order to avoid transaction cost, managers prefer to use internal cash first, then 
bank borrowings, then to raise fund through capital increase. However, Dong et al. (2005) did not 
find a significant difference between the answers to questions 19 and 20 as both were highly 
significant at a level of 0.01. 
In the GCC, there are no taxes on dividend income or capital gains.
83
 Thus, questions 25, 
26, 27, 30 and 31, which are related to taxation theories, are removed. Question 28 was modified, 
which asks the respondent how s/he defines stock dividends by either close to cash dividend or 
stock split. We believe that the question in its existing form does not cover the definition of stock 
dividend because it does not mention capital raise as one of the choices. According to the 
accounting text book definition, stock dividend can either be treated as capital increase or stock 
split depending on the size of the dividend (Weygandt et al., 1998).  Hence, the question was 
amended to include the capital increase choice to the definition of stock dividend. 
Question 29, which asks whether the investor prefer stock dividends over cash dividends 
due to transaction cost, was removed because a modified version of question 8 was used instead. 
This question asks if the reason that the investor prefers cash dividend is due to transaction cost. 
Therefore, it tests for both the transaction cost theory and preferred method of dividend payment 
(e.g. cash dividend, stock dividend, or stock repurchase) while taking into consideration the non-
existence of tax effect.  
                                                   
83 See Al Yahyaee (2006) and Al-Kuwari (2009).  
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In addition to the modifications above, several questions were added to test validity of the 
Lintner model, competitive payout, clientele and substitution effects, and Islamic banking. The 
final version of the questionnaire contains 39 closed-ended questions. Questions 1 to 9 are used to 
capture the demographic variables of the respondents and other information required for the 
research. These variables are: country of residency, gender, age group, education level, income, 
investing experience, stock markets, investment style, and whether the respondent invests in other 
instruments besides stocks (e.g. funds, real estate, and bank fixed deposits). These variables are 
useful to create investor groups for detailed analysis and comparisons between different groups. 
On the other hand, the stock market variable is used in creating investor groups based on a stock 
exchange, which allows comparing the results across different markets in the GCC.  
As shown in table 4.2, questions 11 to 33 cover the theories related to dividend relevance, 
agency conflict, revaluation effect, clientele and substitution effects, share repurchasing, stock 
dividends, and behavioural finance. Finally, Questions 34 to 39 focus on the investors‘ perception 
towards Islamic banks, their products and services, and the valuation of profit distributions on 
deposits. 
Table  4.2 – Questionnaire Structure 
Theory Questions 
  
Dividend Relevance 11, 12, 20, 21, 27 
  
Agency Conflict  
Uncertainty Resolution and Bird-in-the-hand 13, 14, 15 
Window Dressing 16 
Free Cash Flow 19, 20 
Monitoring Cost 21 
  
Revaluation Effect  
Information Signalling 22, 23 
The Lintner Model 30, 28 
Competitive Payouts 29 
  
Clientele and Substitution Effects 31, 32, 33 
  
Share Repurchasing 24, 25 
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Islamic Banking 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 10 
  
Stock Dividends 26, 27 
  
Behavioural Finance 17, 18 
  
 
4.4.4 Goodness of Measures 
To avoid the potential problems associated with the choice of research method, it is crucial to test 
the goodness of measure, which comprises of the tests of reliability, validity and sample 
representation. These tests and the research results were generated using the Statistical Package 
for Social Science (SPSS) version 15.00. 
4.4.4.1 Validity 
Validity is defined as the extent in which the measuring instruments tackle the intended concept 
(Sekaran, 2003). There are three types of tests for validity namely: content validity, criterion-
related validity, and construct validity. Content validity ensures that sufficient questions or items 
are developed in order to understand the concept. This can be performed through the panel of 
judges‘ method, who can attest that the instruments used in the research are sufficient to 
understand the concept. Furthermore, face validity, which is a more primitive form of content 
validity, indicates that the researcher can achieve validity by feeling that the measures are 
sufficient. However, many researchers believe that this method does not give sufficient validity 
(Sekaran, 2003).  
The second type of validity tests is the criterion-related test, which comprises of two 
tests. The first is the concurrent validity test, which basically tests if the instrument or scale 
discriminates between the results of different participants. The second test is the predictive 
validity test. The test checks the ability of an instrument or a scale to differentiate between 
various participants, who are predicted to perform differently (Sekaran, 2003).  
The last type of validity test is the construct validity test. It comprises of two types of 
tests namely: convergent and discriminant tests. The convergent test is performed by checking if 
there is a positive correlation between two different instruments measuring the same construct. In 
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contrast, the discriminant test checks if two variables, which are predicted to be uncorrelated, are 
indeed uncorrelated (Sekaran, 2003). 
Since the questionnaire is based on a published article, it is assumed that it was evaluated 
based on high academic standards. Therefore, content validity is preserved and hence, the 
questions used in the questionnaire would serve the intended purpose.
84
 Furthermore, each theory 
discussed in the questionnaire is measured by at least one question. The number of questions (i.e. 
elements) depends upon the complexity of the theory, however, Sacket and Larson (1990) argued 
that if the theory is narrow or unambiguous, then one question is sufficient (Wanous et al., 1997). 
After completing the data collection phase, the validity of the questionnaire was tested 
using the factor analysis statistical technique. This technique comprises of a collection of 
statistical methods used to determine how a common factor or construct influences the measured 
variables. The purpose of factor analysis is to discover a pattern in the relationships among 
measured variables in an attempt to find if these variables can be explained by a smaller number 
of common variables called factors (DeCoster, 1998).  
There are two types of factor analysis methods: exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). As the names indicate, EFA attempts to explore possible 
factors that have high correlation with the measured variables. This can help the researcher to find 
possible hidden relations between the variables that were not previously identified. On the other 
hand, CFA is used to confirm a predefined set of factors and their relationship with underlying 
variables (DeCoster, 1998). In this research, the EFA method is employed to explore the 
relationships between variables and to indirectly confirm those relations that are already 
hypothesised.  
To perform factor analysis on the research data, Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin (KMO) was used to 
measure sampling adequacy and the Bartlett‘s test of sphericity to check if the data was suitable 
                                                   
84 Dong et al. (2005) employed the CentER data panel, a division of the faculty of Economics and Business 
Administration, of Tilburg University in the Netherlands. 
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for factor analysis. As shown in table 4.3, the results of KMO and Bartlett‘s test were 0.84 and 
0.000 significance, respectively. These figures should be at least 0.6 for KMO and a significance 
value of no more than 0.05 for the Bartlett‘s test (DeCoster, 1998). Therefore, the researcher can 
proceed with the factor analysis test.  
Table ‎4.3 – KMO and Bartlett’s Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy 
0.840 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity Sig. 0.000 
The results of the factor analysis are shown in appendix 1.E – Rotated Component 
Matrix. These factors were rotated using the Varimax rotation methodology in order to find the 
simplest interpretation. The Kaiser criterion recommends the selection of factors that have Eigen 
values above one (DeCoster, 1998). Based on this, six factors were extracted. Appendix 1.F – 
Factor Analysis shows that the selected factors explain 59.99% of the total variance. Each factor 
is loaded on the corresponding variables. For this study, the researcher used a loading criterion of 
0.4 or above. The factor loadings can be thought of as the regression coefficient for the variables 
(DeCoster, 1998). In addition, the extracted factors were reconfirmed by visual inspection of the 
Scree plot, which is shown in figure 4.3. According to the graph, all six variables that were 
extracted are above one.  
    Figure  4.3 – Scree Plot Graph 
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The extracted factors were renamed according to the following conventions: dividend 
relevance, agency cost, revaluation effect, share repurchasing, substitution effect and Islamic 
banking. As shown in appendix 1.E, the dividend relevance measurements are all related in the 
sense that it basically asks the respondent if s/he prefers to receive stocks. However, each 
question asks for certain characteristics of the dividend relevance such as in question 12, where 
the respondent is required to indicate if the reason for dividend preference is to minimize 
transaction cost.  
On the other hand, the agency theory factors comprise of seven measurements that tackle 
different aspects of the theory. As per the questionnaire of Dong et al. (2005), the seven questions 
are divided into four agency based theories: the uncertainty resolution or bird-in-the-hand, the 
window dressing hypothesis, the free cash flow hypothesis, and the monitoring cost hypotheses. 
According to the findings, these theories are related since all of them are centred around the 
concept of agency conflict but focus on different aspects of it.  
The third factor extracted in the analysis is the revaluation effect. This factor is subject to 
three main theories of dividends namely the signalling effect, the Lintner model, and competitive 
payouts. It is important to note that all these theories are based on events (e.g. dividend 
declaration) that trigger market revaluation of the related asset. Hence, a correlation between the 
results is expected.  
The fourth and fifth factors are related to share repurchasing and the clientele and 
substitution effects. Lastly, the Islamic banking factor covers the questions mentioned under the 
Islamic banking section in addition to question 10, which asks the respondent for his or her 
perception of banking products such as funds, real estate funds or financing and fixed deposit 
products. Therefore, the correlation is justified.  
It is important to note that certain questions were removed from the factor analysis. These 
questions are: demographic and personal information questions (i.e. Questions 1 to 9), question 
26, question 30, question 34 and question 35. The reason is that the responses to these questions 
were not based on the standard Lickert scale, which was used throughout the questionnaire. 
Hence, a direct comparison will not give valid results.  
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Furthermore, questions 17 and 18, which involve behavioural finance theory, were also 
removed for two reasons. Firstly, question 17 is a personal information question related to 
consumer spending, which is based on nominal selection rather than Lickert scale. Secondly, 
question 18 showed an Eigen value less than the criterion of 0.4. Hence, in order to be able to 
prove or disprove the behavioural finance theory, we either need to increase the number of 
questions covering the theory in more detail or to support the findings through the managers‘ 
survey study or the results of published articles on the topic. 
4.4.4.2 Reliability 
Sekaran (2003) described to the reliability of a measure as ―it indicates the extent to which it is 
without bias (error free) and hence ensures consistent measurement across time and across the 
various items in the instrument. In other words, the reliability of a measure is an indication of the 
stability and consistency with which the instrument measures the concept and helps to assess the 
‗goodness‘ of measure‖ (2003: 203).  
There are two types of reliability tests. The first type is the stability of measure, which 
follows two main tests. The first test is the test-retest reliability measure, which can be obtained 
by using the same measure on a second occasion with the same method. The second test is the 
parallel-form reliability mesaure, which is conducted by using two sets of measures that address 
the same construct and the only difference would be in the wordings and sequence of questions. If 
the responses of the two forms are highly correlated then the reliability is considered adequate 
(Sekaran, 2003).  
The second type of reliability test is the internal consistency of measures, which 
comprises of inter-item consistency reliability and the split half reliability methods. The first 
method tests the consistency of the answers of different respondents to the items of a certain 
measure. These items are then correlated to check for consistency. Similarly, split half method 
correlates between two halves of an instrument to check for consistency (Sekaran, 2003).  
Large variance in the results indicates internal inconsistency. This means that either the 
questions do not define the concept properly (e.g. wording problems) or that some of the 
participants were not really paying attention to the correct answers. The reliability techniques 
help to mitigate such issues (Sekaran, 2003). 
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To test the reliability of results, the Cronbach‘s alpha measure of internal consistency was 
employed. This measure is a widely used reliability test in social sciences research. The test aims 
to measure a split-half reliability by estimating the average correlation obtained from every 
possible way to split the test in half (Gravetter and Forzano, 2009). Cronbach‘s alpha has values 
between 0 and 1.00. George and Mallery (2003) presented a common interpretation of the 
Cronbach‘s alpha values using the following scale: above 0.9 – Excellent, above 0.8 – Good, 
above 0.7 – Acceptable, above 0.6 – Questionable, above 0.5 – Poor, and less than 0.5 – 
Unacceptable (Gliem and Gliem, 2003). Hence, the higher the internal consistency between the 
items measuring a common factor or construct, the higher the value of Cronbach‘s alpha. In 
addition, the more elements the scale has, the higher the Cronbach‘s alpha.  
The Cronbach‘s alpha was calculated for the common factors observed in the factor 
analysis test. The test shows the overall results for each factor and related elements.
85
 The 
Cronbach‘s alpha readings for most factors are above 0.7, which indicates an acceptable 
reliability of results. The only exception was the share repurchasing factor, which has a value of 
0.61. A possible justification for this result is that the factor contains two elements only, which 
tends to lower the Cronbach‘s alpha. Hence, when analysing this factor the researcher should take 
into consideration other studies (e.g. managers‘ survey and other investors‘ survey articles) to 
reinforce the findings. 
4.4.4.3 Common Method Biases 
The common method variance (CMV) is defined as the amount of covariance between variables 
or elements of a questionnaire as a result of using a common method of data collection (Buckley 
et. al, 1990, (Malhotra et al., 2006)). For example, in this study the research data is based on 
single respondents answering a questionnaire with several factors or variables. CMV introduces 
biases that lead to difficulties in differentiating a factor from the others (Hufnagel and Conca, 
1994, (Malhotra et al., 2006)). These biases can result from social desirability (Ganster and 
Hennessey, 1983, (Malhotra et al., 2006)), question ambiguity (Hufnagel and Conca, 1994, 
(Malhotra et al., 2006)), and scale length (Harrison et al., 1996, (Malhotra et al., 2006)). 
                                                   
85 See Appendix 1.G – Crondbach‘s Alpha. 
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To test the research data for the occurrence of CMV, the Harman‘s one-factor test was 
used. This test is the most common test to detect CMV. The test implies that for a CMV to occur 
a single or common factor should explain the majority of the covariance (i.e. above 50%) in the 
independent or criterion variables (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). The results of the factor 
analysis
86
 were visually inspected. It shows the extracted factors and total contributed explanation 
of variance. The results show six factors extracted from the data, and the first factor, which has 
the highest Eigen value, explains 26.77% of the total variance. This indicates that no common 
factor exists. 
4.4.5 Sample Representation  
In this research, the judgmental sampling technique was employed to select the research sample.
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The reason is that the research topic requires the participant to have an experience in investments 
and stock trading, and through this sampling technique the results will be more valid (Cooper and 
Schindler, 2003). 
The sample selection, size and response rate are important factors for performing 
statistical tests and to reach conclusive and generalized results. For this purpose, multiple 
strategies were employed during the data collection phase to arrive at an adequate sample for the 
research. In this section, the strategies are illustrated along with their implications on sample 
selection, size, and response rates.  
4.4.5.1 Data Collection Strategies 
Sample representation is a classical research barrier. Dong et al. (2005) have used a survey panel 
to maximize sample representation. However, such panel is not available in the GCC. Hence, 
other strategies were followed to innovate and implement different techniques to increase both 
sample size and response rate.  
                                                   
86 See Appendix 1.F – Factor Analysis. 
87 For information on sampling techniques, refer to  (Sekaran, 2003). 
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The first technique used in this study is the electronic questionnaire, which can be 
distributed via email and websites. This technique helped to expand the reach while maintaining 
the research focus on targeted segments. An electronic version of the questionnaire was created 
through a specialized website called SurveyGizmo.
88
 This tool simplifies the process of data 
collection, exportation, conversion and reporting.  
Among the main features of electronic questionnaires is that it gives the respondent an 
opportunity to save and continue the questionnaire on their convenience and to forward the 
questionnaire to other friends. Thus help increase questionnaire completion rate and expand 
sample size through referrals. It also preserves the respondents identity, which is believed to 
increase the response rate (Faria and Dickinson, 1996). A limitation of electronic questionnaires 
is that it prevents respondents from asking for clarification if the questions were not properly 
understood. Secondly, the information provided is limited to the questions ask. For example, the 
researcher cannot ask for further explanations or even read the body language of the respondent 
to elicit clues.  
The second technique used to overcome the sample size and response rate issues is to 
send bulk emails to targeted audience. For this purpose, the researcher used a built-in tool in the 
survey hosting website that allows sending bulk email to a predefined list of investors.
89
 The third 
technique is to post the questionnaire on investment and stock market forums.
90
 These forums are 
available across GCC states and it directly contains the targeted audience.  
The fourth technique is to link questionnaire completion with contribution to charities. 
For this purpose, a fixed amount of money is donated to charities on behalf of the participant with 
every questionnaire submission. The participants were assured that the questionnaire belongs to a 
non-for-profit research (i.e. academic research) that will benefit the society and economy and it is 
                                                   
88 Visit SurveyGizmo on http://www.surveygizmo.com. 
89 The investors‘ list was sourced from a brokerage house based in Kuwait. 
90 The investment forums are: http://www.saudishares.net for Saudi market, http://uaesm.maktoob.com for 
UAE markets, http://www.qatarshares.com for Qatar market.  Last accessed April 10th 2011.  
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sponsored by a reputed university in the field.
91
 Due to this, some forum administrators placed the 
questionnaire in a notable and pronounced position so that it is viewable by all website visitors.  
The charity contribution technique considerably increased the response rate. In addition, 
linking participation to charity contribution is believed to be a religious duty that will only be 
fulfilled, and accepted by God (Almighty), if it were performed with honesty and accuracy. This 
assumption has positively influenced the reliability of data. 
4.4.5.2 Sample Size and Response Rate 
Table  4.4 - Sample Size and Response Rate 
Responses Abandoned Response Rate 
 
287 
 
267 51.81 % 
The survey process started on May 1
st
 2010 and was completed on July 15
th
 2010. It covered 
Kuwait, Saudi, UAE and Qatar. The researcher received 287 useable responses. According to 
Tabachnik and Fidell (2006), in order to perform factor analysis, the sample size should be at 
least 150 respondents. Furthermore, the ratio of responses to items should be above 8:1 (Hair et 
al., 2006). In both cases the sample size exceeded these requirements.  
In comparison with other research studies on the same topic, the sample size is below the 
555 responses used by Dong et al. (2005) but above the 248 responses used by Maditinos et al. 
(2007). In terms of the response rate, the study‘s response rate is 51.81%. This rate is higher than 
Dong et al. (2005) and Maditinos et al. (2007), which had a response rate of 27.3% (for investors 
only) and 33.06% respectively. 
 
 
  
                                                   
91 Using sponsorship (i.e. a university) was found to increase the response rate (Faria and Dickinson, 1996). 
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4.4.5.3 Sample Geographic Coverage  
Table  4.5 – GCC Markets 
Stock Exchange 
Value  
(USD billion) 
% 
Market Cap. 
(USD billion) 
% 
Kuwait 135.5 13.49% 210 18.57% 
Saudi 682.1 67.88% 519 45.89% 
Bahrain 1.1 0.11% 27 2.39% 
Qatar 29.9 2.98% 95 8.40% 
UAE 151 15.03% 257 22.72% 
Oman 5.2 0.52% 23 2.03% 
Total 1,005  1,131  
Source: (Global, 2008) 
The research sample covered all GCC markets except Bahrain and Oman. This is due to the 
difficulty of reaching investors in these markets through email or investment and stock market 
forums. However, this limitation has insignificant influence on the results for several reasons. 
Firstly, as shown in table 4.5 the combined value of trade in these markets represents less than 
3.6% of the GCC markets. Similarly, the market cap of Bahrain and Oman markets represent less 
than 12.82% of the GCC markets. Both figures are very small and have limited influence on the 
research results. Secondly, some large companies listed in these markets are cross-listed in other 
GCC markets. For example, Gulf Finance House is listed in both the Bahrain and Kuwait 
markets.
92
 Hence, these companies are already addressed in the research through other GCC 
markets.   
4.4.6 Sample Subcategorization 
Based on the statistical methods and coding techniques used by Dong et al. (2005), the results 
were organized into a single combined group and subgroups. These subgroups are based on the 
demographic variables provided in the questionnaire and the limitations set by the sample size. It 
is also based on the hypothesis under investigation and the purpose of analysis. During this 
exercise, a re-categorization process was performed on the demographic variables that were in the 
original version of the questionnaire. The final categorization of results is presented in table 4.6. 
 
                                                   
92 See the official websites of Kuwait and Bahrain stock exchanges at http://www.kuwaitse.com and 
http://www.bahrainbourse.com.bh respectively.  
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Table  4.6 - Sample Subcategories 
Category N % 
Country of residence   
Owning stocks only 113 38.31 
Owning stocks and other Assets* 182 61.69 
Age below 40 year old 168 58.54 
Age of 40 year old and above 119 41.46 
Lower income (Below USD 5,000) 140 48.78 
Higher income (Above USD 5,000) 147 51.22 
Non-university degree 72 25.09 
University degree or more 215 74.91 
* Other assets are: funds, real estate, and fixed deposits.  
The country of residence was considered as a subcategory that contains the stock market 
variable. The reason is that a person living in a country and have stock market experience tends to 
have a good background on the local market even if s/he does not trade in it. The other reason is 
that using the country of residence as a subgroup would bring with it the cultural implications of 
that country, which is the variable that the researcher is trying to gauge when comparing the 
perception of different countries in the GCC. Gender was also omitted, due to the limitations 
imposed by the small number of female respondents, which may lead to false analysis due to 
imbalanced male vs. female samples. Furthermore, and for the same reason, the investment style 
and years of experience was also omitted.
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In addition, the responses were categorized in terms of ownership of assets. The purpose 
of this categorization is to study the investor‘s perception in terms of investment purpose and 
stability of dividends of each asset class. As per the sample distribution, two categories were 
identified namely: owning stocks only and owning stocks and other assets.  
                                                   
93 For descriptive statistics of results, refer to section 4.5. 
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On the other hand, the age groups were re-categorized into below 40 year old and 40 year 
old & above. The reason behind this arrangement goes back to the sample imbalances for some 
age groups (i.e. 18 – 24 and more than 55) in the responses. This limitation may cause difficulty 
in evaluating behavioural finance theory, which states that investors‘ preference for receiving 
cash dividends increase with age (e.g. close to retirement).
 94
 
 Similarly, the monthly income was divided into higher and lower income groups. The 
higher income group are defined as those who earn more than USD 5,000 per month. In contrast, 
the lower income group is those who earn less than USD 5,000 per month. This figure was 
determined based on the sample distribution in terms of income.  
As for the level of education, the sample was categorized into two subgroups, namely 
above and below university degree. We believe that this categorization would not only address 
the degree of understanding of the complexity of stock exchanges but it also considers the income 
threshold between the subgroups. The same categorization was used in Dong et al. (2005) and 
Maditinos et al. (2007). 
4.4.7 Statistical Inference  
Most of the answers in the questionnaire are based on a scale between 1 and 5, where 1 = 
―strongly disagree‖ and 5 = ―strongly agree‖, and 3 is the neutral response. The respondent can 
also select 6, which means that ―no comment/ I do not know‖. If this answer is selected, then the 
score will be disregarded in the statistical analysis. It is important to note that answer 6 plays a 
crucial role in the reliability of the responses. The answer gives the participant the choice not to 
comment in case s/he perceives that the question would be politically or socially unacceptable or 
if s/he does not clearly understand the question or know the answer. Hence, the quality of the 
responses is protected from bogus and random answers.   
The scale employed in the questionnaire is known as the Lickert scale. It is employed to 
measure the degree of agreement or disagreement with the presented statement rather than a 
conventional yes/no scale, which only shows two stances and hence delivers less information 
                                                   
94 For more details on the theory, refer to chapter 3.  
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(Sekaran, 2003). This scale is widely used in social science research and it was used by Dong et 
al. (2005) and Maditinos et al. (2007). However, in these studies, they scale was a 7 point scale 
instead of a 5 point scale. The researcher believes that such scale is cumbersome to comprehend 
by respondents and may not add value to research findings.
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Before performing statistical tests on the questionnaire responses, it is important to 
identify the data type (e.g. parametric or non-parametric) and hence, select a suitable method. The 
central limit theory assumes that when the sample size exceeds 30, the data are considered normal 
regardless of the shape of the population distribution (Bajpai, 2010). In addition, Hill and Lewicki 
(2007) argue that if the number of observations (n) exceed 100, there would be no sense of using 
non parametric tests on the data and the data should be considered normal. However, the results 
of Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests, found in appendix 1.H, reject the normality 
assumption of the research data.  
Based on the above arguments, and to be in the safe side, both parametric and non-
parametric tests were employed. Any discrepancies in the results of parametric and non 
parametric tests are carefully considered during the analysis. This mixed method approach was 
used in the studies of Dong et al. (2005) and Maditinos et al. (2007).  
Using suitable statistical tests on the data, the mean and median scores are tested for 
significant difference from the neutral response. For parametric test, the t-statistics are used to test 
the mean scores, and a one-sample t-test is used to find significant differences between 
subgroups. For the non-parametric test, a two-tail Fisher sign test is used to find whether the 
difference between the neutral response and the median score is significantly different from zero. 
Similarly, for the subgroups, a non-parametric two-sample median test is used to find significant 
differences between subgroups.  
                                                   
95 Dawes (2008) conducted an experiment to see if the number of scale points has an effect of survey data. 
He split respondents into three groups to answer a survey using: five-points, seven-points, and ten-points 
respectively. The answers were identical in terms of mean scores and variation about the mean and no 
significant difference was found between the scales.  
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Question 34 is based on a binomial response, where yes = 1 and no = 0. To test this 
question, a one sample t-test was used to find significant difference of the mean score from 0.5. 
Similarly, a two-tail Fisher sign test was employed for the median scores. As for testing the 
difference between subgroups, the Z-test was used for the mean scores and a non-parametric two-
sample median test for the median scores. For questions 26, 30 and 35, the answers are based on 
categorical variables rather than ordinal variables. Therefore, the means are calculated for each 
answer along with the margin of error. Finally, to compare the results of different countries in the 
GCC, F-test (Kruskal_Wallis test) is used for mean (median) comparisons. If the difference is 
identified, Scheffé test is performed to find the pair(s) of variables that is significantly different. 
4.5 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF RESULTS 
The questionnaire was posted in selected stock market and investment internet forums. Another 
batch of the questionnaire was sent to the clients of a brokerage house in Kuwait via email. As a 
result, the researcher was able to collect 287 useable responses from various channels. The data 
was processed and analyzed. A descriptive statistics of the responses are found in table 4.7. 
Table ‎4.7 - Descriptive Statistics of the Questionnaire Responses 
Item Description 
Total responses 
 
287  
Response per country 
Kuwait 
Saudi 
Bahrain 
Qatar 
UAE 
Oman 
Others 
N 
116 
37 
2 
69 
46 
1 
16 
% 
40.42 
12.89 
0.70 
24.04 
16.03 
0.35 
5.57 
Response per stock market
*
 
Kuwait 
Saudi 
Bahrain 
Qatar 
UAE 
Oman 
USA 
Others 
 
119 
49 
1 
89 
72 
2 
25 
7 
 
32.69 
13.46 
0.27 
24.45 
19.78 
0.55 
6.87 
1.92 
Response per gender   
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Male 
Female 
259 
28 
90.24 
9.76 
Response per age group 
18 – 24 
25 – 39 
40 – 55 
Above 55 
 
9 
159 
111 
8 
 
3.14 
55.40 
38.68 
2.79 
Response per education level 
Less than high school 
High school 
Associate Degree 
Bachelor‘s Degree 
Master‘s or Doctorate Degrees 
 
8 
27 
37 
165 
50 
 
2.79 
9.41 
12.89 
57.49 
17.42 
Response per income category 
Below USD 2,000 
USD 2,000 – 5,000 
USD 5,000 – 10,000 
USD 10,000 – 20,000 
Above USD 20,000 
 
21 
119 
79 
51 
17 
 
7.32 
41.46 
27.53 
17.77 
5.92 
Response per investment experience 
Below 6 months 
6 – 12 months 
1 – 3 years 
Above 3 years 
 
13 
15 
83 
176 
 
4.53 
5.23 
28.92 
61.32 
Response per investment style 
Short-term 
Medium-term 
Long-term 
 
85 
109 
93 
 
29.62 
37.98 
32.40 
Respondent per Asset
*
 
Stocks only 
Funds 
Real Estate 
Fixed Deposits 
 
113 
32 
79 
71 
 
38.31 
10.85 
26.78 
24.07 
 
*Answer is based on nominal variables and the respondent can enter multiple selections.
 
The majority of the respondents came from Kuwait and they mainly trade on the Kuwait 
Stock Exchange. The reason is due to the effect of bulk email, which was sent to investors in 
Kuwait. The email messages were sent on May 1
st
 2010 to 2,392 investors and it was available 
for two weeks. This method positively influenced the sample size. 
The respondents were mostly males with an average age between 25 and 39 and an 
income between USD 2,000 and 5,000. Their education level is mainly Bachelor‘s Degree with 
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investment experience of more than 3 years. This factor is especially valuable as it is assumed 
that education and investment experience increase the participant‘s comprehension level, and 
hence, the validity of responses. Lastly, the majority of the respondents hold stocks only, 
however, a good percentage of them hold real estate and fixed deposits.  
Table ‎4.8 – Correlation Matrix     
Spearman’s 
Correlation 
Income Age Education 
Investment 
Experience 
Investment 
Style 
      
Income 1.000 0.280(**) 0.289(**) 0.183(**) 0.140(**) 
Age 0.280(**) 1 0.27 0.065 0.082 
Education 0.289(**) 0.27 1 0.089 0.077 
Investment Experience 0.183(**) 0.065 0.089 1 -0.020 
Investment Style 0.140(**) 0.173 0.077 -0.020 1 
      
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Table 4.8 shows the correlation between the demographic variables used in the 
questionnaire. The variable income is positively correlated with age, education, investment 
experience, and investment style. The possible explanation for the association between age and 
income is that the older the person is, the more experience s/he posses and the higher salary s/he 
will receive. In addition, the older the person is, the more savings s/he tends to accumulate, and 
hence a higher income from savings. Similarly, the higher the level of education s/he has the 
more sophisticated job s/he would get, and the higher pay s/he receives.  
On the other hand, the positive correlation between income and investment experience is 
expected as the more income (i.e. money) a person has, the more savings s/he will have leading to 
more experience in investments. On the other hand, the more income a person has, the more 
investments s/he will accumulate overtime. Hence, the more long-term investment style s/he 
would follow. This is mainly due asset allocation and time limitations, which hinder people from 
managing their own investments and use professional investment services instead. These services 
are subject to regulations that push them to follow a relatively less risky, more diversified, and 
longer-term investment style.  
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4.6 QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Appendix 1.C - Table 1.C.1 contains the results of the survey across all investors and per investor 
group. Under the column titled ―statistics‖ the table reads the mean, t-stat, median, binomial p, 
percentage of responses above and below the neutral opinion, and N for the total number of 
observations.
96
 Under the columns titled ―All investors‖, means and medians are calculated to 
find the significance that the results are different from 3, which stands for the ―neutral‖ response. 
However, for the remaining column, which shows the investor group, means and medians are 
calculated to find the significance of the paired differences between the answers of different 
investor groups.  
The results of the questionnaire are divided into sections representing the factors 
identified in the factor analysis test and the corresponding dividend theories.
97
 Analysis of the 
results is covered in this section along with excerpts from appendix 1.C showing the questions 
and overall responses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
96 Refer to section 4.4.6. 
97 For more information on dividend theories, refer to chapter 3.  
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4.6.1 Dividend Relevance Hypothesis 
Table ‎4.9 – Results for Dividend Relevance hypothesis  
All investors Statistics Questions 
   
4.17♦♦♦ 
19.7 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
7 
81.2 
271 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q11 You like to receive dividends from the stocks that you 
own. 
 
   
3.26♦♦♦ 
3.4 
3♦♦♦ 
.006 
29.8 
41.2 
255 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q12 To avoid paying commissions and other transaction 
costs, you prefer having your profits in the form of cash 
dividends. 
 
 
   
3.82♦♦♦ 
12 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
14.4 
66.2 
257 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q20 You prefer to receive dividends because you believe 
that the profits could otherwise be used by the management 
in unfeasible investments or unjustified expenses. 
 
   
3.08 
1 
3♦♦ 
.03 
40.8 
43.1 
262 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q21 You prefer to receive dividends despite your 
knowledge that the company would need these funds to 
support its future plans and current expenses. 
 
 
   
3.42♦♦♦ 
5.4 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
29.7 
55.8 
266 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q27 If you own a stock of a company that did not distribute 
cash dividends this year, then you would prefer that it 
distributes stock dividends instead. 
 
 
   
One diamond (♦) denotes mean (median) response is significantly different from 3 at the 0.10 level, ♦♦ at the 
0.05 level, and ♦♦♦ at the 0.01 level based on the Student‘s t-value (binomial p). 
The first theory tested is the dividend relevance hypothesis, which argues that dividend policy is a 
relevant decision to the value of the firm. This theory is covered in question 11 shown in table 
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4.9. It was also supported by questions 12, 20, 21 and 27 on the hypothesis of transaction cost, 
free cash flow, monitoring cost, and stock dividends respectively. Question 11 asks the 
respondent directly if s/he likes to receive dividends. The result of this question shows a mean 
score of 4.17 with a t-stat of 19.7, which is significantly different from 3 at a significance level of 
0.01. Similarly, only 7% of the respondents gave an answer less than 3 while 81.2% gave an 
answer above 3. The median score was 4 with a binomial p equal to 0.00, again significantly 
different from 3 at a 0.01 significance level.  
Question 12 asks if investors prefer to receive dividends to minimize transaction costs. 
The results were positive. Question 20 supports the dividend relevance hypothesis. It asks 
whether the respondent prefers to receive dividends to minimize the excess cash available to 
managers that could be used for unjustified investments or expenditures. The responses were 
significantly positive. The results of question 21 are neutral. The question asks whether the 
respondent prefer to receive dividends even if the company needs them for future expansion or 
for operating expense. Furthermore, question 27 asks the respondent whether s/he would like to 
receive stock dividends if cash dividends are not distributed for the year. The responses for this 
question are positive. 
Overall, the above results support the dividend relevance hypothesis. Hence, the null 
hypothesis is rejected and the alternative hypothesis H1 is accepted, which entails that there is a 
positive relationship between dividend declarations and stock prices. The results are consistent 
with the findings of Dong et al. (2005) and Maditinos et al. (2007). The exception is that Dong et 
al. (2005) found a difference in the opinion between age groups as the older investors show more 
interest for dividends than the younger.
98
 One possible explanation for the difference in the age 
results between this study and Dong et al. (2005) is that the age criteria in this study is lower than 
that used by them due to sample limitations.
99
 In addition, there could be an external factor (e.g. 
agency factors) that influences the dividend preference of the lower age group as well, which 
makes their preference closely similar to the older age group. 
                                                   
98 This finding comply with the behavioural finance theory of Shefrin and Statman (1984). 
99 See section 4.4.6. 
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4.6.2 Transaction Cost 
Table ‎4.10 – Results for Transaction Cost 
All 
investors 
Statistics Questions 
  
3.26♦♦♦ 
3.4 
3♦♦♦ 
.006 
29.8 
41.2 
255 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial 
P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q12 To avoid paying commissions and other transaction costs, you prefer 
having your profits in the form of cash dividends. 
 
   
One diamond (♦) denotes mean (median) response is significantly different from 3 at the 0.10 level, ♦♦ at 
the 0.05 level, and ♦♦♦ at the 0.01 level based on the Student‘s t-value (binomial p). 
The transaction cost theory argues that transaction cost (i.e. commissions and tax differential) 
may control the preference of investors and was tested through question 12, shown in table 4.10, 
to find a possible justification for the dividend relevance hypothesis. The question asks the 
respondent whether s/he favours cash dividends to avoid paying commissions and other 
transaction costs. The mean score for this question was 3.26 with a t-statistic of 3.4. The mean 
score is significantly different from 3 on a significance level of 0.01. Conversely, 29.8% of the 
respondents gave an answer below 3, while 41.2% gave an answer above 3. The median score 
was 3 with 0.006 binomial p. The median score is significantly different from 3 at a significance 
level of 0.01. The findings show support for the transaction cost theory, which states that 
investors prefer receiving dividends to avoid, as much as possible, the commissions and fees 
associated with selling part of their stock capital to receive cash.  
In addition, the results show a preference for cash dividends over stock dividends and 
share repurchasing due to transaction cost reasons. This implies that investors use cash dividends 
for either reinvesting in other stocks or for consumption purposes. These assumptions are further 
analyzed using the results of the substitution and clientele effects as well as behavioural finance 
theory. These results support the assumption that cash dividends are used for reinvestment rather 
than consumption purposes as a strong support was found for the former hypothesis and no 
conclusive results were found for the latter.  
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Furthermore, the results show that non-university educated investors have higher scores 
for the transaction cost hypothesis than university educated investors or above
100
. As will be 
shown later, this difference has also been noticed in the window dressing and free cash flow 
theories. A possible explanation for the difference within the education level is that university 
educated investors are more acquainted with reading and comprehending financial statements and 
economic reports. Hence, they are more aware of the future direction of their investments than the 
less educated investors. For this reason, if dividends are not paid, arguably the less educated 
investors will be more prone to sell an equivalent amount of their stock capital to minimize their 
exposure risk. This will increase their transaction cost in the form of commissions and other fees. 
In addition, correlation analysis discussed in section 4.5, show that the higher the level of 
education, the more long-term investment style the person would follow and hence, a less 
transaction cost is incurred.  
The findings conform to Dong et al. (2005) except for the fact that they found older and 
low income investors to have a higher preference for avoiding transaction cost than otherwise. 
Dong et al. (2005) stated that this is possibly due to the behavioural finance theory of Shefrin and 
Statman (1984) as it indicates that older and low income investors rely more on dividends for 
consumption purposes. Our findings, however, did not find support for behavioural finance 
theory. On the other hand, the findings did not support the results of Maditinos et al. (2007).  
4.6.3 Agency Theories  
Agency theories are a collection of theories that describe the relationship of agency cost to 
dividend policy. In this section, the theories of uncertainty resolution or bird-in-the-hand, window 
dressing, free cash flow (FCF) and the monitoring cost hypothesis are discussed. 
 
 
 
                                                   
100 Subcategory results are found in appendix 1.C. 
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4.6.3.1 Uncertainty Resolution or Bird-in-the-hand  
Table ‎4.11 – Results for Uncertainty Resolution or Bird-in-the hand 
All 
investors 
Statistics Questions 
   
3.71♦♦♦ 
9.5 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
17.4 
65.5 
261 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial 
P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q13 Companies that retain earnings are more risky than companies that pay 
dividends on regular basis. The reason is that dividends give the opportunity to 
investors to diversify.  
 
   
3.81♦♦♦ 
13.5 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
11.3 
68.7 
261 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial 
P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q14 The total return on a stock comprises of the dividends paid during the period 
of retention plus the capital increment. In case the market is down, the dividend 
return will be higher than the capital increments, thus you will prefer purchasing 
high dividend paying stocks than others. 
 
One diamond (♦) denotes mean (median) response is significantly different from 3 at the 0.10 level, ♦♦ at 
the 0.05 level, and ♦♦♦ at the 0.01 level based on the Student‘s t-value (binomial p). 
The uncertainty resolution or bird-in-the-hand theory states that investors have a greater 
preference to receive dividends to avoid the uncertainty associated with the firm‘s future 
operations. The theory was tested in questions 13 and 14 shown in table 4.11. Question 13 asks 
whether the respondent perceives companies that frequently retain earnings as more risky 
compared to those that distribute most of their earnings. The explanation is based on two 
justifications. The first one is that by following a residual dividend policy, the excess cash 
available to managers is reduced. Therefore, the chance that this cash is used in unjustifiable 
expenditures or undesirable investments is minimized. The second justification is that by 
receiving dividends, investors would have the opportunity to reinvest the dividend in other stocks. 
Hence, diversification will minimize the unsystematic risk faced by investors.  
The result of question 13 shows a mean score of 3.17 with a t-statistic of 9.5. The mean 
score is significantly different from 3 at a significance level of 0.01. On the other hand, 17.4% of 
the respondents gave an answer below 3, while 41.2% gave an answer above 3. The median score 
was 3 with 0.006 binomial p, which is significantly different from 3 at a significance level of 
0.01.  
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Conversely, question 14 looks at the uncertainty resolution or bird-in-the-hand theory 
from another angle. The question starts by explaining the possible ways that investors make a 
profit, which is through capital gains and dividends during the investment period. It then asks if 
during economic downturns investors prefer purchasing stocks, which pay higher dividends than 
capital gains. The essence of the question is to measure whether investors believe that cash in-
hand through dividends are more profitable and less risky than capital gains, which is illustrated 
by the bird-in-the-hand theory.  
The result of question 14 shows a mean score of 3.26 with a t-statistic of 3.4, which is 
significantly different from 3 at a significance level of 0.01. On the other hand, 29.8% of the 
respondents gave an answer below 3, while 41.2% gave an answer above 3. The median score 
was 3 with 0.006 binomial p, which is significantly different from 3 at a significance level of 
0.01. 
Our findings confirm the uncertainty resolution or bird-in-the-hand of Gordon (1959). 
Hence, the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative hypothesis H2 is accepted, which states 
that there is a negative relationship between agency cost and stock price. Our results contradict 
with the findings of both Dong et al. (2005) and Maditinos et al. (2007). However, Dong et al. 
(2005) mentioned that a possible explanation for non-conformance of their results with the 
uncertainty resolution is due to the research period, which was between July and Oct 2002. 
During this period Amsterdam Stock Exchange dropped more than 300 points. However, most 
companies kept the rate of dividend distributions as is. Consequently, due to lower price levels, 
the dividend yields were relatively high and the worst price performing companies had the 
highest dividend yields. This could possibly have influenced investors‘ perception towards higher 
dividend yield stocks. 
In addition, the results show that investors, who hold stocks only, scored higher on the 
uncertainty resolution question(s) than investors who hold stocks and other assets (i.e. funds, real 
estate, and fixed assets). The reason could be due to the fact that some of these assets (e.g. funds 
and fixed deposits) are more regulated and monitored than stocks. For example, unlike stocks, 
which are subject to the supervision of Kuwait Stock Exchange only, funds and fixed deposits are 
also monitored by the central bank of Kuwait. In addition, on the expense side, stocks usually 
have a more complicated structure of expenses whereas the expenses of funds, real estate, and 
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fixed deposits are limited and normally straightforward. Consequently, investors in such assets 
could be more confident than those holding stocks only.    
4.6.3.2 Window Dressing 
Table ‎4.12 – Results for Window Dressing 
All investors Statistics Questions 
   
3.84♦♦♦ 
3.21 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
16.3 
70.4 
273 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q15 Companies that pay high dividends are financial more 
stable than others which pays no or little dividends. 
   
3.85♦♦♦ 
3.21 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
16.4 
71.4 
269 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q16 You prefer to purchase stocks that pays high dividends 
because you believe that these stocks have real operating income 
compared to those stocks that window dress their financials. 
 
One diamond (♦) denotes mean (median) response is significantly different from 3 at the 0.10 level, ♦♦ at 
the 0.05 level, and ♦♦♦ at the 0.01 level based on the Student‘s t-value (binomial p). 
 
The window dressing theory argues that companies which constantly pay cash dividends are more 
stable and less prone to window dressing or financial statement gimmicks. This idea was covered 
in questions 15 and 16 shown in table 4.12. Question 15 asks the respondent if s/he perceives the 
companies that distribute relatively high cash dividends as more stable than companies that pay 
small or no dividends. The mean score for this question was 3.84 with a t-stat of 12.3, which is 
significantly different from 3 at a significance level of 0.01. Only 16.3% of the respondents gave 
an answer below 3 while 70.4% gave an answer above 3. The median score was 4 with a binomial 
p of zero, which is significantly different from 3 at a significance level of 0.01.  
Question 16 asks the respondent if s/he prefers high dividend paying stocks because they 
have real operating income compared to other stocks. The mean score was 3.85 with a t-stat of 
12.4, which is significantly different from 3 at a significance level of 0.01. Similarly, 16.4% gave 
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an answer below 3 while 71.4% gave an answer above it. The median score was 4 with a zero 
binomial p, which is significantly different from 3 at a significance level of 0.01.   
The findings strongly support the window dressing hypothesis. Hence, the null 
hypothesis is rejected and the alternative hypothesis H3 is accepted, which argues that there is a 
negative relationship between dividends and the possibility of accounting manipulation by firms‘ 
management.  
In addition, the results show that university educated investors offer less support to the 
theory than non-university educated investors. A possible explanation is that university graduates 
tend to be more acquainted with reading financial and economic reports. Therefore, they are more 
comfortable with the usage of undistributed cash dividends by the firm management provided 
they have legitimate reasons (e.g. clear investment plan).  
Although the findings are in conflict with Dong et al. (2005) and Maditinos et al. (2007), 
the research referee employed by Dong et al. (2005) suggested that they might receive different 
results when considering the nationality of the investments planned to be funded by the 
undistributed dividend. They argue that the stronger the accounting standards and regulations are, 
the more confidence investors will have in dividend announcements. We believe that this could 
be the case in the GCC because the regulations, audit standards, and minority protection laws are 
underdeveloped ( Al-Kuwari, 2009). 
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4.6.3.3 Free Cash Flow (FCF)  
Table ‎4.13 – Results for Free Cash Flow (FCF) 
All investors Statistics Questions 
 
3.7♦♦♦ 
8.8 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
18.3 
62.3 
252 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q19 In economic downturns, fewer good investment 
opportunities are available. Therefore, you would invest more in 
dividend-paying stocks. 
 
 
   
3.82♦♦♦ 
12 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
14.4 
66.2 
257 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q20 You prefer to receive dividends because you believe that 
the profits could otherwise be used by the management in 
unfeasible investments or unjustified expenses. 
 
 
One diamond (♦) denotes mean (median) response is significantly different from 3 at the 0.10 level, ♦♦ at 
the 0.05 level, and ♦♦♦ at the 0.01 level based on the Student‘s t-value (binomial p). 
The free cash flow hypothesis argues that excess cash may increase agency conflict, which could 
be mitigated through dividends. The theory was covered in questions 19 and 20 shown in table 
4.13. Question 19 asks the respondent if s/he invests more in dividend paying stocks during an 
economic downturn. The rationale behind the question is that fewer investment opportunities that 
meet the risk/return profile of shareholders will be available to management during an economic 
slowdown. In addition, under such economic conditions expenditures are assumed to be 
minimized and should only cover the necessities. Under such circumstances, the free cash flow 
hypothesis argues that cash dividends should be at maximum levels in order to avoid management 
temptation to over invest or over consume.  
The results for question 19 gave a mean score of 3.7 with a t-stat of 8.8, which is 
significantly different from 3 at a significance level of 0.01. Only 18.3% of the respondents gave 
an answer below 3 while 62.3% gave an answer above it. The median score for the question was 
4 with a zero binomial p, which is significantly different from 3 at a significance level of 0.01.   
Question 20 is a rephrase of question 19 intended to make the argument clearer to the 
respondent, and hence, test the validity of the answer. The question has a mean score of 3.82 with 
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a t-stat of 12, which is significantly different from 3 at a significance level of 0.01. 14.4% 
answered less than 3 while 66.2 gave an answer above 3. The median score was 4 with a zero 
binomial, which is significantly different from 3 at a significance level of 0.01.   
The results support the free cash flow hypothesis. It also shows that non-university 
educated subgroup have a greater tendency towards the free cash flow hypothesis. As explained 
earlier, the possible reason lies in the fact that investors with university-degree or higher tend to 
be more confident in their investment decisions as they can read and understand the financial and 
economic reports more easily. Based on the above results, the null hypothesis is rejected and the 
alternative hypothesis H4 is accepted, which argues that there is a positive relationship between 
free cash flow and the agency cost. The results are inconsistent with Dong et al. (2005) and 
Maditinos et al. (2007). 
4.6.3.4 Monitoring Cost Hypothesis  
Table ‎4.14 – Results for Monitoring Cost 
All investors Statistics Questions 
   
3.08 
1 
3♦♦ 
.03 
40.8 
43.1 
262 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q21 You prefer to receive dividends despite your knowledge 
that the company would need these funds to support its future 
plans and current expenses. 
One diamond (♦) denotes mean (median) response is significantly different from 3 at the 0.10 level, ♦♦ at 
the 0.05 level, and ♦♦♦ at the 0.01 level based on the Student‘s t-value (binomial p). 
The monitoring cost hypothesis argues that dividends are used as a control for agency problem. 
By paying higher dividends, firms will constantly require to raise capital for new investments and 
expenditures. During this process, firms will be exposed to the scrutiny of creditors, investors and 
regulators, which eventually reduces the effect of the agency problem. The theory was covered in 
question 21 shown in table 4.14. The question asks whether the respondent still prefers to receive 
funds despite the knowledge that the company needs the funds to support its investment plans and 
expenditure. The mean score was 3.08 with a t-stat of 1. 40.8% answered less than 3 while 43.1% 
answered above it. The median was 3 with a 0.03 binomial p, which is significantly different 
from 3 at a significance level of 0.05.  
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 The results show weak support for the monitoring cost hypothesis proposed by 
Easterbrook (1984). Hence, there is not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis H5.
101
 The 
findings suggest that if the act of retaining earnings is properly justified by the firm, the impact of 
reducing dividends will not be as drastic as in the case where no justification is given.  
Our findings conform to Dong et al. (2005), who explained that investors prefer that 
managers follow the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984), which states that firms 
will use external sources of funds only after exhausting internal funds. Our findings are also in 
line with Baker et al. (2002) and Brav et al. (2005). 
4.6.4 Revaluation Theories 
The revaluation theories are based on the notion that an event (e.g. declaration of dividend) would 
have a revaluation effect on the stock price. In this research, the effect is covered by information 
signaling, the Lintner model and the competitive payout hypotheses.  
4.6.4.1 Information Signalling  
Table ‎4.15 – Results for Information Signalling 
All investors Statistics Questions 
 
3.87♦♦♦ 
14.6 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
10.7 
71.9 
271 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q22 A dividend increase is a signal that the company‘s future 
earnings are improved. 
 
 
   
                                                   
101 The null hypothesis states that no relationship between the variables exists. The results of the test could 
not reject the hypothesis. In other words, the hypothesis prevails and may not be rejected using the existing 
test. However, failing to reject the hypothesis does not necessarily mean confirming it because it requires 
an extremely large number of tests to validate a hypothesis with adequate accuracy. However, it takes a 
single test to invalidate a hypothesis, which is the essence of null hypothesis and alterative hypothesis 
testing based on the principle of falsification introduced by Popper (1959).  
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Table ‎4.15 – Results for Information Signalling 
All investors Statistics Questions 
3.11 
1.5 
3♦♦ 
.01 
37.5 
39.4 
264 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q23 A dividend decrease is a signal that the company‘s future 
earnings are deteriorating. 
 
 
One diamond (♦) denotes mean (median) response is significantly different from 3 at the 0.10 level, ♦♦ at 
the 0.05 level, and ♦♦♦ at the 0.01 level based on the Student‘s t-value (binomial p). 
The information signaling hypothesis argues that firms use dividends as a device to signal future 
profitability to the market. The theory was discussed in questions 22 and 23 shown in table 4.15. 
Question 22 asks the respondent if s/he perceives a dividend increase as a signal for improved 
future earnings of the company. The mean score of the question is 3.87 with a t-stat of 14.6, 
which is significantly different from 3 at a significance level of 0.01. Only 10.7% of the 
respondents gave an answer below 3 while 71.9% gave an answer above 3. The median was 4 
with a zero binomial p, which is significantly different from 3 at a significance level of 0.01.  
 On the other hand, question 23 asks the respondent if a dividend decrease is considered as 
a signal of deteriorating future earnings. The mean score of this question is 3.11 with a t-stat of 
1.5. 37.5% of the respondents answered below 3 while 39.4 of them gave an answer above 3. The 
median score was 3 with a binomial p of 0.01, which is significantly different from 3 at a 
significance level of 0.05.  
 For signalling effect associated with dividend increases, the results show strong support 
for the information signalling theory, which was proposed by Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and 
Rock (1985). Hence, the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative hypothesis H6 is accepted, 
which states that there is a positive relationship with dividend declarations and future cash flows. 
The results conforms to the findings of Dong et al. (2005) and Maditinos et al. (2007). 
However, the results gave weak support for the signalling effect of dividend decreases. A 
possible explanation for this phenomenon is discussed by Lang and Litzenberger (1989). They 
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argue that firms with average Tobin‘s Q102 less than unity are over-invested. On the other hand, 
firms with Tobin‘s Q greater than unity are at the value-maximization level. Based on these 
definitions, the study empirically found significant signalling effect associated with large 
dividend increases for both types of firms. However, for large dividend decreases, the results 
showed significance for over-invested firms only; and since question 23 does not differentiate 
between over-invested and value-maximization firms, investors have had mixed perceptions.  
The results show that non-university educated investors have stronger reliance on the 
signalling theory. The reason is that university educated investors generally depend on a variety 
of information sources (e.g. financial and economic reports) to minimize the information 
asymmetry risk, which makes their reliance on signalling comparatively less. 
4.6.4.2 The Lintner Model 
Lintner (1956) argue that firms attempt to smooth dividends using a targeted payout ratio and 
speed of adjustments. Firms try to avoid dividend reduction as it may have a negative impact on 
their stock price. The reason is that investors perceive firms with stable payouts (i.e. dividends 
and profits on PSIA) as stronger and more valuable. The hypothesis is tested through questions 28 
and 30 shown in table 4.16.  
Table ‎4.16 – Results for The Lintner Model 
All investors Statistics Questions 
   
3.98♦♦♦ 
19.5 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
7.2 
81.3 
263 
 
 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q28 You assess the quality of the dividend by comparing it to 
the dividend paid last year. 
 
 
                                                   
102 Tobin‘s Q is defined as the ratio of market value of firm‘s debt and equity to the replacement cost of its 
assets. For more information on the topic, refer to Lang and Litzenberger (1989) 
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Percentage (%) Count Q30 When you assess the quality of dividends you take in 
consideration the following figures: 
 
21.8±0.05 a 
13.9±0.04 
50.0±0.06 
14.3±0.04 
100.0 
52 
33 
119 
34 
N = 238 
1. Dividend yield 
2. Dividend per share 
3. All the above  
4. Other factors 
 
One diamond (♦) denotes mean (median) response is significantly different from 3 at the 0.10 level, ♦♦ at 
the 0.05 level, and ♦♦♦ at the 0.01 level based on the Student‘s t-value (binomial p). a Margin of error is 
calculated on 95% confidence.  
Question 28 attempts to identify the dividend assessment mechanism and whether or not 
investors consider taking the last year‘s distribution as an indicator of the quality of dividend 
distributions. The mean score of the question was 3.98 with a t-stat of 19.5, which is significantly 
different from 3 at a significance level of 0.01. Only 7.2% of the respondents gave an answer 
below 3 while 81.3% gave an answer above 3. The median score was 4 with a zero binomial p, 
which is significantly different from 3 at a significance level of 0.01.  
The score for question 28 show a significant difference in the perception between 
investors in stocks only and those owning stocks and other assets (i.e. funds, real estate, and fixed 
deposits), as the first group showed higher agreement with the concept presented. The reason 
could be attributed to the nature of the other assets. For example, the dividend payment of mutual 
funds can be affected by many factors such as: asset allocation, incentive fees, and management 
fees. Hence, the dividends assessment process is not straightforward as in the case of stocks.  
On the other hand, question 30 is used to identify the main variables that investors take 
into consideration when assessing the quality of dividend distributions. The variables that were 
used in the questions are: dividend yield, dividend per share, either variable or other variables. 
50% of the respondents selected both the dividend yield and dividend per share while 21.8% 
selected the dividend yield and 13.9% selected the dividend per share. Only 14.3% answered that 
there are other variables used to assess the quality of dividend policy. From the results, it appears 
that investors assess dividend distributions by considering both the dividend per share and 
dividend yield.
103
 
                                                   
103 See Appendix 1.C – Table 1.C.2 
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Overall, the results support the Lintner model. Hence, the null hypotheses are rejected 
and the alternative hypotheses H7 and H8 are accepted. The results are consistent with Al 
Yahyaee (2006) on the applicability of the Lintner model on financial and non-financial firms in 
the Omani market. 
4.6.4.3 Competitive Payouts  
Table ‎4.17 – Results for Competitive Dividends 
All investors Statistics Questions 
   
3.88♦♦♦ 
14.9 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
11.2 
76.2 
260 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q29 You assess the quality of the current dividend by 
comparing it to the dividends paid by other stocks of similar 
characteristics. 
 
 
One diamond (♦) denotes mean (median) response is significantly different from 3 at the 0.10 level, ♦♦ at 
the 0.05 level, and ♦♦♦ at the 0.01 level based on the Student‘s t-value (binomial p). 
The competitive dividend hypothesis argues that investors assess dividend distributions by 
comparing it to the distributions of other stocks of the same category. The argument is covered by 
question 29 shown in table 4.17. The mean score is 3.88 with a t-stat of 14.9, which is 
significantly different from 3 at a significance level of 0.01. Only 11.2% of the respondents gave 
an answer below 3 while 76.2% gave an answer above 3. The median score is 4 with a zero 
binomial p, which is significantly different from 3 at a significance level of 0.01. The results 
show a strong agreement with the concept presented. Hence, the null hypothesis is rejected and 
the alternative hypothesis H11 is accepted, which states that there is a positive relationship 
between the dividend of a firm and dividends of competitors. 
4.6.5 Clientele and Substitution Effects 
The clientele and substitution effects argue that each stock has its own investor‘s clientele. Hence, 
changing the characteristics of a stock (e.g. dividends), investors will sell the stock and purchase 
another one that meets their investment objective. This is known as the substitution effect.
104
 
                                                   
104 For more information, refer to section 3.8.   
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Depending on the magnitude of the change, the selling pressure could have a negative impact on 
the stock price.  
Table ‎4.18 – Results for Clientele and Substitution Effect 
All investors Statistics Questions 
   
4.15♦♦♦ 
18.3 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
9.4 
84.2 
265 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q31 You diversify your risks by investing in a portfolio of 
stocks instead of a single stock. 
 
 
3.95♦♦♦ 
14.4 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
12.2 
74.5 
255 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q32 In your investment portfolio, you allocate your 
investments based on your investment objectives and 
risk/return preferences. 
 
 
   
4.16♦♦♦ 
24.4 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
3.4 
84 
262 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q33 If you own shares in a company that matches your 
financial objective but it suddenly changed its dividend policy 
or its objectives, you would try to sell your shares and 
repurchase another stock that meets your requirements. 
One diamond (♦) denotes mean (median) response is significantly different from 3 at the 0.10 level, ♦♦ at 
the 0.05 level, and ♦♦♦ at the 0.01 level based on the Student‘s t-value (binomial p). 
The clientele and substitution effects are covered by questions 31, 32, and 33 shown in 
table 4.18. Question 31 asks if the respondent diversifies risk by investing in a portfolio of stocks. 
The mean score is 4.15 with a t-stat of 18.3, which is significantly different from 3 at a 
significance level of 0.01. Only 9.4% of the respondents gave an answer below 3 while 84.2% 
gave an answer above 3. The median score is 4 with a zero binomial p, which is significantly 
different from 3 at a significance level of 0.01.  
In addition, question 32 asks if investors allocate their investment based on certain 
investment characteristics and objectives. The mean score for this question was 3.95 with a t-stat 
of 14.4, which is significant at a level of .01. Only 12.2% of the respondents gave an answer 
below 3 while 74.5% gave an answer above 3. The median score is 4 with a zero binomial p, 
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which is significantly different from 3 at a significance level of 0.01. The results show strong 
support for the notion that investors do follow an investment plan and a portfolio allocation 
scheme based on certain investment characteristics. Hence, the null hypothesis is rejected and the 
alternative hypothesis H13 is accepted, which states that there is a negative relationship between 
the change in dividend policy and the stock price.  
 The results are further enforced by the findings of question 33, which directly asks the 
respondent if s/he would switch to other investments when a company changes its dividend policy 
or objectives. The mean score of the question is 4.16 with a t-stat of 24.4, which is highly 
significant at a level of .01. Only 3.4 percent answered below 3 and 84% gave an answer above 3. 
The median score was 4 with a zero binomial p, which is highly significant at the 0.01 level. 
Based on these figures, the results show strong support to clientele effect hypothesis proposed by 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) and Scholes (1972).  
In addition, the results show that investors above 40 are more in favour of the clientele 
argument than younger investors. This could be due to the fact that older investors are more 
diversified than younger investors. This concept was empirically tested by Graham and Kumar 
(2006), who found that older investors (above 45 year old) tend to have more stocks in their 
portfolio than younger investors. In addition, they found that the portfolio turnover rate of older 
investors is relatively lower. 
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4.6.6 Share Repurchasing 
Table ‎4.19 – Results for Share Repurchasing 
All investors Statistics Questions 
   
3.44♦♦♦ 
5.9 
4♦♦ 
.01 
25.2 
60.4 
258 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q24 Suppose a company would stop paying dividends and 
instead use the money to buy back its own stocks on the market. 
 
(1 = Extremely Negative, 2= Negative, 3= Neutral, 4= Positive, 
5= Strongly Positive, 6= No opinions, don‘t know) 
   
3.67♦♦♦ 
9.8 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
16.8 
65.6 
250 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q25 Stock repurchase is a signal that the stock is undervalued. 
 
 
One diamond (♦) denotes mean (median) response is significantly different from 3 at the 0.10 level, ♦♦ at 
the 0.05 level, and ♦♦♦ at the 0.01 level based on the Student‘s t-value (binomial p). 
Share repurchasing is covered by questions 24 and 25shown in table 4.19. Question 24 attempts 
to identify how investors perceive the impact of share repurchasing on stock price and to compare 
it to the importance of dividends. The mean score for the question was 3.44 with a t-stat of 5.9, 
which is significantly different from neutral 3 at a significance level of 0.01. Only 25.2% of the 
respondents gave an answer less than 3 while 60.4% gave an answer above 3. The median score 
was 4 with a 0.01 binomial p, which is significantly different from 3 at a significance level of 
0.05.  
Conversely, question 25 asks if share repurchasing is associated with a signalling effect. 
The mean score of the question was 3.67 with a t-stat of 9.8, which is significantly different from 
3 at a significance level of 0.01. 16.8% of the respondents gave an answer below 3 while 65.6% 
gave an answer above 3. The median score was 4 with a zero binomial p, which is significantly 
different from 3 at a significance level of 0.01.  
Similar to Dong et al. (2005), the findings suggest that investors perceive share 
repurchasing declarations as a positive signal as it indicates that the stock is undervalued. The 
results also show that investors who own stocks only have a greater tendency towards 
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repurchasing than those owning stocks and other assets (i.e. funds, real estate, and fixed assets). 
By taking funds as an example since repurchasing programmes are not applicable to real estate 
and fixed assets, the reason for the difference is possibly due to the fact that stock owners 
experience immediate positive reaction in the stock price after the announcement and 
implementation of share repurchasing programmes. Comparatively, since funds are rarely quoted 
in the GCC (e.g. marked to market on a weekly or monthly basis), the unit price reaction to share 
repurchasing programmes of the underlying assets will not be rendered immediately. Hence, fund 
owners will not notice the response of prices towards repurchasing as fast as stocks owners. 
Therefore, their perception towards the positive impact of share repurchasing programmes will 
not be as powerful compared to those owning stocks only.  
In addition, the results of question 24 show that owners of stock and other assets have a 
weaker preference to share repurchasing compared to investors in stocks only. This is due to their 
greater tendency towards receiving dividends and fixed income instead. This was explained by 
the results of question 10, which show that the purpose of holding funds, real estate, and fixed 
income assets is that it pays more stable dividends compared to stocks.   
Furthermore, the results show that the perception of lower income investors towards the 
signalling effect of share repurchasing programmes is stronger than others. A possible 
explanation lies in the fact that higher income people tend to have more experience in the market 
and therefore they would have more information channels to rely on it when taking investment 
decisions.
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The results conflict with the findings of Dong et al. (2005) and Brav et al. (2005), which 
show that investors have a preference for dividends over share repurchasing. The possible 
explanation is that in the GCC share repurchasing programmes are a complement rather than a 
replacement for dividend distributions. Therefore, GCC investors have a stronger preference 
towards these programmes as they increase the earnings per share and consequently the stock 
price and dividend distributions. Based on this conclusion, the null hypothesis is rejected and the 
                                                   
105 The correlation analysis in section 4.5 under table 4.8 shows that investors‘ income is positively 
correlated with investment experience.  
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alternative hypothesis H14 is accepted, which states that there is a positive relationship between 
share repurchasing programmes and stock prices.  
4.6.7 Islamic Banking  
Table 4.20 shows questions that examine the perception of investors and depositors towards 
Islamic banks. Question 34 asks the respondent if s/he has an account(s) in an Islamic bank(s). 
The answer is either 1 or 0, where 1 equals yes and 0 equals no. The mean score was 0.868 with a 
t-stat of 17.8, which is significantly different from 0.5 at a significance level of 0.01. The median 
score was 1 with zero binomial p, which is significantly different from 0.5 at a significance level 
of 0.01.  
Table ‎4.20 – Results for Islamic Banking  
All investors Statistics Questions 
   
1253♦♦♦ 
13.3 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
8.2 
71.5 
221 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q10 The reason that you invest in mutual funds, real estate, or 
fixed deposits is that it pays more stable income compared to 
stocks. 
 
(1 = Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neutral, 4= Agree, 5= 
Strongly Agree, 6= No opinions, don‘t know)  
   
.868♦♦♦ 
17.8 
1♦♦♦ 
0 
287 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
N 
Q34 Do you have accounts in Islamic banks? 
 
( 1 = Yes, 0 = No) 
   
Percentage (%) Count  Q35 Why did you open accounts in Islamic banks? 
 
85.0±0.04a 
5.6±0.03 
3.0±0.02 
6.4±0.03 
100.0 
198 
13 
7 
15 
N = 233 
1. Religious motives 
2. Return on deposit 
3. Service quality 
4. Other reasons 
   
3.39♦♦♦ 
4.8 
4 
.101 
29.7 
55.6 
232 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q36The risk associated with saving accounts in Islamic banks 
is close to the risks associated with saving account in 
conventional banks. 
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Table ‎4.20 – Results for Islamic Banking  
All investors Statistics Questions 
4.03♦♦♦ 
19.5 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
6.1 
81.4 
231 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q37 You assess the quality of the profits distributed on saving 
and investment accounts by comparing it to last year‘s 
distributions. 
 
 
   
3.74♦♦♦ 
11.5 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
12.1 
66.4 
232 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q38 You assess the quality of the profits distributed on saving 
and investment accounts by comparing it to the profits offered 
by other banks. 
   
4.26♦♦♦ 
28.2 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
2.4 
89.3 
252 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q39 Consistent profit distributions on deposits indicate that the 
bank is financially and operationally stable. 
 
 
 
One diamond (♦) denotes mean (median) response is significantly different from 3 at the 0.10 level, ♦♦ at 
the 0.05 level, and ♦♦♦ at the 0.01 level based on the Student‘s t-value (binomial p). a Margin of error is 
calculated on 95% confidence. 
The figures show that the majority of participants have accounts in Islamic banks, which 
enhance and support the robustness of the research findings in relation to Islamic banking. The 
results also show that the respondents under the age of 40 have relatively more accounts in 
Islamic banks.  
 Question 35 asks for the reason why the respondent has an account(s) in an Islamic 
bank(s). The answer can be: religious motive, return on deposits, service level, or other reasons. 
The mean scores were: 85%, 5.6%, 3.0% and 6.4% respectively. The findings show that the 
religious motive is, by far, the highest choice. The chi-square test of the investors‘ groups shows 
consistent results across all subgroups. Hence, the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative 
hypothesis H15 is accepted, which states that there is a positive relationship between religious 
motives and the demand for the accounts of Islamic banks.  
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 The findings of question 35 are in line with many studies conducted in the GCC. 
Metwally (1996) studies the Islamic banking markets in Kuwait, Saudi and Egypt. He found the 
most determining factor of the attitude towards Islamic banks is religion. Similarly, Metawa and 
Almossaqi (1998) found that the primary factors for using the services of Islamic banks are 
religion then profitability. In Kuwait, Al-Sultan (1999) found that the adherence to religious 
guidelines is the strongest reason for dealing with Islamic banks.  
Although the religious motive is a strong driving force behind the marketability of 
Islamic banking products, reliance on this factor only will not be feasible in the future. This is due 
to the simple and rational economic principle that costless and successful marketing tool will 
attract competition, and as competition intensifies the profit margin will shrink until equilibrium 
is achieved. At this stage, only those who are able to maintain their competitive edge will prosper.   
 Question 36 asks the respondent if the risk associated with the deposits in Islamic banks 
is similar to the risk associated with the deposits in conventional banks. The mean score for this 
question was 3.39 with a t-stat of 4.8, which is significantly different from 3 at a significance 
level of 0.01. 29.7% of respondents gave an answer below 3 while 55.6% gave an answer above 
it. The median score was 4 with a 0.101 binomial p, but not statistically different from 3. This 
result does not provide enough evidence to support the notion that the risks associated with the 
deposits in Islamic and conventional banks are the same. Although both types of deposits appear 
to have similar risks, investors in the GCC seem to understand the concept that Islamic banking is 
based on the principle of profit and loss. 
 Question 37 addresses the applicability of the Lintner model to the profits on PSIA of 
Islamic banks. It asks the respondent if s/he assesses the quality of profits received by comparing 
it to last year‘s distribution. The mean score is 4.03 with a t-stat of 19.5, which is significantly 
different from 3 at a significance level of 0.01. Only 6.1% of the respondents gave an answer 
below 3 while 81.4% gave an answer above 3. The median score was 4 with a zero binomial p, 
which is significantly different from 3 at a significance level of 0.01. Similar to the finding 
related to dividends, depositors perceive historical distributions as an indicator of current 
distributions, which is in line with the proposition of Lintner. Hence, the null hypothesis is 
rejected and the alternative hypothesis H9 is accepted, which states that there is a positive 
relationship between the profit distribution rate on PSIA and the distribution rates of last year. 
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 Question 38 asks the respondents if s/he assesses the profits distributions on PSIA by 
comparing it to the distributions of other banks. The mean score for this question is 3.74 with a t-
stat of 11.5, which is significantly different from 3 at a significance level of 0.01. Only 12.1% of 
the respondents gave an answer less than 3 while 66.4% gave an answer above 3. The median 
score is 4 with a zero binomial p, which is significantly different from 3 at a significance level of 
0.01. The results strongly support the notion that investors tend to compare the profit rates on 
deposits of different banks before taking an investment decision. Hence, the null hypothesis is 
rejected and the alternative hypothesis H12 is accepted, which states there is a positive 
relationship between PSIA distributions and the profit distributions of competitors. 
 Question 39 asks the respondents if consistent profit distributions indicate that the bank is 
financially and operationally stable. The mean score for this question is 4.26 with a t-stat of 28.2, 
which is significantly different from 3 at a significance level of 0.01. Only 2.4% of the 
respondents gave an answer less than 3 while 89.3% gave an answer above 3. The median score 
was 4 with zero binomial p, which is significantly different from 3 at a significance level of 0.01. 
Similar to the results for dividend distributions, depositors perceive consistency in profit 
distributions as a positive indicator of the bank‘s strength. Hence, the null hypothesis is rejected 
and the alternative hypothesis H10 is accepted, which states that there is a positive relationship 
between the stability of profit distributions of PSIA and the demand on these accounts. 
Finally, question 10 asks the investor if the reason for investing in funds, real estate or 
fixed deposits is that it pays more stable income compared to stocks. The mean score for this 
question was 3.86 with a t-statistic of 13.3. The mean score is significantly different from 3 at a 
significance level of 0.01. Furthermore, only 8.2% of the respondents gave an answer below 3, 
while 71.5% gave an answer above 3. The median score was 4 with 0.00 binomial p, which is 
again significantly different from 3 at a significance level of 0.01. The responses indicate that 
investors believe that certain assets are expected to pay more stable dividends than other assets 
(i.e. fixed deposits). The results of both questions 39 and 10 support the views of Lintner in terms 
of stability of payouts in the Islamic banking context. 
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4.6.8 Stock Dividends 
Table ‎4.21 – Results for Stock Dividends 
All investors Statistics Questions 
   
Percentage (%) Count Q26 You consider stock dividends to be more like: 
36.1±0.06a 
26.7±0.05 
37.1±0.06 
100.0 
 
73 
54 
75 
N =202 
 
1. Stock Splits 
2. Cash Dividends 
3. Capital Increase 
 
3.42♦♦♦ 
5.4 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
29.7 
55.8 
266 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q27 If you own a stock of a company that did not distribute 
cash dividends this year, then you would prefer that it 
distributes stock dividends instead. 
 
 
One diamond (♦) denotes mean (median) response is significantly different from 3 at the 0.10 level, ♦♦ at 
the 0.05 level, and ♦♦♦ at the 0.01 level based on the Student‘s t-value (binomial p). a Margin of error is 
calculated on 95% confidence. 
The topic of stock dividends was covered in questions 26 and 27 shown in table 4.21. Question 
26 asks the respondent if s/he perceives dividends as stock splits, cash dividends or capital raise. 
The percentage frequencies were 36.1%, 26.7% and 37.1% respectively.
106
 The results show a 
higher tendency towards defining stock dividends as capital raise or stock splits rather than cash 
dividends. However, it seems not conclusive in terms of the definition of stock dividends. For this 
reason, the answers of stock splits and capital gains are combined since both are considered the 
same in terms of accounting treatments.
107
 Based on this arrangement, the results indicate that 
investors tend to define stock dividends as capital raise or stock splits rather than cash dividends. 
A chi-square test was performed to check if a variation in terms of perception occurs 
from within a subgroup of respondents. The results show a chi-square value of 6.5 with a p-value 
of 0.04 in the income subgroup. This result is significant at a significance level of 0.05. 
                                                   
106 See Appendix 1.C Table 1.C.2. 
107 See section 4.4.3. 
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Therefore, it is expected that a difference in the perception of stock dividends will occur within 
the income subgroup. Further analysis was performed on the income group using t-test two-
sample analysis. The results show the difference in terms of stock dividend perception between 
the lower and higher income groups. The results in appendix 1.C - Table 1.C.3 show that lower 
income investors perceive stock dividends more as capital increase while the higher income 
participants perceive it more as stock splits. 
 Question 27 asks the respondent if s/he prefers to receive stock dividends when the 
company does not distribute cash dividend for the year. The mean score for the question is 3.42 
with a t-stat of 5.4, which is significantly different from 3 at a significance level of 0.01. 29.7% of 
the respondents gave a score below 3 and only 5.8% gave a score above 3. The median was 4 
with a zero binomial p, which is significantly different from 3 at a significance level of 0.01. The 
results show partial agreement with the behavioural finance theory of Shefrin and Statman 
(1984), which states that investors prefer to receive stock dividends rather than no dividends at 
all. This result conforms to Dong et al. (2005) as well. Hence, the null hypothesis is rejected and 
the alternative hypothesis H1 is accepted, which indicate that there is a positive relationship 
between dividend declarations and stock prices. 
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4.6.9 Behavioural Finance  
Table ‎4.22 – Results for Behavioural Finance 
All investors Statistics Questions 
   
2.38 
-6.1 
2 
0 
54.7 
25.1 
203 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q17 How much of your annual dividends do you use for 
consumption purposes? 
 
(1 = 0 – 20 %, 2 = 20 – 40 %, 3 = 40 – 60 %, 4 = 60 -80 %, 5 = 
80 – 100 %, 6 = No opinions, don‘t know) 
   
3.29♦♦♦ 
3.8 
3 
.653 
28.5 
48.3 
242 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q18 You would, for consumption purposes, sell part of your 
shares in a company that has always paid dividends, if the 
management of that company decides not to pay dividends 
anymore. 
One diamond (♦) denotes mean (median) response is significantly different from 3 at the 0.10 level, ♦♦ at 
the 0.05 level, and ♦♦♦ at the 0.01 level based on the Student‘s t-value (binomial p). 
The behavioural finance theory argues that investors employ dividends as a tool of self-discipline 
to help them control their consumption habits. The theory was covered in questions 17 and 18 
shown in table 4.22. Question 17 asks the respondent for the percentage of the annual dividends 
used for consumption purposes. The answer to this question will help decide if dividends are used 
for consumption purposes. The mean score for this question was 2.38 with a t-stat of -6.1. This 
mean score falls between the answers (20 to 40%) and (40 to 60%). Furthermore, 54.7% of the 
respondents gave an answer less than 40 to 60%, while only 25.1% gave an answer above it. The 
median score was 2 with a binomial p of zero. This result is slightly higher than Dong et al. 
(2005), who reported a result close to 20 to 40% dividend consumption rate.   
On the other hand, question 18 directly asks the respondent if s/he would sell part of his 
or her stocks if the management decides not to pay dividends this year. The question restates and 
reinforces the answers of question 17. However, the answer was slightly different from question 
17 as the mean score was 3.29 with a t-stat of 3.8, which is significantly different from neutral 3 
at a level of significance 0.01. Furthermore, 28.5% of the answers came below 3 while 48.3 were 
above it. The median score was 3 with a binomial p of 0.653. 
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 Although the mean score of question 18 shows that the respondents are willing to sell the 
stocks that no longer pay dividends, this does not necessarily mean that investors use dividends 
for consumption purposes. This conclusion is especially true by knowing that investors consume 
around 40% only of their dividends as shown in the results of question 17; the other 60% are 
saved or reinvested.  
In addition, as discussed in the results of clientele and substitution effects, the 
questionnaire found that investors are willing to sell the stocks that have changed their dividend 
policy and characteristics in order to conform to their investment plans and objectives. Based on 
this argument, the results do not conclusively confirm the behavioural finance theory of Shefrin 
and Statman (1984). Hence, there is not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis H16. The 
findings are in line with Dong et al. (2005) Maditinos et al. (2007). 
4.7 GENERALISING THE RESULTS ON GCC COUNTRIES 
In this section, the researcher attempts to identify the difference in the perception of investors in 
various GCC countries. The purpose of this comparison is to be able to generalize the results on 
all GCC countries. Otherwise, the conclusions drawn in this study will be limited to specific 
countries. 
The GCC countries that are covered in the analysis are: Kuwait, Saudi, Qatar and 
UAE.
108
 Appendix 1.D shows the results per country. The mean and median scores are calculated 
for each country in order to detect significant differences between them. For this purpose, the F-
test and Kruskal Wallis test are employed to find the differences in the mean and median scores 
respectively.  
 Although there are significant differences between the responses from different GCC 
countries in questions 10, 13, 22, 25, 37, and 38, all of which are significantly above the neutral 
response of 3. Hence, the difference between the results is in the intensity of the answers but not 
in the overall direction. This entails that the research results and conclusions are applicable to all 
GCC countries in spite of the slight differences in the degree of agreement.  
                                                   
108 Bahrain and Oman are excluded due to sample limitations, see section 4.4.5.3. 
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 Further analysis was performed to identify the pair(s) of countries that has different 
results. The results show statistical difference in the above questions between Kuwait and Saudi. 
For the difference in the results of question 10, the possible reason could be that funds, real estate, 
and fixed deposits in Kuwait have provided far more stable income compared to the income 
distributed by companies listed on the Kuwait stock exchange. This effect could be relatively 
stronger than in Saudi.  
For questions 13, 22 and 25, the reasons could be that the Kuwait stock exchange is 
perceived by local investors as more transparent. Hence, the agency cost and signaling effects 
through dividends or stock repurchasing programs are less relevant to investors in Kuwait 
compared to investors in other GCC countries. For questions 37 and 38, the results that show 
Saudi investors are less influenced by the Lintner model and Competitive payout effect. This 
could be due to their higher preference to receiving dividends through residual dividend policy. 
This could also be linked to the transparency issue. Further studies should be performed to 
validate these hypotheses or come up with new ones that better explain the phenomena. 
4.8 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Table  4.23 - Summary of Results 
Theory Results 
  
Dividend Relevance The alternative hypothesis H1 is accepted. Investors 
prefer to receive dividends. The possible reasons are 
agency and transaction costs.  
  
Agency Conflict 
 
 
Uncertainty Resolution and Bird-in-the-hand The alternative hypothesis H2 is accepted. Investors 
perceive companies, which retain earnings, as more risky.  
 
Window Dressing The alternative hypothesis H3 is accepted. Investors 
perceive companies that pay relatively higher cash 
dividends as more stable and less prone to accounting 
gimmicks.  
 
Free Cash Flow The alternative hypothesis H4 is accepted. Investors 
prefer to receive the free cash flow in the form of 
dividends in order to avoid misuse by management. 
 
Monitoring Cost Hypothesis Not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis. If the 
company requires the funds for a justifiable reason, 
investors were neutral as to whether to receive dividends 
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or not. This is in line with the pecking order hypothesis. 
  
Revaluation Effect 
 
 
Information Signalling The alternative hypothesis H6 is accepted. Investors 
perceive a dividend increase as a positive signal for future 
earnings but a dividend decrease does not necessarily 
mean deteriorating future prospects. 
 
The Lintner Model The alternative hypotheses H7 and H8 are accepted 
Investors assess the value of dividends based on historical 
dividends of the company. 
 
Competitive Payouts The alternative hypothesis H11 is accepted. Investors 
assess dividends by comparing it to the distributions of 
competitors. 
  
Clientele and Substitution Effects The alternative hypothesis H13 is accepted. Investors 
follow a plan and invest in a diversified portfolio. They 
substitute investments in case their characteristics are 
changed.  
  
Share Repurchasing The alternative hypothesis H14 is accepted. Investors 
perceive share repurchasing as a positive signal. It also 
indicates that the stock is undervalued.  
  
Islamic Banking The alternative hypothesis H15 is accepted. The religious 
motive is the primary reason for opening accounts in 
Islamic banks. In addition, the alternative hypotheses H9, 
H10, and H12 are accepted. Depositors perceive 
consistent profit distributions as a signal for bank 
stability. They assess the distributions by comparing them 
to historical ones and to the payouts of competitors. 
These findings support the Lintner model and competitive 
payouts for PSIA distributions.  
  
Stock Dividends Investors do not define stock dividends as cash dividends. 
However, they prefer to receive them than no dividends at 
all.  
  
Behavioural Finance Not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis. 
Investors use around 40% of dividends for consumption 
purposes. However, the results were not enough to 
support or refute the theory.  
  
Table 4.23 summarizes the research results on the perception of GCC investors towards payout 
policies. The first finding states that investors in the GCC prefer to receive dividends due to 
transaction and agency costs. If a company does not distribute dividends for the year, investors 
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prefer to receive stock dividends rather than no dividends. Hence, the results support the dividend 
relevance hypothesis and partially the behavioural finance theory. 
Furthermore, the results support the agency theories of the uncertainty resolution, 
window dressing and free cash flow hypotheses. Thus, dividends are found to mitigate the agency 
cost. On the other hand, investors perceive an increase in dividends as an enhancement of a 
company‘s future cash flows. However, for a decrease in dividends, investors are neutral towards 
the assumption that future cash flows will deteriorate. This finding is complaint with the pecking 
order hypothesis, which can be further explored in the managers‘ survey study as managers are 
more aware of the transaction cost associated with each method of funding and the selection of 
the best method. 
 Investors assess the dividend distributions through comparing it to historical distributions 
and the payouts of competitors of the same category. This concept is in line with the Lintner 
model. The results also indicate that investors diversify their investments through a portfolio of 
assets. The portfolio allocation depends on the investment objectives and risk/return profile of the 
assets. Such requirements form a clientele base for each stock. Hence, If a stock changes its 
characteristics (e.g. dividend policy), investors tend to sell it and purchase another stock to 
maintain their investment objectives. The substitution effect could have a negative impact on the 
stock price depending on the magnitude and speed of change in dividend policy. 
  In terms of share repurchasing, investors perceive it as a positive signal that increases the 
stock price along with the earnings per share. It also signals that the stock price is undervalued. 
On the other hand, stock dividends are not considered by investors as cash dividends, rather it is 
either considered as a stock split or capital increase. As for Islamic banking, the researcher found 
that the most prominent reason for opening accounts in Islamic banks is the religious motive. In 
addition, depositors assess the quality of profit distributions based on historical distributions and 
the payouts of competitors. Finally, the results did not find support for the behavioural finance 
theory except in terms of investors‘ preference towards stock dividends as mentioned earlier.  
 Overall, most findings are in line with Dong et al. (2005) and Maditinos et al. (2007). The 
only exception came in the investor‘s attitude towards agency theories. Although investors have 
strong tendency toward receive dividends to reduce agency conflict, Dong et al. (2005) and 
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Maditinos et al. (2007) did not find enough support for this hypothesis. This could be due to the 
reasons that regulations, audit standards, and minority protection laws are underdeveloped ( Al-
Kuwari, 2009). Furthermore, the findings of the Lintner model were consistent with Al Yahyaee 
(2006). On the other hand, the findings related to the clientele and substitutions effects comply 
with Modigliani and Miller (1963) and Scholes (1972). 
Although the sample size was adequate to arrive at the above conclusions, the sample did 
not sufficiently cover the categories of female and senior investors (i.e. above 55 years old). 
These two categories may give a more complete reading of the retail investor base. For example, 
the researcher can utilize the senior citizens‘ results to find support for the behavioural finance 
theory. This limitation is mainly due to the questionnaire distribution channels, which could be 
resolved by directly communicating with the target audience.     
On the other hand, although there are plenty of individuals in the research sample, who 
work in the banking and investment sectors, the research focused on the retail sector only. Hence, 
similar to the recommendation of Dong et al. (2005), the researcher believes that a specialized 
study on institutional investors using a more suitable research methodology (e.g. semi-structured 
interviews and questionnaire) would help to understand the investors‘ perception from different 
angles. Another recommendation is to extend the research findings by studying the possible 
differences in the perceptions of investors from different GCC states.  
At this stage, the findings will be used as a guideline for the next chapter, which involves 
managers‘ survey conducted to find the payout process and determinants of dividend policy of 
Islamic banks. The results from both research studies will help identify the variables that 
determine the payout policy of Islamic banks, which will be discussed in chapter 6. 
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5 CHAPTER 5: THE PERSPECTIVE OF MANAGERS TOWARDS THE PAYOUT 
POLICY OF ISLAMIC BANKS IN THE GCC 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Investors play a major role in formulating the payout policy. They indirectly respond to payout 
decisions by altering the stock price. As a result, managers have a duty to set suitable payout 
policies to maintain the value of the firm. This goal is achieved by responding to several factors 
that are mainly driven by investors‘ preference and, in the case of Islamic banks, the preference of 
depositors as well.  
In chapter 4, a survey was conducted to discover the perception of investors in the GCC 
towards dividend policies. In this chapter, corporate and financial managers of Islamic banks in 
the GCC were interviewed in order to understand the payout process and to identify the factors 
that affect payout distributions. The results of chapter 4 and 5 are triangulated to formulate a 
payout model, which is tested in chapter 6.  
In this study a concurrent nested approach is employed, which is a mixed methodology 
that uses both qualitative and quantitative approaches. The analysis is based on document review 
and semi-structured interviews with corporate and financial managers.  
The main contribution of the research is the qualitative nature of results, which describe 
in detail the payout process, its determining factors, and justifications through in-depth interviews 
with decision makers and observers. This type of data is difficult to obtain through questionnaires 
or other quantitative methods alone. The research has been conducted for the first time in the 
GCC market.  
Chapter 5 is organized as follows. Section 5.2 assesses selected articles that investigate 
managers‘ perspectives on dividend policy. This section assists in formulating the theoretical and 
methodological grounds for the research. Section 5.3 contains an overview of Islamic banks in the 
GCC. Section 5.4 presents the research methodology, which encompasses the research approach, 
methods, interview design, and sampling. Section 5.5 illustrates the payout process of Islamic 
banks based on document review and in-depth interviews with corporate and financial managers 
of Islamic banks. Finally, section 5.6 presents the conclusion, recommendations, and limitations 
of the study.  
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5.2 SELECTED LITERATURE REVIEW 
Lintner (1956) pioneered survey based research on dividend policy. His aim was to understand 
the process that executive and financial managers follow to formulate suitable dividend policies 
for their firms. To achieve this goal, he reviewed academic and non-academic literature on 
dividends and was able to extract 15 variables that he believed to have an impact on dividend 
decisions. These variables include firm size, capital expenditure, earning stability, control group 
ownership, and stock dividend distributions (Lease et al., 2000).  
From a sample of 600 listed firms, Lintner (1956) chose 28 firms for detailed interviews 
with their corporate executives involved in the dividend policy decisions. The results show a 
consensus among managers that shareholders prefer stable and growing dividend payouts and it 
shows that investors are willing to pay a premium on dividend paying stocks. It also reported that 
managers avoid sudden changes to the dividend policy without justifiable and sustainable 
financial results. The findings also suggest that firms generally follow a targeted dividend payout 
ratio with a certain speed of adjustment. 
The payout levels and speed of adjustment depend upon different factors. Lintner (1956) 
found that it can be effected by factors such as growth expectation, capital expenditure, 
investment opportunities, profitability, and company cash flow. Managers perceive dividends as 
more important than investment opportunities. Therefore, if a shortage of cash occurs after the 
payment of dividends, managers would either postpone the investment opportunity or raise 
external cash. Based on the survey results, Lintner (1956) developed his famous model to 
mathematically describe the relationship between the dividend payouts and related factors.
109
  
Following the path of Lintner (1956), Baker et al. (1985) used a survey based 
methodology to examine how corporate managers perceive dividend policy and if certain 
variables have an impact on the firm‘s value and dividend policy. Their objectives are to compare 
their results with Lintner (1956), to test the signalling and clientele effects, and to determine if 
managers from different industries share the same views on dividend policy.  
                                                   
109 For more details, refer to section 6.2.  
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Baker et al. (1985) surveyed 562 New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) firms from the 
utilities, manufacturing, and wholesale/retail sectors via mail-in questionnaire. The responses of 
318 firms were collected and analysed.  The results were very similar to Lintner  (1956) 
especially in relation to dividend continuity and stability. The vast majority of the respondents 
believe that dividends affect the value of the firm. The results indicate that a possible explanation 
could be due to clientele and signalling effects. Finally, the responses of managers in the utility 
companies differ from those in the two other industries. This is possibly due to the regulations 
that directly or indirectly control dividend policy in these firms, which prompted the author to 
suggest segregating regulated from non-regulated firms when conducting dividend policy 
research.  
Based on his previous studies,
110
 Partington (1985) found that Australian companies 
follow a targeted payout ratio. He was also able to suggest a number of motives behind the 
payment of dividends and whether their dividend policies are managed or simply a residual after 
deducting investment and operational expenditures. Partington (1989) extended his previous 
results by studying the effect of profitability, cash flow, financing cost, liquidity constraints, 
dividend stability, and taxation on dividend policy. In doing so, the author surveyed corporate 
managers of the largest companies listed on the Sydney Stock Exchange using a questionnaire 
method. He received 93 useful responses from a sample of 152. The questionnaire contains 20 
statements by which to gauge the views of corporate managers on dividend policy. Within these 
statements, 22 variables, which were expected to influence dividend policy, were embedded. 
Partington (1989) found that corporate managers believe that dividend stability is highly 
important as it affects investor confidence in the firm and, consequently, the stock price. 
Therefore, firms gradually increase dividends in line with profits and they would only cut 
dividends under exceptional circumstances. The study found that the level of profit, impact on 
stock price, liquidity position, and dividend stability are the most common factors that determine 
dividend distributions of Australian firms. 
                                                   
110 See Partington (1983, 1984) 
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Partington (1989) also found that dividends were not residually determined, and that 
firms would usually adopt independent dividend and investment policies. The results suggest that 
the dividend payout process starts by setting the desired payout level and investment 
expenditures. If there is a short fall in funding, then companies usually resort to external funding 
through debt. If the amount is still not sufficient, the management would either divide it equally 
between dividend and investment plans, or they would give dividends the priority.  
Baker and Powell  (1999) investigated the views of corporate managers about the 
relationship between dividend policy and the value of the firm. The study explained the dividend 
policy decisions in terms of various theories. It also attempted to find the main determinants of 
dividend policy. The survey was sent to 603 chief financial officers of companies listed in NYSE. 
The researcher received 198 usable responses. The results show that the most widely known 
explanation for the relevance of dividend policy is information signalling. The results also 
highlight that managers support the continuity and stability of dividends in order to maintain the 
market value of the firm.  
Brav et al. (2005) tested the validity of the Lintner model 50 years after it was first 
introduced. The researchers surveyed a sample of 384 financial executives and conducted in-
depth interviews with an additional 23. They reported that the link between dividend and earnings 
in the Lintner model had weakened and that managers now prefer share repurchases rather than 
cash dividends. The reason is that it gives managers more flexibility while it increases the 
earnings per share. Furthermore, the findings indicate that repurchases are made out of the 
residual cash flow after determining investment requirements. They also found that executives 
believe that payout policy has little impact on their investors‘ base or clientele. The findings gave 
minor support to agency, signalling, and clientele effect hypotheses.  
Recently, Mizuno (2007) surveyed corporate managers of firms listed on Tokyo Stock 
Exchange. By using a questionnaire approach, the study aimed to find the perception of corporate 
managers on dividend policy. The study targeted firms from four different sectors namely: food 
manufacturing and processing, electrical appliances and electronics, real estate, and utilities. A 
questionnaire was sent to 310 firms and 69 useful responses were received. The analysis shows 
that corporate managers attach more importance to stable dividend policy than performance 
linked dividend policy. Hence, they prefer managed dividend policy rather than residual dividend 
158 
 
policy, which refutes the dividend irrelevance hypothesis. In addition, managers believed that 
dividends should usually be paid after investment plans are determined. The study also finds that 
corporate managers attach importance to the cost of equity and the value of the firm when paying 
dividends. It also shows managers belief in the information signalling hypothesis. However, 
managers did not agree with the free cash flow or maturity hypotheses.   
5.3 ISLAMIC BANKS IN THE GCC 
Islamic banking in the GCC started in the 1970‘s, which witnessed the establishment of several 
major Islamic banks. The trend of Islamic banking in the GCC reached an estimate of USD70 
billion in assets by 2005.
111
 Table 5.1 shows a comparison between Islamic and conventional 
banks in the GCC. In 2005 there were 14 Islamic banks compared to 50 conventional banks. The 
asset base of Islamic banks represents 16.5% of conventional banks. The average return on equity 
of Islamic banks is 29% compared to 22.1% for conventional banks, which gives an equity to 
assets ratio of 14.1% compared to 13.5%. This indicates that the Islamic banking industry has 
grown faster than its conventional counterpart.  
Table  5.1 - Islamic Banks vs. Conventional Banks in the GCC (as of 2005) 
Financial Indicator Islamic Banking Conventional Banking 
Total Assets (in USD millions) 73,603 446,094 
Number of firms 14 50 
Average Assets (in USD millions) 5,257 8,922 
Return on Assets 3.7% 3.0% 
Return on Equity 29.0% 22.1% 
Equity on Assets 14.1% 13.5% 
Debt on Assets 77.6% 55.6% 
Deposits on Assets 71.5% 77.3% 
      Source: Mckinsey & Company cited by (Muthanna, 2005, 2008).  
Table 5.2 shows the financial information of the top ten Islamic banks in the GCC. In 
terms of market capitalization, Al-Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation from Saudi is the 
                                                   
111 In order to read the data provided in this section objectively and to avoid any bias caused by the 
economic crisis occurred in the last quarter of 2008, the data collected is as of 2008 or before. 
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largest, followed by Kuwait Finance House. In terms of return on equity, Al-Rajhi also comes 
first with 25.48%, which indicates a relatively high efficiency. This could be attributed to greater 
economies of scale and a lower cost structure. The table also highlights that smaller banks and 
newly established banks such as Boubyan Bank and Bilad Bank, which were established in 2005, 
have the lowest return on equity. This may indicate that new banks are normally faced with 
higher capital expenditures (e.g. branch network, training, branding, and technology) in the early 
phases of their life cycle and/or less revenues.
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Table  5.2 - Islamic Banks in the GCC (as of 2008) 
Bank Name 
Market Cap 
(in USD billions) 
ROA ROE P/BV P/E EPS 
Al Rajhi Banking & Investment 
Corporation 
22.413 4.50% 25.48% 3.04 12.87 4.35 
Kuwait Finance House 10.24 1.81% 11.64% 1.76 17.00 0.08 
Qatar Islamic Bank 4.486 5.99% 27.91% 2.43 10.59 8.34 
Bilad Bank 2.241 0.77% 3.96% 2.61 67.16 0.42 
Qatar International Islamic Bank 2.034 2.31% 14.74% 14.96 125.47 4.19 
Dubai Islamic Bank 1.558 2.04% 17.66% 0.56 2.87 0.58 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 1.396 1.79% 15.39% 0.91 6.02 0.43 
Boubyan Bank 1.685 0.24% 1.41% 2.87 250.00 0.002 
Bank Al Jazira 1.205 0.91% 4.71% 0.95 20.34 0.74 
Al-Rayan Bank 2.27 6.80% 11.92% 1.45 9.02 1.22 
Source: (Global, 2008) 
5.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY113 
The aim of this research study is to survey managers of Islamic banks in order to understand the 
payout process and to identify the factors that influence payout distributions. Hence, the research 
question is: 
                                                   
112 Refer to section 5.5.4.12. 
113 The term is defined in section 4.4.  
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―What is the payout process of Islamic banks in the GCC and what are the factors that influence 
payout‎distributions?” 
For this purpose, this research involves an in-depth exploration of the process and factors 
affecting the payout policy of Islamic banks in the GCC. The nature of such investigation requires 
a thorough analysis of annual reports of Islamic banks and articles that focus on the topic. This 
analysis is complemented by surveying the perceptions of corporate and financial managers in 
Islamic banks. The approach follows a concurrent nested design, which uses one data collection 
phase to collect both qualitative and quantitative data simultaneously (Creswell, 2003). Since the 
analysis is based on qualitative data to describe the payout process through document review and 
in-depth interviews, the qualitative approach is the predominant approach. However, the study 
uses an embedded quantitative approach, which employs descriptive statistics, in order to 
evaluate the answers of the closed-ended questions of the interview. This process is termed as 
quantification of qualitative data.
114
  
The predominant approach of the research is the qualitative approach. Van Maanen 
(1983) defines qualitative methods as ―an array of interpretive techniques which seek to describe, 
decode, translate, and otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not the frequency, of certain 
more or less naturally occurring phenomena and the social world‖ (1983: 9, (Easterby-Smith et 
al., 1991): 71). In addition, Bazeley (2007) describes the purpose of qualitative research methods 
by stating that it is ―chosen in situations where a detailed understanding of a process or 
experience is wanted, where more information is needed to determine the exact nature of the 
issues being investigated, or where the only information available is in non-numeric 
form‖(Obeidat, 2008). 
To implement the research methodology, several methods were employed. These 
methods are discussed in the following sections.  
                                                   
114 Refer to section 5.4.3. 
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5.4.1 Documents 
Documents are considered an integral part of the qualitative research approach as it provides rich 
sources of information on the topic under investigation. In this regards, Bryman and Bell (2003) 
state that ―documents are used as the primary source of data within a qualitative study or 
alternatively as adjuncts to other methods, such as interviews or participant observation.‖ 
(Obeidat, 2008).  
In this study four types of documents were reviewed namely: articles on payout process 
of Islamic banks, annual reports, customer contracts, and bank brochures. The first type is the 
articles, which discuss the payout distributions of Islamic banks from Shari’ah and accounting 
point of views.
115
 It mainly helped the researcher in drawing the skeleton for the payout process 
of Islamic banks. This skeleton is used as the basis for discussion in the open-ended section of the 
interview to confirm, elaborate, and explain each step of the payout policy.  
The second type of documents is the annual reports of 9 Islamic banks in the GCC. These 
reports were used in conjunction with the payout skeleton drawn earlier to correct and verify any 
discrepancy with the review of literature. The annual reports were also used to add more intricate 
technical details of the payout process.  
The third and forth types of documents are customer contracts and bank brochures. These 
documents helped in the identification of certain details related to the products of Islamic banks 
such as: periodicity of PSIA profit distribution, Mudarabah fees, reserve requirements, account 
restrictions, and other account related features and conditions.  
5.4.2 Interviews 
After detailing the skeleton of the payout process through the analysis of documents, the second 
stage of the research study was initiated. This stage involves conducting in-depth interviews with 
corporate and financial managers of 9 Islamic banks. This section details the interview design and 
process.  
                                                   
115 Refer to section 2.5.  
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5.4.3 Interview Design 
Since the nature of this research requires in-depth understanding of the payout process and the 
factors affecting it, an interview is suitable to uncover such information. Frankfurter and Wood Jr 
(2002) define interviews in the social research context as ―a face-to-face interpersonal role 
situation in which an interviewer asks respondents questions designed to elicit an answer 
pertinent to the research hypothesis‖ (1997: 232, (Al-Hajji, 2003)). Easterby-Smith et al. (1991) 
comment that the interview method is the most fundamental of all qualitative methods and is 
claimed to be the best method for gathering information. The interview method provides an in-
depth understanding of the phenomena because of the ability of gaining insight into interviewee 
perceptions, as well as information from non-verbal clues.  
There are several limitations to this method, such as access to the right people. Also the 
method is time consuming and requires advanced skills to extract useful information while 
avoiding researcher-driven biases. In addition, it is normally more complex to analyse qualitative 
data, gained through interviews. The researcher would face difficult time in trying to identify 
trends in the data, especially if s/he is dealing with many interviews (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991).  
Interview designs vary in the degree of structure, which is related to type and focus of the 
questions asked depending on the topic under investigation. If the topic is new or requires a 
higher degree of information, the interview design should be loosely structured. However, if the 
topic is well defined and can be addresses by asking simple questions, then a highly structured 
interview design is recommended. There are three types of interview designs namely: 
unstructured, structured, and semi-structured.  
Unstructured interviews are based on asking general open-ended questions with no 
specific order. The interviewee can elaborate upon it as required. By comparing the outcomes of 
the interviews, the researcher is able to draw the broad lines of the topic under investigation, 
identify trends and dig deeper into detailed explanations of these trends. The main limitation of 
unstructured interviews is that it is time consuming and it may require high interview skills.  
In contrast, the structured interview is similar to a researcher-administered questionnaire 
whereby the interviewee is asked a set of closed-ended questions. The researcher uses the same 
set for all interviews using the same voice tone in order to avoid any biases. This type of 
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interviews is fast to deliver and it requires limited skills. However, it requires a high degree of 
preparation and theoretical understanding to formulate the questions and to achieve information 
validity.  
The third and most popular type is the semi-structured interview, which takes the best out 
of structured and unstructured interviews. In this type of interview, the conversation is guided and 
focused using a predetermined design that should be well thought out in advance by the 
researcher.
116
 It is recommended that the interviewer follow an interview guide, which is an 
informal ―grouping of topics and questions that the interviewer can ask in different ways for 
different participants‖ ((Lindlof and Taylor, 2002): 195). During the interview, the interviewer 
follows the general structure but can respond flexibly to new ideas or other contingencies that 
occur (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002).  
The degree of structure of the interview depends on the research topic. Saunders et al. 
(2009) states that ―in an exploratory study, semi-structured interviews may be used in order to 
understand the relationships between variables, such as those revealed from descriptive study‖ 
(2007: 314). This description fits our research purpose. Although dividend policy has been 
extensively studied in the past, researchers did not cover the Islamic banking industry. Hence, we 
aim to explore the payout process and its determining factors and then validate the findings 
against dividend theories. For this purpose a semi-structured interview design was employed with 
two sets of questions; open-ended and closed-ended questions. The first set covers the exploration 
part, and the second set covers the validation part. Both sets are administered by the researcher 
during the interview.  
5.4.3.1 Theoretical Review and Preliminary Interview Design 
The semi-structured interview
117
 is divided into three sections. The first section contains four 
open-ended questions that are intended to extract illustrative type of data to describe the process 
of payout policy in Islamic banks in general terms. This includes the process of profit distribution 
                                                   
116 For more details, refer to Easterby-Smith et al. (1991). 
117 See Appendix 2.A. 
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on PSIA
118
 and dividend distribution. In addition, Interviewees are asked to identify the main 
factors that affect payout policy. They were also asked about the role of regulatory bodies in the 
process, including the central bank and the Ministry of Commerce. During the interview, the 
researcher was ready to discuss the process in details and to identify any gaps or discrepancies 
between the answers of interviewees and the skeleton of the payout process drawn from 
document review. 
The second and third sections of the interview comprise of 50 and 19 closed-ended 
questions respectively. These questions were selected from published questionnaires and 
modified as required.
119
 The purpose of the second section is to capture the details of the payout 
policy using dividend theories from mainstream finance while giving the ability to the interviewer 
to elaborate on the answers during the course of the interview. In the third section of the 
interview, a list of the factors that are believed to affect the dividend policy was compiled. 
5.4.3.2 Focus group   
A focus group was formed to validate the draft of the semi-structured interview form. The group 
met over two sessions. In the first session, six participants from the Islamic financial sector were 
selected, including senior people from finance, operations, and audit areas. At the beginning of 
the first session, the topic of payout distributions in Islamic banks was introduced. The discussion 
was mainly around the interplay between profit distribution between investment accounts and 
dividends. The relationship was described, while the possible factors that affect each type of 
distribution were identified and rendered in the interview form.  
The focus group was very helpful in reviewing the first draft of the interview form, 
especially in formulating the open-ended section. After completing the first session, all 
                                                   
118 For convenience purposes, the researcher will use the term PSIA in reference to profit/loss saving and 
investment accounts. 
119 The questions were sourced from four questionnaires, which are designed for managers, namely: Baker 
et al. (1985), Partington (1989), Brav et al. (2005), and Mizuno (2007). Since the questions addresses 
dividends only, it was modified to include PSIA distributions. 
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participants were handed the first draft of the interview form in order to review it and submit their 
feedback in the next session. The session lasted for an hour.  
In the second session, the participants handed back their copies of the interview form 
with their feedback. The group discussed if the form properly addresses the research purpose. The 
written and verbal suggestions were as follows: 
1. Modifications are required in the language of the open-ended question to improve clarity.  
2. To make the interviewees more comfortable in talking about the topic, it was suggested 
that the language of the questions should address the topic in general terms rather than 
specifically in relation to the interviewee‘s bank. When interviewees elaborate, the 
interviewer can steer them to talk about the practice in their banks and compare it to the 
industry.  
3. Certain improvements in the terminology of questions were suggested to make it more 
appropriate to the context of Islamic banks, especially in part two and three.   
4. In some questions related to dividend theories, further explanation is required.  
5. It was suggested that at the end of the interview, interviewees can be asked to refer 
another person in the organization, who is suitable to take the interview. The focus group 
members helped identify several candidates for the study.    
5.4.3.3 Academic approval 
Based on the results of the focus group, the draft of the semi-structured interview form was 
modified. Then it was forwarded to the academic committee in the Department of Finance and 
Accounting at Durham Business School in order for them for final approval. A number of 
modifications were suggested and rendered in the final version. At this stage, the interview form 
was ready for usage. 
5.4.4 Interview Method and Process 
5.4.4.1 Interview Method Selection 
Semi-structured interviews can be conducted via telephone or in-person. The benefits of 
telephone interviews are mainly related to cost and convenience for both the interviewer and 
interviewee. However, the disadvantage of telephone interviews is that it should be short (e.g. 
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between 30 and 60 minutes) in order to prevent interviewee fatigue, which may lead to inaccurate 
or biased responses. Another major disadvantage is that it is difficult for the interviewer to create 
rapport with the interviewee, which can prevent obtaining further information. In addition, the 
interviewer will not be able to assess non-verbal information (Kuper and Kuper, 1996).  
On the other hand, conducting the interview in-person has many benefits. First, the 
interviewer can explain the topic and the questions to the interviewee on the spot. Hence, a more 
complex set of questions can be asked and the interviewee can take time to answer them. Second, 
the interviewee can build a relationship with the interviewee than can be used later if further 
clarification is required. Third, the interviewer can learn from the non-verbal clues and 
environmental settings in determining when and how to ask the questions and if the answers are 
sufficient. This increases the validity of the data collected. The limitations of this type of 
interviews are the associated costs (e.g. travelling and accommodation). It may also be difficult to 
schedule the interview, depending on the level of the people that the interviewer is trying to 
reach. Another difficulty is that many corporate managers refuse to be interviewed as they think it 
would jeopardize their corporate competitiveness by giving away important information. 
In this study, the in-person interview approach was employed for several reasons. First, 
Islamic banks in the GCC are relatively few. Therefore, it is relatively easy to conduct in-person 
interviews with representative sample by using relationship networks. Second, the topic and 
questions were too complex to be conducted over telephone. Finally, the average interview length 
was around 60 minutes, which would be very impractical for a telephone interview as the 
interviewee would be fatigued by the end of the interview, thus, effecting the quality of 
information. 
5.4.4.2 Interview Process 
In this research, a sample of nine Islamic banks in the GCC was selected.
 120
 From these banks, 
ten perspective interviewees were identified and contacted over the phone to give them a brief on 
                                                   
120 Refer to section 5.4.8.  
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the research topic and to schedule an appointment for an interview. Right after the call, an email 
invitation
121
 was sent to them restating the research purpose, appointment time/date, and location. 
Table  5.3 - Interviews Schedule 
Country Schedule 
UAE 15/04/2010 – 22/04/2010 
Saudi 23/04/2010 – 29/04/2010 
Bahrain 07/07/2010 – 14/07/2010 
Kuwait Multiple trips 
As shown in table 5.3, a seven days visit to countries in the GCC was scheduled to 
conduct the interviews. The researcher made sure that all interviews were conducted in the offices 
of the interviewees for their convenience and comfort. When the interview starts, the interviewer 
identifies himself by offering his business card and a letter from Durham Business School. This 
step assured the identity of the interviewer, his sponsor, and the purpose of the interview. Next, 
the interviewer restates the anonymity and confidentiality clauses that protect the interviewee, the 
bank, and the information discussed during the interview. These steps are necessary to increase 
the confidence of the interviewees and encourage them to talk freely (Dean and Sharfman, 1993).  
At the beginning of the interview, the interviewer talks about general matters with the 
interviewee, mainly in relation to the economic situation and other social matters, in an attempt to 
establish rapport. This will increase the interviewee‘s level of comfort and hence, the quantity and 
validity of information provided (Sekaran, 2003). Next, the researcher starts the interview by 
giving a brief introduction on the topic, research objectives, and research contributions. He then 
explains the structure of the interviews and length of time it is expected to take.   
The interviewer starts the first section by asking about the payout process. The 
interviewee is free to answer the open-ended questions until s/he stops. At this point, the 
interviewer starts asking related questions in order to elaborate and clarify relevant issues. This 
                                                   
121 Available in Appendix 2.B – Letter to Interviewee. 
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technique is named funnelling, which continues until the interviewer feels that the information 
given is saturating (Sekaran, 2003). At this stage, the interviewer goes to the next question and 
continues the process until the first section is over. 
In the second and third sections of the interview, which encompasses closed-ended 
questions, the interviewer restates the previous discussion in a more structured manner to ensure 
that all important points were covered and that the information provided is consistent. In case any 
question was not properly covered, or appeared to be inconsistent with the previous discussion, 
the interviewer asks for an explanation. 
During the interview, the interviewer takes note of the entire discussion. Although using 
a recorder would have been more convenient and accurate, it was avoided because it would make 
the interviewee less comfortable. In this regards, Sekaran (2003) states ―the interviews can be 
recorded on tape if the respondent has no objection. However, taped interviews might bias the 
respondents‘ answers because they know that their voices are being recorded, and their  
anonymity is not preserved in full‖ (2003: 231).  
5.4.5 Triangulation 
Hussey and Hussey (1997) defines triangulation as ―the use of different research approaches, 
methods and techniques in the same study to overcome the potential bias and sterility of a single-
method approach‖. In addition, Saunders et al. (2009) defines triangulation as ―the use of 
different data collection techniques within one study in order to ensure that the data are telling 
you (the researcher) what you (the researcher) think they (the interviewees) are telling you‖.  
Easterby-Smith et al. (1991)  mentioned four methods of triangulations namely: data, 
investigator, methodological, and theoretical. Data triangulation means that the data is collected 
in different time frames or that the data is collected from different sources. Investigator 
triangulation means that different investigators are used to collect the same data. Methodological 
triangulation refers to using different methods to collected data (e.g. quantitative and qualitative 
methods). Theoretical triangulation is when different theories are used to describe the same 
results. In all triangulation methods, a comparison is performed to assure consistency of the 
results and, therefore, strengthen the result‘s validity and reliability (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991).  
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 In this research, data triangulation was used by comparing the information from different 
sources such as interviews, articles, annual reports, customer contracts, and bank brochures. In 
addition, internal consistency check between the results of the two parts of the interview (i.e. 
open-ended and closed-ended questions) was performed. Methodological triangulation was 
employed by comparing the findings of qualitative and quantitative approaches. In the qualitative 
approach, the study used the documents and interviews with corporate and financial managers. 
Quantitative approach was covered in the investors‘ survey study.   
5.4.6 Validity122 
Content validity using the panel of judges‘ method was employed in this study. The questions 
asked during the interview were based on published articles, which have gone through intensive 
academic scrutiny. In addition, several stages of validation were employed to ensure that the 
questions measure the intended purpose and adequately cover the research topic.
123
 Furthermore, 
construct validity using the convergent validity method was used to assure that different 
measurements of the same construct were consistent. Problems related to validity can be 
mitigated through using multiple methods of data collection and sources (Bryman, 2004). In this 
study, triangulation at the level of data collection and methodology was employed.   
5.4.7 Reliability124 
The inter-item consistency method was implemented by grouping different items that measure a 
construct to check their consistency. During the analyses each construct was illustrated in terms 
of its items, therefore checking their reliability and consistency simultaneously. At the same time 
the result of other constructs were triangulated, which are expected to produce similar results.   
                                                   
122 The term is defined in section 4.4.4.1. 
123 See section 5.4.3. 
124 The term is defined in section 4.4.4.2 
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5.4.8 Research Sample 
In reference to sampling techniques used in qualitative studies, Bazeley (2007) stated that ―such 
investigation typically necessitates gathering intensive and/or extensive information from a 
purposively derived sample, and they involve interpretation of unstructured or semi-structured 
data‖ (Obeidat, 2008). The size of the sample depends on the complexity of research questions, 
Marshall and Rossman (1999) states that ―An appropriate sample size for a qualitative study is 
one that adequately answers the research question. For simple questions or very detailed studies, 
this might be in single figures; for more complex questions large samples and a variety of 
sampling techniques might be necessary. In practice, the number of required subjects usually 
becomes obvious as the study progresses, as new categories, themes or explanations stop 
emerging from the data.‖ 
There are several sampling techniques available for researchers
125
. However, since the 
population and selected sample in this study is relatively small,
126
 which makes contacting the 
required sample easier, the purposive sampling technique using the judgmental sampling method 
was employed. This sampling technique suggests that instead of obtaining information from those 
readily and conveniently available, the researcher should focus on a specific group, who can 
provide the desired information. 
Based on the above definitions and arguments, nine Islamic banks from different GCC 
states were selected based on size and age. The research sample represents 47.36% of the 
population of listed Islamic banks in the GCC. The sample represents 72.15% of the market 
capitalization of listed Islamic banks in the GCC.
127
 These high percentages are considered 
adequate for generalizing the results from the selected population and to cover the theoretical 
aspects required in this study.  
                                                   
125 For more details, refer to Sekaran (2003). 
126 The number of listed Islamic banks in the GCC on 31/10/2010 was 19 (Muthanna, 2010) and the 
research sample size is 9 banks. 
127 The market capitalization of listed Islamic banks in the GCC on 21/12/2010 was USD74.55 billion and 
the market capitalization of the sample is USD53.8 billion (Muthanna, 2008). 
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5.4.9 Statistical Inference 
In the second and third sections of the interview form, which relate to the applicability of 
dividend theories and the determining factors of payout policy, the interviewee was given a scale 
between 1 and 5, where 1 equals ‗strongly disagree‘ with the statement, 5 equals ‗strongly agree‘, 
and 3 is ‗neutral‘.128 
Although the sample to population ratio was close to 50% and therefore strongly 
representative, the sample size of 9 interviewees was fairly small to conduct full-fledged 
statistical analysis. Therefore, to evaluate the answers of the interviews, simple descriptive 
statistics that give the mean, standard deviation, and other information were employed. These 
numbers are interpreted to arrive at a general consensus between interviewees. If the mean result 
is equal or above 4, which is ‗agree‘ or ‗strongly agree‘, then the statement is considered 
accepted. However, if the mean answer is 2 or below, which is ‗disagree‘ or ‗strongly disagree‘, 
then the statement is not accepted. Finally, if the mean answer is between 2 and 4, then there is a 
mixed opinion about the results and the statement is not supported. If this occurs, triangulation is 
used where possible to justify the answer.  
As for the selection of factors in section three, an answer of 4 or above is required to 
accept the factor. Someone may argue that this stringent criterion may exclude valid factors. This 
assumption is validated in chapter 6, when the factors are tested using multivariate regressions 
analysis and the power of model explanation is checked for sufficiency.
129
 
Basing qualitative findings on the frequency of occurrence is a common technique in 
qualitative research. Silverman (1984, 1985) argues that some quantification of findings from 
qualitative research can help generalize the phenomena under investigation (Bryman, 2004). 
Similarly, Miles and Huberman (1994) recommend using a contract summary sheet to record the 
themes arise during an interview. To build a contract summary, the researcher generates general 
                                                   
128 This scale is referred to as the Lickert scale. See section 4.4.7. 
129 The R squared for the PSIA and dividend models were 0.539 and 0.440 respectively, which are higher 
than similar studies. See section 6.5.5. 
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themes in a sheet of paper and then categorizes the responses during an interview according to 
these themes (Bryman, 2004). Bryman (2004) states that qualitative researchers often employ 
words such as many, often, or some to give greater precision into these estimates of frequency. 
5.5 PAYOUT PROCESS 
The payout process is part of the accounting cycle. In this section, the main stages of the payout 
process of Islamic banks (see figure 5.1). At every stage of the process, there are potential 
differences in the practices of the Islamic banks. These differences are highlighted and any 
associated issues are discussed.  
  Figure  5.1 - Payout Process 
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5.5.1 Revenues and Expenses Allocation 
                 Figure  5.2 – Allocation Methods 
  
During the calculation of net profit, a process of allocating revenues and expenses takes 
place. Figure 5.2 shows the two methods that Islamic banks follow. The first, and most common, 
method is to divide net profit (revenues less expenses
130
) between shareholders and PSIA on pro-
rata basis (DIB, 2009, EIB, 2009, KFH, 2009, QIB, 2009, SIB, 2009). 
The second method is the Mudarabah pool concept ( Rajhi, 2009, BIB, 2009). In this 
method, an allocation process takes place to separate those revenues generated by the Mudarabah 
pool‘s assets from those revenues generated through banking services (i.e. ATM, foreign 
exchange, management fees, …etc) and proprietary investments (i.e. real estate and direct 
investments).
131
 The latter type of revenues goes to shareholders. In terms of expenses, the 
selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A) are born by shareholders only.   
                                                   
130 Net profit before taxes(if any), Zakat, and directors‘ remuneration.  
131 Refer section 2.4 in chapter 2. 
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The downside of the first method is that all bank assets are shared by shareholders and 
PSIA.
132
 Hence, both are exposed to the same risk/return characteristics albeit the difference in 
their preferences and investment objectives. This issue is mitigated by the second method as the 
assets are segregated into Mudarabah pool and bank assets that belong to shareholders only. The 
Mudarabah pool mostly consists of medium to short term assets, thus risk/return profile is more 
tailored to PSIA compared to the first method.  
5.5.2 Deducting Reserves and Provisions 
Before distributing the profits of Mudarabah pool, Islamic banks create reserves and provisions 
necessary for its operations. Islamic banks in the GCC generally maintain five types of reserves 
namely: statutory or legal, general or voluntary, investment risk reserve (IRR) or Mudarabah 
pool reserve, and profit equalization reserve (PER).
 133
 In addition, a number of banks have other 
types of reserves such as: exchange translation reserve, revaluation reserve for properties, and 
hedge reserve (DIB, 2009, EIB, 2009).  
The statutory or legal reserves are stipulated by commercial laws and the regulations of 
central banks in the GCC. Banks are required to transfer a certain percentage of net income
134
 to 
the statutory reserve account until the value of this account equals a certain percentage of paid-up 
capital.
135
 When the condition is reached the BOD and the general assembly can suspend the 
transfer. The statutory reserve is not available for distribution except under certain circumstances 
stipulated by the law (EIB, 2009, KFH, 2009, Rajhi, 2009).  
                                                   
132In this chapter, only the profit distributions to unrestricted investment accounts are discussed. The 
restricted investments are uncommon in the GCC and it resembles a small fraction of deposits. Therefore, it 
is outside the scope of our analysis. For more information on these accounts, refer to section 2.4.  
133 The terms were introduced by AAOIFI.  
134 This percentage depends on state laws and central bank regulations. Most banks in the GCC transfer 
10% of net income. Some banks transfer up to 25% of net income depending on central bank regulations 
(Rajhi, 2009). 
135 Some regulations require 25% others require 50% or 100% of the paid-up capital (DIB, 2009, KFH, 
2009, QIB, 2009, Rajhi, 2009). 
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The general or voluntary reserve is established according to the bank‘s article of 
association, which states that a certain percentage of net income should be transferred to this 
reserve annually. This reserve is available for distribution upon the recommendation of BOD and 
the authorization of the general assembly with prior approval from the central bank (QIB, 2009, 
Rajhi, 2009).  
The reserves discussed this far are mainly deducted from shareholders‘ income and not 
from depositors or the Mudarabah pool. For the Mudarabah pool, Islamic banks use the IRR and 
PER. These types of reserves are employed to maintain the stability of payout distributions. A 
percentage of the Mudarabah pool
136
 income is transferred annually to the IRR reserve. This 
reserve account is normally part of owners‘ equity but shared by both depositors and 
shareholders. Usage from this reserve is recommended by the BOD, authorized by the general 
assembly and approved by the central bank. Whereas, the PER is used as an additional smoothing 
tool for PSIA only. The reserve is normally held under the liability side of the balance sheet (EIB, 
2009).  
On the other hand, provisions are funds deducted from the entity‘s revenues and set aside 
in a dedicated item on the balance sheet as a precautionary measure to pay for possible losses that 
may occur as a result of defaults (i.e. loan defaults), legal claims, or expected impairment of 
assets (DIB, 2009, QIB, 2009). Today, regulations dictate that every financial institution, 
including Islamic banks, should maintain prudent loss provisioning and write-off policy that is 
compliant with international standards to be able to asses the amount of provision charged 
periodically in financial statements (EIB, 2009).  
The bank‘s management is responsible for setting the provision assessment standards, 
monitoring the process, and approving the results based on objective and justifiable evidence 
(External Auditor‘s Report, EIB, 2009, Rajhi, 2009). This exercise requires specialized expertise 
and may involve careful analysis of the bank‘s operations, historical records, client profiles, asset 
                                                   
136 Mudharaba pool is the pool of assets managed by the bank and shared by unrestricted investment 
account holders and shareholders (EIB, 2009). 
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and liability structure,
137
 and other aspects of the bank. Among the main measures used by 
financial institutions to trigger and quantify provisions are: 
 Delays in loan payments in terms of principle, profit, or both.138 
 A client facing cash flow difficulties. 
 Breaching the terms of contract. 
 A client facing liquidation procedure. 
 A client facing business downtrend. 
 Reductions in the value of collateral (Rajhi, 2009). 
In addition to provision evaluation on a case-by-case basis, some financial institutions in 
the GCC are required by central bank regulations to make a minimum general provision on the 
loans portfolio for those accounts which are not yet provisioned (KFH, 2009).  
The evaluation of provisions is required to be conducted regularly in financial institutions 
as a whole.
139
 Upon completion of the exercise, the results are usually required to be audited by 
the external auditor and approved by the central bank.
140
  
  
                                                   
137 For financial assets banks use IAS 39 standard for asset valuation (EIB, 2009, Rajhi, 2009). 
138 Usually accounts under provision are ranked in terms of the amount of delay (e.g. 90, 120, 180 delays) 
and a weights are assigned accordingly (e.g. 5%). For an illustration, refer to (U.A.E, 2010) 
139 The frequency of review depends on the provision rank given to the account type (U.A.E, 2010). 
140 See auditor‘s report in DIB (2009).  
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5.5.3 PSIA Profit Distribution Process 
Figure  5.3 - PSIA Distribution Process 
After allocating the revenues and expenses and booking relevant reserves and provisions, the net 
profit is then available for distribution amongst depositors and shareholders. As shown in figure 
5.3, the PSIA distribution process goes through six steps. In this section each stage of the process 
is illustrated. Towards the end of the section, the factors affecting the PSIA distribution rate are 
discussed. 
5.5.3.1 Setting the Reserve Requirement 
The reserve requirement is used by Islamic banks to mitigate liquidity risks from adverse 
economic conditions or maturity mismatch. Each account type offered by Islamic banks is subject 
to two types of reserve requirements, namely: legal and voluntary reserve requirements. The legal 
reserve requirement is set by the central bank, which requires that all banks under its supervision 
maintain a certain percentage of their customer deposits in their accounts with the central bank 
((EIB, 2009, KFH, 2009, QIB, 2009, Rajhi, 2009)). In comparison, the voluntary reserve 
requirement is a percentage of customer deposits kept with the Islamic bank for liquidity purposes 
(Interview 8, Interview 9, KFH, 2009, United, 2009). This percentage is determined by the 
management based on a multitude of factors such as economic and market conditions and is 
subject to periodic (BIB, 2009, KFHB, 2009). The percentage of the voluntary reserve 
requirement varies depending on the type of deposit, duration, and liquidity option (United, 
2009). For example, the voluntary reserve requirement for fixed investment deposits, which have 
longer maturities, are usually lower than that for saving accounts due to the liquidity option of the 
latter.  
Overall, the voluntary reserve requirement is clearly stipulated in the customer contract 
of the Islamic bank. The majority of the contracts of Islamic banks in the GCC state that the 
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voluntary portion of the reserve is guaranteed through Qardh Hassan (a non-interest bearing loan 
arrangement) between the bank and depositors. Therefore, the bank has the right to invest it and 
reap the income (KFH, 2009).   
5.5.3.2 Calculating Available for Investment and Invested Funds  
At this stage, and after the reserve requirements are set, the amount available for investment in 
the Mudarabah pool for the accounting period is calculated. This amount is defined as the amount 
available for investment after deducting the legal and voluntary reserve requirements mentioned 
earlier (Interviewee 8, Interviewee 10, United, 2009)
141
. However, not all available funds are 
actually invested by the bank. Usually, a certain amount of funds remains in the bank‘s 
possession. The ability to invest the funds depends on the bank‘s efficiency and market 
conditions.  
As stipulated by Shari’ah, when an investment opportunity arrives, all types of funds (i.e. 
shareholder or depositors of different types) in the Mudarabah pool have an equal right to 
participate (EIB, 2009). Hence, the total invested funds from the Mudarabah pool is apportioned 
on a pro-rata basis for each source. This can be calculated by multiplying the funds available for 
investment of each source by the ratio of total invested funds to the total available for investment 
(Interviewee 8).
142
  
Figure  5.4 - Calculating Available for Investment Balance for Saving Accounts 
 
                                                   
141 For more details, see El Tegani (1996) and Shaheen (2005).  
142 For more details, see El Tegani (1996) 
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Once the amount available for investment is determined for each type of fund (i.e. 1 
month, 3 months, 6 months, equity, …etc), a calculation is performed to determine the balances 
available for investment for saving accounts. For this purpose, Islamic banks in the GCC base 
their calculations on either the minimum account balance method during a period (e.g. minimum 
monthly balance) or on the average account balance method until maturity (United, 2009). Figure 
5.4 illustrates these two methods. For example, assume that at the beginning of January an 
account balance was 1000 and on Jan 15 the balance went up to 2000 and it remained constant 
until Jan 31. On 31 January the account balance was 2000. Then according to the minimum 
balance method, the available for investment amount is 1000 while in the average balance method 
it is 1500.   
A periodic calculation
143
 of account balances is performed in order to achieve such 
calculation schemes. Once the invested fund is calculated then the allocation of profit is made on 
a pro-rata basis at the level of fund sources and individual accounts. Other deductions such as 
Mudarabah fees and Mudarabah pool reserves apply.  
5.5.3.3 Profit Distribution Frequency 
Islamic banks offer different types of PSIA accounts.
144
 These types of accounts vary in terms of 
minimum amount, liquidity option, and maturity. Islamic banks in the GCC normally offer 
maturities from one month to one year (renewable) (Interviewee 7, Interviewee 8, Interviewee 9, 
United, 2009). Upon maturity, the bank distributes the profits to depositors. To achieve this, the 
Islamic bank calculates the profits of depositors on a monthly basis. If the deposit matures, then 
the distribution amount is paid to the account holder, otherwise the profit is accrued to the next 
period and paid upon maturity (Interviewee 7, Interviewee 8, United, 2009). For example, at the 
end of January, deposits with monthly maturities are paid a declared profit according to the 
bank‘s management official declaration. However, deposits with three months maturities accrue 
the declared profits until maturity when payment is due (Interviewee 7, Interviewee 8, 
Interviewee 10).  
                                                   
143 This depends on the accounting policies and bank‘s capabilities (e.g. technology). 
144 Refer to section 2.4.1 in chapter 2.  
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In some cases, the account holder breaks the fixed deposit before maturity. Under such 
circumstance, the account holder will only receive a profit distribution of the shorter period type 
of account. For example, if a three month deposit is broken during the second month, the 
customer will only get the distribution of a one month deposit (United, 2009, KFH, 2009, 
Interviewee 10). Other penalties and fees are applicable.    
5.5.3.4 Charging Mudarabah fees 
It is stipulated by Shari’ah that the Mudarabah fees, voluntary reserve requirements, and other 
account conditions should be mentioned in the customer contract. Different types of PSIA 
accounts at Islamic banks have different Mudarabah fee rates. The fees are based on the cost 
associated with maintaining the account. For example, the shorter the maturity of the account, the 
more operational cost associated with maintaining it, hence, the higher the Mudarabah fees 
would be.  
After the profit distributions are allocated to PSIA shareholders, the Mudarabah fees are 
deducted from PSIA (BIB, 2009, DIB, 2009, EIB, 2009, KFH, 2009, QIB, 2009, Rajhi, 2009). 
The Mudarabah fees are paid against the bank‘s management services. It is considered as income 
to shareholders who are the legal owners of the bank.  
5.5.3.5 Booking Mudarabah Pool Reserves 
As was stated earlier, Islamic banks maintain a certain level of reserves in order to protect the 
Mudarabah pool from economic volatility. These reserves can be in the form of a PER charged to 
the revenue of the entire pool or as an IRR deducted from the profit distributed to depositors only. 
A number of banks have both types of reserves.
145
 The net profit distribution for the period is then 
assessed by the bank‘s management, which can take a decision to use these reserves to enhance 
the distribution rate. This process is covered the next section.    
                                                   
145 Refer to section 5.5.2.  
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5.5.3.6 Deciding on the Profit Distribution Rate for PSIA  
The payout process discussed this far appears to be a systemized and rigid accounting procedure 
rather than a flexible and responsive management decision-making process. However, in practice 
this is not always the case, the BOD and the management of Islamic banks play a major role in 
setting and amending the reserves and provisions, voluntary reserve requirements on deposits, 
Mudarabah fees, profit distribution rates on PSIA, and dividends. For example, although the 
distribution rate on PSIA is predetermined, it is not declared until it passes certain criteria, in case 
the management of the bank decides to amend it using various methods at its disposal. In this 
section, we will cover the theories and factors that are expected to influence the management 
decision of profit distribution on PSIA. 
                             Figure  5.5 - Deciding on PSIA Distribution Rate 
 
Figure 5.5 shows the factors that are hypothesized to have an influence on the profit 
distribution rates for PSIA based on the research findings. These factors were found to be: the 
distribution rate of competitors, historical distribution rates, and information signalling. Other 
factors explained by dividend theories such as profitability, liquidity, and maturity effects have 
minimal implications. These findings are discussed below. 
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5.5.3.6.1 The Effect of Competitive Payout Hypothesis on PSIA Rates 
The competitive payout hypothesis suggests that the primary factor that affects the profit 
distribution rate of PSIA is the distribution of competitors for similar types of accounts and 
products. Managers believe that the rate of distribution is a key factor in determining the bank‘s 
competitive position in the market. Therefore, a careful analysis of the market plays a major role 
in the pricing strategy of the bank. In relation to this concept, Interviewee 7 stated the following: 
―The Assets Liabilities Committee (ALCO) meets on monthly basis to set the rates 
on different products offered by the bank. One of the main factors considered in such 
decision is the rates offered by competitors. This consideration is vital to maintain 
our market competitiveness.
146‖  
Table 5.4 below shows the results of the closed-ended questions of the interview that 
addresse the issues related to the distribution rate on PSIA.
147
 
Table  5.4 - Questions for the Effect of Competitors’ Distributions on PSIA Rate 
 
Questions 
 
Mean 
  
Q2 Profit distribution decisions on saving and investment accounts 
affect the future demand on these accounts. 
4.67 
  
Q5 A cut in the profits distributed to saving and investment accounts 
would have unfavourable effects on the demand on this type of 
accounts.  
 
4.44 
  
Q6 Islamic Banks try to avoid reducing dividends or profits on saving 
and investment accounts. 
 
4.33 
  
Q34 Managements of Islamic banks are sensitive to its shareholders‘ 
and depositors‘ preferences in regards to expected dividends and 
profits on investment accounts.  
4.00 
  
  
 
                                                   
146 See Appendix 2.D for a list of interviewee codes, designation, date/time, and location.  
147 Full results are available in Appendix 2.C.  
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Question 2 asks if profit distributions on PSIA would influence the demand on these 
accounts. The mean response for the question was 4.67, which shows high agreement with the 
statement. Similarly, the results of questions 5 and 6, which have mean responses of 4.44 and 
4.33 respectively, reconfirm the findings. Hence, managers are reluctant to reduce the profit 
distribution rates on PSIA as it would have an unfavourable effect on the demand for these 
accounts.  
In addition, as highlighted by question 34, Islamic banks are sensitive to the preferences 
and expectations of their customers in terms of profit distribution rates and dividends. The mean 
result for this question was 4.00. Interviewee 2 stated that: 
―The bank‘s management is keen to set the distribution rates of investment accounts 
at or above the average market rates. We believe that the demand elasticity of such 
accounts is highly affected by the distribution rates more than other aspects.‖ 
The intensity of the effect of profit distribution rates on the demand of investment 
accounts differs between retail and corporate clients. Interviewee 8 explains this difference by 
stating that: 
―Our internal analysis of the behaviour of customers reveals that corporate clients 
are more sensitive to distribution rates than retail clients. As demanded by their 
shareholder or owners, corporate clients actively and regularly shop around for better 
rates in the market.‖ 
Interviewee 8 added that the demand elasticity differs between saving and investment accounts as 
the latter is more sensitive to the profit distribution rates than the earlier. He states that: 
―We have analysed the behaviour of our customers for the past ten years. We found 
that the demand on saving accounts is less affected by the profit distribution rates 
than investment accounts. I believe that the reason behind this finding is attributed to 
the nature of saving accounts, which is usually considered by clients as a current or 
temporary account. Hence, service quality and other complementary services are 
more important to the retail clients than the profit distribution rates. In any case, the 
profit distribution rates on such accounts are normally low across the market relative 
to investment accounts, and hence, any difference in profits is perceived negligible.‖ 
Based on the above results, Islamic banks perceive the rate of distribution on PSIA and 
other financial products (e.g. Murabaha financing) as a key element for maintaining the 
competitive edge of the entity. Therefore, the researcher expects that the bank, represented by its 
shareholder, would be reluctant to lose its market competitiveness by reducing the profit 
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distribution rates, even if this reluctance would mean a negative impact on the shareholders‘ 
income in the short-run.  
The results are consistent with the investors‘ perception. They reported that they assess 
PSIA distributions by comparing it to the distributions of competitors. It also complies with 
Partington (1989). However, Brav et al. (2005) did not find enough evidence for the competitive 
payout hypothesis.  
5.5.3.6.2 The Effect of the Lintner Model on PSIA Rates 
Lintner (1956) argues that managers smooth payouts and avoid any increases or reduction to it 
unless the trend is validated by earning prospects. Based on this concept, Lintner formulated a 
model, which comprises of four factors namely: the targeted payout ratio, last year‘s dividend 
distribution, speed of adjustment, profitability and the after tax earnings.  
Table  5.5 - Questions on the Effect of Historical Distributions on PSIA Rate 
 
Questions 
 
Mean 
  
Q10 Islamic banks have a targeted profit payout ratio on deposits. 
They should periodically adjust payouts towards this target. 
 
2.33 
  
Q11 Islamic banks are reluctant to make payout changes that might be 
reversed in future. 
 
4.11 
  
Q12 Islamic banks consider the payouts paid last year in the 
calculation of payouts for this year. 
 
4.33 
  
Q14 Stable payouts as opposed to fluctuating payouts create 
considerably more confidence in the minds of investors and depositors 
about the bank‘s profitability. 
 
4.67 
  
Q36 Banks tend to smooth the profits of investment accounts even if it 
affects the dividends for this year.  
4.00 
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In the context of profit distributions on PSIA, the applicability of the Lintner model was 
tested. As shown in table 5.5, question 10 discusses the concept that bank tend to follow a target 
payout ratio for PSIA distributions. The mean response for the question was 2.33, which does not 
support the idea. In this reference, Interviewee 7 stated that: 
―The payout ratio of PSIA distributions is not planned or targeted by the 
management. The Mudharba contract explicitly states the distribution mechanism. 
The only intervention by management in the existing PSIA distributions can be in 
the form of increasing the distribution using existing reserves. However, in the long 
run management can amendment Mudarabah fees, Mudarabah reserves, and 
percentage of available for investment funds for investment accounts.  These 
amendments require contractual changes and customer agreement.‖ 
Managers believe that stable payouts give more confidence to investors. Hence, Islamic 
banks are reluctant to reduce their payouts unless they are comfortable that such change will 
continue in the future. As shown in Table 5.5, the findings from the answers to questions 11, 12, 
and 14 validate and capture the essence of this argument. The mean responses were 4.11, 4.33, 
and 4.67, respectively.  
Finally, in question 36, the interviewees were asked if they thought that Islamic banks 
tend to smooth PSIA profits even if it affects dividends. The mean answer was 4, which supports 
the argument and the displaced commercial risk assumption. The findings are also in complement 
with the results of questions 5 and 6, which stress the importance of payout stability.  
The results are consistent with the investors‘ perception. They reported that they assess 
PSIA distributions by comparing it to historical payouts. It also complies with Baker et al. (1985), 
Partington (1989), Brav et al. (2005), and Mizuno (2007).  
5.5.3.6.3 The Effect of Information Signalling on PSIA Rates 
Information signalling theory states that due to information asymmetry between corporate 
managers and the market, the former use dividend distributions as a device to signal such 
information. The new information is reflected in the stock price. Consequently, the market price 
of the firm will be close to its fair value. By applying this theory in the context of profit 
distributions to PSIA, it is suggested that profit distributions are believed to convey information 
on the profitability of the firm to depositors and shareholders. However, unlike dividend 
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distributions, the profit distributions on PSIA are short-term, as well as the information conveyed. 
In relation to this argument, Interviewee 10 explained the concepts by stating that:  
―The declaration of interim PSIA profits is a good indicator of the amount of Mudarabah 
fees earned by the bank which, by holding everything else equal, could give a good 
estimate of the bank‘s expected profitability in the short-run.‖ 
Table  5.6 - Questions on Information Signalling Effect on PSIA rate 
 
Questions 
 
Mean 
  
Q19 If an Islamic bank expects to raise external finance in the near 
future, it would adopt a more generous payout policy to ‗sweeten‘ the 
market. 
2.25 
  
Q27 Payout decisions for dividend and profits on investment accounts 
convey information about the Islamic bank to investors and 
stakeholders.  
4.38 
  
Q28 Islamic banks believe that investors regard a change in dividends 
or profits on investment accounts as a signal of a change in earning 
prospects.  
4.22 
  
Q29 Islamic banks attract investors and depositors by paying larger 
distributions to convey good profitability prospects and security value.  
3.56 
  
Q31 Islamic banks pay larger payouts to their shareholders and 
depositors in order to increase the stock price and attract more 
deposits. 
 
3.33 
Q40 Islamic banks use profits on investment accounts as a tool to 
attain a desired credit rating. 
3.63 
  
Q41 Islamic banks use dividend distributions and profits on 
investment accounts to show investors and depositors that they can 
bear possible transaction costs associated with costly borrowings or 
capital issue.  
3.33 
  
Q42 Islamic banks pay higher payout distributions to show investors 
and depositors that they are financially strong. 
3.11 
  
  
 
In support of these views, questions 27 and 28, shown in table 5.6, discussed the concept 
of information signalling by arguing if dividends and PSIA distributions are used as a device to 
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signal future prospects of the firm. The interviewees agreed with the concepts presented in 
questions 27 and 28 with means of 4.38 and 4.22 respectively.  
Interviewees were very careful in distinguishing information signalling, which enhances 
transparency, from deceptive signalling. Their view is that Shari’ah promotes transparency in all 
aspects of human relationships including business. It also forbids Taghreer (deception) and 
Nagash (price manipulation) exemplified in the use of misleading messages or false information 
in an attempt to artificially increase the stock price or to serve a hidden agenda. In this regard, 
Interviewee 3 stated that: 
―Out of our conformance to the guidelines of Shari’ah and commitment to our 
customers and shareholders, we strive to be transparent as much as possible. We 
believe that any information, which has an impact on the firm‘s value, should be 
disclosed immediately. At the same time, we do not, under any circumstance, take 
advantage of our credibility and trust by issuing inaccurate, misleading, or false 
information. This act is against Shari’ah and our core principles.‖ 
 In line with the above, the results of the closed-ended questions agree with the concept 
that Islamic banks avoid using generous payouts to purposely ‗sweeten‘ the market in preparation 
for raising funds. Question 19 asks if Islamic banks follow such a tactic. The mean result for this 
question was 2.25, which indicates a disagreement with the statement.  
However, when question 19 was worded differently in questions 29 and 31, the means 
increased to 3.56 and 3.33 respectively. The answers indicate that Islamic banks would attract 
investors and depositors by paying larger distributions and by conveying strong profitability 
prospects and security value. Although, under the research criteria neither answer indicates 
agreement, avoiding the use of the word ―sweeten‖, which could be perceived as a form of 
deception, significantly enhanced the results.
148
 This supports the findings of questions 27 and 28 
that information signalling theory applies in Islamic banks when used for legitimate purposes.  
                                                   
148 The results of Partington (1989) was the same. Although managers were found to believe in the 
signalling role of dividend, they gave mixed opinion with the word ―sweeten‖ was used as it indicate false 
or misleading signalling.  
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 Furthermore, questions 40, 41, and 42 present the idea those Islamic banks may use the 
profit distributions of PSIA as a tool to attain certain goals such as enhancing credit ratings and 
showing that they are financially strong and able to bear costly borrowings. The mean of 
questions 40, 41, and 42 were 3.63, 3.33, and 3.11 respectively. Unlike the results of question 19, 
which is sharply inclined towards disagreement, the results for questions 40, 41, and 42 were 
neutral. As discussed earlier, the possible explanation is that interviewees perceive the questions 
differently. Some of them interpreted it as the bank attempting to generate a false or deceptive 
signalling. While answering these questions, Interviewee 3 responded: 
 ―This is absolutely not true. Islamic banks would never attempt to deceive 
shareholders through signalling in order to gain better credibility, credit rating, or image.‖ 
Other interviewees could perceive the questions as the bank generating legitimate signals 
to bridge the information gap. In this regard, Interviewee 9 responded: 
 ―Markets are inefficient. Payout distributions can indeed be a good device to 
signal the bank‘s condition in a legitimate and truthful manner.‖ 
The questions can be interpreted differently, which is the possible reason that the results 
were mixed. However, respondents agree that transparency is a priority for Islamic banking in 
order to avoid falling into Taghreer. Thus, the information that influences the value of the bank 
should be communicated to stakeholders immediately.  
Another aspect of information signalling is associated with dividend stability. This was 
covered previously through questions 14 and 36 under the Linter model section. Managers 
reported that investors perceive stable dividends as a positive signal of the firm‘s strength.  
The findings support the information signalling hypothesis, which cover both PSIA and 
dividend distributions. Hence, the same results apply to dividends as well. The results conform to 
the findings of the investor‘s survey, Baker et al. (1985), Partington (1989), Brav et al. (2005), 
and Mizuno (2007). 
189 
 
5.5.3.6.4 The Effect of Liquidity on PSIA Rates 
Many studies that are based on management survey address the issue of liquidity effect on 
dividend distributions.
149
 It is hypothesized that the firm‘s liquidity is positively correlated with 
the firm‘s ability to pay dividends (Partington, 1989). At the first glance, the argument seems to 
be straight forward as more cash entails higher cash dividends. However, to a certain degree this 
is not always the case as other factors such as profitability, payout stability, and investment plans 
could have a stronger influence on the amount of dividends.   
Table  5.7 - Questions on Liquidity Effect on PSIA Rate 
 
Questions 
 
Mean 
  
Q20 A poor liquidity position means fewer profits on investment 
accounts due to shortage of funds. 
 
3.11 
  
Q25 When faced with a higher cost of raising funds or when tight 
conditions are anticipated in capital markets, Islamic banks tend to 
have less generous profits on investment accounts. 
2.56 
  
  
 By applying the liquidity effect hypothesis in the context of Islamic banks, the more 
liquid the bank is, the more generous the profit distributions on PSIA should be. The concept is 
covered by Questions 20 and 25, shown in table 5.7. The questions argue that a poor liquidity 
position or tight market conditions would mean less profits distributed to PSIA.  
Not all interviewees agree with the liquidity effect when it comes to PSIA distributions.  
Managers believe that depositors should have the upper hand in acquiring the profits from the 
Mudarabah pool due to the short term nature of their investments. By doing so, bank would avoid 
associated risk of externalities caused by loosing its reputation and market competitiveness. The 
mean results for the questions were neutral showing a mixed or undecided opinion. In this 
relation, Interviewee 4 explained that:  
                                                   
149 See Partington (1985) and Harkins and Walsh (1971) (Partington, 1985). 
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―Higher maturity mismatch could put the bank at a risk of default or, in the worst 
case scenario, a bank run. However, under normal conditions, lower liquidity is not 
the concern of depositors who can have access to reserves, profits, central bank 
facilities, or even shareholder‘s equity in order to protect the bank‘s reputation and 
interest. Therefore, normal liquidity shortages would have a minor effect on profit 
distributions on saving and investment accounts.‖ 
In addition, Interviewee 3 stated: 
―At the stage of profit distribution, the bank‘s management have less control over the 
amount of distribution compared to dividends since the distribution scheme has 
already been delineated in the Mudarabah or Wakalah contracts. Hence, a liquidity 
shortage may only affect shareholders unless it is extremely severe.‖ 
Under normal circumstances, not enough support was found for the liquidity effect 
hypothesis.  
5.5.3.6.5 The Effects of Growth and Maturity on PSIA Rates 
The maturity effect hypothesis argues that firms in the early stages of their life cycle require 
capital expenditures to build the business and to be able to efficiently produce products and 
services at a competitive price. Similarly, banks in their early years require intensive capital 
spending to establish their branch network, banking technology, hiring and training, and other 
expenses. These expenditures limit the banks‘ ability to invest available funds from depositors 
and shareholders, thus, its ability to pay competitive distributions.  
In this regard, Interviewee 6 stated that:  
―Although it may seem reasonable that shareholders may expect less distributions in 
the first five years of the bank establishment, depositors are not exposed to the same 
risk because the capital expenditure is linked to the capital of shareholders and not 
depositors.‖ 
Table  5.8 - Questions on Growth and Maturity Effects on PSIA Rate 
 
Questions 
 
Mean 
  
Q16 Payout decisions for profits on deposits are often made after the 
Islamic bank‘s investment plans are determined. 
 
2.00 
  
Q23 A higher rate of asset expansion reduces dividends and profits on 
investment accounts due to the need to conserve funds. 
 
3.20 
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Questions 
 
Mean 
  
Q38 Profits on investment accounts should be viewed as a residual 
after financing investment opportunities from available earnings. 
1.67 
  
  
The maturity effect hypothesis was tested in questions 16, 23, and 38 (see table 5.8). 
Questions 16 and 23 ask if capital expenditures (i.e. growth) would influence the payout 
distribution. The mean results for these questions were 2.00 and 3.20 respectively. This shows 
that interviewees disagree with the statement.  
This argument is further supported by the results of question 38, which asks if profit 
distributions should be viewed as a residual after financing investment opportunities. Based on 
the above, managers believe that the maturity effect hypothesis is not applicable to PSIA 
distributions.  
5.5.3.6.6 Profit Equalization and Displaced Commercial Risk  
Archer and Abdel Karim (2005) argue that there is ample empirical proof that Islamic banks 
smooth the profit distributions on investment accounts. This is evident by the practice of booking 
PER and IRR reserves in Islamic banks. Managers may use these reserves in order to correct or 
equalize the profit distribution of PSIA if it were below the optimal rate expected by investors. In 
this regards, Interviewee 3 mentioned: 
―Under current market trends and competitive pressures, the bank strives to maintain 
its competitive position by enhancing profit distributions, products, and services. 
The management and shareholders are willing to invest in such strategy as it will pay 
off in the future.‖ 
 When the reserves of Mudarabah are fully depleted, and management are unable to 
perform the task of equalizing the distributions, they may take the consent of shareholders‘ to 
return part of the Mudarabah fees to depositors as Hebba (gift). If the amount is still not 
sufficient to equalize the profit distribution, the process may continue by paying the difference 
from shareholders‘ reserves or even capital, depending on the severity of the situation. The risk 
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associated with the process of using shareholders‘ income or capital to payback depositors as a 
result of market and competitive pressures is termed as displaced commercial risk.
150
  
In regards to displaced commercial risk, Al-Gurrah Daghi (2009) highlights the case of a 
Middle Eastern Islamic bank, which was facing major losses. He stated that: 
―Instead of equally sharing the losses between depositors and shareholders of the 
bank as stipulated in the Mudarabah contract, the BOD asked the shareholders in the 
general assembly to bear all the losses in order to maintain the bank‘s reputation and 
the ongoing concern. Within few years, the bank was able to recover. Therefore, the 
solution not only saved the bank from going bankrupt, but it also prevented 
macroeconomic externalities.‖ 
 Based on the above discussion, we conclude that profitability would have a minor role 
in the profit distribution decision for PSIA. This argument is supported by the results of the 
competitive payout hypothesis and the Lintner Model, which suggest PSIA profit smoothing 
to avoid hurting the demand on it and to maintain competitiveness.  
5.5.4 Dividend Distribution Process 
Figure  5.6 - Dividend Distribution Process 
At this stage, the dividend distribution process, seen in figure 5.6, commences after the 
Mudarabah fees and the Mudarabah net profit
151
 are both calculated and channelled to 
                                                   
150 This term was coined by the AIOFFI organization and mentioned in the discussion memorandum of The 
Purpose and Calculation of the Capital Adequacy Ratio for  Islamic Banks and subsequent discussions 
(Archer and Abdel Karim, 2005). 
151 The Mudharaba net profit is the Mudharaba profit attributed to shareholders after deducting the PSIA 
share and related expenses.  
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shareholders as revenue. In addition, shareholders are also entitled to other revenues from non-
Mudarabah assets such as real estate, direct investment, and banking operations such as credit 
card, LC/LG, and wire transfers.
152
 After the deduction of SG&A, statutory and general reserves, 
Zakat and corporate taxes (if any), and directors‘ remunerations, the net income is then available 
for distribution to shareholders. In this section the dividend theories and factors that are expected 
to affect the dividend decisions are discussed. 
5.5.4.1 The Validity of Dividend Relevance Hypothesis 
In their seminal paper, Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1961) argued that in efficient capital 
markets, the dividend distribution decision is irrelevant to the value of the firm, which is mainly 
driven by the amount of future generated cash flows. However, with market impurities such as 
taxes, brokerage commissions, and fees that are prevalent in all capital markets, the dividend 
irrelevance hypothesis is not expected to hold. Scholars, including Modigliani and Miller (1963), 
believe that the dividend distribution is a relevant management decision that impacts the firm‘s 
stock price and market value. This argument is known as the dividend relevance hypothesis.  
Table  5.9 - Questions on Dividend Relevance Hypothesis Effect on Dividends 
 
Questions 
 
Mean 
  
Q1 Dividend payout decisions affect the price of the common stock. 
 
4.44 
Q4 A cut in dividends would probably have unfavourable effect on the 
firm‘s share price. 
4.11 
  
Q43 Islamic banks believe that their firm values are affected by a 
change in dividend policy. 
 
4.00 
  
The dividend relevance hypothesis was covered in the interview by questions 1, 4, and 
43. As shown in table 5.9, the mean result to question 1 was 4.44, which shows strong agreement 
by managers of Islamic banks that dividend payouts impact the firm‘s stock price. The idea was 
further elaborated by question 4, which gave a mean result of 4.11. This indicates that managers 
                                                   
152 Refer to section 2.4.2. 
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also believe that a cut in dividends would be unfavourable for the stock price. Additionally, the 
mean result to question 43 was 4.00, which provides additional support to the validity of the 
hypothesis. Interviewee 1 stated:  
―Our management pay careful attention to the payout decisions as it would directly affect 
the demand on our deposits and the price of our stock. Such decision is based on careful analysis 
of the economy and the bank‘s financials.‖ 
According to the investors‘ survey, the results match the expectations of investors in the 
GCC market. Investors indicated that they prefer to receive dividends. The findings of the 
investors‘ survey suggest that possible explanations of this preference would be agency and 
transaction costs. Furthermore, the results comply with the findings of Baker et al. (1985), 
Partington (1989), Brav et al. (2005), and Mizuno (2007).  
5.5.4.2 The Effect of the Increasing Stream Hypothesis on Dividends  
The increasing stream hypothesis argues that managers believe that investors prefer stable and 
increasing dividends. Hence, managers attempt to stabilize and increase earning levels and avoid 
any reduction in dividends unless a clear trend of declining profits occurs.  
Table  5.10 - Questions on Increasing Stream Hypothesis Effect on Dividends 
 
Questions 
 
Mean 
  
Q3 The investors‘ preference is to generally have dividends increase 
along with the bank profits even if good reinvestment opportunities are 
open to the bank. 
 
3.56 
Q4 A cut in dividends would probably have unfavourable effect on the 
firm‘s share price. 
4.11 
  
Q14 Stable payouts as opposed to fluctuating payouts create 
considerably more confidence in the minds of investors and depositors 
about the bank‘s profitability. 
4.67 
  
The increasing stream hypothesis was covered in questions 3, 4, 14, shown in table 5.10. 
The mean result to question 4 was 4.11, which indicates that managers believe that a cut in 
dividends would have a negative impact on the firm‘s stock price. In addition, the mean result to 
question 14 was 4.67, which illustrates that managers strongly believe that a stable dividend 
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policy creates confidence in the minds of investors. This supports the hypothesis that managers 
avoid cutting dividends unless a declining trend of earnings is evident.   
Based on the increasing stream hypothesis and the results presented above, it is 
hypothesised that if management decides to cut dividends it requires to support this decision with 
a good and clear justification,
153
 otherwise the stock price will be negatively affected. Question 3 
tested this concept. The mean result to question 3 is 3.56, which shows that managers have a 
mixed opinion towards the ramifications of a dividend cut, even if a valid justification is 
presented. Similarly, according to the results of chapter 4, investors have a mixed attitude towards 
a dividend cut for reinvestment purposes. From a rational point of view, although the results are 
mixed, a valid justification for a dividend cut is believed to have a smaller negative impact on the 
stock price than the one without any justification.  
Managers believe that investors have a positive perception of firms with stable dividends. 
These findings are consistent with the results of investors‘ survey, which indicate that investors 
prefer stable and increasing dividends. In addition, the results are also consistent with the findings 
of Baker et al. (1985), Partington (1989), Brav et al. (2005), and Mizuno (2007). 
5.5.4.3 The Effect of the Lintner Model on Dividends 
Lintner‘s arguments were covered in the questions shown in table 5.11. The results of all 
questions were above 4.00, indicating strong support by managers for the Lintner model and its 
assumptions. Therefore, managers are believed to follow a targeted payout ratio while trying their 
best to smooth the dividend distributions and avoid dividend cuts. 
  
                                                   
153 Managers believe that a good justification should be associated with an announcement of a dividend cut. 
The findings of Baker et al. (1985) and Mizuno ( 2007) are consistent with this view. 
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Table  5.11 - Questions on the Lintner Model Effect on Dividends 
 
Questions 
 
Mean 
  
Q6 Islamic Banks try to avoid reducing dividends or profits on saving and 
investment accounts. 
4.33 
  
Q7 Dividend would only be cut if profits fell sharply and continued at 
depressed levels. 
4.00 
  
Q8 Dividends would only be raised above current levels when a trend of 
increasing profits has been clearly established. 
4.00 
  
Q9 Islamic banks have a target dividend payout ratio. They should 
periodically adjust payouts towards this target. 
4.44 
  
Q11 Islamic banks are reluctant to make payout changes that might be 
reversed in future. 
4.11 
  
Q12 Islamic banks consider the payouts paid last year in the calculation of 
payouts for this year. 
4.33 
  
  
 
 Not surprisingly, it matched the findings of the increasing stream hypothesis, as the basic 
premise of both theories relies on dividend smoothing by corporate managers. Further support for 
the findings comes from the results of chapter 4, which suggest that investors prefer stable 
dividends and they assess the value of dividends based on historical distributions. In addition, the 
results are consistent with the findings of Baker et al. (1985), Partington (1989), Brav et al. 
(2005), and Mizuno (2007). 
5.5.4.4 The Effect of Residual Dividend Policy and Pecking Order on Dividends 
The residual dividend policy is a policy whereby dividend distributions are the residual earnings 
after allocating the funds required for investment activities. The pecking order hypothesis 
explains the process by arguing that corporate managers prioritize the source of financing in 
terms of the least resistive and expensive. Therefore, for reinvestment purposes and other 
expenditures, corporate managers would use internally generated funds first. If these are fully 
depleted, they would issue debt or equity as a last resort. The pecking order hypothesis was 
supported in the investors‘ survey.  
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 The concepts were covered by the questions shown in table 5.12. In relation to the 
residual dividend policy, the mean results of questions 15, 23, and 37 were above 4.00, which 
indicates that Islamic banks decide on dividends after their expansion plans are determined and 
the required funds are allocated. This assumption is further supported by the mean result of 
question 17, which was 2.67. The result indicates that Islamic banks tend to use internally 
generated cash rather than raising external funds. Hence, in case the bank requires capital 
expenditures, dividends are reduced.  
In addition, the mean result to question 24, which was 4.22, indicates that under tight 
market conditions, Islamic banks tend to lower their dividend distributions in order to conserve 
liquidity. The question tests the assumptions of residual policy and pecking order hypothesis 
under extreme conditions.   
Table  5.12 - Questions on the Effect of Residual and Pecking Order Hypothesis 
 
Questions 
 
Mean 
  
Q15 Payout decisions for dividends are often made after the 
investment plans are determined. 
4.00 
  
Q23 A higher rate of asset expansion reduces dividends and profits on 
investment accounts due to the need to conserve funds. 
 
4.22 
  
Q37 Dividends should be viewed as a residual after financing 
investment opportunities from available earnings.  
 
4.11 
  
Q24 When faced with a higher cost of raising funds or when tight 
conditions are anticipated in capital markets, Islamic banks tend to 
have less generous dividends. 
4.22 
 
 
  
  In support of this argument, Interviewee 4 stated that: 
―As a relatively new bank, our strategy is to establish a strong and robust 
infrastructure in order to increase competency and operation efficiency. This 
involves geographic expansion in terms of branch operation and implementing high-
end information technology systems. Hence, we expect much reliance on our capital 
and retained earnings to support our expansion plans. We however, try as much as 
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possible to stay competitive in our product offerings, pricing, and payout 
distributions on PSIA.‖  
Overall, the findings support the residual dividend policy for banks during their 
establishment phase as funds are needed for capital expenditure. However, as it mature, a 
managed dividend policy is followed. In relation to the latter, the results are consistent with 
the investors‘ perception, Baker et al. (1985), Partington (1989), and Brav et al. (2005). 
5.5.4.5 The Effect of Liquidity on Dividends 
The liquidity effect hypothesis was covered by questions 21 and 26 shown in table 5.13.  
Table  5.13 - Questions on Liquidity Effect on Dividends 
 
Questions 
 
Mean 
  
Q21 A poor liquidity position means less dividend distribution due to 
shortage of funds. 
 
4.11 
  
Q26 Commitments for debt repayment or refinancing mean lower 
dividends. 
4.00 
  
  
  
Question 21 asks if the firm‘s poor liquidity position would have a negative impact on the 
amount of dividends. The mean result to the question was 4.11, which supports the concept. 
Furthermore, question 26 tests if repayment of debt would reduce the size of dividends. The mean 
result was 4.00, which also supports the concept.   
 Overall, Islamic banks fall under the stringent control of central banks that stipulate the 
maintenance of adequate liquidity positions through the imposition of a minimum reserve 
requirement, capital adequacy, reserves, provisions and other liquidity measures. These controls 
are expected to have an indirect impact on the dividend policy. Based on this, the liquidity effect 
has a direct impact on the dividend policy of the bank. The findings are in compliance with Baker 
et al. (1985), Partington (1989) and Mizuno (2007). 
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5.5.4.6 The Effect of Financing on Dividends 
The financing effect hypothesis assumes that financing variables such as the level of leverage, the 
required level of financing, and cost of financing can limit dividend payouts.
154
 In relation to this 
argument, Interviewee 8 stated that: 
―In the dividend determination process, the bank takes into consideration the cost of 
undistributed funds. These funds are considered a burden on the bank if it fails to 
meet the required rate of return by shareholders. This process also involves 
maintaining a proper capital structure in order to meet the regulatory requirements.‖ 
Table  5.14 - Questions on Financing Effect on Dividends 
 
Questions 
 
Mean 
  
Q24 When faced with a higher cost of raising funds or when tight 
conditions are anticipated in capital markets, Islamic banks tend to 
have less generous dividends. 
 
4.22 
  
Q30 A lower level of debt in the Islamic bank allows it to pay higher 
dividends because the firm‘s financial position is more flexible. 
4.11 
  
  
 
 The financing effect hypothesis was covered in questions 24 and 30, which are shown in 
table 5.14. Question 24 test if financing cost and availability would influence the dividend 
decision. The mean result was 4.22, which supports the hypothesis. Question 30 tests the concept 
of financing effect by reversing question 24. The mean result was 4.11, which confirms the 
previous finding.  
The results support the financing effect hypothesis. The findings are consistent with 
Baker et al. (1985). However, it is inconsistent with Partington (1989) and Brav et al. (2005). A 
possible explanation for this conflict could be due to the type of firms under investigation. The 
authors surveyed firms from different sectors while this study focused on the banking sector only. 
                                                   
154 For more details refer to Partington (1985). 
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This sector is heavily regulated and monitored by central banks which impose minimum capital 
adequacy ratio, reserve ratio, and provisions. This could influence the ability of the bank to 
distribute dividends.   
5.5.4.7 The Effect of Free Cash Flow Hypothesis on Dividends 
The free cash flow hypothesis argues that excess cash in the hands of management may induce 
them to invest in less than desirable investments in an attempt to increase the size of assets of the 
company and therefore the management status. In addition, excessive cash could induce managers 
to spend it on unnecessary expenditures such as lavish offices and frequent business trips. Hence, 
investors prefer to receive the excess cash as dividends to avoid possible misuse by the firm‘s 
management.  
 The concept was covered in questions 32 and 33 shown in table 5.15. Generally, the 
questions ask if by consistently paying dividends, the managers will be more efficient in their 
investment and expenditure decisions leading to a more stable company. The mean results to 
questions 32 and 33 were 3.78 and 3.33 respectively. The results show neutral opinion about the 
validity of the hypothesis.  
Table  5.15 - Questions on Free Cash Flow Hypothesis's Effect on Dividends 
 
Questions 
 
Mean 
  
Q32 By consistently paying dividends and profits on investment 
accounts, the firm‘s stock price will be less risky compared to 
retaining earnings. 
 
3.78 
  
Q33 Paying dividend and profits on investment accounts reduce cash, 
which pushes the management to make more efficient investment and 
consumption decisions. 
3.33 
  
  
 
On one hand, a number of interviewees argue that less cash in the hands of management 
pushes them to take more efficient decisions and therefore, the firm will be less susceptible to 
earnings volatility. In support of this argument, Interviewee 9 stated:  
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―During the 2008 financial crisis, our management were very picky with spending. 
Expansion plans were almost non-existent and expenditures on business trips and 
unnecessary training were almost stopped.‖ 
On the other hand, some interviewees disagreed with the concept that management may 
misuse excess cash. They argue that under certain circumstances management may retain cash for 
future investments depending on market conditions. In this regards, Interviewee 1 stated: 
―Islamic banks are controlled by regulations from the central bank, Shari’ah boards, 
auditors, and capital markets. These bodies control the extent and type of 
investments and expenditures. For example, opening a bank branch requires many 
concessions before a decision is taken. Central banks apply strict criteria for the 
types of investments, asset allocation, and investment concentration on banks. 
Hence, it is difficult to misuse the bank‘s capital.‖ 
The results gave mixed opinion towards the influence of free cash flow hypothesis on 
dividend policy. The same findings were reported by Mizuno (2007). Brav et al. (2005) reported 
that managers believe that dividends are not employed for self-imposing discipline and hence, is 
not important for dividend policy.  
The finding conflicts with the investors‘ preference to receive cash dividends in order to 
avoid management misuse of excess cash. It is also inconsistent with Baker et al. (1985). A 
possible explanation for the inconsistency is due to the type of industry covered in the study (i.e. 
general or non-regulated vs. regulated). This study focus on the banking sector only, which, as 
stated by some managers, fall under strict scrutiny from stakeholders.  
5.5.4.8 The Clientele and Substitution Effects on Dividends 
The clientele and substitution effects assume that each firm has its own base of investors or 
clientele. It argues that if any of the main characteristics of the firm (e.g. risk, dividends, size 
...etc) are changed, a substitution effect will take place as clients will sell the firm‘s stock to buy 
another stock that fits their investment objectives. The intensity of this effect on stock price 
depends on stock liquidity, speed and magnitude of the change in the characteristics. 
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Table  5.16 - Question on Clientele and Substitution Effects on Dividends 
 
Questions 
 
Mean 
  
Q34 Managements of Islamic banks are sensitive to its 
shareholders‘ and depositors‘ preferences in regards to expected 
dividends and profits on investment accounts.  
4.00 
  
 The concept of clientele and substitution effects were covered in question 34 shown in 
table 5.16. The question checks if investor‘s preference is relevant to dividend distribution 
decision. The mean answer was 4.00, which supports the hypothesis.  
 The results support the clientele and substitution effects on dividend policy. The findings 
are consistent with the investors‘ survey, which suggest that investors have certain investment 
objectives and they usually invest in a diversified portfolio that translates these objectives. If the 
characteristics of a company change, investors reported that they would sell the stock and 
purchase another stock that fits their investment objectives. The findings also comply with the 
results given by Baker et al. (1985), Partington (1989), and Mizuno (2007). However, it 
inconsistent with Brav et al. (2005), who did not find evidence to support the hypothesis.  
5.5.4.9 The Effect of Competitive Payout Hypothesis on Dividends 
The competitive payout hypothesis was covered by question 39 shown in table 5.17. The mean 
result for question 39 is 4.00, which supports the hypothesis. The results support the competitive 
payout hypothesis. The findings match the investors‘ perceptions, which suggest that investors 
assess the value of dividends by comparing it to the dividends of competitors in the market. The 
results also comply with the findings of Partington (1989). However, it inconsistent with Brav et 
al. (2005), who did not find evidence to support the hypothesis.   
Table  5.17 - Question on Competitive Payout Effect on Dividends 
 
Questions 
 
Mean 
  
Q39 Islamic banks use dividend distributions as a source of 
competitive advantage.  
4.00 
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5.5.4.10 Stock Dividends 
In addition to cash dividends, GCC firms distribute stock dividends on regular basis. There are 
many explanations for the distribution of stock dividends. One argument suggests that stock 
dividends are used to conserve cash by indirectly increasing capital through earning retention. 
Another concept states that stock dividends are useful to expand the shareholder base to achieve 
better management control.  
The main concepts of stock dividends were introduced in questions 45 through 50. Each 
question measures a certain aspect of it. The results of these questions are shown in table 5.18. 
Table  5.18 - Questions on Stock Dividends 
 
Questions 
 
Mean 
  
Q45 Islamic banks use stock dividends to keep the stock price in an 
optimal price range. 
2.56 
  
Q46 One effect of stock dividends is to ultimately increase the number 
of shareholders in the firm. 
2.44 
  
Q47 Islamic banks use stock dividends to conserve cash. 4.11 
  
Q48 Once an Islamic bank has established a policy of issuing stock 
dividends, termination of the stock dividends will adversely affect the 
stock price. 
3.44 
  
Q49 Stock dividends, together with a reduction in cash dividends, are 
an alternative way to using a rights offering to acquire additional 
equity capital. 
4.00 
  
Q50 Stock dividend is used to increase yield to stockholder. 4.11 
  
Question 45 tests if stock dividends are used to keep the stock price at acceptable price 
levels. The mean result was 2.56, which does not support the hypothesis. In addition, question 46 
tackles the idea that the purpose of stock dividends is to increase the number of shareholders in 
the firm. The mean result was 2.44. Similarly, the result does not support the hypothesis.  
Furthermore, question 48 tests if a termination of stock dividend policy would hurt the 
stock price. The mean result was 3.44, which does not offer strong support of the argument. 
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Therefore, unlike cash dividends where a dividend cut would significantly impact the stock price, 
the effect of cutting stock dividends is thought to be minimal.  
Questions 47 and 49 ask the interviewee if the main purpose of stock dividends is to 
conserve cash and if it is another way to raise capital. The mean results were 4.11 and 4.00 
respectively. These results support the concept that stock dividends are another form of capital 
increase. Lastly, question 50 checks if the purpose of stock dividend is merely to increase the 
dividend yield. The mean result was 4.11, which support the hypothesis. In this regard, 
Interviewee 4 cited:  
―Stock dividends are used to increase the rate of dividend, especially during bad times 
when the firm does not have enough cash to distribute.‖ 
 Based on the above, management were found to perceive stock dividends as an 
alternative tool for cash preservation and dividend yield enhancement. This view is consistent 
with the findings of the investors‘ survey. The findings suggest that if the firm cannot pay cash 
dividends, investors prefer to receive stock dividends instead.  
5.5.4.11 The Effect of Growth and Maturity on Dividends  
The growth and maturity hypotheses were covered in question 44 shown in table 5.20. The mean 
result was 4.44, which strongly support the hypothesis. In relation to this hypothesis, Interviewee 
5 stated: 
―For new banks, investors expect low and intermittent dividend distribution due to the 
need to establish branch network, hire staff, and all the rest of the start up expenses. 
These expenditures will pay off in the long-run.‖ 
The findings support the growth and maturity effect on dividends. The results are 
consistent with Brav et al. (2005) and inconsistent with Partington (1989).  
Table  5.19 - Question on Growth and Maturity Effects on Dividends 
 
Questions 
 
Mean 
  
Q44 Islamic banks with large asset bases and high maturity levels 
have more generous and stable payout policies.  
4.44 
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5.5.4.12 Factors that Affect Dividends 
In the third section of the interview, managers were asked to suggest the factors that have strong 
influence on dividend distributions.
 155
 Table 5.20 shows the factors that have a mean score of 
4.00 or above, which is the criteria of acceptance.   
Table  5.20 - Factors that Affect Dividends 
                                           Factor                                                                           Mean   
  
Q4 Net Income 4.78 
Q11 Availability of cash or liquid assets relative to desired cash holdings 4.33 
Q18 Dividend yield 4.33 
Q1  Last year‘s distributions 4.22 
Q15 Expansion plans and decisions 4.22 
Q9  The distributions of competitors 4.13 
Q13 Flotation costs of  raising fund through equity or deposits 4.11 
Q16 Level of debt 4.11 
Q3 A sustainable change in earnings 4 
Q12 Targeted Payout Ratio 4 
Q5 Preference of investors and depositors 4 
 
 
  
  
The factors of net income, last year‘s distribution, a sustainable change in earnings, and a 
targeted payout ratio are all in line with the previous results, which suggest the validity of the 
Linter model and the findings of Baker et al. (1985). Furthermore, the preference of investors and 
depositors factor complies with the results for the clientele and substitution effects. Similarly, the 
factor of distribution of competitors is in agreement with the findings that support the competitive 
payout hypothesis. 
                                                   
155 By default the factors address dividends. However, the interviewee is asked to highlight if any of the 
factors are also relevant to PSIA or stock dividends. The reason is that that the profit distribution on PSIA 
is more rigid from management prospective and hence, subject to a much smaller list of variables that could 
mainly be covered in open-ended and closed-ended questions. Similarly, stock dividends is considered a 
special case of cash dividend, hence, the factors affecting it are relatively fewer and can be covered during 
the first part of the interview.  
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 The factors of availability of cash or liquid assets, flotation costs, and the level of debt 
are all linked to the liquidity and financing effects, which were supported previously by the 
results. Furthermore, the expansion plans and decisions factor follows the results that support the 
maturity effect hypothesis. Finally, interviewees mentioned they take into consideration the 
dividend yield rather than the absolute dividend distribution only. This view is supported by the 
findings of chapter 4, which suggests that investor consider both the dividend yield and the 
amount of distribution in the dividend assessment.  
In addition to the original list of factors that were highlighted during the interviews. 
Interviewees  3 and 8 suggested four additional factors, which are expected to effect dividends 
due to the nature of the banking industry and the regulations of the central bank. These factors 
are: capital adequacy ratio, reserve requirements, legal reserves and provisions, and the discount 
rate. 
5.5.5 Distribution of Losses 
The research has focused on the distribution of profit between depositors and shareholders. 
However, in the case of losses, the process is slightly different. According to the Mudarabah 
principles, the Mudarib (i.e. the bank) does not bear investment losses. The Shari’ah justification 
for this is that the Mudarib has already lost time and effort in the process. However, if the losses 
were due to management negligence, then the Mudarib is liable for it (Al-Gurrah Daghi, 2009).  
Based on Shari’ah guidelines, the losses should be shared on a pro-rata basis between 
investment account holders and shareholders. In the case of demand and saving account, deposits 
are guaranteed by the bank because it is considered as Qardh Hassan. In practice shareholders 
may cover all the losses in order to conserve the bank‘s reputation and identity.156 
                                                   
156 For an example of such action, refer to section 5.5.3.6.6 
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5.6 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this chapter, the payout process of Islamic banks in the GCC was illustrated and discussed in 
detail. Throughout the text, variations between banks in terms of methods were highlighted. In 
addition, the theories and factors that influence the payout decisions were identified.  
Table 5.21 shows the theories that are believed to govern the process of profit distribution 
to PSIA from the perspective of corporate and financial managers. Although it is believed that 
bank‘s profitability is the main driver of the payout magnitude, managers stated that under normal 
circumstances distributions to depositors are also governed by market mechanics and competitive 
forces exemplified by historical distributions and payouts of competitors. If the profit is not 
adequate to meet a suitable distribution for depositors and shareholders, the shortage could be 
covered from shareholders income or capital in an attempt to preserve the bank‘s reputation. This 
situation is defined as displaced commercial risk. On the other hand, managers undermined the 
role of liquidity and maturity effects on PSIA distributions as shareholders would bear any 
shortfalls.  
Table  5.21 – Summary of Findings for PSIA Rates 
Theory Results 
Competitive Payout Hypothesis Islamic banks take in consideration the 
distribution rate of competitors when deciding 
on PSIA distribution to maintain their 
competitive position.  
The Lintner Model Islamic banks take in consideration its 
historical distributions when deciding on PSIA 
distributions because they believe that 
depositors perceive stable payouts as a plus. 
Information Signalling Mangers believe that depositors perceive stable 
PSIA distributions as a signal of the strength 
and stability of the bank. However, Islamic 
banks refrain from using such signalling device 
to produce false or misleading signals. 
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Liquidity Effect hypothesis. Thus, under normal circumstances, 
the liquidity position of the Islamic bank may 
not alter the PSIA distributions.  
Growth and Maturity Effects Managers believe that the maturity level of 
Islamic banks have a minor affect on the PSIA 
distributions because depositors income and 
funds are not subject to capital expenditures.  
Profitability Effect Managers believe that under normal 
circumstances, profitability has a minor role in 
the determination of the PSIA income as 
reserves and shareholders would cover 
shortages in case the distribution is not 
expected to satisfy depositors.  
Table 5.22 shows the theories that are believed to be applicable to the dividend policy of Islamic 
banks in the GCC from the perspective of corporate and financial managers. Managers believe 
that the payout policy is a relevant and important decision in relation to the value of the firm. The 
payout policy is explained by a variety of dividend theories. There was general agreement 
between managers that Islamic banks tend to smooth and stabilize dividends. Dividends gradually 
increase over time in line with earning growth. Managers tend to avoid dividend cuts except 
under adverse conditions.  
The dividend smoothing effect follows the Lintner model, which argues that firms have a 
target payout ratio and base their dividends on earnings and historical dividend distributions. 
Managers believe that investors perceive firms with stable dividend distributions as having better 
prospects. Although dividends can be used as a signalling device, managers strongly condemn the 
act of misleading investors with false signals in an attempt to enhance the firm‘s value. Based on 
the rankings of the factors reported in the study, the increasing stream hypothesis and the Lintner 
model, are reported to have the strongest influence on the payout policy.  
Table  5.22 – Summary of Findings for Dividends 
Theory Results 
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Dividend Relevance Hypothesis Managers believe that payout policy is a 
relevant decision to the value of the firm.  
Increasing Stream Hypothesis Managers are reluctant to cut dividends, and 
they prefer to smooth dividends and increase it 
gradually with the increase of profits. They 
believe that investors value stable payouts.  
The Lintner Model Managers follow a target payout ratio and take 
historic payouts in consideration when deciding 
on current payouts. They try their best to avoid 
dividend cuts.  
The Residual Dividend Policy and Pecking 
Order Hypothesis 
Managers believe that new Islamic banks 
follow a residual dividend policy in order to 
support their expansion plans. As the bank 
mature, a managed payout policy is followed. 
In case of capital shortage, the bank prefers to 
support its plans through internal funding (i.e. 
retained earnings).  
Information Signalling Mangers state that investors perceive dividend 
distributions as a signal of future profitability 
of the firm. However, Islamic banks refrain 
from using such device to produce false or 
misleading signals.  
Liquidity Effect Mangers believe that the bank‘s liquidity 
position has a direct impact on the dividend 
distribution.  
Financing Effect Mangers believe that the bank‘s level of 
leverage, level of financing, and cost of 
financing have a direct impact on the dividend 
distribution.  
Free Cash Flow Hypothesis Managers have mixed opinions towards the 
effect of agency problem in the form of 
overinvestment or over expenditure by 
management.  
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Clientele and Substitutions Effects Mangers believe that Islamic banks have their 
own clientele and that they would take their 
preference in consideration during payout 
determination to avoid a negative impact on 
their stock price due to substitution effect. 
Competitive Payout Hypothesis Managers believe that Islamic banks take in 
consideration the dividend distributions of the 
market and direct competition in order to 
preserve their competitiveness.  
Stock Dividends Managers reported that stock dividends are 
used to conserve cash and to enhance dividend 
yield.  
Growth and Maturity Effects Managers state that during early stages of the 
bank‘s life, capital expenditure is at its peak 
resulting in relatively lower dividends. As the 
bank grows and matures, less cash is needed 
for expansion and hence, dividends increase 
and become more stable.   
The second most important theories that affect dividend distributions were liquidity and 
financing effects. Managers reported that lower liquidity and higher levels of debt can negatively 
impact dividend distributions. They also reported that higher cost of financing and tight market 
conditions may also lower dividend distributions. In addition, managers reported that regulators 
can indirectly influence dividend payout decisions of Islamic banks. Managers stated that this 
could happen through liquidity and financing restrictions in the forms of cost of finance, leverage 
ratio, capital adequacy, reserve requirements, and other mechanisms.   
The third most important theories that explains the dividend policy is the growth and 
maturity effects. Managers believe that young banks tend to have higher capital expenditures to 
build their network of branches, technology, and to acquire and train their human resource. 
Hence, unlike older banks, young banks have relatively lower dividends. When banks mature, 
their operational efficiency and cash flows are enhanced as well as their dividend distributions. 
Although the maturity effect is believed to have a strong impact on the dividend policy, managers 
211 
 
stress the importance of a competitive payout in order to preserve the bank‘s competitiveness and 
to avoid any substitution effect that could hinder the stock price and the firm‘s value.  
The results comply with the residual dividend policy. From the first glance, this may 
seem in conflict with dividend smoothing behaviour and maturity effects. However, managers 
believe that new Islamic bank may require funding during its early stages to support its expansion 
plans through following a residual dividend policy. As the bank matures, it focuses more on 
stabilizing earnings in order to distribute stable and smooth payouts to attract and retain 
depositors and shareholders. This act is consistent with the maturity effect results. To test this 
assumption, a factor such as age can be incorporated in the payout model, which will be 
developed and tested in chapter 6.
157
  
In addition, managers believe that stock dividends are an indirect of preservation of cash. 
In this regard, pecking order theory suggests that mangers tend to use internally generated cash 
for investment and expenditure before using external financing. In addition, managers also 
believe that stock dividends can be used as a tool to enhance the dividend yield. Finally, 
managers reported mixed opinion toward the relevance of the free cash flow hypothesis to the 
payout policy. Some argue that banks fall under strict scrutiny of regulators, auditors, 
shareholders, and other parties, which restrict their investment activities and expenditures. This 
fact deters banks from using dividend as an agency cost mitigation device.  
The factors that affect the dividends payouts were also identified in this study.
158
 These 
factors are used for the payout model, which will be introduced and tested in chapter 6. Managers 
believe, as predicted by the Lintner model, that profitability, last year‘s distribution, a sustainable 
change in earnings, and a targeted payout ratio are crucial. They also believe that the preference 
of investors and the distribution rate of competitors are also important. Mangers also stress the 
importance of expansion plans and the maturity level of the bank. Finally, managers believe that 
                                                   
157 The findings in chapter 6, shows that age is a relevant variable for the dividend payout model. Hence, it 
confirms the growth and maturity effect assumptions.  
158 See table 5.21 for a list of these factors.  
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liquidity and financing factors (i.e. discount rate, capital adequacy ratio, and reserves) are 
important for the Islamic bank due to business risks and regulatory controls.   
In general terms, the findings presented in this chapter were in compliance with the 
articles used for the interview design and methodology.
159
 However, there are slight differences 
with the literature in the findings of some dividend theories. Firstly, while the results of this study 
and Baker et al. (1985) confirm the financing effect hypothesis, the results of Partington (1989) 
and Brav et al. (2005) did not find support for it. On the other hand, managers reported a mixed 
opinion towards the effect of FCF hypothesis, which is a similar to the findings of Mizuno 
(2007). However, the results of the investors‘ survey, Baker et al. (1985), and Brav et al. (2005) 
support the hypothesis. Finally, the results confirm the maturity and growth hypothesis. This is in 
consistence with Brav et al. (2005). However, it does not comply with Partington (1989) and 
Mizuno (2007), who did not find enough evidence to support it. 
The main limitation of this research is that the payout policy involves several entities 
such as: regulatory bodies (e.g. central banks and governmental agencies), board of directors, 
chief executive officers, auditors, and general assembly. However, the sample covers financial 
and corporate managers only, which is one part of the decision loop. Hence, the results are 
specific to the perception of this group only and may differ when taking other groups in 
consideration. This limitation is mitigated though triangulation with the results of chapter 4 and 
the development and testing of the payout model in chapter 6.   
As for future research, it is recommended to conduct a study to identify the factors that 
affect the management decision to set the size of Mudarabah fees, voluntary reserve ratios, and 
the IRR and PER reserves.  These factors are important to the payout policy as it affect the ability 
and flexibility of the management to manipulate the payout distributions. Another 
recommendation is to conduct the research in different market sectors across the GCC (e.g. oil 
gas, telecommunication, banking …etc). This will assist in understanding the perception of 
managers in the GCC and to identify similarities/dissimilarities between various sectors. 
                                                   
159 See section 5.4.3.1. 
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6 CHAPTER 6: THE PAYOUT MODEL OF ISLAMIC BANKS IN THE GCC 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In chapters 4 and 5, investors and managers were surveyed to find their perception towards 
payout policies. In this chapter, the results are employed to formulate and test the payout model 
of Islamic banks in the GCC. This study has several contributions to knowledge and practice. The 
first contribution is that the topic of dividend policy of financial institutions has been rarely 
covered by researchers. Due to contextual factors, the findings are expected to be different from 
other industries (Dickens et al. , 2002).  
The second contribution is that none of the earlier studies on depository institutions 
focused on Islamic banks, which have unique characteristics and capital structure.
160
 The third 
contribution is that only two earlier studies on dividend policy in the GCC were conducted.
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Finally, from a practical point of view, investors, depositors, research analysts, and managers will 
be able to use the payout model, developed in this chapter, to predict payout distributions of 
Islamic banks.  
Chapter 6 is structured as follows. Section 6.2 gives an overview of selected literature 
review on dividend modeling. Section 6.3 mentions the research methodology, which includes 
research methods, proposed model, definition of variables and research hypotheses. Section 6.4 
discusses the data collection method. In section 6.5 a suitable regression technique is selected for 
the model and the regression assumption tests are performed. Section 6.6 discusses the results and 
analysis of the model, and finally section 6.7 contains the conclusion, limitations, and 
recommendations for future research. 
  
                                                   
160 See section 2.4 for details about Islamic banking and section 6.5 for the payout structure of Islamic 
banks. 
161 See section 6.2. 
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6.2 SELECTED LITERATURE REVIEW 
One of the earliest studies that attempted to build a dividend model was performed by Lintner 
(1956). His aim was to identify the determinants of dividend policy in an effort to establish a 
dividend model that management can use to take dividend decisions. He selected more than 600 
listed and well-established companies and surveyed the sample using a questionnaire. From this 
sample, he chose 28 firms to perform extensive interviews to confirm the questionnaire findings 
and to further explain some results (Lease et al., 2000). 
Lintner (1956) set a criteria of selecting the research sample based on 15 factors, which 
are hypothesized to have an effect on dividend policy. Some of these factors are: firm size, plant 
and equipment expenditure, willingness to use external finance, use of stock dividends, earning 
stability, and ownership and control (Lease et al., 2000).  
Lintner (1956) observed that most managers are reluctant to reduce the dividend policy 
because they believe that if they do so, they would hurt the stock price, which reduces the value 
of the firm. Managers believe that investors pay a premium on dividend stability. Therefore, they 
are keen on meeting investor‘s expectations. Lintner (1956) also found that managers have a 
tendency to be very conservative when it comes to changing the dividend payout. In other words, 
they would not change the policy unless they are comfortably sure that the dividend change is 
sustainable. 
Lintner (1956) also found that if there is a gradual growth in earnings, firms tend to 
increase their dividend payout conservatively to follow a target payout ratio. The gradual increase 
is called the adjustment speed. Lintner (1956) explained his theory in a mathematical format. He 
constructed the following model: 
Di,t - Di,t-1 = Ai + ßi,1 Di,t-1 + ßi,2 Ei,t + μi,t 
Di,t - Di,t-1 = change in dividend from period t-1 to t for firm i 
Ai = the intercept term for firm i 
ßi,1 = speed of adjustment 
ßi,2 = ßi,1 multiplied by payout ratio 
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Ei,t =  the earnings after taxes per share in period t for firm i 
μi,t = error term for firm i in period t  
The Lintner model was the first model to represent the dividend policy. The model was 
empirically tested by many researchers to confirm its validity. Fama and Babiak (1968) tested 
several models to find the best one that predicts future dividends. The study found that the 
Lintner model outperforms other models. However, they found that the model can be improved 
by replacing the constant with a lagged profit variable Ei,t-1.  This leads to a slight improvement in 
the model prediction power.  
Furthermore, Baker et al. (1985) used the methodology of Lintner (1956). He surveyed 
the corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) to find the determinants of their 
dividend policy and to examine the management‘s perception towards signalling and clientele 
effects. He also attempted to determine if managers in different industries share the same views 
towards dividend policy. The results came to be very similar to those of Lintner (1956) 
particularly in relation to dividend continuity. The results support the signalling and clientele 
effects. It also shows that managers in regulated firms have different perceptions towards 
dividends than those working in a more competitive environment. 
Shirvani and Wilbratte (1997) used three determinants that measure the ability of 
corporations to pay dividends, namely: current earnings, cash flows and stock prices. Their results 
support the Lintner model. In addition, out of the three determinants, the study found that current 
earnings are better at explaining long-run dividends than cash flows or stock prices.  
More recently, Brav et al. (2005) tested the validity of the Lintner model. The study 
surveyed a sample of 384 financial executives and conducted in-depth interviews with 23 
participants. They reported that the link between dividend and earnings in the Lintner model has 
weakened since the Lintner model was introduced. It showed that managers prefer share 
repurchases over cash dividends because it gives them more flexibility while it increases earnings 
per share. Furthermore, the research findings indicated that repurchases are made out of the 
residual cash flow and after investment requirements are met. In addition, the findings showed 
that executives believe that payout policy has little impact on their clientele. The findings gave 
little support for agency, signalling and clientele theories. 
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Similar to the concepts proposed by Lintner (1956), Smith (1971) introduced the 
increasing stream hypothesis. The hypothesis argues that managers believe that investors perceive 
stable corporate dividends as a positive signal of the financial strength of the firm and its future 
direction. Based on this assumption, managers strive to stabilize dividends. Hence, unless there is 
a valid trend of declining earnings, managers would avoid cutting dividends. Since dividend 
stability is important to managers, stabilizing and increasing earning levels would be their 
primary goal. Smith (1971) was able to empirically support the increasing stream hypothesis. 
Rozeff (1982) attempted to explain the wide variations between U.S. companies in their 
dividend policies. He built a model to determine the optimal dividend payout. Rozeff (1982) 
based his logic on the concept that the dividend policy of a firm should take into consideration the 
minimization of two costs, namely: the agency cost and the transaction cost. The agency cost is 
derived from the assumption that the free cash flow can be misused by management and, hence, 
should be returned to investors through dividend distributions. On the other hand, the transaction 
cost occurs when management follow an overly generous dividend policy that would constantly 
require raising funds through debt or equity. This could increase the associated transaction cost, 
which has a negative impact on the value of the firm.  
Rozeff (1982) used four factors in his payout model. The first factor is revenue growth. 
He assumes that higher growth rate in revenues correlated with higher investment expenditure. As 
a result, it is expected that dividend payout is negatively correlated with higher growth rate of 
revenues. The reason is that cash is required to support the high growth rate otherwise the 
company will be exposed to the higher transaction cost of raising additional funds. The second 
factor is the Beta coefficient, which represents the volatility of the company‘s earnings compared 
to the market. This volatility is induced by the financial and operating leverage of the company. 
Therefore, when Beta is higher, the dividend payout tends to be lower because the company is 
obligated to pay fixed payments to cover the leverage.  
The third factor in Rozeff‘s model is the percentage ownership of insiders in the 
company. He argues that the higher the percentage ownership of insiders, the more agency cost is 
expected. Therefore, the company should try to minimize this cost by issuing higher dividends. 
The fourth factor is the number of shareholders. Rozeff  (1982) argues that the higher the number 
of shareholders, the higher the agency cost; consequently, the higher the dividends required to be 
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paid to investors to reduce such cost. Both factors represent the agency cost of the model. The 
coefficients of all variables were found significant in the prediction of dividend payouts. 
Many subsequent studies followed the same logic used by Rozeff (1982). However, the 
differences between studies were in the selection of proxy factors that best represent the optimal 
dividend policy and the attempt to examine the model across different industries (Dickens et al., 
2002). In an effort to test and enhance the Rozeff model, Lloyd et al. (1985) used data from July 
to September 1984 of actively traded U.S. firms. The results support the Rozeff model. However, 
the study expanded the model by introducing a size variable with annual sales as a proxy for 
transaction cost. This variable enhanced the predictability of the model.  
Another empirical application of Rozeff‘s model was conducted by Rao and White 
(1994), who studied the dividend payouts of private firms. Private firms are a special case for 
Rozeff‘s model for several reasons. First, private firms have relatively few shareholders. 
Therefore, the agency cost will be much weaker than in the case of publicly held companies. 
Secondly, owners of the firm tend to hold executive positions in the company. This makes them 
prefer to receive income in the form of employee compensation (e.g. salary, indemnity, and 
bonuses) rather than dividends. The reason is that unlike dividends, employee/owners income is 
tax deductible.  Hence, the researcher expected that Rozeff‘s model would be less relevant for 
private companies. The model was tested successfully and expanded to include the accumulated 
earnings tax.  
Schooley and Barney Jr (1994) examined the effect of managerial ownership on the 
dividend policy as it is expected to reduce the agency cost. To test this proposition, the study uses 
data in 1980 of 235 industrial firms of the two-digit SIC industry group. The data was used in a 
regression model to describe the relationship between managerial ownership and dividend 
payouts. The study found a significant non-monotonic relation between dividend yield and 
managerial ownership. This result is in conflict with the findings of Rozeff (1982), which indicate 
that insider‘s ownership has a linear positive relationship with dividends. The results stated that 
before a certain point, the managerial ownership reduces the agency cost and dividend yields. 
However, beyond this point, a further increase to the managerial ownership increases the 
dividend yields, which entails that the interest of shareholders and managers could be misaligned. 
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Moh'd et al. (1995) constructed a model that tested the agency and transaction cost trade-
off using a modified version of Rozeff‘s model. The model is tested through time and across 
firms using data of 341 U.S. firms from 1972 to 1989. The modifications to Rozeff‘s model 
include redefining some of its independent variables. The results show that dividend policy is a 
function of size, rate of growth, operating and financial leverage, intrinsic business risk, and 
ownership structure. This conclusion holds through time and across firms.  
Barclay et al. (1995) examined a more generalized version of agency model by the 
inclusion of the interaction between leverage and dividend policy. Their argument is that dividend 
policy is an integral part of the capital structure decisions. The study analysed the leverage and 
dividend choices of more than 6,700 industrial corporations over a 30 year period. The aim of the 
research study is to examine the relevance of various factors, such as: taxes, contracting costs, 
and signalling effects, to the leverage and dividend policy decisions made by corporate managers. 
Barclay et al. (1995) original model contains four independent factors, namely: investment 
opportunity, regulation, size and signalling. The findings support the first three factors only.  
Dickens et al. (2002) employed a modified version of Barclays‘s model to examine the 
factors that determine the dividend policy of banks. The modified model used investment 
opportunities, capital adequacy, size, signalling, ownership, dividend history and risk. The study 
analysed the financial data of 677 banks incorporated in the United States. The findings suggest a 
negative relationship between dividends and investment opportunities, signalling, insider 
ownership and risk.  A positive relationship was found between dividends and the bank‘s size and 
dividend history.  
Emerging markets are a special case and may have considerably different results than 
developed markets in terms of payout policy determination. Factors such as: culture, perceptions, 
market efficiency, market size, market depth, regulations, transparency levels, taxation, 
technology and many other factors make emerging markets a unique case.
 162
 Several studies were 
conducted to cover this part of the world. Mookerjee (1992) found that the Lintner model 
explained the dividend behaviour in the Indian market by testing it against data from 1949 to 
                                                   
162 For details, refer to Aivazian et al. (2003).  
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1981. He enhanced the model by adding a factor that encompassed the effect of availability of 
external finance (Manos, 2001).  
In the context of this research study where the GCC market is examined, it is expected that 
market constituencies would alter the dividend policy of GCC institutions making it different 
from developed countries and other emerging markets. Al Yahyaee (2006) examined the dividend 
policy of Omani firms in the financial and non-financial sectors. The study aims to identify the 
factors that determine the dividend payment decision, dividend amount and stability of dividend 
policy. It also seeks to find the potential differences between the dividend policies of financial 
and non-financial firms.  
Al Yahyaee (2006) used data taken from Muscat Stock Market between 1989 and 2004. 
The empirical results suggested three factors that influence the dividend policy of both financial 
and non-financial firms. These factors are: profitability, size, and business risk. However, the 
dividend policy of non-financial firms is also affected by government ownership, leverage and 
age. The study shows that the Lintner model is applicable to both types of firms in the Omani 
market. However, the speed of adjustment of financial institutions is faster than non-financial 
institutions. This entails that the dividend policy of financial institutions is less stable and more 
dependable on earning levels. 
More recently, Al-Kuwari (2009) investigated dividend policies in the GCC markets. The 
study used a panel data of non-financial firms from 1999 to 2003. Using a series of random effect 
Tobit, the dividend model was tested. The results show that dividends are influenced by 
government ownership, firm size, firm profitability and leverage ratio. The study suggests that 
firms tend to employ dividends to reduce agency costs due to limited legal protection of minority 
interests in the GCC. The study also found that the dividends depend mainly on profitability and, 
therefore, it is expected to be less stable.  
The studies presented in this section provide evidence that variations in generic payout 
models may occur as a result of changing the industry, market and firm characteristics.  
6.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
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This study intends to test the perception of the investors‘ and managers‘ towards payout policies, 
which was covered in chapter 4 and 5. For this purpose, a payout model is derived to 
mathematically explain the relationship between payouts and its determining factors. Therefore, 
the research question should be: 
“What are the determinants of payout distributions of Islamic banks?” 
A proposed payout model was constructed. As seen in figure 6.1, the model comprises of 
two sub-models, namely: the PSIA, and dividend models. These sub-models are linked by an 
arrow resembling the displaced commercial risk, which under certain circumstances reduces the 
shareholders profits for the benefit of PSIA holders.
163
  
The payout model is tested by multivariate regression analysis using the financial data of 
13 Islamic banks in the GCC between 1993 and 2008. In this section, the model formulation and 
variable selection process is discussed. 
  Figure  6.1- Payout Model 
 
                                                   
163 For more details on displaced commercial risk, refer to section 5.5.3.6.6. 
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6.3.1 PSIA Model  
6.3.1.1 Competitors’ Distribution Rates 
The first factor expected to influence the PSIA profit distribution rate is the competitors‘ 
distribution rate. This factor was reported by the investors and managers. Investors stated that 
they assess the quality of PSIA profit distributions by comparing it to the distributions of other 
banks. Managers argued that banks desire to maintain the demand on their products by offering 
competitive PSIA rates. 
In support of this view, Archer and Abdel Karim (2005) stated that Islamic banks 
consider the distributions of competitors during their payout decisions process. If the profit rate is 
less attractive compared to competition, banks tend to reduce the profit allocated to shareholders 
for the benefit of PSIA holders. This action is termed as the displaced commercial risk.
164
  
As a proxy for the competitors‘ distribution rate, the market deposit rate was included in 
the model.
165
 The data for this variable was retrieved from the website of international monetary 
fund (IMF).
166
 The first research hypothesis H1 states that there is a positive relationship between 
the average market rate (MARKET) and the PSIA profit rate.  
6.3.1.2 Historical Distribution Rates 
The findings of the investors‘ and managers‘ survey studies suggest that depositors perceive firms 
with stable PSIA payouts as stronger and more valuable. Investors reported that they assess the 
quality of PSIA distribution by comparing it to last year‘s distribution. Managers stated that 
Islamic banks attempt to smooth their distributions because they believe that depositors perceive 
stable payouts as a plus. 
Lintner (1956) showed that historical dividends are essential in determining current 
dividends. The model was tested and reaffirmed by Fama and Babiak (1968), Brav et al. (2005), 
                                                   
164 See section 5.5.3.6.6. 
165 Market rate is the average deposit rate of banks in a given country.  
166 See http://www.imf.org. 
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and Mookerjee (1992). Dickens et al. (2002) has also used the historic dividend variable in his 
dividend model for banks. In addition, Al Yahyaee (2006) found that the Lintner model is 
applicable to financial institutions in Oman.  
In this study, the previous year‘s PSIA distribution rate is employed as a proxy for 
historical distribution rates. The second research hypothesis H2 states that there is a positive 
relationship between PSIA profit rates paid last year (PSIA(t-1)) and the PSIA profit rate of this 
year. 
6.3.1.3 Maturity 
Managers reported that although newly established banks have higher capital expenditure, which 
is spent on branch network, information systems, training and the like, these expenditures have a 
minor effect on PSIA but may impact dividends. The reason is that banks want to maintain their 
competitiveness in the market. If the managers‘ view was correct, and maturity effect is not 
supported, this result can be a good example for the validity of the displaced commercial risk 
assumption.  
In terms of theoretical and empirical support for the maturity effect, Grullon et al. (2003) 
argue that firms reaching higher maturity levels have declining capital expenditure, and hence, it 
will have higher levels of free cash flow that can be distributed as dividends. This view was 
supported by the findings of Julio and Ikenberry (2004) and Brav et al. (2005). Al Yahyaee 
(2006) used the variable age to surrogate for maturity levels and found it significant to the 
dividends of non-financial firms in Oman.  
As a proxy for maturity, the age variable is used, which is the difference between the 
observation year and the year of establishment. The third research hypothesis H3 states that there 
is a positive relationship between the firm‘s age (AGE) and the PSIA profit rate. 
6.3.1.4 Profitability 
Managers believe that under normal circumstances, profitability would have a minor effect on 
PSIA. Managers would decide on a suitable PSIA distribution and any shortage could be covered 
by the reserves and/or shareholders‘ income. Hence, testing for profitability effect would also 
provide a good evidence for the validity of displaced commercial risk.   
223 
 
In spite of the above view, profitability was found to play an essential role in the 
determination of dividends. As a proxy for profitability, earnings were a component of the 
Lintner mode. Fama and Babiak (1968) have empirically tested the validity of the Lintner model. 
They were able to enhance the predictability of the Lintner model by including the lagged 
earnings variable.  
Other empirical evidence confirms the relationship between earnings and dividends such 
as Mookerjee (1992), Partington (1985), and Brav et al. (2005), Aivazian et al. (2003). Al-Kuwari 
(2009) found that the firm‘s dividend policy is heavily dependent on profitability. In addition, Al 
Yahyaee (2006) has empirically confirmed a relationship between profitability and dividends in 
the financial services sector in Oman. He used the return on assets ratio as a proxy for 
profitability.  
In this study, ROA is used as a proxy for profitability. Since shareholders share the 
bank‘s assets (or for some banks Mudarabah pool) with depositors, then under normal 
circumstances, the ROA (i.e. general ROA) would be positively correlated with the ROA for 
depositors.
167
 The fourth research hypothesis H4 states that there is a positive relationship 
between the return on assets ratio (ROA) and the PSIA profit. 
The previous discussion is summarized in the equation below. The signs between the 
parentheses indicate the expected relationship between the dependent and independent variables.  
PSIA Profit Rate = f [Competitors’ Distribution Rates (+), Historical Distribution 
Rates (+), Maturity (+), Profitability (+)] 
PSIA Profit Rate = the profit distribution rate earned by PSIA (PSIA) in a given year 
                                                   
167 In theory, there are two cases for the relationship between the general ROA and the ROA for depositors 
(or for some bank Mudharaba pool), namely: positive or negative relationship. When the economy 
improves or deteriorates, all types of returns move in the same direction, hence, both ROA‘s move in the 
same direction (up or down). However, in exceptional cases (e.g. management inefficiency, law suits, 
operational issues, credit defaults …etc) the returns, and ROA‘s, could move in opposite directions as a 
result of displaced commercial risk. These exceptional cases are individual (i.e. bank) specific, which can 
be controlled by the regression analysis and the usage of panel data (See section 6.5.5). Hence, it is 
assumed that both ROA‘s are positively correlated and the exceptional cases are neglected.  
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Competitors‘ Distribution Rates = competitors‘ distribution rate surrogated by the 
average market rate of deposits (MARKET) 
Historical Distribution Rates = the PSIA profit rate paid last year (PSIA(t-1)) 
Maturity = represented by the age of the firm (AGE) 
Profitability = represented by the return on assets ratio (ROA) 
6.3.2 Dividend Model  
6.3.2.1 Profitability  
In the managers‘ survey, the factors of net income received the highest score among the factors 
expected to influence the payout policy. In addition, the findings of the investors‘ and managers‘ 
surveys strongly support the applicability of the Lintner model on dividends, which contains 
earnings as a component.
168
  
In this study, ROA is used as a proxy for profitability.
169
 The fifth research hypothesis H5 
states that there is a significant positive relationship between ROA and dividends.   
6.3.2.2 Historical Dividends 
The results of both the investors‘ survey and managers‘ survey studies suggested that investors 
perceive firms that have stable dividends as stronger and more valuable. Investors reported that 
they assess the quality of dividends by comparing it to last year‘s distributions. Managers stated 
that investors would pay a premium for firms that have stable dividends. Hence, Islamic banks 
tend to avoid cutting dividends.
 170
 
                                                   
168 For a theoretical and empirical support, refer to section 6.3.1.4. 
169 ROA is used instead of the return on equity ratio (ROE) as the latter is sensitive to leverage ratio. 
Therefore, the results could be erroneous due to multicollinearity effect induced by the inclusion of 
leverage ratio, which is presented in the next section. Pearson correlation shows significant correlation 
between ROE and the leverage ratio at the 0.01 level. 
170 For a theoretical and empirical support, refer to section 6.3.1.2. 
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In this study, the last year‘s dividend distribution is used as a proxy variable for historical 
dividends. The sixth research hypothesis H6 states that there is a positive relationship between the 
dividends paid last year (Div(t-1) ) and this year‘s dividends. 
6.3.2.3 Leverage  
Managers reported that the bank‘s level of leverage, financing ability and cost of financing have a 
direct impact on the dividend distribution. They argue that firms with higher level of leverage are 
committed to fixed payments to service their debt. Reneging on such commitment may expose 
the firm to bankruptcy. In some cases, such debt is associated with covenants that legally restrict 
the distribution of dividends.  
It is also expected that banks with higher leverage ratio (lower capital adequacy ratio) are 
under greater regulatory pressures. This puts a restriction on paying higher dividends or accepting 
further deposits (Dickens et al., 2002).  DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) found that more than 
half of their sample of firms from NYSE faced binding debt covenants in the years they reduced 
their dividends. Crutchley and Hansen (1989) empirically found that firms‘ leverage has a 
negative relationship with dividends.  
In addition, Jensen (1986) developed a dividend payout model that shows a significant 
relationship between leverage ratio and dividend payout. His argument is that debt reduces the 
availability of excess cash in the hand of firms‘ management and, therefore, will reduce the 
agency problem associated with over expenditure and over investment. Other studies verified the 
effect of leverage on dividends including Aivazian et al. (2003), Al Yahyaee (2006)
171
, and Al- 
Kuwari (2009).  
As a surrogate for leverage, the liability over equity ratio is used in the model. The 
seventh research hypothesis H7 states that there is a negative relationship between liability over 
equity ratio (L/E) and dividends. 
6.3.2.4 Maturity 
                                                   
171 Al Yahyaee (2006) employed leverage to proxy for agency cost and the effect of fixed payments on 
dividends. The author found leverage to be relevant for non-financial institutions only.  
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Managers stated that newly established banks incur higher capital expenditures to build their 
branch network, information systems, staff hiring and training. Hence, young banks pay relatively 
lower dividends. As banks mature, the capital expenditure and growth opportunity will be 
relatively smaller. Hence, they are expected to pay relatively higher dividends.
172
  
As a proxy for maturity, the age variable is used, which is defined as the difference 
between the observation year and the year of establishment. The eighth hypothesis H8 states that 
there is a positive relationship between firm‘s age (AGE) and dividends.   
6.3.2.5 Firm’s Size 
The firm size was found to have a positive effect on dividends. Dickens et al. (2002) empirically 
proved that the bank‘s size has a positive relationship with dividends. He argued that larger banks 
tend to be more competitive in the market due to factors such as: accessibility to capital market, 
better credit rating, more customers, and other factors. These factors enhance the bank‘s 
profitability and efficiency while reducing the operating cost due to the effect of economy of 
scale. This increases the ability of the bank to distribute dividends. Other studies found empirical 
support for the size effect hypothesis.
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Dickens et al. (2002) employed the log of revenues as a proxy for size, Al Yahyaee 
(2006) used the sales, and Al-Kuwari (2009) used the market capitalization. In this study, the 
natural log of revenues is employed to capture the effect of size on dividends. The ninth 
hypothesis H9 states that there is a positive relationship between revenues (REV) and dividends.   
The previous discussion is summarized in the equation below. The signs between the 
parentheses indicate the expected relationship between the dependent and independent variables.  
Dividend = f [Profitability (+), Historical Dividends (+), Leverage (-), Maturity (+), 
Firm’s Size (+)] 
                                                   
172 For a theoretical and empirical support, refer to section 6.3.1.3. 
173 See Lloyd et al. (1985), Moh'd et al. (1995) and Barclay et al. (1995). 
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Dividend = the dividend over equity ratio (Div)  
Profitability = represented by the return on assets (ROA) 
Historical Dividends = the dividend paid last year (Div(t-1) ) 
Leverage = represented by the liability over equity ratio (L/E) 
Maturity = represented by the age of the firm (AGE) 
Firm‘s Size = represented by revenues (REV) 
To increase the predictability of the dividend model, a comparison is conducted between 
its variables and the variables employed by other dividend policy studies of a similar geography 
and industry. For this purpose, we selected the studies of Dickens et al. (2002) on the banking 
industry, Al Yahyaee (2006) on the Omani market, and Al-Kuwari (2009) on the GCC markets.
174
  
The comparison entails that the majority of the variables used in the above studies are addressed 
in the proposed dividend model except for two variables namely: government ownership and 
business risk.  
Government owneship was not included in the dividend model due to inconsistency of 
results regarding it. Dickens et al. (2002) did not include the variable in their dividend model. In 
addition, unlike non-financial institutions covered in his study, Al Yahyaee (2006) did not find 
enough evidence to support the effect of government ownership. Although Al-Kuwari (2009) 
found significance of the variable to dividends, the study covered unregulated firms only, which 
does not include financial institutions. 
 Business risk was covered by the three studies. As a proxy for it, Dickens et al. (2002) 
employed the market over book ratio, Al Yahyaee (2006) used the standard deviation of returns, 
and Al-Kuwari (2009) used beta. The first two studies found significance of business risk to 
dividend policy. However, the third study was not able to find support for the hypothesis. 
Although the results were mixed, the leverage ratio (L/E) was employed to indirectly capture the 
                                                   
174 See section 6.2. 
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business risk effect. Arguably, L/E is positively associated with business risk because businesses 
with higher leverage would incur higher fixed costs and eventually higher volatility in earnings. 
As a consequence, these firms would use internally generated funds, which reduce dividends, in 
order to avoid higher transaction costs associated with raising external capital.
175
  
6.4 RESEARCH DATA COLLECTION AND DESCRIPTION 
In order to achieve an adequate level of generalizability and validity of results and to fulfill the 
regression test requirements, an adequate sample of financial data of Islamic banks in the GCC is 
collected. The sample selection criteria states that the Islamic bank should be listed and 
incorporated in the GCC. The bank should be operational for at least 5 fiscal years as of 2008. 
This condition helps avoiding the influence of external factors (e.g. economic) that may bias the 
results.    
According to the sample criteria, 11 banks were selected for the PSIA model. These banks 
represent 68.75% of the population in 2008 and 72.85% of the total market capitalization as of 
2010.  On the other hand, 13 banks were selected for the dividend model. These banks represent 
81.12% of the population in 2008 and 77.11% of the market capitalization as of 2010.
176
 These 
figures are sufficient to generalize the findings on the population.
177
  
For data collection, Reuters Knowledge service was used to fetch the data electronically. 
Annual reports were also employed to complete any missing data.  The data collected was 
between 1993 and 2008. It has the statistical description shown in table 6.1 for the PSIA model 
and table 6.2 for the dividend model.   
  
                                                   
175 See Moh'd et al. (1995). 
176 The difference in the number of banks between the PSIA and dividend models is due to availability of 
data. Overall, 13 banks were selected for both models. However, the financial reports of two banks did not 
publish the PSIA profits clearly and according to the standards. The rest of the banks are identical in both 
models.  
177 The figures are based on Muthanna (2010, 2008).   
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Table  6.1 - Descriptive Statistics for the Data of PSIA Model 
The table contains the descriptive statistics of PSIA model variables for a sample of 11 Islamic banks in the 
GCC using data from 1993 to 2008 with 72 observations. The variables in the table are PSIA Profit Rate 
(PSIA), Market Profit Rate (MARKET), Historical PSIA rate (PSIA(t-1)), Maturity (AGE), and 
Profitability (ROA).  
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
PSIA  0.040 0.021 0.003 0.088 
MARKET  0.038 0.015 0.009 0.071 
PSIA(t-1) 0.039 0.022 0.003 0.088 
AGE 20.4 12.83 5 52 
ROA 0.033 0.021 0.000 .082 
Table  6.2 - Descriptive Statistics for the Data of Dividend Model 
The table contains the descriptive statistics of dividend model variables for a sample of 13 Islamic banks in 
the GCC using data from 1993 to 2008 with 101 observations. The variables in the table are Dividend 
(Div), Profitability (ROA), Historical Dividends (Div(t-1)), Leverage (L/E), Maturity (AGE), and Firm‘s 
Size (REV).  
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Div  0.916 0.079 0.000 2.065 
ROA  0.031 0.021 0.000 8.046 
Div(t-1) 0.089 0.080 0.000 2.065 
L/E 0.069 0.038 0.01 18.45 
AGE 20.00 12.56 5.000 52.00 
REV (USD) 4.26+08 6.81e+08 9.1e+06 3.1e+09 
6.5 REGRESSION MODEL TESTS 
In this section, an attempt to formulate the best model is performed using stepwise regression test. 
A suitable regression technique is selected. The final model is tested for the assumptions of 
regression to substantiate the results. These assumptions are multicollinearity, normality, 
linearity, and homoscedasticity tests (Tacq, 1997). All computations were produced using SPSS 
version 15.00 and STATA version 9.1.  
6.5.1 Stepwise Regression Test  
Stepwise regression test is often used by researchers as preliminary test for the purpose of 
identifying and reducing the number of independent variables that best fit the regression model. It 
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is a recommended test especially if the model contains a large number of independent variables. 
The test can follow three procedures, namely: forward selection, backward elimination and best-
subsets regression. In all of these procedures, a single independent variable is added or deleted 
and the new model is evaluated until all the variables that fall under the selection criteria are 
included. The best model is then identified and selected (Anderson et al., 2008).  
In this study, the researcher used the stepwise forward selection procedure. The results 
are utilized to shortlist those variables found to be significant in preparation for further 
investigation using panel data regression analysis, where more accurate techniques are employed. 
The results of the stepwise regression, shown in table 6.3, is performed between the 
log_PSIA, as dependent variable, and log_MARKET, log_PSIA(t-1), log_AGE, and log_ROA as 
independent variables. The sample size for this regression test contains 72 observations. Another 
stepwise regression, shown in table 6.4, is performed between ln_Dividend, as dependent 
variable, and ln_ROA, ln_Div(t-1), ln_L/E, ln_AGE, and ln_REV as independent variables. The 
sample size for this regression test contains 101 observations.  
Table  6.3 - Results of Stepwise Regression Analysis for PSIA Model 
The table contains the stepwise regression analysis results of the PSIA 
model for a sample of 11 Islamic banks in the GCC using data from 1993 to 
2008 with 72 observations. The variables in the table are Competitors‘ 
Distribution Rates (log_MARKET), Historical PSIA rate (log_PSIA(t-1)), 
Maturity (log_AGE), and Profitability (log_ROA).  
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 
b P>t b P>t 
       
Constant  0.005 
0.359 
0.727* 
0.005 
0.004 
0.000 .000 
0.517* 
0.565* 
0.029 
-0.037 
0.832 
0.000 
0.000 
0.681 
0.593 
log_MARKET  0.000 
log_PSIA(t-1) 0.000 
log_AGE 0.946 
log_ROA 0.964 
Prob. > F                0.000       0.000 
R2                 0.591 0.690 
Adj R2                 0.585  0.681 
* The variable is included in the model. 
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Table  6.4 - Results of Stepwise Regression Analysis for Dividend Model 
The table contains the stepwise regression analysis results of the Dividend 
model for a sample of 13 Islamic banks in the GCC using data from 1993 to 
2008 with 101 observations. The variables in the table are Profitability 
(ln_ROA), Historical Dividends (ln_Div(t-1)), Leverage (ln_L/E), Maturity 
(ln_AGE), and Firm‘s Size (ln_REV).  
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 
b P>t b P>t 
       
Constant  -.014 
0.678* 
0.715* 
0.311* 
0.084 
0.316 -0.036 
0.726* 
0.669* 
0.351* 
0.007* 
0.127 
0.000 
0.000 
0.010 
0.32 
ln_ROA  0.00 
ln_Div(t-1) 0.00 
ln_L/E 0.01 
ln_AGE 0.24 
ln_REV     0.000 0.83  0.000                     0.80 
Prob.> F                0.000       0.000 
R2                 0.652 0.657 
Adj R2                 0.642  0.643 
* The variable is included in the model. 
The results suggest that the best model for the PSIA is Model2. The model has the 
highest coefficient of determination (R squared), which measures the proportion of variance in 
the dependent variable explained by the independent variable(s) (Anderson et al., 2008). The 
model contains log_MARKET and log_PSIA(t-1) and excludes log_AGE and log_ROA. In terms 
of the dividend model, the results suggest Model2, which has the highest R squared. The model 
contains ln_ROA,  ln_Div(t-1), ln_L/E, and ln_AGE variables, and excluded ln_REV. The 
independent variables identified in this section will be further examined using panel data 
regression analysis found in section 6.5.5.  
6.5.2 Multicollinearity Test 
Multicollinearity in the regression model suggests substantial correlations among independent 
variables. This phenomenon introduces a problem because the estimates of the sample parameters 
become inefficient and entail large standard errors, which makes the coefficient values and signs 
unreliable. In addition, multiple independent variables with high correlation add no additional 
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information to the model. It also conceals the real impact of each variable on the dependent 
variable (Anderson et al., 2008).  
A widely used method to test the existence of multicollinearity between independent 
variables is by calculating Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each independent variable. VIF can 
be calculated through the equation VIF= 1 / (1 - R
2
). If the VIF coefficient for an independent 
variable is less than 2, then the variable is considered independent of other variables in the model 
(Chatterjee, 1977). In this case, multicollinearity has no significant effect on the relationship 
between the independent variable and the dependent variable. VIF results are shown in table 6.7 
for each independent variable. The values of all VIFs are below 2. Hence, no multicollinearity is 
evident in the model. 
Table  6.5 – VIF of Model Variables 
The table contains the VIF results of the PSIA and 
dividend model variables for a sample of 11 and 13 
Islamic banks in the GCC using data from 1993 to 2008 
with 72 and 101 observations. 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
PSIA Model   
log_MARKET  1.42 0.705 
log_PSIA(t-1) 1.32 0.75 
Dividend Model   
ln_ROA  1.57 0.638 
ln_Div(t-1) 1.47 0.678 
ln_AGE 1.47 0.679 
Another method to test the existence of multicollinearity is by checking the Pearson 
correlation between the independent variables. For the PSIA model, the correlation between the 
log_MARKET and log_PSIA(t-1) is 0.271. For the Dividend model, the correlations between the 
independent variables are shown in table 6.8 below. All correlation results are below 0.7, which 
indicates that multicollinearity is not a potential problem (Anderson et al., 2008). 
Table  6.6 - Correlation Matrix of Dividend Model 
The table contains the Pearson correlation matrix between independent variables of the 
dividend model for a sample of 12 Islamic banks in the GCC using data from 1993 to 
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2008 with 88 observations. The variables in the table are Profitability (ln_ROA), 
Historical Dividends (ln_Div(t-1)), Leverage (ln_L/E), and Maturity (ln_AGE).   
Variable ln_ROA ln_Div(t-1) ln_L/E ln_AGE 
ln_ROA  1.00    
ln_Div(t-1) -0.350 1.00   
ln_L/E 0.499 -0.207 1.00  
ln_AGE 0.175 0.487 0.253 1.00 
 
6.5.3 Normality Test  
The normality assumption was tested through the Skewness-Kurtosis, ShapiroWilk, and Shapiro-
Francia tests. These tests are performed to check the validity of the null hypothesis that the 
research sample is drawn from a normally distributed population (Park, 2002). The results of the 
tests, shows in table 6.9, indicate that there is not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis 
that the distribution is normal.  
Table  6.7 – Normality Tests 
The table contains the normality tests of the PSIA residuals (R1) and dividend model residuals (R2) 
for a sample of 11 and 13 Islamic banks in the GCC using data from 1993 to 2008 with 72 and 101 
observations. 
Skewness/ Kurtosis Skewnsess Kurtosis Adj X
2
 Prob.> X
2
 
R1  .800 0.107 2.76 0.251 
R2 .720 0.276 1.34 0.5109 
Shapiro-Wilk W V z Prob.>z 
R1  0.983 1.069 0.146 0.441 
R2 0.981 1.562 0.99 0.160 
Shapiro-Francia W’ V’ z Prob.>z 
R1 0.989 0.737 -0.617 0.731 
R2 0.984 1.437 0.736 0.230 
In addition, the normality assumption was tested through visual inspection of the 
distribution of standardized residuals. Figure 6.2 below shows the histogram of residuals. From 
the histograms of PSIA and dividend models, it is apparent that the standardized residuals are 
closed of being normally distributed with mean zero and unit standard deviation (Yaffee, 2004). 
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Figure  6.2 - Histogram of the Distribution of Standardized Residuals 
The figure shows the histogram of the distribution of standardized residuals of the PSIA and Dividend 
models. 
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6.5.4 Linearity Test 
In order to maintain the accuracy of the model, the relationship between the dependent and 
independents variables should be linear. Linearity can be visually inspected by plotting the 
relationship between the dependent versus each independent variable and by plotting the residuals 
versus dependent variables (Chatterjee, 1977).  
Figures 6.5 and figure 6.6 depict dependent versus independent variables and the 
residuals versus dependent variables for the PSIA and dividend models. The figures suggest 
linearity between dependant and independent variables by showing data distributions around 
diagonal lines. Linearity is also evident in the plots of errors versus dependent and independent 
variables as the distribution of data is across horizontal lines while showing no evidence of 
curvature type patterns in the areas of small and large predicted values (Yaffee, 2004).    
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Figure  6.3 - Linearity Test of PSIA Model 
The figure contains the linearity test of the PSIA model for a sample of 11 Islamic    
banks in the GCC using data from 1993 to 2008 with 72 observations. 
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Figure  6.4 - Linearity Test of Dividend Model 
The figure contains the linearity test of the Dividend model for a sample of 13 Islamic  
banks in the GCC using data from 1993 to 2008 with 101 observations. 
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6.5.5 Panel Data Regression Analysis 
Three regression methods were performed on the PSIA and dividend models, namely: pooled 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), fixed effect, and random effect methods. The pooled OLS method 
pools all the data together and assumes homogeneity across individuals (i.e. banks). The fixed 
and random effect methods assume unobserved heterogeneity between individuals. The fixed 
effect method assumes that the unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with the independent 
variables. However, random effect method assumes it is not (Torres-Reyna, 2010).  
The Hausman test was employed to find the most suitable method for the PSIA and 
dividend models (Torres-Reyna, 2010). The null hypothesis of the test is that the random effect 
method is the preferred regression method. Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show the results of the test, which 
indicate that the null hypothesis is rejected for both models. Hence, the fixed effect method is 
preferable for the PSIA and dividend models.  
Table ‎6.8 – Regression Methods for the PSIA Model 
The table contains three regression methods for the PSIA model for a sample of 11 Islamic banks in the 
GCC using data from 1993 to 2008 with 72 observations. The variables in the table are Competitors‘ 
Distribution Rates (log_MARKET) and Historical PSIA rate.  
 
Variable 
Pooled OLS Fixed Effect Random Effect 
b P>t b P>t b P>|z| 
       
Constant  -.0003 0.833 0.004 0.03 -.0003 0.832 
log_MARKET  0.517* 0.00 0.639* 0.00 0.517* 0.00 
log_PSIA(t-1) 0.564* 0.00 0.187* 0.01 0.564* 0.00 
Prob.> F or X2 † 0.000  0.000  0.000  
R2 0.689  0.599  0.689  
Breusch- Pagan / Wald Test ‡ 2.64  642.89  0.13  
Prob.> X2 0.103  0.000  0.715  
Wooldridge  13.195      
Prob.>F 0.004      
Hausman 30.41      
Prob.>X2 0.000      
* The variable is included in the model. † F test for simple OLS and fixed effect and X2 is for the 
random effect. ‡ Bruesch-Pagan for simple OLS and random effect and Wald test for fixed effect. 
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Table ‎6.9 – Regression Methods for the Dividend Model 
The table contains three regression methods for the dividend model for a sample of 13 Islamic banks in 
the GCC using data from 1993 to 2008 with 101 observations. The variables in the table are 
Profitability (ln_ROA), Historical Dividends (ln_Div(t-1)), Leverage (ln_L/E), and Maturity (ln_AGE).  
  
Variable 
Pooled OLS Fixed Effect Random Effect 
b P>t b P>t b P>|z| 
       
Constant  -.0355 0.04 0.232 0.60 -.350 0.12 
ln_ROA  0.725* 0.00 1.136* 0.00 0.725* 0.00 
ln_Div(t-1) 0.669* 0.00 0.223* 0.02 0.669* 0.00 
ln_AGE 0.007 0.24 0.058* 0.00 0.007 0.24 
ln_L/E 0.351* 0.01 0.232 0.24 0.350* 0.00 
Prob.> F or X2 † 0.068  0.000  0.000  
R2 0.657  0.420  0.657  
Breusch- Pagan / Wald Test ‡ 3.55  516.98  0.00  
Prob.> X2 0.059  0.000  0.95  
Wooldridge 17.89      
Prob.> F 0.001      
Hausman 50.28      
Prob.>X2 0.000      
* The variable is included in the model. † F test for simple OLS and fixed effect and X2 is for the 
random effect. ‡ Bruesch-Pagan for simple OLS and random effect and Wald test for fixed effect. 
Using the fixed effect method, the results of the PSIA model suggests a significant 
positive relationship between the independent variables of log_MARKET, log_PSIA(t-1), and the 
dependent variable. Similarly, the dividend model suggests a significant positive relationship 
between the independent variables of ln_ROA, ln_Div(t-1), ln_AGE, and the dependent variable.  
According to the readings of the R squared results in table 6.5, the independent variables 
of the PSIA model explains 59.9% of the variations in the dependent variable. The R squares 
results in table 6.6 shows that the independent variables of the dividend model explain 42% of the 
variations in the dependent variable. For both models the results of the F test indicate statistical 
significant relationships between the independent and dependent variables at the model level. The 
results of R squared were higher than Dickens et al. (2002), which was 23%. 
6.5.6 Homoscedasticity and Autocorrelation Tests  
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Heteroscedasticity occurs when unequal error variance is found in the model. Standard deviation 
of residuals tends to increase as the explanatory variables increase. To meet the assumptions of 
regression test, the error of variance should be homoscedastic (Chatterjee, 1977). To test for 
homoscedasticity, the Wald test was employed for the fixed effect method (See tables 6.5 and 
6.6). The results of both PSIA and dividend models reject the null hypothesis, which suggests the 
occurrence of heteroscedasticity.  
Autocorrelation occurs when the sequential residuals or a regression model are highly 
correlated (Chatterjee, 1977). Wooldridge test was applied to detect autocorrelation. The results 
for both the PSIA and dividend models reject the null hypothesis that no first order 
autocorrelation exist. As a consequence, the researcher employed the (cluster (bank)) option 
,available in STATA version 9.1, to standardize the error terms to control for heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation when performing the fixed effect regression (Torres-Reyna, 2010). 
6.6 ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
6.6.1 PSIA Model 
The regression test results of the PSIA profit rate model show, with 95% confidence, a significant 
effect of the competitors‘ distribution rates (MARKET) and the historical rate (PSIA(t-1)) on the 
dependent variable. The results excluded the factors of maturity (AGE) and profitability (ROA) 
from the model. Hence, hypotheses H1 and H2 are accepted and H3 and H4 could not be 
supported by the research data.  
The confirmation of H1 indicates that there is a positive relationship between the average 
market rate of deposits and the PSIA profit rate, and hence, the validity of the competitive payout 
hypothesis. The hypothesis is consistent with the investors and managers survey studies. Investors 
were found to assess the quality of PSIA profit distributions by comparing it to the market. 
Managers reported that Islamic banks strive to maintain their market position by distributing 
competitive PSIA profit rates. In addition, investors reported that they assess PSIA distributions 
by comparing it to the distributions of competitors. Furthermore, the results of the competitive 
payout are predicted by the researcher because the PSIA funds tend to be invested in short and 
medium-term assets based on Islamic financial products, which are priced at the prevailing 
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market rate. Hence, the PSIA rate is naturally close to the prevailing market rate of return (asset 
side) plus a profitability spread.  
The acceptance of H2 shows that there is a positive relationship between the PSIA profit 
rate paid last year and the current rate, and hence the validity of the dividend stability assumption 
of the Lintner model. Investors reported that they assess the quality of the PSIA distributions by 
historical comparison. Managers reported that stability of distributions is perceived positively by 
investors and, hence, it would affect the demand on depository products. Furthermore, investors 
reported that they assess PSIA distributions by comparing it to historical distributions. The results 
comply with the findings of Dickens et al. (2002) and Al Yahyaee (2006).   
 The overall findings of the PSIA model support the existence of the displaced 
commercial risk assumption posed by AAOIFI and (Archer and Abdel Karim, 2005). Islamic 
banks give more priority to maintain a stable and competitive level of PSIA payouts even if it 
comes at the expense of shareholders. Profitability and maturity of the bank are not considered as 
a significant factor in the determination of the PSIA distribution, which is consistent with results 
reported in the managers‘ survey.   
6.6.2 Dividend Model 
The regression test results of the dividend model shows, with 95% confidence, a significant effect 
of profitability (ROA), historical dividends (Div(t-1)), and maturity (AGE) on the dependent 
variable. The results excluded the factors of leverage (L/E) and firm‘s size (REV) from the 
model. Hence, hypothesis H5, H6 and H8 are accepted and H7 and H9 could not be supported by 
the research data.  
The acceptance of H5 indicates that profitability has a positive influence on dividends. 
The results support the earning component of the Lintner model. The results were consistent with 
Al-Kuwari (2009) on the GCC markets except for the free cash flow hypothesis. Also, Al 
Yahyaee (2006) found that profitability is a relevant factor to the dividends of financial 
institutions in Oman. In addition, several other studies reported similar findings.
178
 
                                                   
178 See section 6.3.1.4. 
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The acceptance of H6 shows the existence of a positive relationship between dividends 
paid last year and current dividends. Along with the confirmation of H5, the results support the 
increasing stream hypothesis and the Lintner model. Managers stated that Islamic banks attempt 
to smooth and gradually increase dividends. They reported that investors perceive firms with such 
characteristics as stronger and more valuable. On the other hand, investors reported that they 
evaluate dividend distributions through historical comparison. The results are consistent with the 
findings of Dickens et al. (2002) and Al Yahyaee (2006) for financial institutions in Oman.  
The acceptance of H8 indicates that the bank‘s age has a positive influence on dividend 
distributions. The finding is consistent with the growth and maturity effects reported by 
managers. Newly established banks have relatively higher capital expenditures and consequently, 
lower dividends. As they gradually mature, they have relatively stabilizing capital expenditures 
and higher efficiency, which consequently allow them to pay relatively higher dividends. The 
findings are consistent with Grullon et al. (2003) and Al Yahyaee (2006) for non-financial 
institutions in Oman. 
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6.7 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The aim of the research study presented in this chapter is to identify the determinants of the 
payout policy of Islamic banks in the GCC. For this purpose, a payout model was formulated 
based on the feedback from the investors‘ and managers‘ surveys. The model was tested through 
multivariate regression analysis using the financial data of 13 Islamic banks in the GCC for the 
period between 1993 and 2008.  
The payout model comprises of the PSIA and dividend models. The variables of the 
proposed PSIA model were competitors‘ rate of distribution (MARKET), historical rate (PSIA(t-
1)), maturity (AGE) and profitability (ROA). The results show a significant positive relationship 
between the dependent variable and the competitors distribution (MARKET) and the historical 
distribution rate (PSIA(t-1)). The rest of variables were excluded from the model. Thus, hypotheses 
H1 and H2 are accepted and H3 and H4 could not be supported by the findings. 
On the other hand, variables of the initial dividend model were profitability (ROA), 
historical dividends (Div(t-1)), leverage (L/E), maturity (AGE), and Firm‘s Size (REV). The results 
show a significant positive relationship between the dependent variable and profitability (ROA), 
historical dividends (Div(t-1)), and maturity (AGE). The leverage (L/E) and Firm‘s Size (REV) 
factors were excluded from the model. Therefore, hypothesis H5, H6 and H8 are accepted and H7 
and H9 could not be supported by the findings. 
The results of both the PSIA and dividend models support the competitive payout 
hypothesis, increasing stream hypothesis, Lintner model and information signaling hypothesis. In 
addition, the results of the dividend model support the increasing stream hypothesis, Lintner 
model, information signaling hypothesis, and the maturity and growth effects.  
The results reported by the investors‘ and managers‘ surveys were generally consistent 
except for the findings of the agency cost and financing effects. For the agency cost effect, 
investors reported that they prefer receiving dividends to mitigate agency cost. However, 
managers reported that agency conflict is controlled through stringent regulations set and audited 
by the authorities. This assumption was validated in this study through the elimination of the 
leverage variable, which represent the agency cost hypothesis. A possible explanation for the 
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inconsistency is that the investors‘ survey addresses the market as a whole (i.e. all industries), 
whereas the managers‘ survey and the payout model focus on Islamic banks only.  
On the other hand, managers reported that financing variables (e.g. cost of financing, 
financial requirement and level of financing) have a direct influence on dividend policy. 
However, the results of the payout model were not enough to support the hypothesis. An 
explanation for the discrepancy could be related to the period of study. In order to avoid a 
possible bias related to the economic crisis, the payout model was tested with data of up to 2008, 
prior to the economic crisis. However, managers were interviewed in 2010, during which banks 
started to take abnormally high provisions to cover bad loans and asset devaluations. These 
provisions have reduced payouts and may have influenced the perception of managers towards 
the importance of financing variables for payout decisions.    
Comparing our findings with the results of Dickens et al. (2002), Al Yahyaee (2006), and 
Al-Kuwari (2009), a general consensus on the importance of profitability variable to the 
determination of dividends is achieved. However, the results did not find evidence for 
profitability in the PSIA model. This is due to existence of displaced commercial risk. In addition, 
similar to Dickens et al. (2002) and Al Yahyaee (2006), the findings strongly suggest the  
applicability of the Lintner model to payouts. On the other hand, unlike the above articles, not 
enough evidence was found for the size variable. This could be due to the influence of 
competitive pressures on payout policy. Thus, firms, regardless of their size, strive to distribute 
competitive payouts. 
The limitation of this research is in the size of population and the amount of data 
available on Islamic banks. This limits the number of hypotheses that could be tested and may 
reduce the validity and reliability of results. To overcome this issue in future, it is recommended 
to study larger populations such as: the entire Islamic financial sector, banking sector, industries, 
and countries. Such studies will depict a more comprehensive picture of the payout policy in the 
GCC.  
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7 CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY OF RESULTS, LIMITATIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this study is to define the payout policy of Islamic banks in the GCC and to identify 
the factors that influence payout distributions. Based on that, three empirical studies were 
conducted, namely: an investors‘ survey, a managers‘ survey and econometric modelling of the 
payout policy. The study involves two stages of research. In the first stage, the researcher 
employs a concurrent triangulation strategy whereby a quantitative approach is implemented to 
survey investors while a concurrent nested approach is employed to survey managers of Islamic 
banks. In the second stage, the feedback from the two studies is used to formulate and test a 
payout policy model to be tested using multivariate regression analysis. 
In this chapter, a summary of results is provided in section 7.2. The results are discussed 
in terms of the implication for knowledge and practice in section 7.3. The research limitations are 
covered in section 7.4, and finally, recommendations of future research are presented in section 
7.5.  
7.2 SUMMARY OF RESULTS  
In this thesis, three studies were conducted. The first study is the investors‘ survey. The purpose 
of the study is to understand how investors perceive payout policies. A questionnaire was 
developed to capture the perceptions of investors and it was electronically delivered to targeted 
participants through email and investment forums over the internet. The researcher received 287 
useable responses. 
The main results of the investors‘ survey report that investors prefer to receive dividends 
due to transaction and agency costs, which supports the dividend relevance hypothesis. The 
findings suggest that the agency cost is explained by the uncertainty resolution, window dressing 
and free cash flow hypothesis.  Investors were found to assess the payouts, including PSIA profit 
distributions, by comparing it to market and historical rates.  
In addition, investors were found to diversify their investments based on risk and return. If 
the characteristics of an asset (e.g. dividend policy) are changed, investors would switch to other 
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assets that meet their investment objectives. This may negatively affect the stock price through 
substitution effect. In terms of stock repurchase, investors perceive it as a signal that the stock 
price is undervalued. On the other hand, stock dividends were interpreted as a stock split or 
capital increase. As for Islamic banking, the religious motivation was found to be the primary 
reason for opening accounts in these banks.  
The research purpose of the managers‘ survey study is to describe the payout process and 
to identify the determinants of payout distributions of Islamic banks. For this purpose, a 
documentation review using articles, annual reports, customer contracts, and bank brochures were 
used to describe the payout process. The findings were triangulated with a semi-structured 
interview of 10 corporate and financial managers from nine Islamic banks. A detailed skeleton of 
the payout process was drawn highlighting the differences in the payout methods employed by 
Islamic banks.  
According to the study, managers believe that PSIA distributions are mainly driven by 
competitors‘ payouts and historical distributions. The study reported that liquidity, profitability 
and maturity effects have minor influence on PSIA distributions. As for dividends, managers 
reported that payout decisions are relevant to the firm‘s value. Dividends were believed to 
comply with the increasing stream hypothesis and the Lintner model. Managers believe that 
stability of the payout policy is perceived by investors as a positive signal of the bank‘s strength. 
They also believe in the maturity and growth effects as new banks have relatively high capital 
expenditures, which flatten out over time. Consequently, mature banks tend to have higher 
dividend distributions. Finally, managers reported that banks‘ liquidity and financial ability have 
a positive relationship with dividend distributions.  
The feedback from the investors‘ and managers‘ surveys was used to formulate and test a 
payout model, which is comprised of a PSIA and dividend models. These two models are linked 
through what is known as the displaced commercial risk triggered by the influence of competitive 
payout hypothesis. The study was based on the financial data of 13 Islamic banks in the GCC 
between 1993 and 2008. The study employed multivariate regression analysis to test the payout 
model.  
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The results of the PSIA model show that PSIA is affected by the competitors‘ distribution 
and historical distribution rates. On the other hand, the results of the Dividend model show that 
the dividends are influenced by profitability, historical dividends, and maturity. The research 
findings for the PSIA model support the competitive payout hypothesis, increasing stream 
hypothesis, Lintner model and information signaling hypothesis. Not enough support was found 
for the profitability effect on PSIA profits, which provide support for the existence of displaced 
commercial risk given that competitive payouts was found as a key driver for the size of 
distribution.  
The research findings of the dividend model were the same as PSIA results but it also 
supported the maturity and growth hypothesis. These results are consistent with the findings of 
the investors‘ and managers‘ survey studies. However, not enough support was found for the 
financing effect.    
The results of the three studies are consistent with each other. The only two exceptions 
were found is in the findings of agency theories and financing effects. Investors reported that they 
consider dividends as a control device for agency cost. However, managers reported that banks 
are subject to scrutiny from several regulatory and monitoring bodies, which may minimize the 
role of dividends in mitigating agency cost. This assumption is supported by the payout model.
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An explanation of the inconsistency lies in the fact that the investors‘ survey addresses the GCC 
market as a whole and not the banking sector specifically, which may have different results. In 
support of this view, Al- Kuwari (2009) reported that dividend policies in the GCC are subject to 
agency costs. However, Al Yahyaee (2006) added that only the dividend policies of non-financial 
firms are affected by agency cost and not the financial firms.
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On the other hand, managers reported that the financing effect has a direct impact on 
dividends. They argue that the higher the level of financing, the higher the payment obligations 
                                                   
179 Not enough evidence was found to include the leverage ratio in the payout model of Islamic banks, 
which is used as a proxy for agency cost hypothesis. See Jensen (1986). 
180 Similar to this study, both Al Yahyaee (2006) and Al- Kuwari (2009) employed leverage ratio as a 
proxy for agency cost. 
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the bank will have, and hence less dividends can be distributed. However, the results of the 
payout model did not provide support for the financing effect hypothesis.
181
 This could be due to 
the period of the study which was purposely set before 2008 to avoid the effect of the financial 
crisis, which may bias the results. Therefore, it is possible that during the period of study banks 
had adequate liquidity to cover dividends and hence, leverage ratio would have had minor affect 
on dividends. However, the semi-interviews were conducted after the financial crisis of 2008. 
During this time, banks started to take abnormally high provisions to cover for credit risk, which 
negatively influenced the profitability, liquidity, capital adequacy, and their ability to distribute 
dividend.
182
 This situation may have influenced the perception of managers towards the impact of 
financial effect.  
 The three studies were unanimous in indicating that Islamic banks strive to stabilize their 
payout distributions to signify their strength and efficiency of operations. These banks are also 
keen to distribute competitive profits on their deposits to maintain the demand for their products. 
To achieve these goals, many banks create special reserves to equalize the payouts in order to 
avoid the eruption of displaced commercial risk, which may channel funds from shareholders to 
depositors if the reserves are not sufficient. Such competitive forces should be properly addressed 
to avoid sudden withdrawals of deposits that could lead to shortage in the bank‘s liquidity and, 
under severe conditions, a threat of insolvency and eventually a bank-run that creates a ripple 
effect in the economy.  
                                                   
181 In their original model, Dickens et al. (2002) proposed that banks‘ with lower capital adequacy, which is 
another form of leverage ratio, have less ability to distribute dividends due to regulatory controls. However, 
they did not find significance of this hypothesis. In addition, unlike the results for non-financial firms, 
AlYahyaa did not find enough evidence for the agency cost in the dividend determination of financial 
firms. 
182 Parashar and Venkatesh (2010) stated that the financial crisis has reduced the capital adequacy ratio, 
leverage, and return on equity of Islamic banks.  
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7.3 RESULTS IMPLICATION 
7.3.1 Implication for Knowledge 
The research findings support the notion that dividend policies are subject to contextual factors 
(e.g. country and industry).
183
 The payout policy of Islamic banks was found to be different from 
conventional banks and other firms. This is mainly due to their business model, which is based on 
the Mudarabah concept. This concept makes the payout policy subject to the interaction between 
PSIA and dividend distributions. Hence, gives it a unique structure.  
As for its contribution to knowledge, this research is the first research conducted on the 
payout policy of Islamic banks. It is also the first of its kind to cover the GCC banking industry. 
In addition, it is among the rare studies that focus on the banking industry in general.
184
  
This research employed a unique methodology, which comprises of a mixed approach 
strategy dividend into two stages of investigation. This strategy increases the depth, validity, and 
reliability of results through the process of triangulation. Only few studies were found that 
employed a mixed strategy with a maximum of two approached (e.g. questionnaire and interview) 
while the majority of studies are based on either questionnaire and/or econometric modelling.
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The methodology covered in this research can be replicated to study the dividend policy of 
different countries and industries. 
In addition, the investors‘ perception towards dividend policy was uncovered by the 
findings. Investors play a major role in the determination of dividend policy. This is the first 
study of its kind to be conducted in the region and the third in the subject area.
186
 In addition, the 
                                                   
183 See Aivazian et al. (2003). 
184 Dickens et al. (2002) reported that the financial industry has been rarely covered by previous research 
relative to non-regulated firms. 
185 Examples of mixed approach studies employing questionnaire and in-depth interviews are Lintner 
(1956) and Brav et al. (2005).  
186 Only two studies that focused on investors were found in literature namely: Dong et al. (2005) on the 
Dutch market and Maditinos et al. (2007) on the Greek market. 
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research employed managements‘ survey to gain deep understanding of the topic. The survey was 
mainly based on semi-structured interviews with managers of Islamic banks. This method of 
investigating the payout policy is conducted for the first time in the GCC.  
The results mentioned in this thesis have several implications for knowledge and the 
studies conducted in the field of investigation. As for the investors‘ survey, The majority of the 
findings were consistent with Dong et al. (2005) and Maditinos et al. (2007). The exception was 
in the investors‘ attitude towards agency theories. Investors reported that they prefer receiving 
dividends to mitigate agency cost. However, Dong et al. (2005) and Maditinos et al. (2007) did 
not find enough evidence to support the hypothesis. A possible explanation to such discrepancy is 
that the minority protection laws and audit standards are relatively less mature in the GCC, which 
tend to spur higher agency cost  ( Al-Kuwari, 2009). Moreover, the results of the Lintner model 
comply to Al Yahyaee (2006), who found it applicable to financial and non-financial firms in 
Oman. Lastly, the results of the clientele and substitution effects support Modigliani and Miller 
(1963) and Scholes (1972). 
In addition, the results of the managers‘ survey study are generally consistent with 
Partington (1989), Baker et al. (1985), Brav et al. (2005), and Mizuno (2007). However, there 
were minor differences noticed during the analysis. First, unlike  Partington (1989) and Brav et al. 
(2005), the results support the financing effect  hypothesis, which was confirmed by Baker et al. 
(1985). Second, similar to Mizuno (2007), the study did not find enough support for FCF 
hypothesis, which was confirmed by Baker et al. (1985) and Brav et al. (2005). Lastly, the 
findings confirm the maturity and growth hypothesis as found by Brav et al. (2005). However, 
Partington (1989) and Mizuno (2007) did not find evidence to support it.  
As for the findings of the payout model, it was consistent with Dickens et al. (2002), Al 
Yahyaee (2006), and Al-Kuwari (2009) in the significance of profitability variable to the dividend 
model. However, the variable was found irrelevant for the PSIA model due to the existence of 
displaced commercial risk. In addition, similar to Dickens et al. (2002) and Al Yahyaee (2006), 
the results support the relevance of the Lintner model to PSIA distributions and dividends. Unlike 
Dickens et al. (2002), Al Yahyaee (2006), and Al-Kuwari (2009), not enough evidence were 
found to support the inclusion of the size variable in the payout model. This could be due to the 
competitive effect, which can influence payouts regardless of the firm‘s size.       
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7.3.2 Implication for Practice 
The research findings have many implications for managers. To fulfill their fiduciary duties, 
managers should be aware that banks have their own investor‘s clientele. This clientele has a 
strong preference for receiving dividends. Managers should know that if such preference is 
altered, a substitution effect may take place as investors would sell the stock and purchase another 
stock to meet their investment objectives. Similar effect may occur to holders of PSIA. 
Depending on the speed and magnitude of change in the payout distribution, this effect may harm 
the stock price and the demand on PSIA.  
In addition, investors evaluate the quality of distributions by comparing it to historical 
distributions and the distribution of industry peers. Therefore, managers should attempt to smooth 
distributions using techniques such as asset allocation and reserve policies. They should also take 
in consideration the market distribution rate when deciding on their own payouts. In case 
managers fail to arrive at suitable cash dividends, they may employ stock dividends to increase 
the dividend yield. This may reduce the negative impact on the stock price. On the other hand, if 
managers perceive their stock to be undervalued, they could issue a stock repurchasing program 
which will have immediate effect on their stock price, as investors perceive it as a positive signal 
to purchase the stock. When the repurchasing program commences the earning per share will be 
enhanced, which pushes the stock price even higher.  
The findings provide evidence for the existence of displaced commercial risk. In this 
regard, investors reported that they assess the value of distribution by comparing it to 
competitors. This remark was confirmed by managers and validated through the findings of the 
PSIA model, whereas the competitive payout variable was a key determinant of the distribution 
while no support was found for profitability effect.  
By understanding the mechanism and the factors that affect the payout policy of Islamic 
banks, regulators can more precautionary measures toward the protection of depositors and 
shareholders and by issuing more effective regulations in this regard. Last, but not the least, the 
research findings benefit investors and analysts as it presents a payout model of Islamic banks in 
a mathematical format. This model can be employed to predict the payout distributions and 
hence, arrive at a more accurate stock valuation.  
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7.4 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
The research limitations of the investors‘ survey study is that it could be prone to questionnaire 
method bias in the form of misrepresentation and misinterpretation (Dong et al., 2005).  Another 
limitation could be in the usage of scale measure (i.e. Lickert Scale), which could be prone to 
acquiescence, central tendency and social desirability biases (Dawes, 2008). The acquiescence 
bias is the tendency to agree with the questions asked. The central tendency bias is the tendency 
of respondents to give extreme answers, and the social desirability bias is the tendency to which 
the respondent agrees with socially desirable answers.  
Another limitation is in the sampling technique. The collected data is not balanced in 
terms of age group as there were relatively fewer senior citizens (i.e. above 60 year old) in the 
sample. The reason could be due to the data collection mechanism which is based on electronic 
channels that are less used by senior citizens. Similarly, the population of female participants was 
relatively small compared to male participants. Hence, the findings may not adequately cover 
these two groups.   
The above limitations were carefully considered during the questionnaire development 
phase. The researcher also used a large sample size, which was relatively adequate compared to 
the other studies in the field.  In addition, the researcher compared the investor‘s survey results 
with the managers‘ survey and econometric modelling, which use different research tools, data, 
and methodologies. Furthermore, statistical tools were employed to check the goodness of 
measure. 
As for the managers‘ survey study, there are some limitations and obstacles that may 
occur during the research as well as risks involved in the interpretation of the research findings. 
Firstly, in terms of data collection, the banking and the financial sectors in general consider 
internal practices as trade secrets. The norm in these industries is that information leakage to 
outsiders may cause possible competitive threats to the organization. This concern may intensify 
when revealing profitability and dividend issues. Therefore, interviewees would naturally hesitate 
to provide information about the practice or participate in an interview. The confidentiality issue 
was mitigated through anonymous questionnaires where the identity of the participant is not 
revealed. The researcher has personally administered the questionnaire and tried to develop 
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rapport with the participant, which may have increased the levels of trust and self confidence of 
the interviewee. Also the researcher presented an official letter from Durham School of Business 
that explicitly stated the non-disclosure of the information and the maintenance of confidentiality.   
Another major challenge in the data collection process was to gain access to top 
executives (e.g. CEO‘s and CFO‘s), who are involved in the payout policy. This required strong 
networking and insistency to arrange the interviews. In addition, adequate level of interview skill 
is required in order to elicit information from the interviewee while maintaining his span of 
attention. The main limitation to such interviews is that interviewees may not be the only people 
involved in the payout decision making loop. As such, the feedback may represent their views 
and not necessarily the perception of other stakeholders. To mitigate such risk, the researcher has 
employed econometric modelling to validate the information provided by participants. 
The main limitation of the payout model lies in the population size from longitudinal and 
cross-sectional aspects. Such limitation restricted the number of hypothesis that could be tested 
and hence, the amount of knowledge extracted from the data.
187
 To minimize such limitation, 
statistical tools were used to evaluate the goodness of the model. 
7.5 RECOMMENDATIONS  
In this thesis, the existence of displaced commercial risk was validated. Banks tend to respond to 
market pressures through payment of stable payouts and competitive distributions on deposits. 
Failure to do so may results in excessive withdrawals that, depending on the intensity of the 
incident, would lead to liquidity shortage and consequently a bank-run. Occurrence of such 
scenario may have a drastic effect on the banking sector and the economy overall. Hence, 
focusing on the ramifications and mitigations of displaced commercial risk is of utmost 
importance to regulators and practitioners. They should carefully and closely analyze the payout 
                                                   
187 The limited number of individuals (i.e. banks) in the sample, and population in general, along with 
limited time series data may minimize the variability required to detect a significant factor in the model. 
For instance, the study did not find support for the agency cost effect. Agency cost could have been 
alternatively tested with other variables such as insider ownership. It is a major challenge to find accurate 
historical data and across all individuals for this variable (Al- Kuwari , 2009).   
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process and mechanisms followed by Islamic banks to pin-point any weaknesses that may spur 
displaced commercial risks. In this relation, we recommend focusing on the following areas: 
– Regulators should adopt precautionary measures such as the imposition of an Islamic 
accounting standard (e.g. AAOIFI) that emphasizes, among other standards, the 
implementation of the Mudarabah pool concept
188
 and reserve management of PSIA (e.g. 
IRR and PER). Such measures reduce the risks faced by depositors and eventually, 
protect shareholders from the eruption of displaced commercial risk. 
– Islamic banks should follow strict asset allocation mechanism that, among other things, 
has the majority of its assets invested in a diversified portfolio of medium to short-term 
instruments to maintain relative liquidity. Since by the nature of the trade, the majority of 
the bank assets are funded by depositors, the asset allocation should serve their risk/return 
preference rather than that of shareholders. As such, Long-term and higher risk assets 
should constitute a minute percentage of the bank‘s assets. 
– Many Islamic banks do not rely on central banks as a last resort for liquidity and instead 
are self dependent to manage such risk. This poses a major threat not on these banks 
alone but on the entire banking sector. Therefore, central banks should standardize the 
use of Islamic banking products to efficiently and swiftly intervene in case of liquidity 
shortage. Hence, further research is required to develop innovative liquidity products for 
Islamic banks and ways to trade such products. 
– Unlike their conventional counterparts, Islamic banks lack the protection of Islamic 
compliant insurance policy. A professionally managed cooperative policy would assist 
the entire Islamic banking sector during crisis. This effort should be lead by regulators to 
assure the objectiveness, effectiveness, and proper utilization of the policy.  
– Another major source of liquidity that could mitigate the displaced commercial risk and 
liquidity shortages is an Islamic capital market. Building such market requires a 
                                                   
188 The concept stresses the importance of segregating the bank‘s proprietary investments, which are long 
term in nature, from the Mudarabah pool, which mainly contains more liquid asset classes specifically 
meeting the demand of PSIA holders. This pool may also include funds from shareholders as well. For 
more information, refer to section 5.5.3.6.6.  
255 
 
collaborative effort between major banks, investment houses, regulators, brokers, and 
technology providers. 
7.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In order to cover the payout policy in the GCC from all aspects, several research topics are 
suggested. First, it is recommended to conduct an investor survey study on the perception of 
corporate investors (e.g. fund managers) towards payout policies (Dong et al., 2005).  The reason 
is that corporate investors have an influence on the payout policy through trading activities, 
insider ownerships, and board memberships.  
Previous studies suggested that different countries and industries have their own 
characteristics and payout policies.
189
 Hence, similar to the suggestion of Al-Kuwari (2009), the 
second suggestion would be to replicate this study in different GCC states and across several 
industries. By doing so, we will be able to draw a wider picture of the payout policy in the GCC.  
It is also suggested to study the impact of payout declarations on stock prices in the GCC. 
The findings would help managers understand and quantify the possible impact of their payout 
decisions. Hence, they would be able to make more effective and realistic decisions. In similar 
fashion, other Islamic banking industries (i.e. Malaysian) can be explored and a comparative 
analysis can then be conducted to learn the similarities/dissimilarities with Islamic banking in the 
GCC in terms of payout policies.  
The last and foremost suggestion by the researcher is to conduct a study on Islamic banks to 
identify the factors that influence the management decision on setting the size of Mudarabah 
fees, voluntary reserve ratios, and the IRR and PER reserves. These factors determine the 
flexibility of the management to arrive at the desired payout distribution. Such information is 
important to stakeholders (e.g. regulators, directors, investors, and credit rating agencies) to help 
them assess the ability of the bank in absorbing possible losses spurred by displaced commercial 
risks. This survey can be employed as the ground work for future research in this area to 
standardize and enhance the mechanism in which these variables are set controlled.  
                                                   
189 See Aivazian et al. (2003). 
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APPENDIX 1.A: QUESTIONNAIRE (ENGLISH VERSION) 
(SN:       )  
 
 
The Perception of Investors towards 
Dividends 
 
 
Questionnaire 
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Date:  
Dear Participant,  
We would like to extend our gratitude for your participation in this research. This 
questionnaire is designed to determine the factors that affect the dividend and payout policy. 
Results of the survey will only be used in aggregate and for the sole purpose of academic 
research. All participants‘ identities will be kept strictly confidential. Please be assured that only 
research members will be able to view your responses.  
This research is valuable for you and the overall financial industry. Please be sure to 
provide accurate information for this purpose. Upon completion of the questionnaire, a 
contribution of 5 KD (or equivalent depending on the country) will be deposited in the account of 
(organization). For assurance, this process is administered by the University and (Organization). 
Thanks for your cooperation.  
 
Sincerely,  
Name: 
Tel:  
Email:  
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1- Country of Residence: 
 Kuwait 
 Kingdom of Saudia Arabia 
 Bahrain 
 Qatar 
 UAE 
 Oman 
 Others 
 
2- Gender: 
 Male  
 Female 
 
3- Age Group:  
 18 – 24 
 25 – 39 
 40 – 55 
 More than 55 
 
4- Level of Education: 
 Less than high school 
 High School 
 Associate degree 
 Bachelor‘s degree 
 Master‘s or Doctorate degrees 
 
5- Monthly Income:  
 Less than USD 2,000 
 Between USD 2,000 – 5,000 
 Between USD 5,000 – 10,000 
 Between USD 10,000 – 20,000 
 More than USD 20,000 
 
6- How many years of experience do you have in investment: 
 Less than 6 months 
 Between 6 – 12 months 
 Between 1 – 3 years 
 More than 3 years 
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7- In what market(s) do you invest? 
 Kuwait 
 Kingdom of Saudia Arabia 
 UAE 
 Qatar 
 Bahrain 
 Oman 
 US 
 Others 
 
8- What is your investment style? 
 Short term 
 Medium term 
 Long term 
 
9- Do you own other investments beside stocks such as:  
 Mutual funds 
 Real Estate 
 Fixed deposits 
 
10- The reason that you invest in mutual funds, real estate, or fixed deposits is that it pays 
stable income.  
 
(1 = Strongly Agree, 2= Agree, 3= Neutral, 4= Disagree, 5= Strongly Disagree, 6= No opinions, 
don‘t know)  
 
11- You prefer to receive dividends from the stocks that you own.  
 
12- The commission fees and other transaction costs would make you prefer having your 
profits in the form of cash dividends than stock dividends. 
 
13- Companies that retain earnings are more risky than companies that pay dividends on 
regular basis. The reason is that dividends give investors the opportunity to diversify.  
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14- The total return on a stock comprises of the dividends paid during the period of 
retention plus the capital increment. In case the market is down, the dividend return will be 
higher than the capital increments, thus you will prefer purchasing high dividend paying 
stocks than others.  
 
15- Companies that pay high dividends are financial more stable than others which pays no 
or little dividends.  
 
16- You prefer to purchase the stocks that regularly pay high dividends because you believe 
that these stocks have real operating income compared to those stocks that window dress 
their financials.  
 
17- How much of your annual dividends you use for consumption purposes? 
(1 = 0 – 20 %, 2 = 20 – 40 %, 3 = 40 – 60 %, 4 = 60 -80 %, 5 = 80 – 100 %, 6 = No opinions, 
don‘t know) 
18- You would, for consumption purposes, sell part of your shares in a company that has 
always paid dividends, if the management of that company would decide not to pay 
dividends anymore. 
 
(1 = Strongly Agree, 2= Agree, 3= Neutral, 4= Disagree, 5= Strongly Disagree, 6= No opinions, 
don‘t know)  
19- In economic downturns, fewer good investment projects are available. Therefore, you 
would invest more in dividend-paying stocks.  
 
20- You prefer to receive dividends because you believe that the profits could otherwise be 
used by the management in unfeasible investments or unjustified expenses.  
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21- You prefer to receive dividends despite your knowledge that the company would need 
these funds to support its future plans and current expenses, which may push the company 
to increase its capital or borrow to cover these requirements.  
 
22- A dividend increase is a signal that the company’s future earnings are improved.  
 
23- A dividend decrease is a signal that the company’s future earnings are deteriorating. 
 
24- Suppose a company would stop paying dividends and instead use the money to buy back 
its own stocks on the market. How would you consider such decision? 
 
25- A stock repurchase is a signal that the stock is undervalued.  
 
26- In international markets, some companies split their shares instead of paying dividends. 
For example, if an investor owns 100 shares a 2 to 1 split raises the number of shares he or 
she owns to 200 shares. Do you consider stock dividends to be more like: 
(1 = Stock splits, 2 = Cash dividends, 3 = Capital Increase, 4 = No opinions, don‘t know) 
27- If you own a stock of a company that did not distribute cash dividends this year, then 
you prefer that it distributes stock dividends instead.  
(1 = Strongly Agree, 2= Agree, 3= Neutral, 4= Disagree, 5= Strongly Disagree, 6= No opinions, 
don‘t know)  
28- You assess the quality of the current dividend by comparing it to the dividend paid last 
year.  
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29- You assess the quality of the current dividend by comparing it to the dividends paid by 
other stocks of similar characteristics.  
 
30- When you assess the quality of dividends you take in consideration the following figures 
in the valuation process: 
 (1 = Dividend yield, 2 = Dividend per share, 3 = all the above, 4 = other figures, 5 = No 
opinions, don‘t know) 
31- You diversify your risk by investing in a portfolio of stocks instead of a single stock.  
 
32- In your investment portfolio, you allocate certain investment percentages in each sector 
and stock type (i.e. gas, services, …etc and large, medium or small capital).  
 
33- If you own shares in a company that matches your financial purposes but it suddenly 
changed its dividend policy or its investment and operating objectives, you would then try 
to sell your shares and repurchase another stock that meets your requirements. 
 
34- Do you have accounts in Islamic Banks? 
(1 = Yes, 2 = No) 
35- What is the reason that you opened accounts in Islamic banks? 
(1 = Religious motives, 2 = the returns on deposits, 3 = services level, 4 = other reasons, 5 = No 
opinions, don‘t know) 
36- The default risk associated with saving and investment accounts in Islamic banks is 
close to the risks associated with saving account in conventional banks.  
(1 = Strongly Agree, 2= Agree, 3= Neutral, 4= Disagree, 5= Strongly Disagree, 6= No opinions, 
don‘t know)  
37- You assess the quality of the profits distributed on saving and investment accounts by 
comparing it to last year’s distributions.  
281 
 
 
38- You assess the quality of the profits distributed on saving and investment accounts by 
comparing it to the profits offered by other banks. 
39- Consistent profit distributions on saving and fixed deposit accounts indicate that the 
bank is financial and operationally stable.  
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APPENDIX 1.B: TOTAL VARIANCE EXPLAINED TABLE  
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
  Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 6.427 26.778 26.778 6.427 26.778 26.778 2.952 12.302 12.302 
2 2.474 10.310 37.088 2.474 10.310 37.088 2.811 11.714 24.016 
3 1.808 7.532 44.620 1.808 7.532 44.620 2.357 9.819 33.834 
4 1.452 6.049 50.669 1.452 6.049 50.669 2.202 9.175 43.010 
5 1.176 4.900 55.569 1.176 4.900 55.569 2.191 9.128 52.138 
6 1.062 4.425 59.994 1.062 4.425 59.994 1.885 7.856 59.994 
7 .948 3.952 63.946             
8 .892 3.715 67.661             
9 .794 3.306 70.967             
10 .751 3.130 74.098             
11 .701 2.923 77.021             
12 .670 2.790 79.811             
13 .608 2.534 82.345             
14 .550 2.294 84.638             
15 .504 2.101 86.739             
16 .482 2.009 88.748             
17 .467 1.945 90.693             
18 .434 1.810 92.503             
19 .408 1.699 94.202             
20 .364 1.519 95.721             
21 .307 1.278 96.999             
22 .293 1.222 98.220             
23 .238 .992 99.212             
24 .189 .788 100.000             
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
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APPENDIX 1.C: QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS 
       Table 1.C.1: Questionnaire Results 
University 
educated 
Non-
University 
educated 
Higher 
income 
Lower 
income 
Age 
40 & 
above 
Age 
below 
40 
Owning 
stocks 
& other 
Assets
* 
Owning 
stocks 
only 
All 
investors 
Statistics Theories and Related Questions 
          Dividend Relevance Hypothesis 
           
4.15 
16.7 
4 
0 
6.8 
81 
205 
4.24 
10.3 
5 
0 
7.6 
81.8 
66 
4.24 
15.2 
4 
0 
5.7 
82.9 
140 
4.09 
12.6 
4 
0 
8.4 
79.4 
131 
4.26 
14.9 
4 
0 
7.1 
85.8 
113 
4.11 
13.1 
4 
0 
7 
77.8 
158 
4.11 
13.8 
4 
0 
7.2 
79.9 
152 
4.23 
13.1 
4 
0 
7.3 
83.6 
110 
4.17♦♦♦ 
19.7 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
7 
81.2 
271 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q11 You like to receive dividends 
from the stocks that you own. 
 
(1 = Strongly Disagree, 2= 
Disagree, 3= Neutral, 4= Agree, 
5= Strongly Agree, 6= No 
opinions, don‘t know) 
           
         Transaction Cost 
 
3.16• 
1.9 
3• 
0 
31.4 
36.6 
191 
3.55• 
3.6 
4• 
.533 
25 
54.7 
64 
3.21 
1.6 
3 
.009 
31.3 
38.2 
142 
3.31 
2.9 
3 
.243 
28.2 
45.4 
135 
3.28 
2.43 
3 
.078 
26.7 
40.9 
105 
3.25 
2.43 
3 
.041 
32 
41.3 
150 
3.21 
2.1 
3 
.02 
31 
40 
145 
3.35 
3.02 
3 
.232 
25.7 
44.6 
101 
3.26♦♦♦ 
3.4 
3♦♦♦ 
.006 
29.8 
41.2 
255 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q12 To avoid paying 
commissions and other transaction 
costs, you prefer having your 
profits in the form of cash 
dividends. 
 
 
       
Uncertainty Resolution or Bird-in-the hand 
 
3.16 
7.1 
4 
0 
25.1 
64.1 
195 
3.94 
7.4 
4 
.002 
11.1 
69.8 
63 
3.68 
6.5 
4 
0 
22.6 
65.4 
133 
3.74 
6.9 
4 
.001 
20.8 
65.6 
125 
3.75 
6.73 
4 
0 
21.5 
67.2 
107 
3.68 
6.76 
4 
.001 
21.9 
64.3 
151 
3.5
•
 
4.6 
4 
.037 
28.5 
59 
144 
3.93
•
 
8.9 
4 
0 
14.2 
72.6 
106 
3.71
♦♦♦
 
9.5 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
17.4 
65.5 
261 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q13 Companies that retain 
earnings are more risky than 
companies that pay dividends on 
regular basis. The reason is that 
dividends give the opportunity to 
investors to diversify. 
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       Table 1.C.1: Questionnaire Results 
University 
educated 
Non-
University 
educated 
Higher 
income 
Lower 
income 
Age 
40 & 
above 
Age 
below 
40 
Owning 
stocks 
& other 
Assets
* 
Owning 
stocks 
only 
All 
investors 
Statistics Theories and Related Questions 
           
3.79 
11.6 
4 
0 
11.5 
69.4 
191 
3.86 
6.9 
4 
.006 
10.8 
67.7 
65 
3.81 
9.8 
4 
0 
9.8 
67.5 
132 
3.80 
9.2 
4 
0 
12.9 
70.2 
124 
3.76 
7.9 
4 
0 
13.1 
68.3 
107 
3.85 
11 
4 
0 
10.1 
69.2 
149 
3.72 
9.04 
4 
0 
12.6 
66.4 
143 
3.89 
9.3 
4 
0 
9.5 
70.5 
105 
3.81♦♦♦ 
13.5 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
11.3 
68.7 
261 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q14 The total return on a stock 
comprises of the dividends paid 
during the period of retention plus 
the capital increment. In case the 
market is down, the dividend 
return will be higher than the 
capital increments, thus you will 
prefer purchasing high dividend 
paying stocks than others. 
 
          Window Dressing 
          
3.76• 
9.3 
4 
0 
23.3 
68 
206 
4.01• 
9.1 
4 
0 
10.4 
77.6 
67 
3.83 
8.7 
4 
0 
17.7 
71.8 
141 
3.86 
8.6 
4 
0 
1.9 
68.2 
132 
3.96 
10.1 
4 
0 
12.4 
74.3 
113 
3.76 
7.9 
4 
0 
20 
67.5 
160 
3.79 
8.8 
4 
0 
16.4 
69.4 
152 
3.85 
7.6 
4 
0 
18.8 
69.6 
112 
3.84♦♦♦ 
3.21 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
16.3 
70.4 
273 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q15 Companies that pay high 
dividends are financial more 
stable than others which pays no 
or little dividends. 
 
           
3.76• 
9.3 
4 
0 
19.3 
68.3 
202 
4.12• 
9.7 
4 
0 
7.5 
80.6 
67 
3.90 
9.6 
4 
0 
15 
73.6 
140 
3.30 
8.0 
4 
0 
17.8 
69 
129 
4 
9.9 
4 
0 
14.4 
78.3 
111 
3.74 
8.1 
4 
0 
17.7 
66.5 
158 
3.79 
8.5 
4 
0 
16.7 
70.6 
150 
3.89 
8.3 
4 
0 
17.1 
70.2 
113 
3.85♦♦♦ 
3.21 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
16.4 
71.4 
269 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q16 You prefer to purchase stocks 
that pays high dividends because 
you believe that these stocks have 
real operating income compared to 
those stocks that window dress 
their financials. 
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       Table 1.C.1: Questionnaire Results 
University 
educated 
Non-
University 
educated 
Higher 
income 
Lower 
income 
Age 
40 & 
above 
Age 
below 
40 
Owning 
stocks 
& other 
Assets
* 
Owning 
stocks 
only 
All 
investors 
Statistics Theories and Related Questions 
        Behavioural Finance 
 
2.4 
-5.1 
2 
0 
55.3 
25.7 
152 
2.33 
-3.4 
2 
0 
52.9 
23.5 
51 
2.29 
-5.1 
2 
0 
56.6 
19.8 
106 
2.48 
-3.5 
2 
0 
52.6 
30.9 
97 
2.55 
-2.7 
3 
0 
48.2 
29 
83 
2.27 
-5.8 
2 
0 
59.3 
22.5 
120 
2.25 
-5.6 
2 
0 
63.2 
24 
117 
2.54 
-2.8 
3 
0 
45.6 
27.9 
79 
2.38 
-6.1 
2 
0 
54.7 
25.1 
203 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q17 How much of your annual 
dividends do you use for 
consumption purposes? 
 
(1 = 0 – 20 %, 2 = 20 – 40 %, 3 = 
40 – 60 %, 4 = 60 -80 %, 5 = 80 – 
100 %, 6 = No opinions, don‘t 
know) 
           
3.23 
2.647 
3 
.237 
29.5 
45.4 
183 
 
3.47 
3 
4 
.298 
25.4 
57.6 
59 
3.18 
1.6 
3 
.127 
29 
29 
124 
3.41 
3.8 
4 
.407 
28 
54.2 
118 
3.36 
3.1 
4 
1 
26.3 
44.2 
99 
3.24 
2.4 
3 
.504 
30.1 
46.9 
143 
3.12 
1.8 
3 
.121 
31.9 
43 
135 
3.41 
3.4 
4 
.363 
25.5 
55.1 
98 
3.29♦♦♦ 
3.8 
3 
.653 
28.5 
48.3 
242 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q18 You would, for consumption 
purposes, sell part of your shares 
in a company that has always paid 
dividends, if the management of 
that company decides not to pay 
dividends anymore. 
         Free Cash Flow (FCF) 
 
3.61 
7.1 
4 
.002 
19.6 
61.3 
189 
3.81 
5.2 
4 
.023 
14.2 
65.1 
63 
3.73 
6.8 
4 
.001 
16.8 
64.9 
131 
3.59 
5.5 
4 
.045 
19.8 
59.5 
121 
3.67 
5.8 
4 
.001 
19.4 
61.1 
103 
3.65 
6.6 
4 
.033 
17.4 
54 
149 
3.67 
6.8 
4 
.002 
16.7 
63.2 
144 
3.62 
5 
4 
.035 
21 
61 
100 
3.7♦♦♦ 
8.8 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
18.3 
62.3 
252 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q19 In economic downturns, 
fewer good investment 
opportunities are available. 
Therefore, you would invest more 
in dividend-paying stocks. 
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       Table 1.C.1: Questionnaire Results 
University 
educated 
Non-
University 
educated 
Higher 
income 
Lower 
income 
Age 
40 & 
above 
Age 
below 
40 
Owning 
stocks 
& other 
Assets
* 
Owning 
stocks 
only 
All 
investors 
Statistics Theories and Related Questions 
3.72• 
8.9 
4 
0 
16.9 
63 
195 
4.13• 
9.5 
4 
0 
6.5 
75.8 
62 
3.67 
5.8 
4 
.001 
16.2 
66.4 
134 
3.65 
6.6 
4 
.033 
11.4 
65.8 
123 
3.91 
9.19 
4 
0 
13.8 
69.8 
109 
3.76 
8.03 
4 
.001 
14.9 
63.6 
148 
3.76 
8.2 
4 
0 
15.4 
65.8 
143 
3.91 
8.5 
4 
0 
13.3 
67.6 
105 
3.82♦♦♦ 
12 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
14.4 
66.2 
257 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q20 You prefer to receive 
dividends because you believe that 
the profits could otherwise be used 
by the management in unfeasible 
investments or unjustified 
expenses. 
 
           
          Monitoring Cost 
 
3.02 
9.5 
3 
.022 
42.6 
41.6 
197 
3.28 
1.7 
3 
.804 
35.4 
47.7 
65 
3 
-1.33 
3 
.071 
44.9 
41.9 
136 
3.2 
1.6 
3 
.247 
36.5 
44.4 
126 
3.13 
1.135 
3 
.299 
42 
44.7 
112 
3.04 
.372 
3 
.06 
40 
42 
150 
2.97 
-.317 
3 
.026 
43.2 
40.5 
148 
3.26 
2.2 
4 
.771 
35.8 
48.1 
106 
3.08 
1 
3♦♦ 
.03 
40.8 
43.1 
262 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q21 You prefer to receive 
dividends despite your knowledge 
that the company would need 
these funds to support its future 
plans and current expenses. 
 
 
           
        Information Signalling 
3.81 
11.6 
4 
0 
42.2 
33.2 
208 
4.03 
9.5 
4 
0 
23.1 
53.8 
67 
3.82 
9.8 
4 
0 
11.5 
70.5 
139 
3.92 
10.9 
4 
0 
9.8 
73.4 
132 
3.85 
9.17 
4 
0 
12.5 
71.4 
112 
3.88 
11.37 
4 
0 
9.4 
72.4 
159 
3.79 
9.8 
4 
0 
12.6 
79.5 
151 
3.96 
10.7 
4 
0 
8.1 
74.7 
111 
3.87♦♦♦ 
14.6 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
10.7 
71.9 
271 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q22 A dividend increase is a 
signal that the company‘s future 
earnings are improved. 
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       Table 1.C.1: Questionnaire Results 
University 
educated 
Non-
University 
educated 
Higher 
income 
Lower 
income 
Age 
40 & 
above 
Age 
below 
40 
Owning 
stocks 
& other 
Assets
* 
Owning 
stocks 
only 
All 
investors 
Statistics Theories and Related Questions 
2.97• 
-.316 
3• 
0 
42.2 
34.7 
199 
3.51• 
3.8 
4• 
.620 
23.1 
53.8 
65 
3.05 
.537 
3 
.004 
36 
53.7 
136 
3.16 
1.6 
3 
.063 
39.1 
41.4 
128 
3.2 
1.90 
3 
.055 
31.2 
40.4 
109 
3.04 
.423 
3 
.006 
41.9 
38.7 
155 
3.03 
.4 
3 
.001 
33.8 
34.4 
149 
3.19 
1.7 
3 
.285 
36.8 
34.3 
106 
3.11 
1.5 
3♦♦ 
.01 
37.5 
39.4 
264 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q23 A dividend decrease is a 
signal that the company‘s future 
earnings are deteriorating. 
         Share Repurchasing 
 
3.46 
5.4 
4 
.001 
23.6 
62 
195 
3.40 
2.5 
4 
.45 
30.2 
55.5 
63 
3.35 
3.4 
4 
.195 
27.6 
56 
134 
3.55 
5.10 
4 
.001 
22.6 
65.4 
124 
3.44 
3.96 
4 
.031 
22.9 
60.9 
105 
3.45 
4.4 
4 
.015 
26.8 
60.1 
153 
3.36 
3.9 
4• 
.055 
24.3 
58.3 
144 
3.56 
4.5 
4• 
.006 
26.7 
63.8 
105 
3.44♦♦♦ 
5.9 
4♦♦ 
.01 
25.2 
60.4 
258 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q24 Suppose a company would 
stop paying dividends and instead 
use the money to buy back its own 
stocks on the market. How would 
you consider such decision?  
 
(1 = Extremely Negative, 2= 
Negative, 3= Neutral, 4= Positive, 
5= Strongly Positive, 6= No 
opinions, don‘t know) 
           
3.6 
8.1 
4 
0 
17.5 
65 
189 
3.8 
5.5 
4 
.01 
14.8 
67.2 
61 
3.54• 
5.4 
4 
.034 
20.2 
59.7 
129 
3.81• 
8.8 
4 
0 
13.2 
71.9 
121 
3.65 
6.2 
4 
0 
18.1 
68.5 
105 
3.7 
7.7 
4 
.001 
15.9 
63.4 
145 
3.65 
7.5 
4• 
0 
16.4 
67.2 
140 
3.75 
6.6 
4• 
.02 
16.7 
65.8 
102 
3.67♦♦♦ 
9.8 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
16.8 
65.6 
250 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q25 Stock repurchase is a signal 
that the stock is undervalued. 
 
 
           
         Stock Dividends 
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       Table 1.C.1: Questionnaire Results 
University 
educated 
Non-
University 
educated 
Higher 
income 
Lower 
income 
Age 
40 & 
above 
Age 
below 
40 
Owning 
stocks 
& other 
Assets
* 
Owning 
stocks 
only 
All 
investors 
Statistics Theories and Related Questions 
3.4 
4.9 
4 
.065 
27.1 
56.8 
199 
3.4 
2.4 
4 
.328 
37.3 
56.8 
67 
3.41 
3.8 
4 
.201 
29 
55.8 
138 
3.44 
3.8 
4 
.093 
30.5 
57.8 
128 
3.13• 
1.1 
4• 
.704 
41.4 
47.7 
111 
3.63• 
6.3 
4• 
.002 
21.3 
63.2 
163 
3.42 
4.1 
4 
.049 
30.9 
58.4 
149 
3.46 
3.6 
4 
.29 
27.8 
55.6 
108 
3.42♦♦♦ 
5.4 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
29.7 
55.8 
266 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q27 If you own a stock of a 
company that did not distribute 
cash dividends this year, then you 
would prefer that it distributes 
stock dividends instead. 
 
 
           
         The Lintner Model 
 
3.9 
16.3 
4 
0 
7.6 
80.7 
197 
4.1 
10.8 
4 
0 
6.1 
83.3 
66 
3.96 
12.7 
4 
0 
9 
59.8 
134 
4 
15.1 
4 
0 
5.4 
83 
129 
3.89 
10.9 
4 
0 
10.1 
78 
109 
4.05 
16.5 
4 
0 
5.2 
83.7 
154 
3.89• 
13 
4 
0 
8.7 
78.6 
149 
4.10• 
14.2 
4 
0 
5.7 
54.8 
105 
3.98♦♦♦ 
19.5 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
7.2 
81.3 
263 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q28 You assess the quality of the 
dividend by comparing it to the 
dividend paid last year. 
 
 
           
         Competitive Payouts 
3.92 
14.1 
4 
0 
10.3 
77.8 
194 
3.76 
5.8 
4 
.001 
13.6 
71.2 
66 
3.91 
11.4 
4 
0 
9.8 
75 
132 
3.86 
9.8 
4 
0 
12.5 
77.3 
128 
3.91 
1.9 
4 
0 
10.3 
77.6 
107 
3.87 
10.6 
4 
0 
11.8 
75.2 
163 
3.89 
12 
4 
0 
10.3 
76.7 
146 
3.90 
9.1 
4 
0 
12.4 
76.2 
105 
3.88♦♦♦ 
14.9 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
11.2 
76.2 
260 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q29 You assess the quality of the 
current dividend by comparing it 
to the dividends paid by other 
stocks of similar characteristics. 
 
 
           
         Substitution and Clientele Effects 
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       Table 1.C.1: Questionnaire Results 
University 
educated 
Non-
University 
educated 
Higher 
income 
Lower 
income 
Age 
40 & 
above 
Age 
below 
40 
Owning 
stocks 
& other 
Assets
* 
Owning 
stocks 
only 
All 
investors 
Statistics Theories and Related Questions 
4.19 
16.9 
4 
0 
8.5 
84.9 
199 
4.03 
7.5 
4 
0 
12.1 
81.8 
66 
4.26 
15.1 
4 
0 
8.1 
87.5 
136 
4.03 
11 
4 
0 
10.9 
80.6 
129 
4.32• 
17.3 
4 
0 
5.5 
90 
110 
4.03• 
11.2 
4 
0 
12.3 
80 
155 
4.23 
15.8 
4 
0 
6.7 
87.2 
149 
4.05 
9.7 
4 
0 
13.1 
81.3 
107 
4.15♦♦♦ 
18.3 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
9.4 
84.2 
265 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q31 You diversify your risks by 
investing in a portfolio of stocks 
instead of a single stock. 
 
 
           
4.01 
13.8 
4 
0 
9.9 
75.9 
191 
3.78 
5.3 
4 
.002 
18.8 
70.4 
64 
4.09• 
12.2 
4• 
0 
11.5 
80 
130 
3.8• 
8.4 
4• 
0 
12.8 
68 
125 
4.07 
11.8 
4 
0 
9.4 
79.3 
106 
3.87 
9.3 
4 
0 
14.1 
71.1 
149 
3.95 
11 
4 
0 
11.7 
73.1 
145 
3.98 
9.2 
4 
0 
11.9 
78.2 
113 
3.95♦♦♦ 
14.4 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
12.2 
74.5 
255 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q32 In your investment portfolio, 
you allocate your investments 
based on your investment 
objectives and risk/return 
preferences. 
 
 
           
4.14 
20.7 
4 
0 
3.6 
83.6 
195 
4.19 
12.8 
4 
0 
3 
85.1 
67 
4.17 
18.3 
4 
0 
2.2 
80.3 
136 
4.09 
18.3 
4 
0 
4.8 
84.1 
126 
4.15 
16.1 
4 
0 
3.7 
86.2 
109 
4.17 
18.2 
4 
0 
3.3 
82.3 
153 
4.19 
19.7 
4 
0 
2 
84.7 
150 
4.12 
13.8 
4 
0 
5.8 
83.5 
103 
4.16♦♦♦ 
24.4 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
3.4 
84 
262 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q33 If you own shares in a 
company that matches your 
financial objective but it suddenly 
changed its dividend policy or its 
objectives, you would try to sell 
your shares and repurchase 
another stock that meets your 
requirements. 
           
         Islamic Banking  
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       Table 1.C.1: Questionnaire Results 
University 
educated 
Non-
University 
educated 
Higher 
income 
Lower 
income 
Age 
40 & 
above 
Age 
below 
40 
Owning 
stocks 
& other 
Assets
* 
Owning 
stocks 
only 
All 
investors 
Statistics Theories and Related Questions 
3.90 
12 
4 
0 
8.5 
72.8 
176 
3.73 
5.7 
4 
.036 
6.7 
66.7 
45 
3.79 
8.5 
4 
0 
9.6 
67.8 
115 
3.94 
10.4 
4 
0 
6.6 
75.5 
106 
3.86 
8.9 
4 
0 
8.2 
69.4 
98 
3.87 
9.8 
4 
0 
8.1 
73.2 
123 
3.96 
12.1 
4 
0 
5.6 
74.6 
126 
3.75 
6.7 
4 
.001 
11.5 
67.8 
87 
1253♦♦♦ 
13.3 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
8.2 
71.5 
221 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q10 The reason that you invest in 
mutual funds, real estate, or fixed 
deposits is that it pays more stable 
income compared to stocks. 
 
 
           
.86 
14.8 
1 
0 
215 
.88 
9.7 
1 
0 
72 
.83 
10.5 
1 
0 
147 
.91 
15.9 
1 
0 
140 
.81• 
8.2 
1• 
0 
119 
.91• 
18 
1• 
0 
168 
.87 
13.1 
1 
0 
182 
.86 
10.9 
1 
0 
113 
.868♦♦♦ 
17.8 
1♦♦♦ 
0 
287 
Mean 
t-stata,b 
Median 
Binomial P 
N 
Q34 Do you have accounts in 
Islamic banks? 
 
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) 
 
           
3.4 
4.2 
4 
.039 
29.7 
58.1 
172 
3.37 
2.5 
3 
.897 
30 
48.3 
60 
3.49 
4.4 
4 
.093 
25.2 
58.3 
115 
3.30 
2.5 
4 
.579 
34.2 
53 
117 
3.4 
3.7 
4 
.602 
27.2 
53.3 
92 
3.39 
3.4 
4 
.108 
31.4 
57.2 
140 
3.51 
4.8 
4 
.011 
25 
61.4 
132 
3.22 
1.7 
3 
.675 
36.3 
47.3 
91 
3.39♦♦♦ 
4.8 
4 
.101 
29.7 
55.6 
232 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q36The risk associated with 
saving and investment accounts in 
Islamic banks is close to the risks 
associated with saving account in 
conventional banks. 
 
 
           
4.03 
17.1 
4 
0 
5.7 
81.6 
174 
4.04 
9.3 
4 
0 
7 
80.7 
57 
4.06 
13.5 
4 
0 
6.9 
81 
116 
4 
14.1 
4 
0 
5.2 
81.8 
115 
4.03 
13.1 
4 
0 
5.1 
81.6 
98 
4.03 
14.4 
4 
0 
6.8 
81.2 
133 
4.02 
14.6 
4 
0 
6.2 
82.2 
129 
4.05 
12.7 
4 
0 
5.4 
81.7 
93 
4.03♦♦♦ 
19.5 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
6.1 
81.4 
231 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q37 You assess the quality of the 
profits distributed on saving and 
investment accounts by comparing 
it to last year‘s distributions. 
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       Table 1.C.1: Questionnaire Results 
University 
educated 
Non-
University 
educated 
Higher 
income 
Lower 
income 
Age 
40 & 
above 
Age 
below 
40 
Owning 
stocks 
& other 
Assets
* 
Owning 
stocks 
only 
All 
investors 
Statistics Theories and Related Questions 
3.77 
10.7 
4 
0 
10.2 
67.6 
176 
3.64 
4.6 
4 
.081 
17.9 
62.5 
56 
3.68 
6.9 
4 
.03 
14.5 
64.1 
117 
3.79 
9.7 
4 
0 
9.6 
68.7 
115 
3.70 
7.2 
4 
.006 
10.2 
64.3 
98 
3.76 
8.9 
4 
0 
13.4 
57.9 
134 
3.70 
8.4 
4 
0 
2.3 
67.4 
132 
3.85 
8.3 
4 
.001 
2.2 
67.2 
91 
3.74♦♦♦ 
11.5 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
12.1 
66.4 
232 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q38 You assess the quality of the 
profits distributed on saving and 
investment accounts by comparing 
it to the profits offered by other 
banks. 
 
 
           
4.24 
23.2 
4 
0 
3.1 
88.1 
192 
4.33 
17.2 
4 
0 
0 
93 
60 
4.29 
20.6 
4 
0 
2.3 
89.9 
129 
4.23 
19.2 
4 
0 
2.4 
88.6 
123 
4.19 
16.2 
4 
0 
3.8 
87.5 
104 
4.31 
23.5 
4 
0 
1.4 
90.5 
148 
4.27 
20.9 
4 
0 
2.8 
89.4 
142 
4.24 
17.5 
4 
0 
2 
88.1 
101 
4.26♦♦♦ 
28.2 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
2.4 
89.3 
252 
Mean 
t-stat 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q39 Consistent profit 
distributions on deposits indicate 
that the bank is financially and 
operationally stable. 
 
 
General dividends questions from all investors, and investors categorized according to direct stock ownership or investment fund, age, income and education. 
The t-stat tests whether the mean is different by ownership type, income, age, and education categories. The t-stat tests whether the mean is different from 3. The 
binomial p tests whether the median is different from 3 based on the two-tail Fisher sign test. [% (<3)],[%>3] is the percentage responses greater [less] than 3. N 
is the number of valid responses to each question. In the all investors column, one diamond (♦) denotes mean (median) response is significantly different from 3 
at the 0.10 level, ♦♦ at the 0.05 level, and ♦♦♦ at the 0.01 level based on the Student‘s t-value (binomial p). One, two, or three asterisks (•) denote these 
significance levels for difference in mean (median) between the pairs of demographic groups based on the two-sample t-test (non-parametric median test). 
a The t-stat (binomial p) for Question 34 is for testing whether the mean (median) response is different from 0.5. b Statistical significance of the difference in 
means between subgroups for Question 27 is based on the Z-test for the difference in two proportions. * Other assets are funds, real estate, and fixed deposits. 
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Table 1.C.2 
Country Education Income Age Ownership Statistics Percentage (%) Count 
 
 
         
Q26 You consider stock dividends to be more 
like: 
4.70 
0.59 
 
0.24 
0.89 
 
6.5* 
0.04 
 
0.126 
0.94 
 
1.14 
0.57 
 
X2 
P-value 
 
36.1±0.06a 
26.7±0.05 
37.1±0.06 
100.0 
 
73 
54 
75 
N =202 
 
4. Stock Splits 
5. Cash Dividends 
6. Capital Increase 
 
        Q30 When you assess the quality of dividends 
you take in consideration the following figures: 
7.96 
0.53 
6.20 
0.102 
1.40 
0.71 
3.60 
0.31 
0.635 
0.89 
X2 
P-value 
 
21.8±0.05 
13.9±0.04 
50.0±0.06 
14.3±0.04 
100.0 
52 
33 
119 
34 
N = 238 
5. Dividend yield 
6. Dividend per share 
7. All the above  
8. Other factors 
 
        Q35 Why did you open accounts in Islamic 
banks? 
5.64 
0.78 
1.40 
0.71 
4.30 
0.23 
5.40 
0.14 
0.85 
0.84 
X2 
P-value 
 
85.0±0.04 
5.6±0.03 
3.0±0.02 
6.4±0.03 
100.0 
198 
13 
7 
15 
N = 233 
5. Religious motives 
6. Return on deposit 
7. Service quality 
8. Other reasons 
         
* Chi-square test is significant at the 5% significance level. 
a
 Margin of error is calculated on 95% confidence.  
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Table 1.C.3 - The difference in stock dividend preference between investors income type. 
High Income Low Income 
 
 
Percentage (%) Count Percentage (%) Count  
    Q26 Do you consider stock dividends to be more 
like:  
44.2 
25.0 
30.8 
100.0 
46 
26 
32 
N = 104 
 
26.6 
28.6 
43.9 
100.0 
 
27 
28 
43 
N = 98 
 
1. Stock Splits 
2. Cash Dividends 
3. Capital Raise 
 
 
  
 
294 
 
APPENDIX 1.D: QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS PER COUNTRY 
UAE Qatar Saudi  Kuwait All investors Statistics Questions 
       
Dividend Irrelevance hypothesis  
 
4.18 
7.4 
4 
0 
8.9 
82.2 
45 
 4.07 
7.9 
4 
0 
8.8 
76.5 
68 
4.06 
5.8 
4 
.024 
11.8 
70.6 
34 
4.23 
16 
4 
0 
4.3 
86.2 
116 
4.17♦♦♦ 
19.7 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
7 
81.2 
271 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q11 You like to receive dividends 
from the stocks that you own. 
 
(1 = Strongly Disagree, 2= 
Disagree, 3= Neutral, 4= Agree, 5= 
Strongly Agree, 6= No opinions, 
don‘t know) 
       
     Transaction Cost 
 
3.27 
1.5 
3 
1 
28.9 
48.9 
45 
3.25 
1.6 
3 
.532 
28.1 
45.3 
64 
3.61 
2.8 
4 
1 
25.8 
51.6 
31 
3.1 
.9 
3 
0 
33.3 
30.5 
108 
3.26♦♦♦ 
3.4 
3♦♦♦ 
.006 
29.8 
41.2 
255 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q12 To avoid paying commissions 
and other transaction costs, you 
prefer having your profits in the 
form of cash dividends. 
 
       
   
      Uncertainty Resolution or Bird-
in-the hand 
3.85• 
4.7 
4* 
.06 
17.1 
65.8 
41 
3.89• 
7.4 
4* 
0 
13.6 
74.2 
66 
4.00•‡  
5.0 
4* 
.014 
18.2 
72.8 
33 
3.42•†‡ 
3.7 
4*† 
.105 
28.2 
58.2 
110 
3.71♦♦♦ 
9.5 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
17.4 
65.5 
261 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q13 Companies that retain 
earnings are more risky than 
companies that pay dividends on 
regular basis. The reason is that 
dividends give the opportunity to 
investors to diversify.  
 
       
3.98 
7.6 
4 
.001 
4.9 
75.6 
41 
3.97 
7.9 
4 
0 
10.6 
78.2 
64 
3.67 
4.7 
4 
.080 
21.2 
66.6 
33 
3.68 
6.8 
4 
.028 
11.8 
60.9 
110 
3.81♦♦♦ 
13.5 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
11.3 
68.7 
261 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q14 The total return on a stock 
comprises of the dividends paid 
during the period of retention plus 
the capital increment. In case the 
market is down, the dividend 
return will be higher than the 
capital increments, thus you will 
prefer purchasing high dividend 
paying stocks than others. 
 
Window Dressing 
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UAE Qatar Saudi  Kuwait All investors Statistics Questions 
3.93 
5.2 
4 
.002 
13.3 
73.3 
45 
3.90 
6.8 
4 
.001 
13.2 
70.6 
68 
3.97 
5.1 
4 
.001 
16.7 
77.8 
37 
3.72 
6.8 
4 
.001 
20.7 
66.4 
116 
3.84♦♦♦ 
3.21 
4
♦♦♦
 
0 
16.3 
70.4 
273 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q15 Companies that pay high 
dividends are financial more stable 
than others which pays no or little 
dividends. 
       
3.86 
5.7 
4* 
.002 
11.6 
74.4 
43 
4.11 
8.8 
4* 
0 
11.9 
80.6 
67 
3.86 
4.7 
4* 
.041 
17.1 
68.6 
25 
3.70 
6.3 
4* 
.001 
19.8 
65.5 
116 
3.85♦♦♦ 
3.21 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
16.4 
71.4 
269 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q16 You prefer to purchase stocks 
that pays high dividends because 
you believe that these stocks have 
real operating income compared to 
those stocks that window dress 
their financials. 
 
     
      Behavioural Finance  
 
2.15 
-3.2 
1 
.003 
64.7 
23.5 
34 
2.53 
-2.3 
2 
.004 
51 
28.5 
49 
2.47 
-2.1 
3 
.005 
46.7 
23.3 
30 
2.36 
-4.2 
2 
0 
55.3 
24.7 
85 
2.38 
-6.1 
2 
0 
54.7 
25.1 
203 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q17 How much of your annual 
dividends do you use for 
consumption purposes? 
 
(1 = 0 – 20 %, 2 = 20 – 40 %, 3 = 
40 – 60 %, 4 = 60 -80 %, 5 = 80 – 
100 %, 6 = No opinions, don‘t 
know) 
       
3.40 
2.2 
4 
542 
23.3 
52.2 
43 
3.37 
2.3 
3 
.791 
22.8 
47.4 
57 
3.52 
2.5 
4 
.487 
30.3 
57.5 
33 
3.07 
.7 
3 
.092 
35.3 
41.2 
102 
3.29♦♦♦ 
3.8 
3 
.653 
28.5 
48.3 
242 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q18 You would, for consumption 
purposes, sell part of your stocks in 
a company that has always paid a 
dividend, if the management of 
that company decides not to pay a 
dividend anymore. 
 
      
Free Cash Flow (FCF) 
 
3.54 
2.9 
4 
.644 
19 
54.8 
42 
3.74 
4.3 
4 
.02 
21.3 
65.6 
61 
3.73 
3.3 
4 
.163 
21.2 
63.7 
33 
3.61 
5.6 
4 
.026 
16.7 
51.1 
108 
3.7♦♦♦ 
8.8 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
18.3 
62.3 
252 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q19 In economic downturns, fewer 
good investment opportunities are 
available. Therefore, you would 
invest more in dividend-paying 
stocks. 
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3.98 
6.2 
4 
.01 
9.1 
70.4 
44 
3.86 
6.4 
4 
.013 
13.8 
66.2 
65 
4.17 
7 
4 
.001 
6.7 
80 
30 
3.64 
5.8 
4 
.028 
19.1 
60.6 
110 
3.82♦♦♦ 
12 
4
♦♦♦
 
0 
14.4 
66.2 
257 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q20 You prefer to receive 
dividends because you believe that 
the profits could otherwise be used 
by the management in unfeasible 
investments or unjustified 
expenses. 
 
 
       
      Monitoring Cost 
 
2.96 
-.2 
3 
.072 
46.7 
35.6 
45 
3.36 
2.1 
4 
.382 
29.7 
56.3 
64 
3.19 
.8 
3 
1 
35.5 
48.4 
31 
2.96 
-.39 
3 
.006 
45.9 
36.9 
114 
3.08 
1 
3♦♦ 
.03 
40.8 
43.1 
262 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q21 You prefer to receive 
dividends despite your knowledge 
that the company would need these 
funds to support its future plans 
and current expenses. 
     
      Information Signalling 
 
4.09• 
10.4 
4* 
0 
2.2 
84.5 
45 
4.05• 
9.2 
4* 
0 
7.6 
80.3 
66 
3.92•‡ 
5.2 
4* 
.011 
11.1 
72.2 
36 
3.67•†‡ 
7.2 
4*† 
.012 
14.7 
61.2 
116 
3.87♦♦♦ 
14.6 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
10.7 
71.9 
271 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q22 A dividend increase is a 
signal that the company‘s future 
earnings are improved. 
 
 
       
3.38 
2.4 
3 
1 
26.7 
48.9 
45 
3.13 
.9 
3 
.06 
34.4 
37.5 
64 
3.27 
1.4 
4 
1 
30.3 
51.5 
33 
2.94 
-.6 
3 
0 
45.6 
32.5 
114 
3.11 
1.5 
3♦♦ 
.01 
37.5 
39.4 
264 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q23 A dividend decrease is a 
signal that the company‘s future 
earnings are deteriorating. 
 
 
       
     Share Repurchasing 
 
3.49 
2.6 
4 
.233 
24.4 
60 
45 
3.55 
3.6 
4 
.015 
2.8 
66.2 
62 
3.5 
2.1 
4 
.215 
28.1 
62.5 
32 
3.33 
2.9 
4 
.255 
9.9 
55.8 
111 
3.44♦♦♦ 
5.9 
4♦♦ 
.01 
25.2 
60.4 
258 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q24 Suppose a company would 
stop paying dividends and instead 
use the money to buy back its own 
stocks on the market. 
 
(1 = Extremely Negative, 2= 
Negative, 3= Neutral, 4= Positive, 
5= Strongly Positive, 6= No 
opinions, don‘t know) 
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3.83• 
4.9 
4* 
1 
14.6 
75.6 
41 
3.78• 
5.8 
4* 
.001 
13.1 
72.1 
61 
3.89•‡ 
5.8 
4* 
.017 
4 
8.6 
35 
3.41•†‡ 
3.8 
4*
†
 
.497 
23.6 
53.7 
106 
3.67♦♦♦ 
9.8 
4
♦♦♦
 
0 
16.8 
65.6 
250 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q25 Stock repurchase is a signal 
that the stock is undervalued. 
 
 
       
     Stock Dividends 
 
3.23 
1.1 
4 
.542 
34.9 
55.8 
43 
3.46 
2.7 
4 
.136 
32.4 
60 
65 
3.74 
3.5 
4 
.311 
22.9 
60 
35 
3.41 
3.7 
4 
.263 
27.6 
55.6 
115 
3.42♦♦♦ 
5.4 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
29.7 
55.8 
266 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q27 If you own a stock of a 
company that did not distribute 
cash dividends this year, then you 
would prefer that it distributes 
stock dividends instead. 
 
 
       
     The Lintner Model 
 
4.05 
9.1 
4* 
0 
4.9 
85.4 
41 
4.09 
9 
4* 
0 
10.9 
84.4 
64 
3.82 
6 
4* 
.024 
5.9 
70.5 
34 
3.91 
12.9 
4* 
0 
6.9 
80.2 
116 
3.98♦♦♦ 
19.5 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
7.2 
81.3 
263 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q28 You assess the quality of the 
dividend by comparing it to the 
dividend paid last year. 
 
 
       
     Competitive Dividends 
3.86 
5.4 
4 
.001 
14.3 
76.2 
42 
3.92 
7.4 
4 
0 
11.1 
74.6 
63 
3.85 
5.6 
4 
.009 
5.9 
73.5 
34 
3.84 
9.4 
4 
0 
12.4 
78.1 
113 
3.88♦♦♦ 
14.9 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
11.2 
76.2 
260 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q29 You assess the quality of the 
current dividend by comparing it to 
the dividends paid by other stocks 
of similar characteristics. 
 
 
       
     Substitution Effect 
 
3.93 
5.5 
4 
.002 
11.6 
74.4 
43 
4.14 
8.8 
4 
0 
9.2 
80 
65 
4.26 
6.1 
5 
0 
11.4 
85.7 
35 
4.26 
15.5 
4 
0 
7 
91.3 
114 
4.15♦♦♦ 
18.3 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
9.4 
84.2 
265 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q31 You diversify your risks by 
investing in a portfolio of stocks 
instead of a single stock. 
 
 
       
     Clientele Effect 
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3.83 
4.7 
4* 
.02 
14.3 
69 
42 
3.92 
6.9 
4* 
0 
12.9 
72.6 
62 
4.35 
8.3 
5* 
0 
5.9 
88.3 
34 
3.92 
9.4 
4* 
0 
11.9 
73.4 
109 
3.95♦♦♦ 
14.4 
4
♦♦♦
 
0 
12.2 
74.5 
255 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q32 In your investment portfolio, 
you allocate your investments 
based on your investment 
objectives and risk/return 
preferences. 
 
 
       
4.23 
12.5 
4 
0 
11.6 
34.5 
43 
4.29 
13.6 
4 
0 
3.1 
77.7 
65 
4.09 
6.5 
4 
.001 
11.4 
80 
35 
4.09 
15.4 
4 
0 
2.7 
82 
111 
4.16♦♦♦ 
24.4 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
3.4 
84 
262 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q33 If you own shares in a 
company that matches your 
financial objective but it suddenly 
changed its dividend policy or its 
objectives, you would try to sell 
your shares and repurchase another 
stock that meets your requirements. 
       
     Islamic Banking  
 
3.79• 
4.6 
4* 
.08 
9.1 
66.6 
33 
3.72• 
5.9 
4* 
.076 
7.4 
62.9 
54 
3.53•†‡ 
1.6 
4*† 
.57 
26.9 
57.7 
28 
4.06•‡ 
12.6 
4* 
0 
4 
82 
100 
1253♦♦♦ 
13.3 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
8.2 
71.5 
221 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q10 The reason that you invest in 
mutual funds, real estate, or fixed 
deposits is that it pays more stable 
income compared to stocks. 
 
(1 = Strongly Disagree, 2= 
Disagree, 3= Neutral, 4= Agree, 5= 
Strongly Agree, 6= No opinions, 
don‘t know)  
       
.89 
8.4 
1 
0 
46 
.79 
6 
1 
0 
69 
.84 
5.5 
1 
0 
37 
.91 
15.8 
1 
0 
116 
.868♦♦♦ 
17.8 
1♦♦♦ 
0 
287 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
N 
Q34 Do you have accounts in 
Islamic banks? 
 
( 1 = Yes, 0 = No) 
       
3.22 
1.1 
4 
.868 
36.1 
52.8 
36 
3.47 
2.8 
4 
.262 
23.5 
58.8 
51 
3.6 
2.3 
4 
.585 
23.3 
56.6 
30 
3.35 
2.8 
4 
.439 
33.6 
54.2 
107 
3.39♦♦♦ 
4.8 
4 
.101 
29.7 
55.6 
232 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q36The risk associated with 
saving accounts in Islamic banks is 
close to the risks associated with 
saving account in conventional 
banks. 
 
 
       
3.84• 
6.9 
4* 
0 
7.9 
79 
38 
4.3• 
14.2 
4* 
0 
0 
90 
50 
3.74•†‡ 
3.8 
4*† 
.248 
14.8 
62.9 
27 
4.02•‡ 
13.2 
4* 
0 
6.5 
82.4 
108 
4.03♦♦♦ 
19.5 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
6.1 
81.4 
231 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q37 You assess the quality of the 
profits distributed on saving and 
investment accounts by comparing 
it to last year‘s distributions. 
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3.71• 
5.2 
4* 
.005 
13.2 
84.3 
42 
4.08• 
8.1 
4* 
0 
9.8 
84.3 
51 
3.38•†‡ 
2 
3*
†
 
.557 
19.2 
42.3 
26 
3.64•‡ 
6.7 
4* 
.021 
11.9 
61.4 
109 
3.74♦♦♦ 
11.5 
4
♦♦♦
 
0 
12.1 
66.4 
232 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q38 You assess the quality of the 
profits distributed on saving and 
investment accounts by comparing 
it to the profits offered by other 
banks. 
       
4.14 
9.9 
4 
0 
4.8 
88.1 
42 
4.46 
17.9 
5 
0 
0 
93.2 
59 
4.19 
8.4 
4 
0 
3.2 
83.9 
31 
4.21 
18.3 
4 
0 
2.7 
89.3 
112 
4.26♦♦♦ 
28.2 
4♦♦♦ 
0 
2.4 
89.3 
252 
Mean 
t-test 
Median 
Binomial P 
% (<3) 
%(>3) 
N 
Q39 Consistent profit distributions 
on deposits indicate that the bank 
is financially and operationally 
stable. 
 
 
 
One diamond (♦) denotes mean (median) response is significantly different from 3 at the 0.10 level, ♦♦ at 
the 0.05 level, and ♦♦♦ at the 0.01 level based on the Student‘s t-value (binomial p). • denote that there is a 
significant difference at .05 level between the means according to F-test, * denote the existence of a 
significant difference at .05 level between the medians according to Kruskal_Wallis test. † denote 
significant difference from 3 at the .05 level of significance. ‡ denote that the pair is significantly different 
at the .05 level of significance according to Scheffé test.  
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APPENDIX 1.E: ROTATED COMPONENT MATRIX 
Islamic 
Banking 
Substitution 
Effect 
Share 
Repurchasing 
Valuation 
Effect 
Agency 
Cost 
 
Dividend 
Relevance 
 
 
 
       
     0.66 Q11  
     0.68 Q12  
     0.47 Q20  
     0.61 Q21  
     0.51 Q27. 
    0.61  Q13 
    0.67  Q14 
    0.71  Q15 
    0.82  Q16  
    0.52  Q19 
    0.70  Q20 
    0.51  Q21 
   0.64   Q22  
   0.64   Q23  
   0.57   Q28  
   0.49   Q29 
  0.72    Q22 
  0.78    Q23  
 0.85     Q31 
 0.82     Q32  
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Islamic 
Banking 
Substitution 
Effect 
Share 
Repurchasing 
Valuation 
Effect 
Agency 
Cost 
 
Dividend 
Relevance 
 
 
 
 0.50     Q33 
0.53      Q10 
0.64      Q36 
0.85      Q37  
0.83      Q38  
0.71      Q39  
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Rotation converged in 10 iterations. 
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APPENDIX 1.F: FACTOR ANALYSIS 
Component 
Initial Eigen values Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 6.427 26.778 26.778 6.427 26.778 26.778 2.952 12.302 12.302 
2 2.474 10.310 37.088 2.474 10.310 37.088 2.811 11.714 24.016 
3 1.808 7.532 44.620 1.808 7.532 44.620 2.357 9.819 33.834 
4 1.452 6.049 50.669 1.452 6.049 50.669 2.202 9.175 43.010 
5 1.176 4.900 55.569 1.176 4.900 55.569 2.191 9.128 52.138 
6 1.062 4.425 59.994 1.062 4.425 59.994 1.885 7.856 59.994 
7 .948 3.952 63.946             
8 .892 3.715 67.661             
9 .794 3.306 70.967             
10 .751 3.130 74.098             
11 .701 2.923 77.021             
12 .670 2.790 79.811             
13 .608 2.534 82.345             
14 .550 2.294 84.638             
15 .504 2.101 86.739             
16 .482 2.009 88.748             
17 .467 1.945 90.693             
18 .434 1.810 92.503             
19 .408 1.699 94.202             
20 .364 1.519 95.721             
21 .307 1.278 96.999             
22 .293 1.222 98.220             
23 .238 .992 99.212             
24 .189 .788 100.000             
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APPENDIX 1.G: CRONBACH’S ALPHA FOR QUESTIONS 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Total 
Correlation  
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted  
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha  
 
    
 0.72 
 
Dividend Relevance 
 
0.67 
 
0.509 
 
16.325 
 
11.17 
 
 Q11  
 0.69 
 
0.44 
 
15.08 
 
10.09 
 
 Q12  
 0.65 
 
0.53 
 
14.37 
 
10.64 
 
 Q20  
 0.66 
 
0.51 
 
14.65 
 
10.01 
 
 Q21  
0.69 
 
0.43 
 
15.47 
 
10.38 
 
 Q27  
 
    0.77 Agency Cost 
      
0.75 0.45 
 
30.27 
 
15.07 
 
 Q13  
0.73 
 
0.52 
 
30.29 
 
15.13 
 
 Q14  
0.73 
 
0.54 
 
31.279 
 
15.41 
 
 Q15  
0.70 
 
0.68 
 
28.959 
 
15.35 
 
 Q16  
0.77 
 
0.36 
 
31.22 
 
14.94 
 
 Q19  
0.72 
 
0.57 
 
29.07 
 
15.17 
 
 Q20  
0.77 
 
0.36 
 
32.04 
 
14.53 
 
 Q21  
 
    0.71 Valuation Effect 
      
0.67 
 
0.45 
 
8.25 
 
7.53 
 
 Q22  
0.65 
 
0.50 
 
7.24 
 
6.72 
 
 Q23  
0.58 
 
0.60 
 
7.18 
 
7.53 
 
 Q28  
0.68 
 
0.45 
 
7.40 
 
7.39 
 
 Q29  
      
    0.61 Share Repurchasing 
      
n/a 
 
0.44 
 
2.18 
 
2.66 
 
 Q22  
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Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Total 
Correlation  
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted  
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha  
 
n/a
 
 
0.44 
 
2.05 
 
2.76 
 
 Q23  
      
    0.75 Substitution Effect 
      
0.64 
 
0.60 
 
5.08 
 
4.37 
 
 Q31  
0.52 
 
0.69 
 
4.02 
 
4.03 
 
 Q32  
0.78 
 
0.47 
 
6.10 
 
4.33 
 
 Q33  
    0.78 Islamic Banking 
      
0.79 
 
0.39 
 
24.95 
 
10.63 
 
 Q10  
 0.77 
 
0.45 
 
24.54 
 
10.39 
 
 Q36  
 0.68 
 
0.72 
 
21.22 
 
10.90 
 
 Q37  
 0.69 
 
0.67 
 
21.95 
 
10.67 
 
 Q38  
 
0.73 
 
0.58 
 
25.21 
 
11.42 
 
 Q39  
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APPENDIX 1.H: NORMALITY TESTS 
 
Tests of Normality
.274 133 .000 .836 133 .000
.251 133 .000 .782 133 .000
.166 133 .000 .902 133 .000
.255 133 .000 .842 133 .000
.283 133 .000 .855 133 .000
.275 133 .000 .838 133 .000
.287 133 .000 .829 133 .000
.218 133 .000 .903 133 .000
.256 133 .000 .857 133 .000
.248 133 .000 .862 133 .000
.219 133 .000 .889 133 .000
.299 133 .000 .845 133 .000
.223 133 .000 .874 133 .000
.307 133 .000 .839 133 .000
.280 133 .000 .858 133 .000
.215 133 .000 .889 133 .000
.320 133 .000 .797 133 .000
.304 133 .000 .813 133 .000
.277 133 .000 .740 133 .000
.266 133 .000 .819 133 .000
.264 133 .000 .790 133 .000
.535 133 .000 .306 133 .000
.276 133 .000 .869 133 .000
.294 133 .000 .801 133 .000
.264 133 .000 .863 133 .000
.256 133 .000 .764 133 .000
Q10
Q11
Q12
Q13
Q14
Q15
Q16
Q18
Q19
Q20
Q21
Q22
Q23
Q24
Q25
Q27
Q28
Q29
Q31
Q32
Q33
Q34
Q36
Q37
Q38
Q39
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
Shapiro-Wilk
Lilliefors Significance Correctiona. 
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 حىزيع لسيبسبث المسخثمريه قبىل مدي قيبس
 الأرببح
 
 اسخبيبن
  
 703
 
 /اٌراس٠خ
  ،،، الاعرث١اْػض٠ضٞ اٌّشاسن فٟ 
 ذؼاٌٝ،تارْ الله  عرٕصة،ٚ اٌرٟ  الاعرث١اْأٚخٗ ٌىُ وً اٌرس١ح ٚ اٌرمذ٠ش ػٍٝ ٚلرىُ ٚ ِؼٍِٛاذىُ اٌم١ّح اٌرٟ عرذٌْٛ تٙا فٟ ٘زا 
ٌمذ لّٕا تاخر١اسوُ ٌٍّشاسوح فٟ ٘زا 2 فٟ دٚي ِدٍظ اٌرؼاْٚ اٌخٍ١دٟ اٌّاٌ١ح الإعلاِ١حفٟ خذِح اٌثسث اٌؼٍّٟ ٌرطٛ٠ش اٌصٕاػح 
ِصذسا سئ١غ١ا ٌثسثٕا اٌؼٍّٟ ٚ اٌس١ادٞ  الاعرث١اْز١ث عرىْٛ ِادج ٘زا 2 تٕاء ػٍٝ خثشذىُ فٟ عٛق الأٚساق اٌّاٌ١ح الاعرث١اْ
 2 ٚ ٚدائغ اٌثٕٛن الإعلاِ١حِذٜ ذمثً اٌّغاّ٘١ٓ ٌرٛص٠ؼاخ أستاذ الأعُٙ  اٌّرخصض فٟ ِؼشفح
ٚ عٛف ٔمَٛ تؼشض ٔرائح ٘زا اٌثسث 2 ٔرؼٙذ تسفع آسائىُ ٚ اٌرٟ عرغرخذَ ٌغشض اٌثسث فمط اٌّؼٍِٛاخ،ٚ ٌّشاػاج عش٠ح 
ذ ػٕٚرٌه (  ) تإٌ١اتح ػٕىُ ٌّإعغح (  ) ٚ ٔٛد ئفادذىُ تأٔٗ عٛف ٠رُ اٌرثشع تٍّغ 2 ِٕٙا ٚرٌه ٌرؼّ١ُ اٌفائذج الأرٙاءػٍ١ىُ فٛس 
 2 اعرث١اْ ذغٍ١ُ
 
  ،،، الاِرٕاٌْٚىُ ِٕا خض٠ً اٌشىش ٚ 
 
  / أخٛوُ  
 7 ٘اذف
 7 اٌىرشٟٚٔ تش٠ذ
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 : معبومبث المشبرك
 )غشض اٌثسثٚ ٌٓ ٔغرخذَ ِؼٍِٛاذه ئلا فٟ ) الإعُ أٚ اٌؼٕٛاْ(٠شخٝ اٌؼٍُ تإٔٔا ٌٓ ٔمَٛ تأخز ِؼٍِٛاذه اٌشخص١ح (
 بلد الإقبمت .1
 اٌىٛ٠د 
 اٌغؼٛد٠ح 
 اٌثسش٠ٓ 
 لطش 
 ِاساخ الإ 
 ػّاْ 
 غ١ش٘ا 
 
 الجىس .2
 روش 
 أٔث  ٝ
 
 الفئت العمريت .3
 عٕح 1. –53 
 عٕح 61 –2. 
 عٕح 22 –41 
 عٕح 22فٛق  
 
 المسخىي الخعليمي .4
 ألً ِٓ اٌثأٛ٠ح اٌؼاِح 
 ثأٛ٠ح ػاِح 
 دتٍَٛ 
 خاِؼح 
 دورٛساٖ/ ِاخغر١ش  
 
 الدخل الشهري .5
 دٚلاس أِش٠ىٟ 444,.ألً ِٓ  
 دٚلاس أِش٠ىٟ 444,2 – 444,.ت١ٓ  
 دٚلاس أِش٠ىٟ 444,43 – 444,2ت١ٓ  
 دٚلاس أِش٠ىٟ 444,4. – 444,43ت١ٓ  
 دٚلاس أِش٠ىٟ 444,4.فٛق  
 
 مب هى مسخىي الخبرة لديك في سىق الأوراق المبليت؟ .6
 شٙٛس 3ألً ِٓ  
 شٙشا .3 – 3ِٓ 
 عٕٛاخ 1 – 3ِٓ 
 عٕٛاخ 1فٛق  
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 في أي مه الأسىاق المبليت الخبليت حعبملج أو مبزلج حخعبمل؟  .7
 ىٛ٠رٟ اٌغٛق اٌ 
 اٌغٛق اٌغؼٛدٞ 
 اٌغٛق الإِاساذٟ 
 اٌغٛق اٌمطشٞ 
 اٌغٛق اٌثسش٠ٕٟ 
 اٌغٛق اٌؼّأٟ 
 اٌغٛق الأِش٠ىٟ 
 أعٛاق أخشٜ 
 
 مب هى أسلىبك في الإسخثمبر؟ .8
 )ألً ِٓ شٙش(ِعاستح لص١شج الأخً  
 )ح أشٙشِٓ شٙش ئٌٝ عر(ئعرثّاس ِرٛعط الأخً  
 )ح أشٙشفٛق عر(ئعرثّاس طٛ٠ً الأخً  
 
 حك الأخري بجبوب الأسهم؟مب هي اسخثمبرا .9
 اٌصٕاد٠ك الإعرثّاس٠ح 
 اٌؼماس 
 اٌٛدائغ اٌثٕى١ح 
  7 اٌشخاء اٌرؼٍ١ك ػٍٝ اٌدًّ اٌراٌ١ح ٚفما ٢سائه ٚ لٕاػاذه
اٌغثة ِٓ ِغاّ٘ره فٟ ٚزذاخ اٌصٕاد٠ك الاعرثّاس٠ح أٚ اٌؼماس أٚ اٌٛدائغ اٌثٕى١ح ٟ٘ أٔٙا ذؼطٟ أستازا عٕٛ٠ح  243
  2تأرظاَ ِماسٔح تالأعُٙ
 
فك أٚا □
 ذّاِا 
أػاسض  □ أػاسض □ ِسا٠ذ □ أٚافك □
 تشذج
لا / لا ذؼٍ١ك  □
 أػٍُ
 
 2 ذفعً اٌسصٛي ػٍٝ ذٛص٠ؼاخ أستاذ ِٓ الأعُٙ اٌرٟ ذرٍّىٙا 233
 
أٚافك  □
 ذّاِا 
أػاسض  □ أػاسض □ ِسا٠ذ □ أٚافك □
 تشذج
لا / لا ذؼٍ١ك  □
 أػٍُ
 
 2ذىٍفح ػّٛلاخ اٌٛعاطح لذ ذدؼٍه ذفعً اٌسصٛي ػٍٝ الأستاذ تشىً ٔمذٞ 2.3
 
أٚافك  □
  ذّاِا
أػاسض  □ أػاسض □ ِسا٠ذ □ أٚافك □
 تشذج
لا / لا ذؼٍ١ك  □
 أػٍُ
 
أوثش ِخاطشج ِٓ ٔظ١شاذٙا اٌرٟ اػرادخ ػٍٝ ذٛص٠غ ِؼظُ ذؼرثش اٌششواخ اٌرٟ اػرادخ ػٍٝ الازرفاظ تأستازٙا  213
 2 تذ٠ٍحٌلاعرثّاس فٟ فشص اعرثّاس٠ح  ِدالاز١ث أْ ذٛص٠ؼاخ الأستاذ لذ ذؼطٟ اٌّغاُ٘ 2 أستازٙا ػٍٝ اٌّغاّ٘١ٓ
 
ٚافك أ □
 ذّاِا 
أػاسض  □ أػاسض □ ِسا٠ذ □ أٚافك □
 تشذج
لا / لا ذؼٍ١ك  □
 أػٍُ
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2 ئخّاٌٟ اٌؼائذ ػٍٝ اٌغُٙ ٘ٛ ػثاسج ػٓ اٌرٛص٠ؼاخ خلاي فرشج الإزرفاظ تاٌغُٙ ئظافح ئٌٝ ػائذ اسذفاع عؼش اٌغُٙ 213
ػٍٝ ششاء الأعُٙ فٟ زاي ٔضٚي اٌغٛق ، فاْ ػائذ اٌرٛص٠ؼاخ ع١ىْٛ أػٍٝ ِٓ ػائذ اسذفاع اٌغؼش ، ٚتاٌراٌٟ ئلثاٌه 
 2 راخ اٌرٛص٠ؼاخ اٌؼاٌ١ح ع١ىْٛ أوثش ِٓ غ١ش٘ا
 
 أٚافك □
 ذّاِا 
أػاسض  □ أػاسض □ ِسا٠ذ □ أٚافك □
 تشذج
لا / لا ذؼٍ١ك  □
 أػٍُ
 
اٌششواخ راخ اٌرٛص٠ؼاخ اٌؼاٌ١ح ذؼرثش أوثش اعرمشاسا ٚ ِلاءج ِٓ اٌششواخ اٌرٟ لاذٛصع أستازا تراذا أٚ ذٛصع أستازا  223
 2 لٍ١ٍح
 
أٚافك  □
 ذّاِا 
أػاسض  □ أػاسض □ ِسا٠ذ □ ٚافكأ □
 تشذج
لا / لا ذؼٍ١ك  □
 أػٍُ
 
ذمَٛ تششاء الأعُٙ راخ اٌرٛص٠ؼاخ اٌؼاٌ١ح لأٔه ذؼرمذ أٔٙا راخ أستازا زم١م١ح ٚ ذشغ١ٍ١ح ٚ أٔٙا ٌ١غد والأعُٙ راخ  233
 2 الأستاذ اٌصٛس٠ح أٚ اٌغ١ش ِسممح
 
أٚافك  □
 ذّاِا 
أػاسض  □ أػاسض □ ِسا٠ذ □ أٚافك □
 تشذج
لا / لا ذؼٍ١ك  □
 أػٍُ
 
ِٓ ذٛص٠ؼاخ ) ِثً اٌغىٓ ٚ اٌغزاء ٚ اٌّلاتظ ٚ اٌغ١اساخ ٚ اٌّمرٕ١اخ(ٟ٘ إٌغثح اٌرمذ٠ش٠ح ٌّصشٚفاذه اٌشخص١ح  ِا 243
 الأستاذ اٌرٟ ذغرٍّٙا؟ 
 
 % 45ئٌٝ  42ِٓ  % 42ئٌٝ  4.ِٓ  % 4.ئٌٝ  43ِٓ % 01ئٌٝ  4ِٓ 
 لا أػٍُ/ لا ذؼٍ١ك  %  443ئٌٝ  45ِٓ  
 
 
ص١ح ، ذمَٛ تث١غ خضء ِٓ أعّٙه فٟ ششوح راخ ذٛص٠ؼاخ ػاٌ١ح لأْ ئداسذٙا ػٕذ ازر١اخه ٌغذ ِصشٚفاذه اٌشخ 253
  2ِغرمثلا لشسخ اٌرٛلف ػٓ ذٛص٠غ أٞ أستاذ
 
أٚافك  □
 ذّاِا 
أػاسض  □ أػاسض □ ِسا٠ذ □ أٚافك □
 تشذج
لا / لا ذؼٍ١ك  □
 أػٍُ
 
ُ راخ اٌرٛص٠ؼاخ فٟ زاٌح اٌشوٛد الإلرصادٞ ٚ ذعاؤي فشص الإعرثّاساخ اٌد١ذج ، ذمَٛ تاعرثّاس أِٛاٌه تالأعٙ 263
  2 اٌؼاٌ١ح
 
أٚافك  □
 ذّاِا 
أػاسض  □ أػاسض □ ِسا٠ذ □ أٚافك □
 تشذج
لا / لا ذؼٍ١ك  □
 أػٍُ
 
ذفعً اٌسصٛي ػٍٝ ذٛص٠ؼاخ أستاذ ِٓ اٌششواخ اٌرٟ ذغاُ٘ تٙا خٛفا ِٓ اعرغلاي الإداسج ٌٙزٖ الأستاذ فٟ  24.
  2 اٌّشاس٠غ اٌغ١ش ِدذ٠ح أٚ اٌّصاس٠ف اٌغ١ش ِثشسج
 
  □
أٚافك  □
 ذّاِا 
أػاسض  □ أػاسض □ ِسا٠ذ □ أٚافك □
 تشذج
لا / لا ذؼٍ١ك  □
 أػٍُ
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ذفعً اٌسصٛي ػٍٝ ذٛص٠ؼاخ أستاذ سغُ ِؼشفره تأْ اٌششوح لذ ذسراج ٌٙزٖ الأستاذ ٌرّٛ٠ً ِصاس٠فٙا ٚ ِشاس٠ؼٙا   23.
 2  اٌّغرمثٍ١ح ، ٚ أٔٙا لذ ذعطش ٌض٠ادج سأط ِاٌٙا أٚ الإلرشاض ٌغذ اٌؼدض إٌاذح ِٓ اٌرٛص٠ؼاخ
 
أٚافك  □
 ذّاِا 
أػاسض  □ أػاسض □ ِسا٠ذ □ أٚافك □
 تشذج
لا / لا ذؼٍ١ك  □
 أػٍُ
 
 2 ٠ؼرثش ِإششا ػٍٝ ذسغٓ أستاذ اٌششوح اٌّغرمثٍ١ح ػٓ اٌّؼرادص٠ادج ذٛص٠ؼاخ الأستاذ   2..
 
أٚافك  □
 ذّاِا 
أػاسض  □ أػاسض □ ِسا٠ذ □ أٚافك □
 تشذج
لا / لا ذؼٍ١ك  □
 أػٍُ
 
ٔخفاض أٚ ذذ٘ٛس أستاذ اٌششوح فٟ زاي لاِد ششوح ترخف١ط ذٛص٠ؼاخ أستازٙا اٌّؼرادج فاْ رٌه ٠ش١ش ئٌٝ ا 21.
 2 اٌّغرمثٍ١ح
 
أٚافك  □
 ذّاِا 
أػاسض  □ أػاسض □ ِسا٠ذ □ أٚافك □
 تشذج
لا / لا ذؼٍ١ك  □
 أػٍُ
 
ٌٕفرشض أْ أزذ اٌششواخ لذ ذٛلفد ػٓ ذٛص٠غ أستاذ ٌّغاّ٘١ٙا ، ٚ أٔٙا ػٛظا ػٓ رٌه اعرخذِد أستازٙا اٌغٕٛ٠ح  21.
 2 ُ ، فاْ ٘زٖ اٌخطٛج ذؼذ ئ٠دات١ح ٌٍّغاّ٘١ٓفٟ ششاء أعّٙٙا ِٓ اٌغٛق ٌرسغ١ٓ اٌم١ّح اٌغٛل١ح ٌٍغٙ
 
أٚافك  □
 ذّاِا 
أػاسض  □ أػاسض □ ِسا٠ذ □ أٚافك □
 تشذج
لا / لا ذؼٍ١ك  □
 أػٍُ
 
 2 لشاس ششاء ششوح لأعّٙٙا ٠ؼرثش ِإششا تأْ عؼش اٌغُٙ فٟ اٌغٛق ألً ِٓ اٌم١ّح اٌؼادٌح ٌٗ 22.
 
أٚافك  □
 ذّاِا 
أػاسض  □ أػاسض □ ِسا٠ذ □ أٚافك □
 تشذج
لا / لا ذؼٍ١ك  □
 أػٍُ
 
 443فٟ الأعٛاق اٌؼاٌّ١ح ، ذمَٛ تؼط اٌششواخ تردضئح أعّٙٙا تذلا ِٓ ذٛص٠غ الأستاذ ، أٞ أٔٗ ئرا اِرٍه اٌّغرثّش   23.
2 عُٙ 44.، فاْ ػذد الأعُٙ اٌرٟ ٠ّرٍىٙا اٌّغرثّش تؼذ ػٍّ١ح اٌردضئح عرصثر  3ئٌٝ  .عُٙ ٚ أػٍٕد اٌششوح ذدضئح 
 7ٛي تٗ ِسٍ١ا ألشب ئًٌٝ٘ ذؼرمذ أْ ٔظاَ ذٛص٠ؼاخ أستاذ إٌّسح اٌّؼّ
 
 لا أػٍُ/ لا ذؼٍ١ك  □ ص٠ادج سأط ِاي □ اٌرٛص٠ؼاخ إٌمذ٠ح □ ذدضئح الأعُٙ  □
 
 
ئرا وأد اٌششوح اٌرٟ ذغاُ٘ تٙا ٌُ ذسمك أٞ أستاذ ٔمذ٠ح خلاي اٌغٕح ، فأه ذفعً أْ ذمَٛ اٌششوح ترٛص٠غ أعُٙ ِٕسح  24.
 2  تذلا ِٓ ػذَ ذٛص٠غ أستاذ تراذا
 
أٚافك  □
 ذّاِا 
أػاسض  □ أػاسض □ ٠ذِسا □ أٚافك □
 تشذج
لا / لا ذؼٍ١ك  □
 أػٍُ
 
 2اٌّاظ١ح اٌغٕح ترٛص٠ؼاخ ِماسٔرٙا خلاي ِٓ اٌغُٙ أستاذ ذٛص٠ؼاخ ترم١١ُ ذمَٛ  25.
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أٚافك  □
 ذّاِا 
أػاسض  □ أػاسض □ ِسا٠ذ □ أٚافك □
 تشذج
لا / لا ذؼٍ١ك  □
 أػٍُ
 
 2ٌمطاعا ٔفظ ِٓ أخشٜ ترٛص٠ؼاخ أعُٙ ِماسٔرٙا خلاي ِٓ اٌغُٙ أستاذ ذٛص٠ؼاخ ترم١١ُ ذمَٛ  26.
 
أٚافك  □
 ذّاِا 
أػاسض  □ أػاسض □ ِسا٠ذ □ أٚافك □
 تشذج
لا / لا ذؼٍ١ك  □
 أػٍُ
 
 7تالإػرثاس ذأخز فأه اٌغُٙ أستاذ ذٛص٠ؼاخ ترم١١ُ ذمَٛ ػٕذِا  241
 
 اٌغُٙ دخً ٔغثح □
 اٌرٛص٠غ ِٓ
 ) اٌغُٙ عؼش \ اٌغُٙ ذٛص٠ؼح( 
 لا أػٍُ/ لا ذؼٍ١ك  □ أسلاَ ٚ ػٛاًِ أخشٜ □ وً ِاذمذَ □ ل١ّح ذٛص٠ؼح اٌغُٙ □
 
ذمَٛ ترٛص٠غ ِخاطشن الإعرثّاس٠ح ػٓ طش٠ك ششاء أعُٙ ِرؼذدج ٚ فٟ لطاػاخ ِرٕٛػح تذلا ِٓ ذشو١ض٘ا فٟ عُٙ   231
 2ٚازذ
 
أٚافك  □
 ذّاِا 
أػاسض  □ أػاسض □ ِسا٠ذ □ أٚافك □
 تشذج
لا / لا ذؼٍ١ك  □
 أػٍُ
 
ٛص٠ؼاخ ػاٌ١ح أعُٙ راخ ذ7 ِثاي( فظره ٌىً ٔٛع ِٓ الأعُٙذؼرّذ فٟ ذٛص٠غ ِخاطشن ػٍٝ ذسذ٠ذ ٔغة ِؼ١ٕح ِٓ ِس  2.1
 ) ئٌخ222،أعُٙ ّٔٛ ، أعُٙ لص١شج اٌّذٞ ، أعُٙ ئعرثّاس٠ح ، 
 
أٚافك  □
 ذّاِا 
أػاسض  □ أػاسض □ ِسا٠ذ □ أٚافك □
 تشذج
لا / لا ذؼٍ١ك  □
 أػٍُ
 
فٟ زاي لاِد ئداسج اٌششوح اٌرٟ ذّرٍه أعّٙٙا ترغ١١ش أ٘ذافٙا أٚ ع١اعح ذٛص٠غ أستازٙا فأه عرمًٍ ِٓ ٔغثح   211
 2ي ششاء أعُٙ أخشٜ ذٍثٟ ِرطٍثاذه الإعرثّاس٠ح تشىً أفعًالإعرثّاس ف١ٙا ٚ ذساٚ
 
أٚافك  □
 ذّاِا 
أػاسض  □ أػاسض □ ِسا٠ذ □ أٚافك □
 تشذج
لا / لا ذؼٍ١ك  □
 أػٍُ
 
 ً٘ ٌذ٠ه زغاتاخ فٟ تٕٛن ئعلاِ١ح ؟  211
 
 لا □ ٔؼ ُ□
    
 ِا ٘ٛ عثة فرسه ٌسغاتاخ فٟ تٕٛن ئعلاِ١ح ؟ 221
 
 لا أػٍُ/ لا ذؼٍ١ك  □ أعثاب أخشٜ □ ٜٛ اٌخذِحِغر □ اٌؼٛائذ ػٍٝ اٌٛدائغ الإعرثّاس٠ح □ اٌٛاصع اٌذ٠ٕٟ □
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ئْ ِخاطش اٌؼٛائذ ٚ ظّاْ سأط اٌّاي اٌّصازثح ٌسغاتاخ اٌٛد٠ؼح الإعرثّاس٠ح فٟ اٌثٕٛن الإعلاِ١ح لش٠ثح ِٓ ذٍه   231
 2اٌّٛخٛدج فٟ اٌثٕٛن اٌرمٍ١ذ٠ح
 
أٚافك  □
 ذّاِا 
أػاسض  □ أػاسض □ ِسا٠ذ □ أٚافك □
 تشذج
لا / لا ذؼٍ١ك  □
 أػٍُ
 
 2 لأستاذ اٌّٛصػح ػٍٝ اٌٛدائغ ػٓ طش٠ك ِماسٔرٙا ترٛص٠ؼاخ اٌغٕح اٌّاظ١حذمَٛ ترم١١ُ ا  241
 
أٚافك  □
 ذّاِا 
أػاسض  □ أػاسض □ ِسا٠ذ □ أٚافك □
 تشذج
لا / لا ذؼٍ١ك  □
 أػٍُ
 
 2ذمَٛ ترم١١ُ الأستاذ اٌّٛصػح ػٍٝ اٌٛدائغ ػٓ طش٠ك ِماسٔرٙا ترٛص٠ؼاخ اٌثٕٛن الأخشٜ  251
 
أٚافك  □
 ذّاِا 
أػاسض  □ أػاسض □ ِسا٠ذ □ أٚافك □
 جتشذ
لا / لا ذؼٍ١ك  □
 أػٍُ
 
 2 اٌرشغ١ٍ١ح ٚ اٌّاٌ١ح إٌاز١ح ِٓ اٌثٕه اعرمشاس ػٍٝ ِإششا ٠ؼذ اٌٛدائغ ػٍٝ اٌّٛصػح الأستاذ ّٔٛ ٚ ئعرمشاس  261
 
أٚافك  □
 ذّاِا 
أػاسض  □ أػاسض □ ِسا٠ذ □ أٚافك □
 تشذج
لا / لا ذؼٍ١ك  □
 أػٍُ
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APPENDIX 2.A – INTERVIEW FORM 
(SN:             )  
 
 
The Determinants of Payout Policy of Islamic Banks in the GCC 
 
 
Interview Questionnaire 
 
SN:  
Date:  
Place:  
Time Started:  
Time Ended:  
Participant Name/Title:   
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Date: 
To:  
 
Subject: An Interview on the Payout Policy of Islamic Banks 
Dear Participant,  
 
We would like to extend our gratitude for your participation in this research. This questionnaire is designed to determine the factors that affect the 
dividend and payout policy in the Islamic financial institutions. Due to your experience in such matters within the industry and the Islamic finance 
industry in particular, you have been selected to give us your views on the subject.  
Results of the survey will only be used in aggregate and for the sole purpose of academic research. All participants‘ identit ies will be kept strictly 
confidential. Please be assured that only research members will be able to view your responses. To ensure utmost privacy, no personal data is 
collected during the process. You will be assigned an identification number that is kept with the administrator of the questionnaire for further 
clarifications.  
This research is valuable for your organization, the industry, and the overall Islamic finance body of knowledge. The research findings will be 
mailed to you upon completion. We are thankful for your cooperation and assistance.  
Sincerely,  
Name: 
Tel:  
Email:  
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SECTION 1: Please answer the following questions: 
 
1- Describe in detail how Islamic banks decide on profit distributions for both the depositors (profits on saving and investment accounts) and 
shareholders (cash and stock dividends)? 
 
2- What are the main factors that affect the payout policy (profits on saving and investment accounts, cash, and stock dividends)? 
 
3- How does the central bank regulate the payout policy of Islamic banks? 
 
4-Does the central bank intervention in payout decisions restrict the ability of higher management to form their own payout policy in any way? 
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PART 2: By checking (X) in the corresponding column, please indicate the extent to which you agree with  the following statements  
 Strongly 
Agree 
5 
Agree 
4 
Neither 
Agree 
Nor 
Disagree 
3 
Disagree 
2 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
      
1. Dividend payout decisions affect the price of the common stock.       
2. Profit distribution decisions on saving and investment accounts affect the future 
demand on these accounts.  
     
3. The investors‘ preference is to generally have dividends increase along with the bank 
profits even if good reinvestment opportunities are open to the bank.  
     
4. A cut in dividends would probably have unfavourable effect on the firm‘s share price.      
5. A cut in the profits distributed to saving and investment accounts would have 
unfavourable effects on the demand on this type of accounts.  
     
6. Islamic Banks try to avoid reducing dividends or profits on saving and investment 
accounts.  
     
7. Dividend would only be cut if profits fell sharply and continued at depressed levels.      
8. Dividends would only be raised above current levels when a trend of increasing profits 
has been clearly established. 
     
9. Islamic banks have a target dividend payout ratio. They should periodically adjust 
payouts towards this target. 
     
10. Islamic banks have a targeted profit payout ratio on deposits. They should periodically 
adjust payouts towards this target. 
     
11. Islamic banks are reluctant to make payout changes that might be reversed in future. 
 
     
12. Islamic banks consider the payouts paid last year in the calculation of payouts for this 
year.  
     
13.  A change in dividend payout is more important than the actual amount of dividends.        
14. Stable payouts as opposed to fluctuating payouts create considerably more confidence 
in the minds of investors and depositors about the bank‘s profitability. 
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 Strongly 
Agree 
5 
Agree 
4 
Neither 
Agree 
Nor 
Disagree 
3 
Disagree 
2 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
      
15. Payout decisions for dividends are often made after the investment plans are 
determined. 
     
16. Payout decisions for profits on deposits are often made after the investment plans are 
determined. 
     
17. Rather than reducing dividends, Islamic banks would raise new funds to undertake 
profitable projects.  
     
18. Rather than reducing profits on investment accounts, Islamic banks would raise new 
funds to undertake profitable projects. 
     
19. If an Islamic bank expects to raise external finance in the near future, it would adopt a 
more generous payout policy to ‗sweeten‘ the market.   
     
20. A poor liquidity position means less profits on investment accounts due to shortage of 
funds. 
     
21. A poor liquidity position means less dividends due to shortage of funds.      
22. A higher rate of return on investment makes it desirable by the Islamic bank to retain 
earnings to support its expansion plans.  
     
23. A higher rate of asset expansion reduces dividends and profits on investment accounts 
due to the need to conserve funds.  
     
24. When faced with a higher cost of raising funds or when tight conditions are anticipated 
in capital markets, Islamic banks tend to have less generous dividends.  
     
25. When faced with a higher cost of raising funds or when tight conditions are anticipated 
in capital markets, Islamic banks tend to have less generous profits on investment 
accounts. 
     
26. Commitments to debt repayment or refinancing mean lower dividends.      
27. Payout decisions for dividend and profits on investment accounts convey information 
about the Islamic bank to investors and stakeholders.   
     
28. Islamic banks believe that investors regard a change in dividends or profits on      
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 Strongly 
Agree 
5 
Agree 
4 
Neither 
Agree 
Nor 
Disagree 
3 
Disagree 
2 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
      
investment accounts as a signal of a change in earning prospects.  
29. Islamic banks attract investors and depositors by paying larger distributions to convey 
good profitability prospects and security value.  
     
30. A lower level of debt in the Islamic bank allows it to pay higher dividends because the 
firm‘s financial position is more flexible.    
     
31. Islamic banks pay larger payouts to their shareholders and depositors in order to 
increase the stock price and attract more deposits. 
     
32. By consistently paying dividends and profits on investment accounts, the firm‘s stock 
price will be less risky compared to retaining earnings.  
     
33. Paying dividend and profits on investment accounts reduce cash, which pushes the 
management to make more efficient investment and consumption decisions. 
     
34. Managements of Islamic banks are sensitive to its shareholders‘ and depositors‘ 
preferences in regards to expected dividends and profits on investment accounts.  
     
35. Profits on investment accounts are decided before dividends.       
36. Banks tend to smooth the profits of investment accounts even if it affects the dividends 
for this year.  
     
37. Dividends should be viewed as a residual after financing investment opportunities 
from available earnings.  
     
38. Profits on investment accounts should be viewed as a residual after financing 
investment opportunities from available earnings. 
     
39. Islamic banks use dividend distributions as a source of competitive advantage.       
40. Islamic banks use profits on investment accounts as a tool to attain a desired credit 
rating. 
     
41. Islamic banks use dividend distributions and profits on investment accounts to show 
investors and depositors that they can bear possible transaction costs associated with 
costly borrowings or capital issue.  
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 Strongly 
Agree 
5 
Agree 
4 
Neither 
Agree 
Nor 
Disagree 
3 
Disagree 
2 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
      
42. Islamic banks pay higher payout distributions to show investors and depositors that 
they are financially strong. 
     
43. Islamic banks believe that their firm values are affected by a change in dividend 
policy. 
     
44. Islamic banks with large asset bases and high maturity levels have more generous and 
stable payout policies.  
     
45. Islamic banks use stock dividends to keep the stock price in an optimal price range.      
46. One effect of stock dividends is to ultimately increase the number of shareholders in 
the firm. 
     
47. Islamic banks use stock dividends to conserve cash.      
48. Once an Islamic bank has established a policy of issuing stock dividends, termination 
of the stock dividends will adversely affect the stock price. 
     
49. Stock dividends, together with a reduction in cash dividends, are an alternative way to 
using a rights offering to acquire additional equity capital. 
     
50. Stock dividend is used to increase yield to stockholder.      
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PART 3: By checking (X) in the corresponding column, please indicate the importance of the following elements in the dividend decisions of 
Islamic banks, please highlight any relevance of these factors to stock dividends and distributions on deposits.  
 
 Very 
Important 
 
Important 
 
Neutral Irrelevant Completely 
irrelevant 
1. Last year‘s distributions      
2. Stability of future earnings      
3. A sustainable change in earnings      
4. Net Income      
5. Preference of investors and depositors       
6. The influence of major shareholders      
7. Availability of good investment opportunities      
8. Stock price relative to fair value      
9. The distributions of competitors      
10. Asset base      
11. Availability of cash or liquid assets relative to desired cash holdings      
12. Payout Ratio       
13. Flotation costs of  raising fund through equity or deposits      
14. Required rate of return by investors and depositors      
15. Expansion plans and decisions      
16. Level of debt      
17. Debt repayment obligations      
18. Dividend yield      
19. Discount Rate      
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Do you know anyone in your organization who is knowledgeable in this field? If yes, please mention the name(s) and contacts 
below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do you have any comments on the interview and questionnaire?  
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APPENDIX 2.B – LETTER TO INTERVIEWEE 
Date: 
Dear Mr. (Name), 
I would like to thank you for your time and attention during our telephone conversation (date). As 
you know, the Islamic financial industry is its infancy and would therefore require development 
in terms of products and services and research efforts. We at Durham University have established 
many programs in Islamic finance to serve this purpose. Our current research activity involves a 
visit to (country) to interview financial officers in the Islamic banks to collect data for our 
research that measures the determinants of payout policy in Islamic banks. The research depends 
on feedback through questionnaires and survey from financial managers, investors, regulators, 
and through econometrics modelling. 
   
We have selected you to participate in this study based on your academic and practical experience 
in Islamic banking as financial managers. Your feedback is precious and essential to the success 
of this research. We kindly request a meeting with you during our visit on (date) at (time) in your 
office or as you suggest as per your schedule and convenience. We appreciate if you send us the 
address and contacts as well. 
   
Please note that the information and identities of all participants in the research is kept 
confidential and will only be used for the purpose of research. No insider information (i.e. current 
financial earnings) or other confidential information of your institution will be asked during the 
interview. Upon completion of the research, you will receive a copy of the findings that could 
help you understand the market practices in relation to the payout policy of Islamic banks. We 
ask god to compensate you for the efforts that you exert on daily basis to develop the Islamic 
banking industry.  
   
Sincerely,  
 
 
Name: 
Telephone: 
Email: 
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APPENDIX 2.C – INTERVIEW QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
 
Int.1 Int. 2 Int. 3 Int. 4 Int. 5 Int.6 Int. 7 Int. 8 Int. 9 Mean Theories and Related Questions 
  
           
Q1 Dividend payout decisions affect the price 
of the common stock. 
4 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 5 4.44 
           
Q2 Profit distribution decisions on saving and 
investment accounts affect the future demand 
on these accounts.  
5 5 5 3 5 5 4 5 5 4.67 
 
Q3 The investors‘ preference is to generally 
have dividends increase along with the bank 
profits even if good reinvestment opportunities 
are open to the bank. 
4 5 5 4 4 4 2 2 2 3.56 
 
Q4 A cut in dividends would probably have 
unfavourable effect on the firm‘s share price. 
3 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 5 4.11 
           
Q5 A cut in the profits distributed to saving 
and investment accounts would have 
unfavourable effects on the demand on this 
type of accounts.  
5 4 5 2 5 5 4 5 5 4.44 
           
Q6 Islamic Banks try to avoid reducing 
dividends or profits on saving and investment 
accounts. 
5 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 4.33 
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Q7 Dividend would only be cut if profits fell 
sharply and continued at depressed levels. 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
           
Q8 Dividends would only be raised above 
current levels when a trend of increasing 
profits has been clearly established. 
4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 
           
Q9 Islamic banks have a target dividend 
payout ratio. They should periodically adjust 
payouts towards this target. 
5 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 5 4.44 
 
Q10 Islamic banks have a targeted profit 
payout ratio on deposits. They should 
periodically adjust payouts towards this target. 
3 3 3 2 3 3 2 1 1 2.33 
 
Q11 Islamic banks are reluctant to make 
payout changes that might be reversed in 
future. 
4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4.11 
 
Q12 Islamic banks consider the payouts paid 
last year in the calculation of payouts for this 
year. 
4 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 4.33 
 
Q13 A change in dividend payout is more 
important than the actual amount of dividends. 
3 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 4.11 
 
Q14 Stable payouts as opposed to fluctuating 
payouts create considerably more confidence 
in the minds of investors and depositors about 
the bank‘s profitability. 
5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 4 4.67 
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Q15 Payout decisions for dividends are often 
made after the investment plans are 
determined. 
5 4 3 4 5 4 4 4 3 4 
 
Q16 Payout decisions for profits on deposits 
are often made after the investment plans are 
determined. 
2 2 2 2 2 3 2 1 2 2 
 
Q17 Rather than reducing dividends, Islamic 
banks would raise new funds to undertake 
profitable projects. 
2 4 2 2 2 3 4 1 4 2.67 
 
Q18 Rather than reducing profits on 
investment accounts, Islamic banks would 
raise new funds to undertake profitable 
projects. 
2 4 2 4 1 2 3 1 4 2.56 
 
Q19 If an Islamic bank expects to raise 
external finance in the near future, it would 
adopt a more generous payout policy to 
‗sweeten‘ the market. 
2 2  2 2 2 4 2 2 2.25 
 
Q20 A poor liquidity position means fewer 
profits on investment accounts due to shortage 
of funds. 
4 5 2 4 2 4 4 2 1 3.11 
 
Q21 A poor liquidity position means less 
dividends due to shortage of funds. 
4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4.11 
 
Q22 A higher rate of return on investment 
makes it desirable by the Islamic bank to retain 
earnings to support its expansion plans. 
4 4 5 4 4 4 4 3 2 3.78 
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Q23 A higher rate of asset expansion reduces 
dividends and profits on investment accounts 
due to the need to conserve funds. 
4 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 4.22 
 
Q24 When faced with a higher cost of raising 
funds or when tight conditions are anticipated 
in capital markets, Islamic banks tend to have 
less generous dividends. 
4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 4.22 
 
Q25 When faced with a higher cost of raising 
funds or when tight conditions are anticipated 
in capital markets, Islamic banks tend to have 
less generous profits on investment accounts. 
1 4 4 2 1 2 5 2 2 2.56 
 
Q26 Commitments for debt repayment or 
refinancing means lower dividends. 
5 4 4 2 4 4 4 5 4 4 
 
Q27 Payout decisions for dividend and profits 
on investment accounts convey information 
about the Islamic bank to investors and 
stakeholders.   
4 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 5 4.38 
 
Q28 Islamic banks believe that investors 
regard a change in dividends or profits on 
investment accounts as a signal of a change in 
earning prospects.  
4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4.22 
 
Q29 Islamic banks attract investors and 
depositors by paying larger distributions to 
convey good profitability prospects and 
security value.  
4 5 2 2 4 4 4 4 3 3.56 
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Q30 A lower level of debt in the Islamic bank 
allows it to pay higher dividends because the 
firm‘s financial position is more flexible. 
5 4 4 3 5 4 4 4 4 4.11 
 
Q31 Islamic banks pay larger payouts to their 
shareholders and depositors in order to 
increase the stock price and attract more 
deposits. 
4 4 2 2 4 3 4 4 3 3.33 
 
Q32 By consistently paying dividends and 
profits on investment accounts, the firm‘s 
stock price will be less risky compared to 
retaining earnings. 
4 4 4 2 4 5 3 3 5 3.78 
 
Q33 Paying dividend and profits on 
investment accounts reduce cash, which 
pushes the management to make more efficient 
investment and consumption decisions. 
3 4 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 3.33 
 
Q34 Managements of Islamic banks are 
sensitive to its shareholders‘ and depositors‘ 
preferences in regards to expected dividends 
and profits on investment accounts.  
4 4 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 4 
 
Q35 Profits on investment accounts are 
decided before dividends.  
5 5 2 5 5 4 5 5 5 4.56 
           
Q36 Banks tend to smooth the profits of 
investment accounts even if it affects the 
dividends for this year.  
2 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4.00 
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Q37 Dividends should be viewed as a residual 
after financing investment opportunities from 
available earnings.  
4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4.11 
           
Q38 Profits on investment accounts should be 
viewed as a residual after financing investment 
opportunities from available earnings. 
2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1.67 
 
Q39 Islamic banks use dividend distributions 
as a source of competitive advantage.  
3 5 4 3 4 4 4 4 5 4 
 
Q40 Islamic banks use profits on investment 
accounts as a tool to attain a desired credit 
rating. 
5 4 2 2 2 5 5 4 4 3.67 
 
Q41 Islamic banks use dividend distributions 
and profits on investment accounts to show 
investors and depositors that they can bear 
possible transaction costs associated with 
costly borrowings or capital issue.  
4 4 2 3 2 3 4 4 4 3.33 
 
Q42 Islamic banks pay higher payout 
distributions to show investors and depositors 
that they are financially strong. 
4 5 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3.11 
 
Q43 Islamic banks believe that their firm 
values are affected by a change in dividend 
policy. 
4 4 2 4 4 4 4 2 5 3.67 
 
Q44 Islamic banks with large asset bases and 
high maturity levels have more generous and 
stable payout policies.  
5 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 5 4.44 
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Q45 Islamic banks use stock dividends to keep 
the stock price in an optimal price range. 
4 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 4 2.56 
 
Q46 One effect of stock dividends is to 
ultimately increase the number of shareholders 
in the firm. 
3 5 2 2 2 3 2 2 1 2.44 
 
Q47 Islamic banks use stock dividends to 
conserve cash. 
4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4.11 
 
Q48 Once an Islamic bank has established a 
policy of issuing stock dividends, termination 
of the stock dividends will adversely affect the 
stock price. 
4 4 2 2 2 4 4 4 5 3.44 
 
Q49 Stock dividends, together with a 
reduction in cash dividends, are an alternative 
way to using a rights offering to acquire 
additional equity capital. 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
 
Q50 Stock dividend is used to increase yield to 
stockholder. 
 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4.11 
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Factor 
 
 
 
 
 
Int. 1 Int. 2 Int. 3 Int. 4 Int. 5 Int. 6 Int. 7 Int. 8 Int.9 Mean 
   
           
Q1 Last year‘s distributions 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4.22 
  
Q2 Stability of future earnings 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3.89 
  
Q3 A sustainable change in earnings  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
  
Q4 Net Income  5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 4.78 
  
Q5 Preference of investors and depositors  4 4 3 4 5 4 4 4 4 4.00 
  
Q6 The influence of major shareholders 5 5 1 5 4 4 5 2 3 3.78 
  
Q7 Availability of good investment opportunities  5 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 3.78 
  
Q8 Stock price relative to fair value  3 4 4 4  4 4 3 4 3.75 
  
Q9 The distributions of competitors  5 5 4 5 4 4 4 3 4 4.13 
  
Q10 Asset base 2 4 5 3 4 4 4 2 5 3.67 
  
Q11 Availability of cash or liquid assets relative to desired cash 
holdings  
4 4 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 4.33 
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Q12 Payout Ratio  4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 5 4 
  
Q13 Flotation costs of  raising fund through equity or deposits  5 3 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4.11 
  
Q14 Required rate of return by investors and depositors  4 4 4 2 4 5 4 3 4 3.78 
  
Q15 Expansion plans and decisions  5 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4.22 
  
Q16 Level of debt 4 5 2 4 4 4 4 5 5 4.11 
  
Q17 Debt repayment obligations 4 5 2 2 4 4 4 5 4 3.78 
  
Q18 Dividend yield  5 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 4.33 
  
Q19 Discount Rate  4 5 2 5 4 4 5 1 5 3.88 
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APPENDIX 2.D– LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
Interviewee Code Designation Date/Time Location 
Interviewee 1 Deputy CFO 05/03/2010 
8.:20pm – 9:25pm 
Coffee Shop 
Interviewee 2 Head of Shari‘ah 
Supervision 
20/04/2010 
11:30am – 1:00pm 
Interviewee‘s Office 
Interviewee 3 CFO 21/04/2010 
2:38pm –  
3:40pm 
Interviewee‘s Office 
Interviewee 4 CFO and Deputy CFO 25/04/2010 
2:10pm – 3:10pm 
Interviewee‘s Office 
Interviewee 5 Head of Shari‘ah 
Compliance 
26/04/2010 
2:00pm – 3:00pm 
Interviewee‘s Office 
Interviewee 6 Head of Research and 
Development 
27/04/2010 
8:40am – 10:15am 
Interviewee‘s Office 
Interviewee 7 CFO 08/07/2010 
10:30am – 11:35am 
Interviewee‘s Office 
Interviewee 8 CFO 09/07/2010 
12:40am – 13:50am 
Interviewee‘s Office 
Interviewee 9 Deputy CFO 04/11/2010 
9:30am – 10:32am 
Interviewee‘s Office 
Interviewee 10 Head of Product 
Development 
14/12/2010 
11:00am – 12:00pm 
Coffee Shop 
 
